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645 orders · Page 2 of 13
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid as it was issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the amended provisions of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the assessment order passed pursuant to this notice was quashed.
The Tribunal held that since the allotment and part-payment for the three flats occurred prior to the insertion of Clause 'f' of Section 80IB(10), and these flats were allotted to different family members, there was no concealment or inaccurate particulars of income. Therefore, penalty could not be levied.
The Tribunal held that while there should be a transfer pricing adjustment on outstanding receivables, the TPO's method was flawed. The matter was remitted to the AO/TPO for fresh adjudication, considering working capital adjustments and applying a specified interest rate if receivables fall outside WCA.
The Tribunal held that while there should be a transfer pricing adjustment on outstanding receivables, the TPO's method was flawed. The matter was remitted to the AO/TPO for fresh adjudication, considering working capital adjustments and applying a specified interest rate if receivables fall outside WCA.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied retrospectively and that the AO failed to record proper satisfaction as required by Section 14A(2) before invoking Rule 8D. Therefore, the disallowance made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal held that no disallowance under Section 14A is required if no exempt income is earned, citing the Hon'ble Delhi High Court's decision on the prospective nature of the Finance Act, 2022 amendment. Regarding finance cost, it was held that since the assessee had sufficient own funds, the interest-free loan was presumed to be out of own funds. Finally, the addition to book profit under Section 115JB was deemed incorrect as the disallowance under Section 14A was not applicable and no exempt income was earned.
The Tribunal held that the non-recovery of a principal loan amount advanced as part of business activity should be allowed as a bad debt or business loss, distinguishing it from cases of loan waiver. The AO's reliance on the Mahindra & Mahindra judgment was found not applicable as it dealt with waiver, not non-recovery.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to obtain approval from the correct specified authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act for passing the order under Section 148A(d) and issuing the notice under Section 148. This non-compliance affected the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's claim to invoke the MFN clause was not valid. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in the Nestle SA case, it was determined that Slovenia was not an OECD member when it entered into the DTAA with India, a condition for invoking the MFN clause. Therefore, the dividend income was correctly taxed at 10%.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to consider the various details and submissions filed by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice under Section 148 of the new regime was issued beyond the surviving time limit, making it time-barred and invalid. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings and the assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that there was a mismatch in the limbs of Section 271(1)(c) of the Act concerning the initiation of penalty proceedings and the penalty order. The AO did not come to a clear finding on whether there was concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently discharged the onus to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the lenders. As the entities are independently assessed to income tax, the addition made by the AO was not justified and directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the appeals should be remitted back to the CIT(A) to pass a detailed order on merits after considering the assessee's submissions and granting a proper opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied retrospectively for assessment years prior to its introduction. Following precedents, the AO was directed to disallow 1% of the exempt income for the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal, following previous decisions of coordinate benches, held that the interest income earned from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It was noted that Section 80P(4) is not applicable as the assessee is not a cooperative bank claiming a deduction.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal on Ground No. 7, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to tax common maintenance charges as business income, citing ITAT's decision that such charges are attributable to conducting the business activity of running the Mall. The Tribunal also dismissed the revenue's appeal on Ground No. 8, confirming the deletion of disallowance of unallocable expenses, stating that head office expenses need not be allocated if incurred wholly and exclusively for business. The Tribunal also confirmed the deletion of depreciation disallowance based on the CIT(A)'s factual findings regarding the assessee's computation of income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on Ground No. 1, deleting the deemed rental income from Flat No. 901, Golden Peak, by following the rule of consistency as laid down by the Supreme Court in Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, as the property's status remained unchanged since 2006 without prior additions. The Tribunal dismissed Ground No. 2 of the assessee's appeal as it was adjudicated while deciding Grounds 4 & 5 of the revenue's appeal. The judgment does not record specific findings or decisions on Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the revenue's appeal, nor does it explicitly state if they were dismissed or allowed implicitly through the overall outcome.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's application was rejected by the CIT(E) without affording due opportunity. Citing previous decisions with similar circumstances, the Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied for assessment years prior to its introduction and directed a disallowance of 1% of exempt income for AY 2006-07. The claim for amortization of lease premium was restored to the Assessing Officer for decision in light of High Court rulings. The claim for compensation paid from Investment Compensation Reserve was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in treating the sale proceeds of old cars as unexplained cash credit. Since the sales were accepted and the vehicles' identities were established with RTO registration, the addition under Section 68 was uncalled for.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied retrospectively as it was introduced later. The AO failed to record proper satisfaction as required by Section 14A(2) before invoking Rule 8D. Therefore, the disallowance made by the AO was deleted, and the suo moto disallowance made by the assessee was directed to be adopted.
The Tribunal held that no penalty could be levied in this case because the assessee had already disclosed the capital gain in the return of income, which was accepted by the AO without any disallowance. The penalty proceedings were initiated after the assessment was completed, and no inaccurate particulars were found.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee, a cooperative housing society, from deposits made with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal relied on decisions of co-ordinate benches, specifically citing ITA No. 2024/Mum/2023 (Kona Seema Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. for AY 2015-16). The reasoning was that for Section 80P(2)(d), the conditions are that the income is by way of interest derived by the cooperative society from its investments, and such investments are with any other cooperative society. The Tribunal noted that the assessee is registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and is required to invest funds in modes including cooperative banks. It was further held that Section 80P(4) is relevant only when a cooperative bank claims deduction under Section 80P, which is not the case here. The Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs CIT, Calicut was also referenced, clarifying that Section 80P(4) excludes only cooperative banks licensed by the RBI to do banking business and that lend to the public. Therefore, the AO was directed to allow the deduction claimed by the assessee. The same decision was applied mutatis mutandis to AY 2017-18 and 2018-19.
The Tribunal partially allowed the assessee's appeal by restricting the addition to 5% of the alleged bogus purchases, following the rule of consistency with previous years. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the impugned quarrel had been decided by a Co-ordinate Bench in the assessee's own case for AY 2015-16 in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Respectfully following that decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals. The reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Sai Publication Fund, which held that publication and distribution of books containing religious preachings, when incidental or ancillary to the main charitable object of spreading a message, do not constitute 'business' unless an independent intention to carry on business is established. The onus was on the Revenue to prove that the assessee was 'carrying on business'. The Tribunal found that the dominant purpose of the assessee was to spread a message based on preachings, which was held not to be a business activity. Earning of profit per se was not the sole criterion for determining if an activity was commercial. Therefore, the assessee trust was not engaged in the business of publishing, printing, and subscription as it was not its main object. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) alone, without corroborating incriminating material found during the search of the assessee's premises, cannot be the sole basis for making additions. Additions made based on material from independent searches without a joint warrant were also deemed invalid.
The Tribunal, respectfully following the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the assessee's own case for AY 2015-16 (ITA No. 2441/Mum/2023, dated 30/01/2024), dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Co-ordinate Bench, in its decision, had held that the assessee trust was engaged in imparting education by printing books and publications related to spiritual discourses, which it claimed to be part of its charitable activity. The Tribunal noted that the primary object of the trust was to spread its message, and the publication activity was incidental to this main object, not a business activity. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Sai Publication Fund, which held that publication and distribution of books containing religious preachings, when incidental to the main charitable object and without profit motive, do not constitute business. The onus was on the Revenue to prove that the assessee was carrying on business. The Tribunal concluded that the dominant purpose was to spread the message, and the publication was not a business activity. Therefore, the appeals by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) alone, without corroborating incriminating material found during the search of the assessee's premises, cannot be the sole basis for making additions. Additions made based on material from independent searches without a joint warrant were also deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) alone, without corroborating incriminating material found during the search of the assessee's premises, cannot be the sole basis for making additions. Additions made based on material from independent searches without a joint warrant were also deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that the additions made in the hands of the assessee were deleted. The primary reasoning was that no incriminating material, much less any material directly linking to the alleged cash loans given and interest earned, was found during the search conducted at the assessee's premises. The Tribunal relied on several Supreme Court and High Court judgments, including CIT v. Harjeev Aggarwal, CIT v. Sinhgad Technical Education Society, CIT v. Abhisar Buildwell (P) Ltd., and PCIT vs. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF). These judgments clarified that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) alone, without corroborating evidence found during the search, cannot be the sole basis for making additions under Section 153A, especially for unabated assessment years. The Tribunal emphasized that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A must be confined to incriminating material found during the search. Since the additions were deleted on this ground, other grounds raised by the assessee became academic and were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal held that the approval for the order under Section 148A(d) was obtained from the incorrect authority as per the new regime under Section 151(ii). This non-compliance vitiated the reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the AO cannot invoke Rule 8D for disallowance under Section 14A without recording specific satisfaction that the assessee's suo moto disallowance was incorrect. Regarding Section 115JB, the Tribunal ruled that disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D cannot be superimposed, and only actual expenses debited to the P&L account related to exempt income should be added back.
The Tribunal held that additions under Section 153A cannot be sustained in an unabated year without incriminating material found during the search. Statements recorded under Section 132(4) alone are not sufficient for additions without corroborative evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessee had filed an application under the Vivad Se Vishwaas Scheme. Consequently, the present appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to revive it if the settlement application did not resolve the dispute.
The Tribunal held that the assessee trust was not engaged in the business of publishing, printing, and subscription as it was incidental to the main object of spreading the message of Rev Dada. Following a Co-ordinate Bench decision and the Supreme Court's ruling in the Sai Publication Fund case, the Tribunal found that the activity was not a business activity.
The Tribunal held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) alone, without corroborating incriminating material found during the search of the assessee's premises, cannot be the sole basis for making additions. Additions made based on material from independent searches without a joint warrant were also deemed invalid.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Considering the assessee's GP ratio and previous orders of coordinate benches, the Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the addition on alleged bogus purchases to 5% over and above the assessee's disclosed GP rate.
Based on the AO's positive remand report, the Ld. CIT(A) deleted the addition made under Section 68. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the Ld. CIT(A)'s order, finding no infirmity in the decision, as the AO had already accepted the genuineness of the loans in the remand proceedings. Consequently, the revenue's appeal and the assessee's cross-objection were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the first and second provisos to Section 56(2)(x) of the Act are applicable. The date of the allotment letter, along with part payment made then, should be considered as the agreement date for determining stamp duty value, not the registration date.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the TPO/AO regarding the markup on reimbursement of expenses was not warranted, following its own previous decisions. Regarding interest under Sections 234A and 234B, the AO was directed to verify and compute it considering the extended due dates due to COVID-19.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not condoning the delay, citing the principle that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities. The Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied when the issue is debatable and two views are possible. Given that the assessee's appeal on the quantum assessment was admitted by the High Court on a substantial question of law, it indicated an arguable point. Therefore, the penalty was not leviable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not be compelled to produce an approval certificate it did not possess. It was observed that the lapse appeared to be on the part of the revenue, considering the assessee's consistent follow-ups. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal held that the receipts from General Business Support Services (BSS) do not constitute income in the hands of the assessee. Relying on a co-ordinate bench decision for AY 2009-10, which found that BSS costs were allocated on a cost-to-cost basis without mark-up and were in the nature of reimbursement, the Tribunal concluded that these receipts were not taxable in India. The AO's reliance on the AAR ruling was not considered binding on the assessee. Regarding receipts for access to SUN and GSAP software (maintenance, license, and Go-Live charges), the Tribunal held that these do not qualify as Royalty under Article 13 of the India-UK DTAA. The reasoning was that the payments were for the right to use the software, not for the right to use the copyright. The Tribunal followed the Supreme Court decision in Engineering Analysis, stating that if the DTAA definition of Royalty is more beneficial, it should be applied as per Section 90(2) of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that these receipts were on a cost-to-cost basis without any income element. Consequently, the additions made by the AO were not tenable. Grounds related to interest under sections 234A, 234B, and 234C were deemed consequential. The issues of TDS credit and penalty under section 271(1)(c) were not explicitly decided, with some grounds left open in view of the decision on the primary issues.
The Tribunal held that the issue of taxability of FTS on an accrual basis is covered by a coordinate bench decision in Siemens AG's case, which ruled in favour of the assessee. It was also held that the assessee and Siemens Limited do not constitute an Association of Persons (AOP).
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied when the issue is debatable and two views are possible. Given that the assessee's appeal on the quantum assessment was admitted by the High Court on a substantial question of law, it indicated an arguable point. Therefore, the penalty was not leviable.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied when the issue is debatable and two views are possible. Given that the assessee's appeal on the quantum assessment was admitted by the High Court on a substantial question of law, it indicated an arguable point. Therefore, the penalty was not leviable.
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeals as withdrawn, granting liberty to the assessee to seek revival if the declarations under the VSVS Scheme are not accepted.
The Tribunal held that since the additions forming the basis of the penalty were deleted by the ITAT in the quantum appeal, the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) could not be sustained and was therefore deleted. The appeal was allowed.