Loading ITAT cases…
583 orders · Page 6 of 12
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the genuine and bonafide reasons provided by the assessee. On merits, the Tribunal followed its previous decision in the assessee's own case and deleted the additions made on account of dividend and interest from tax-free bonds.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was bad in law as the Assessing Officer failed to dispose of the objections raised by the assessee before passing the order. Therefore, the additions made on a protective basis were not sustainable.
The Tribunal found that the Commissioner's deletion of the addition was not supported by any documents, as the assessee remained unrepresented and failed to substantiate its claims. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was bad in law as the Assessing Officer failed to dispose of the objections raised by the assessee before passing the order. Therefore, the additions made on a protective basis were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from its investment in a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal followed the decisions of various High Courts and coordinate benches, distinguishing the case from Totgar's judgment.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was bad in law as the Assessing Officer failed to dispose of the objections raised by the assessee before passing the order. Therefore, the additions made on a protective basis were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was bad in law as the Assessing Officer failed to dispose of the objections raised by the assessee before passing the order. Therefore, the additions made on a protective basis were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings under Section 153A were bad in law as the Assessing Officer failed to comply with the procedure laid down in Rule 112F and CBDT Circular No. 10 of 2012. The cash was seized during the election period, and no certificate was issued by the Investigation Officer as required.
The Tribunal held that the payment received by the assessee was not on account of termination or modification of any contract relating to business. The settlement was to avoid legal consequences arising from a suit filed to injunct BK Parties from business activities detrimental to the assessee. Therefore, the payment was for not exercising the right to sue and is a capital receipt, not taxable under the specified sections.
The Tribunal held that Section 56(2)(viib) is an anti-abuse provision to prevent the introduction of unaccounted money. However, in this case, considering the conversion of an existing loan into share capital and the bonafide business reasons presented by the assessee, including the need to obtain bank finance and maintain shareholding structure, the provision was not applicable. The Tribunal also emphasized lifting the corporate veil for harmonious interpretation.
The Tribunal held that 'similar computation' in Section 70(2) refers to the computation mechanism under Sections 45 to 55 of the Act, not the tax rates. Therefore, short-term capital losses can be set off against short-term capital gains even if they arise from transactions with different tax treatments.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity cannot be sustained. Section 170(2) of the Act mandates that assessment in case of amalgamation must be made on the successor. The fact that the assessee had duly intimated the merger prior to assessment proceedings makes the case distinguishable from precedents relied upon by the revenue.
Regarding Ground No. 1 concerning the Rs. 1 crore commission receipt, the Tribunal noted the assessee's application under Rule 29 to adduce additional evidence, including a CA certificate classifying the income as consultancy charges. The revenue objected to this. The Tribunal did not decide this issue as the judgment was pronounced on the second ground. Regarding Ground No. 2 concerning the Rs. 3,47,410/- stamp duty penalty, the Tribunal found that the assessee had submitted documents to the lower authorities, including the tax audit report and details of work in progress, which were not properly considered. The Tribunal clarified that the payment of penalty in addition to stamp duty was an enhanced stamp duty due to delay, as per the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. It held that this enhanced stamp duty, when transferred to Work in Progress and not debited to P&L, does not tantamount to a penalty for violating a statutory provision, and thus, the assessee should not be denied the benefit of deduction. The addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was deemed not legally sustainable. Accordingly, Ground No. 2 was allowed in favour of the assessee, and the AO was directed to delete the addition. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided detailed submissions and analysis demonstrating the rendition of central services and the commensurate benefits derived by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's CUP analysis, using four comparables, indicated a mean margin of 2.75% for AYs 2015-16 and 5.75% for AYs 2016-17, while the payment was 0.50% and 0.75% respectively. For the year under consideration (AY 2020-21), the assessee's benchmarking analysis was similar to earlier years for which co-ordinate benches had deleted the transfer pricing adjustment. The Tribunal found that the TPO determined the ALP as Nil on conjectures without following any prescribed method, which is contrary to Section 92C of the Act and the decisions of the Bombay High Court. The Tribunal relied on its own decisions in the assessee's own case for earlier AYs (2012-13, 2013-14, 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, and 2018-19) where identical transfer pricing adjustments were deleted due to factual parity. Therefore, the ad-hoc transfer pricing adjustment of Rs. 6,97,76,862/- was deleted. Grounds 1 to 5 were allowed. Grounds 6 and 7 (interest under Section 234C and penalty under Section 270A) were dismissed as consequential and infructuous. Ground 8 (limitation) was kept open as the appeal was allowed on merits.
The Tribunal held that while the delay was substantial, the assessee's belief that one form was common for both 12AB and 80G registration was a bonafide error. The Tribunal distinguished the Wipro Ltd. case as it related to Chapter III exemptions, not Chapter VI-A deductions like Section 80G.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were valid. Regarding the validity of the notice under Section 148 and assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147, the Tribunal noted that the notice was served by affixture and electronically, and the assessee had participated in the proceedings. The reasons recorded were supplied, objections were considered and dismissed by a speaking order, and the reassessment was based on new information from external sources. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order dismissing these grounds. Similarly, the notice under Section 143(2) was considered legal and valid. Concerning the addition for bogus purchases, the Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the purchases, and payments were made through banking channels. However, it held that since the sales turnover was not disputed by the Revenue, the addition should be made only on the profit element embedded in the non-genuine purchases. The Tribunal noted that the suppliers were listed as hawala dealers by the Maharashtra Sales Tax Department, and their confessions proved they issued bogus bills without supplying material. The assessee was a beneficiary of these accommodation entries. Relying on decisions like Kachwala Gems v. JCIT and PCIT vs. Pinaki D. Panani, the Tribunal held that the entire purchase price cannot be disallowed. The addition was restricted to the profit element. The Tribunal observed that the assessee's average gross profit rate was 5.2% (average of AY 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10). Therefore, the addition was restricted to 5.2% of the bogus purchases of Rs. 1,18,84,565 as additional taxable income.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes. It noted that the issue of TDS on discount to distributors was decided in favor of the assessee by the Supreme Court. For ARC, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO to decide in light of the Delhi High Court's decision and examine the depreciation claim.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) and dismissed the revenue's appeals. The Tribunal found that the scheme of amalgamation was approved by the NCLT with an appointed date of 01/04/2019 and effective date of 08/07/2019. Consequently, the erstwhile entities ceased to exist in the eyes of law from 08/07/2019. The fact of amalgamation was duly intimated to the revenue authorities through various communications. The Tribunal held that once this fact was brought to the AO's notice, the assessment order ought to have been passed in the name of the amalgamated entity, as required by Section 170(2) of the Act. An assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity cannot be sustained. The Tribunal distinguished the case of PCIT v. Mahagun Realtors Pvt. Ltd. by noting that in that case, no intimation of amalgamation was given to the AO, and the return was filed suppressing this fact. In contrast, here, the amalgamation was intimated. The Tribunal also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PCIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., which held that an assessment order passed in the name of a non-existing company is a substantive illegality, not a procedural violation curable under Section 292B. The ratio of Maruti Suzuki and Mahagun Realtors was discussed and supported the view taken by the CIT(A), as per the Bombay High Court decision in Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. PL Roongta. Therefore, the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities relied heavily on a generalized investigation report without considering the assessee's evidence as a small, genuine trader. The addition was deleted as the AO failed to prove the assessee's involvement in price manipulation or establish a money trail.
The Tribunal upheld the Ld.CIT(A)'s decision to quash the assessment orders, finding no infirmity in their view. It affirmed that since the assessee had duly intimated the amalgamation to the revenue, assessments against a non-existent entity constituted a substantive illegality, not merely a procedural defect curable under Section 292B. The Tribunal distinguished the PCIT v. Mahagun Realtors Pvt. Ltd. precedent and relied on PCIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and the Bombay High Court's decision in Reliance Industries Ltd.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A). The assessee was directed to file modified grounds of appeal and a detailed note narrating the applicable facts, and the CIT(A) was instructed to adjudicate the grounds afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the learned CIT(A) and dismissed the revenue's appeals. The Tribunal found that the amalgamation of M/s Trapti Trading & Investment Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Turquoise Investment & Finance Pvt Ltd into Birla Group Holdings Private Limited was approved by the NCLT with an appointed date of 01/04/2019 and effective date of 08/07/2019. Consequently, the erstwhile entities ceased to exist in the eyes of law from 08/07/2019. The assessee had duly intimated this fact to the revenue authorities through multiple communications, including filing the NCLT order. The Tribunal noted that once this fact was brought on record, the Assessing Officer was bound to pass the order in the name of the amalgamated entity, which was not done. Therefore, the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existing entity could not be sustained. The Tribunal distinguished the case of PCIT v. Mahagun Realtors Pvt. Ltd. by noting that in that case, no intimation of amalgamation was given to the AO, and the return was filed suppressing the fact of amalgamation. In contrast, here, the amalgamation was duly intimated. The Tribunal also relied on the ratio laid down in PCIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and the Bombay High Court's decision in Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. PL Roongta, which supported the CIT(A)'s view. The Tribunal concluded that the defect of passing an assessment order in the name of a non-existing company is a substantive illegality, not a procedural violation curable under Section 292B.
The Tribunal held that a disallowance based on a DSIR report received after the original assessment cannot be made through rectification proceedings under Section 154, as it is not a mistake apparent on record. It further ruled that the differential expenditure, even if not eligible for weighted deduction under Section 35(2AB), is otherwise allowable as a business expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred in adding the profit from one broker when the assessee had overall losses from other transactions. The Tribunal also noted that the revised computation of income was not rejected by the lower authorities.
The Tribunal held that the reliance on older case laws was not applicable due to changes in the law. While CPC did not provide an opportunity for all issues, the CIT(A) did, and the principle of natural justice could be supplied later. The appeals were remitted back to the AO for verification and potential allowance.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus under Section 68 by providing all necessary documentary evidence, which the revenue failed to disprove. The AO's addition, based on a retracted statement and without independent verification or cross-examination opportunity, was deemed unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the AO followed a plausible view by adhering to the ITAT's order in the appellant's own case. The PCIT's revision order was found to be incorrect as it did not satisfy the twin conditions of 'erroneous' and 'prejudicial to the interest of the revenue'.
The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's contention that the authorities erred in not reducing the corresponding cost of sales for sales to other SEZ units and in the allocation of common expenses and software/sundry expenses. The AO was directed to verify figures and allow the additional exemption.
The Tribunal held that the transaction of surrendering tenancy rights for a new flat constitutes a capital asset transfer, liable for capital gains tax under Section 45. It further ruled that Section 56(2)(x) is not applicable as the income falls under the head 'Capital Gains'. The Tribunal also allowed the claim for deduction under Section 54F.
The Tribunal noted that the complete denial of TDS credit would cause undue hardship as the income was already offered to tax. However, it also agreed with the revenue that TDS credit is generally given in the year the income is offered to tax as per Section 199 r.w.r. 37BA.
The Tribunal observed that the AO denied the alternative claim without factually examining the nexus between the interest expenses and the income from house property or other sources. Therefore, the case was remitted back to the AO to re-examine the claim on merits, establish the necessary nexus, and allow the deduction as per law after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in a writ petition, had already quashed the notice issued to initiate proceedings against the assessee to declare it as an assessee-in-default under Section 201 of the Act. Consequently, the TDS liability along with interest under Section 201(1A) determined by the AO could not survive. Since the assessee's appeal against the CIT(A)'s order had already been restored to the file of the Assessing Officer, the Tribunal felt it appropriate to restore the issue in dispute in the present appeal also to the file of the Assessing Officer. The AO is to decide the issue in view of the directions of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the writ petition. The ground of appeal of the Revenue is accordingly allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction is to restore the issue to the AO.
The Tribunal noted that the core issue was the taxability of capital gains on the sale of rights entitlement (RE) under the India-Saudi Arabia DTAA. The assessee contended that RE is a separate security, distinct from shares, and taxable only in Saudi Arabia under Article 13(6). Conversely, the Assessing Officer (AO) and the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) held that RE is intrinsically linked to shares, a specific type of financial instrument, and should be treated as shares under Article 13(4) of the DTAA, making the gains taxable in India. The DRP reasoned that RE is a temporary credit of shares, offers rights to buy new shares at a discount, is given in proportion to current shareholding, and is a security like a bonus. They concluded that RE and shares are of the same class, linked on origin and conversion, and that 'shares' in Article 13(4) and 13(5) can be interpreted broadly to include comparable interests. Therefore, the transfer of RE would not fall under Article 13(6). The judgment does not provide the Tribunal's final decision on this or other issues, as the provided text is incomplete.
The Tribunal held that 'stake money' paid to horse owners is not liable for TDS under either Section 194B or Section 194BB of the Income Tax Act. It also ruled that if the recipients have already paid taxes on the income and filed their returns, the assessee cannot be treated as an "assessee in default" as per Section 201(1) and the Supreme Court's decision in Hindustan Coca Cola.
The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer (AO) did not provide a clear basis for disallowing the regular loss or for adding the commission income. The AO's order lacked specific evidence linking the appellant to the alleged manipulations.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found at the assessee's premises during the search, the additions made under section 153A were beyond the AO's jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found that the jewellery addition was satisfactorily explained.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found at the assessee's premises during the search, the additions made under section 153A were beyond the AO's jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found that the jewellery addition was satisfactorily explained.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found at the assessee's premises during the search, the additions made under section 153A were beyond the AO's jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found that the jewellery addition was satisfactorily explained.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found at the assessee's premises during the search, the additions made under section 153A were beyond the AO's jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found that the jewellery addition was satisfactorily explained.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found at the assessee's premises during the search, the additions made under section 153A were beyond the AO's jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found that the jewellery addition was satisfactorily explained.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found at the assessee's premises during the search, the additions made under section 153A were beyond the AO's jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found that the jewellery addition was satisfactorily explained.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found at the assessee's premises during the search, the additions made under section 153A were beyond the AO's jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found that the jewellery addition was satisfactorily explained.
The Tribunal held that it is a cardinal principle to provide an opportunity to explain the reasons for delay before dismissing an appeal. Relying on Bombay High Court's decision, it was held that the appeal cannot be dismissed solely on delay without discussing merits. The matter was remitted back to the Additional CIT(A) for a fresh decision on delay and merits after giving an opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271G is discretionary and requires considering the facts and circumstances, including the existence of a reasonable cause for failure. Since the assessee ultimately provided the information and the TPO considered it, and there was a reasonable cause (resignation of CFO), the penalty was not justified.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's application under DTVSV was pending. The revenue did not object to the appeal being treated as withdrawn, with liberty to revive if the DTVSV application did not materialize.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed in the name of the non-existent erstwhile entity cannot be sustained. It was noted that the fact of amalgamation was duly intimated to the revenue authorities, and the NCLT order sanctioning the scheme was filed. The Tribunal found that once this fact was brought on record, the Assessing Officer (AO) was bound to pass the order in the name of the amalgamated entity, which was failed to be done. The Tribunal relied on Section 170(2) of the Act, which mandates that in case of amalgamation, the assessment must be made on the successor (amalgamated company) and not on the predecessor (amalgamating company). The Tribunal distinguished the decision in PCIT v. Mahagun Realtors Private Limited, stating it was not applicable because in that case, no intimation of amalgamation was given to the AO, and the return was filed suppressing the fact of amalgamation. The Tribunal further held that the reliance on Section 292B by the revenue was misplaced, as an assessment order passed in the name of a non-existing company is a substantive illegality, not a procedural violation curable under Section 292B, as held in PCIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. The Tribunal upheld the view taken by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A). It was not disputed that the assessee had duly intimated the fact of amalgamation of the erstwhile entities with Birla Group Holdings Pvt. Ltd. to the revenue authorities, along with the NCLT order. The Tribunal noted that once this fact was brought on record, the Assessing Officer (AO) was bound to pass the order in the name of the amalgamated entity, which was failed to be done. Therefore, the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existing entity could not be sustained. The Tribunal clarified that Section 170(2) of the Act mandates that in case of amalgamation, the assessment must be made on the successor (amalgamated company) and not on the predecessor (amalgamating company). The Tribunal distinguished the case of PCIT v. Mahagun Realtors Pvt. Ltd. by noting that in that case, no intimation of amalgamation was given to the AO, and the return was filed suppressing this fact. In contrast, here, the amalgamation was duly intimated. The Tribunal also referred to the Bombay High Court's decision in Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. PL Roongta, which supported the view taken by the CIT(A) by discussing the ratio laid down in Maruti Suzuki and Mahagun Realtors. Consequently, the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that in preceding years, similar disallowances were restricted based on a percentage of cash expenses. Following these precedents, the Tribunal restricted the disallowance to 2% of 20% of cash expenses.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond the surviving period as per the Supreme Court's ruling in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings and order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the requirement to file Form 67 within the due date is directory and not mandatory, and thus the appellant is entitled to claim FTC.