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645 orders · Page 1 of 13
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid as it was issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the amended provisions of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the assessment order passed pursuant to this notice was quashed.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) must consider only investments yielding exempt income. For commission and club expenses, the Tribunal followed its own earlier decisions in favor of the assessee, finding identical facts and legal positions. The amendment to Form 3CL was held not applicable to the assessment years in dispute.
The Tribunal held that Section 68 can only be invoked if sums are credited in books maintained by the assessee. Since the assessee opted for presumptive taxation under Section 44AD and did not maintain books of account, and a bank passbook is not considered 'books of account' under Section 68, the addition was unjustified.
The Tribunal partially allowed the assessee's appeal by restricting the addition to 5% of the alleged bogus purchases, following the rule of consistency with previous years. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal decided that the addition of ₹2,00,000/- as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided documentary evidence, including bank statements and other relevant documents, to substantiate the cash credit. The Tribunal found that the lower authorities had not properly appreciated the evidence submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal reasoned that once the assessee establishes the identity of the creditor, their creditworthiness, and the genuineness of the transaction, the onus shifts to the Revenue to prove otherwise. In this case, the Tribunal was satisfied that the assessee had discharged its initial onus. Therefore, the Tribunal deleted the addition of ₹2,00,000/-. The ratio decidendi is that if an assessee provides sufficient evidence to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of a cash credit, the addition under Section 68 cannot be sustained merely on the basis of a perfunctory examination by the lower authorities. The operative direction is the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) must consider only investments yielding exempt income. For commission and club expenses, the Tribunal followed its own earlier decisions in favor of the assessee, finding identical facts and legal positions. The amendment to Form 3CL was held not applicable to the assessment years in dispute.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer to adopt the margin agreed under a Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreement (BAPA) with a UK AE for transactions with the US AE, citing judicial precedents. It also directed credit for TDS reflected in Form 26AS.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to consider the various details and submissions filed by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's claim to invoke the MFN clause was not valid. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in the Nestle SA case, it was determined that Slovenia was not an OECD member when it entered into the DTAA with India, a condition for invoking the MFN clause. Therefore, the dividend income was correctly taxed at 10%.
The Tribunal held that the revaluation of stock-in-trade by the AOP does not trigger tax liability in the hands of the assessee. It also confirmed the deletion of disallowance of brokerage expenses paid through banking channels with TDS deducted.
The Tribunal held that while there should be a transfer pricing adjustment on outstanding receivables, the TPO's method was flawed. The matter was remitted to the AO/TPO for fresh adjudication, considering working capital adjustments and applying a specified interest rate if receivables fall outside WCA.
The Tribunal held that the requirement of filing Form 10IC is directory, not mandatory. Since the form was filed before the due date for AY 2022-23 and the assessee fulfilled other conditions, the benefit of Section 115BAA was allowed.
The assessee applied to withdraw the appeals after opting for the DTVSV Scheme, 2024. The Department did not object to this request.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to specify the exact charge under Section 271(1)(c) for levying the penalty, and thus the penalty could neither be levied nor sustained. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had disclosed all particulars and explained the loan transaction.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to consider the various details and submissions filed by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that while there was a failure to respond to notices, the assessee had a reasonable cause due to the Director's severe personal hardship. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 273B of the Act, and the penalty is deleted.
The Tribunal, following previous decisions of coordinate benches, held that the interest income earned from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It was noted that Section 80P(4) is not applicable as the assessee is not a cooperative bank claiming a deduction.
The Tribunal held that the appeals should be remitted back to the CIT(A) to pass a detailed order on merits after considering the assessee's submissions and granting a proper opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to obtain approval from the correct specified authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act for passing the order under Section 148A(d) and issuing the notice under Section 148. This non-compliance affected the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had passed the order based on a mistaken fact. The Tribunal therefore remitted the appeal back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after verifying the facts and providing an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that netting of interest is permissible, and since the net taxable interest was higher, no disallowance under Section 14A was warranted. It also held that investment of borrowed funds as capital contribution in a partnership firm is a business expediency, and thus interest on such borrowed capital should be allowed.
The Tribunal held that there was a mismatch in the limbs of Section 271(1)(c) of the Act concerning the initiation of penalty proceedings and the penalty order. The AO did not come to a clear finding on whether there was concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
The Tribunal held that no penalty could be levied in this case because the assessee had already disclosed the capital gain in the return of income, which was accepted by the AO without any disallowance. The penalty proceedings were initiated after the assessment was completed, and no inaccurate particulars were found.
The Tribunal decided on two main issues. Firstly, regarding the condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)-NFAC, the Tribunal noted that the assessment order was received in January 2020, making the appeal filing deadline fall within the period when the Hon'ble Supreme Court extended all limitations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering the period of extension till May 31, 2021, the delay was approximately 160 days or less. The Tribunal, referring to the decision in Midas Polymer Compounds Pvt. Ltd. (Cochin Bench) and the principle of advancing substantial justice, found merit in condoning the delay. Secondly, concerning the addition made under Section 69A, the Tribunal observed that the assessee's name was struck off from the register of companies on 03/05/2012. Despite being informed of this fact, the AO issued a notice under Section 148 on 29/05/2019 to a non-existent company. Relying on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and its own coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2011-12, which held that framing assessment against a non-existing entity is a jurisdictional defect, the Tribunal quashed the notice under Section 148 and consequently the reassessment order. The addition thus became academic. The appeal was allowed on the legal issue raised in ground 2(d).
The Tribunal held that since the allotment and part-payment for the three flats occurred prior to the insertion of Clause 'f' of Section 80IB(10), and these flats were allotted to different family members, there was no concealment or inaccurate particulars of income. Therefore, penalty could not be levied.
The Tribunal held that while there should be a transfer pricing adjustment on outstanding receivables, the TPO's method was flawed. The matter was remitted to the AO/TPO for fresh adjudication, considering working capital adjustments and applying a specified interest rate if receivables fall outside WCA.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied retrospectively and that the AO failed to record proper satisfaction as required by Section 14A(2) before invoking Rule 8D. Therefore, the disallowance made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued under Section 148 for AY 2016-17 and 2017-18 were invalid because the approval for issuing these notices was not obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner as required by the amended Section 151 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders for these years were quashed.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to consider the various details and submissions filed by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the denial of deduction under Section 11 for the alleged violation of Section 13 was not justified. Relying on a previous decision in the assessee's own case for A.Y. 2012-2013, where a similar issue was decided in favor of the assessee, the Tribunal reversed the stand of the first appellate authority.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently discharged the onus to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the lenders. As the entities are independently assessed to income tax, the addition made by the AO was not justified and directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied retrospectively for assessment years prior to its introduction. Following precedents, the AO was directed to disallow 1% of the exempt income for the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued under Section 148 for AY 2016-17 and 2017-18 were invalid because the approval for issuing these notices was not obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner as required by the amended Section 151 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders for these years were quashed.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied for assessment years prior to its introduction and directed a disallowance of 1% of exempt income for AY 2006-07. The claim for amortization of lease premium was restored to the Assessing Officer for decision in light of High Court rulings. The claim for compensation paid from Investment Compensation Reserve was allowed.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied retrospectively as it was introduced later. The AO failed to record proper satisfaction as required by Section 14A(2) before invoking Rule 8D. Therefore, the disallowance made by the AO was deleted, and the suo moto disallowance made by the assessee was directed to be adopted.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal on Ground No. 7, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to tax common maintenance charges as business income, citing ITAT's decision that such charges are attributable to conducting the business activity of running the Mall. The Tribunal also dismissed the revenue's appeal on Ground No. 8, confirming the deletion of disallowance of unallocable expenses, stating that head office expenses need not be allocated if incurred wholly and exclusively for business. The Tribunal also confirmed the deletion of depreciation disallowance based on the CIT(A)'s factual findings regarding the assessee's computation of income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on Ground No. 1, deleting the deemed rental income from Flat No. 901, Golden Peak, by following the rule of consistency as laid down by the Supreme Court in Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, as the property's status remained unchanged since 2006 without prior additions. The Tribunal dismissed Ground No. 2 of the assessee's appeal as it was adjudicated while deciding Grounds 4 & 5 of the revenue's appeal. The judgment does not record specific findings or decisions on Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the revenue's appeal, nor does it explicitly state if they were dismissed or allowed implicitly through the overall outcome.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee, a cooperative housing society, from deposits made with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal relied on decisions of co-ordinate benches, specifically citing ITA No. 2024/Mum/2023 (Kona Seema Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. for AY 2015-16). The reasoning was that for Section 80P(2)(d), the conditions are that the income is by way of interest derived by the cooperative society from its investments, and such investments are with any other cooperative society. The Tribunal noted that the assessee is registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and is required to invest funds in modes including cooperative banks. It was further held that Section 80P(4) is relevant only when a cooperative bank claims deduction under Section 80P, which is not the case here. The Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs CIT, Calicut was also referenced, clarifying that Section 80P(4) excludes only cooperative banks licensed by the RBI to do banking business and that lend to the public. Therefore, the AO was directed to allow the deduction claimed by the assessee. The same decision was applied mutatis mutandis to AY 2017-18 and 2018-19.
The Tribunal, following previous decisions of coordinate benches, held that the interest income earned from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It was noted that Section 80P(4) is not applicable as the assessee is not a cooperative bank claiming a deduction.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied retrospectively for AY 2006-07 as it was introduced later. Following precedents, the Tribunal directed the AO to disallow 1% of exempt income, allowing the assessee's ground partly.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in treating the sale proceeds of old cars as unexplained cash credit. Since the sales were accepted and the vehicles' identities were established with RTO registration, the addition under Section 68 was uncalled for.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal and partly allowed the assessee's appeal. Regarding Ground No. 7 of the revenue's appeal, concerning common maintenance charges, the Tribunal followed the ITAT's decision that such charges, recovered for the promotion and upkeep of a Mall from both lessees and purchasers, are attributable to the business activity of running the Mall and are thus business receipts. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s finding was upheld, and the ground was dismissed. For Ground No. 8 of the revenue's appeal, concerning unallocable expenses, the Tribunal held that head office expenses pertaining to the overall business need not be allocated to various schemes as long as they are incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the disallowance was upheld. The Tribunal also confirmed the CIT(A)'s factual findings regarding depreciation, stating that no disallowance was warranted on the basis of segment reporting and the assessee had not claimed the specific disallowed amount of Rs. 43.69 lakhs. For Ground No. 1 of the assessee's appeal, concerning deemed rental income from Flat No. 901, the Tribunal, following the rule of consistency as laid down by the Supreme Court in Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, held that since the property's status remained the same since 2006 and no addition was made in prior years, the addition made by the AO was without merit and directed to be deleted. The Tribunal noted that Ground No. 2 of the assessee's appeal was adjudicated while deciding Grounds 4 & 5 of the revenue's appeal and dismissed it. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the non-recovery of a principal loan amount advanced as part of business activity should be allowed as a bad debt or business loss, distinguishing it from cases of loan waiver. The AO's reliance on the Mahindra & Mahindra judgment was found not applicable as it dealt with waiver, not non-recovery.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued under Section 148 for AY 2016-17 and 2017-18 were invalid because the approval for issuing these notices was not obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner as required by the amended Section 151 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders for these years were quashed.
The Tribunal held that no disallowance under Section 14A is required if no exempt income is earned, citing the Hon'ble Delhi High Court's decision on the prospective nature of the Finance Act, 2022 amendment. Regarding finance cost, it was held that since the assessee had sufficient own funds, the interest-free loan was presumed to be out of own funds. Finally, the addition to book profit under Section 115JB was deemed incorrect as the disallowance under Section 14A was not applicable and no exempt income was earned.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on 27/07/2022 was barred by limitation, as the period of six years from the end of the Assessment Year 2015-2016 expired on 31/03/2022. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings and the consequent assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice under Section 148 of the new regime was issued beyond the surviving time limit, making it time-barred and invalid. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings and the assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D cannot be applied for AY 2006-07 as it was not in force. For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's revised suo moto disallowance based on its consistent methodology from preceding years.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal to be withdrawn, noting that the assessee had complied with the VSV Scheme requirements and paid the dues.
The Tribunal partially allowed the assessee's appeal by restricting the addition to 5% of the alleged bogus purchases, following the rule of consistency with previous years. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority was due to sufficient cause. The first appellate authority should have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits.