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667 orders · Page 13 of 14
The ITAT, following its own previous orders in the assessee's case for other assessment years, dismissed the Revenue's appeals. It held that the addition for alleged bogus purchases should be restricted to 2.5% as the issue was squarely covered and consistent with the AO's own findings regarding sales tax savings and profit margin.
The ITAT, following its own previous orders in the assessee's case for other assessment years, dismissed the Revenue's appeals. It held that the addition for alleged bogus purchases should be restricted to 2.5% as the issue was squarely covered and consistent with the AO's own findings regarding sales tax savings and profit margin.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition. It noted that the lenders' own assessments were completed by the same AO without adverse findings regarding the source of funds or loans given to the assessee, and the assessee had provided documentary evidence like bank statements and confirmations.
The Tribunal acknowledged the Assessee's non-compliance despite numerous notices but also considered the ex-parte nature of the assessment and appellate orders. The case was remanded to the Ld. Commissioner for fresh adjudication, subject to a deposit of Rs.11,000/- by the Assessee.
The Tribunal found that no effective opportunity of hearing was granted by the CIT(A) and there was no proof of notice service. Upholding the principles of natural justice, the ITAT set aside the ex parte orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters for a fresh decision after providing the assessee an effective hearing within 60 days.
The Tribunal found that no effective opportunity of hearing was granted by the CIT(A) and there was no proof of notice service. Upholding the principles of natural justice, the ITAT set aside the ex parte orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters for a fresh decision after providing the assessee an effective hearing within 60 days.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's non-compliance before the CIT(A) was due to the former counsel's failure to appear or inform the assessee of notices, which was deemed a bona fide reason. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the case to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, granting the assessee three additional opportunities under Section 250(6).
The Tribunal found that the assessee had bonafide reasons for non-compliance before the First Appellate Authority due to the dissolution of the firm. The case was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh decision on merit.
The Tribunal held that GST, being a statutory levy collected on behalf of the government and shown separately on invoices, does not form part of the taxable income for the purpose of Section 44BB. The Tribunal relied on precedents where similar indirect taxes were excluded from presumptive income calculations.
Citing a Bombay High Court judgment, the ITAT held that the Ld. CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating on merits. Considering the assessee's explanation regarding her deceased husband, the ITAT decided to grant her another opportunity to explain the source of the cash deposits. The matter is remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, with directions to provide two more opportunities to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the assessee's explanation and affidavit. On merits, following its own coordinate benches and the principle of favoring the assessee in case of divergent judicial views, the Tribunal allowed the deduction.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the assessee's explanation and affidavit. On merits, following its own coordinate benches and the principle of favoring the assessee in case of divergent judicial views, the Tribunal allowed the deduction.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(Exemption) rejected the applications before the deadline for submitting requested details had expired. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee one more opportunity to submit the complete information.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(Exemption) rejected the applications before the deadline for submitting requested details had expired. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee one more opportunity to submit the complete information.
The Tribunal held that the advance was given in return for an advantage conferred upon M/s AGIV India Pvt. Ltd., as it facilitated the completion of a commercial transaction for the sale of shares. Therefore, it was considered a commercial transaction and not a deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e).
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee did not respond to notices, the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without discussing the merits. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, emphasizing the observance of natural justice.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal noted that the present appeal (ITA No. 5858/MUM/2024) was a duplication of the physically filed appeal (ITA No. 5847/MUM/2024) that was heard on the same day. Consequently, the tribunal dismissed the present appeal as infructuous.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) may have overlooked the request for condonation of delay. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the withdrawal of LTCG does not fall under the category of 'incorrect claim' under Section 143(1)(a). Entries in the profit and loss account are not determinative of taxable income, especially when subsequent events negate the initial assumption of a transfer.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding reasonable cause. It set aside the impugned order, restoring the appeal to the file of the NFAC for de novo adjudication on merits, provided the assessee rectifies the deficiencies.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A should be computed based on the average value of investments, not market value, and directed the AO to restrict the disallowance accordingly. Regarding depreciation, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO to verify the claim of enhanced depreciation, stating that the restrictions on accepting revised claims do not apply to appellate authorities.
The tribunal held that interest earned by a cooperative housing society from cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. This decision was based on numerous rulings by coordinate benches and subsequent judgments from the Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts, as well as the tribunal's own prior decisions in the assessee's case for earlier assessment years.
The Tribunal found that the original assessment order under Section 143(3) was substituted by the subsequent order under Section 154. Therefore, the appeal challenging the earlier order became infructuous.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had inadvertently filed two appeals for the same assessment year against the same order. Consequently, the present appeal was dismissed as it was duplicate and not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the addition was not sustainable as the AO failed to bring concrete evidence on record incriminating the assessee. The Tribunal followed its own earlier order in the assessee's own case for a different assessment year with identical facts.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted a detailed verification and passed a reasoned order, following the ITAT's own earlier decision which held that lease premiums and related charges collected by MIDC on behalf of the State Government were not taxable in its hands. The Tribunal found no error in the AO's assessment and quashed the revisional order passed by the CIT(E).
The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 9,00,000 as unexplained income. The assessee failed to provide any substantial evidence to prove the genuineness of the business or the source of the cash deposits.
The Tribunal held that the interest expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning income from other sources, as per Section 57(iii) of the Act. The test of commercial expediency should be viewed from the businessman's perspective, not the Revenue's.
The tribunal held that interest earned by a cooperative housing society from cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. This decision was based on numerous rulings by coordinate benches and subsequent judgments from the Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts, as well as the tribunal's own prior decisions in the assessee's case for earlier assessment years.
The Tribunal held that the investment of Rs. 1,10,50,000 was made in FY 2013-14 and 2014-15, which were relevant for AY 2014-15 and 2015-16, not AY 2016-17. The Tribunal also noted that an addition of Rs. 1.04 Crores for cash deposits with Shri Kartik Mohan Prasad had already been made by the AO for AY 2014-15.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148, issued on 29/07/2022, was barred by limitation. This was based on the Supreme Court's decision regarding the application of TOLA and the concession made by the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the AO relied on a generalized investigation report without substantiating that the assessee's transactions were manipulated. Evidence like broker notes, demat statements, and bank transactions supported the genuineness of the purchase and sale.
The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to re-examine the claims of the assessee regarding the delayed payments of EPF and ESIC contributions and allow them as per law after proper verification of all submitted evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for settlement of the dispute for the assessment year under appeal under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and had filed the requisite Form 1 DTVSV, 2024. The revenue did not object to this submission. In view of these facts, the Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the assessee stands dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal also granted liberty to the assessee to get the appeal restored in case the declaration filed under the scheme is not accepted for any reason. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that since the addition was made on an estimate basis for alleged bogus purchases, the levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was not warranted.
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee did not respond to notices, the CIT(A) failed to provide a reasoned order. The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, directing the assessee to be diligent.
The Tribunal held that the hearing provided under Section 250(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is not a mere formality but an essential requirement for upholding the principles of natural justice. Upon examining the impugned order, the Tribunal observed that the tabulated opportunities of hearing provided by the Learned CIT(A) did not demonstrate that the notices were duly served or brought to the assessee's notice. Therefore, an effective opportunity of hearing was not granted. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the file of the Learned CIT(A) for providing an effective hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to present its case before the Learned CIT(A) within 60 days. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that cooperative banks are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act and fall within the definition of 'cooperative society' for the purpose of this deduction.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue had not brought forth concrete evidence to substantiate that the assessee made cash payments for the property. Following coordinate bench decisions and Gujarat High Court rulings, the addition was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not justified in assuming dual jurisdiction for levying penalty on the same facts when the AO had already assumed jurisdiction. The penalty order was quashed due to the lack of valid jurisdiction by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) should have considered the directions of the Bombay High Court regarding the limitation period. Since the appeal was filed within the stipulated time as per the High Court's order, the finding of the Ld.CIT(A) regarding delay was set aside.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeal on merits due to the assessee's non-compliance. Considering the assessee's argument that the addition was protective and a substantive assessment was on the directors, and that such protective additions cannot be made mechanically, the Tribunal remanded all issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with a direction for the assessee to strictly comply.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the bonafide mistake and the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v Mst. Katiji And Others. The penalty order was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the assessee consistently deposited cash from business receipts, and the deposits made during the demonetization period were not disproportionately high compared to preceding months. Considering the nature of the business, which was permitted to collect old demonetized notes, the Tribunal concluded that the cash deposits were from disclosed business receipts. Therefore, the additions made under Section 69A were unwarranted and were deleted.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15, the appeals were allowed as the assessments were found to be barred by limitation. For assessment years 2015-16 to 2018-19, the appeals were partly allowed, directing the Assessing Officer to adopt a fair average GP rate of 0.18% or the declared GP rate, whichever is higher.
The Tribunal held that the diaries and transactions recorded therein belonged to Shri Jatin Shah and not the assessee, Vinay Shah. It also confirmed the genuineness of derivative trading transactions. Regarding Section 14A, the disallowance was directed to be restricted to investments yielding exempt income.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not provide an effective opportunity of hearing and there was no proof of proper service of notices. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that proceedings under Section 153C cannot be initiated without incriminating material pertaining to the specific assessment years. The additions made by the AO were not based on any such material, rendering the initiation of proceedings invalid.
The Tribunal held that the recording of satisfaction by the AO before issuing a notice under section 153C is a statutory and jurisdictional requirement. Since this was not complied with, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the first application due to a wrong section cited is not a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the second application. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(E) did not consider the application on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.