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657 orders · Page 9 of 14
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed an application for condonation of delay in filing Form 10 with the CIT(E), which was allowed. Since the delay was condoned, the Assessing Officer was directed to consider the Form 10 and the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 11 of the Act.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw appeals for AY 2014-15 and 2017-18 as the reassessment proceedings were quashed. For AY 2018-19, the issue of weighted deduction was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that income tax is a tax on real income, not notional or hypothetical income. The assessee should be taxed on actual profit, considering the principle of prudence in accounting, which anticipates losses but not gains. The PCIT erred by ignoring this principle and the settled law by the Supreme Court when setting aside the AO's order.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, holding that the loans were from earlier years. However, the Tribunal noted that Rs. 1,00,000 was received during the assessment year in question. The Tribunal found that the genuineness and timing of these loans needed further verification.
The Tribunal held that the matter should be adjudicated on its merits rather than dismissed on procedural lapses. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated on mere suspicion without any rational basis and in violation of the first proviso to Section 147. The Tribunal also noted that the Assessing Officer was unaware of the prior assessment under Section 143(3).
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw appeals for AY 2014-15 and 2017-18 as the reassessment proceedings were quashed. For AY 2018-19, the issue of weighted deduction was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal deleted the penalty imposed under Section 272A(1)(d). It considered the submissions that the notices were issued during the COVID-19 pandemic and that the quantum appeals had been set aside.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's original directors and shareholders resigned before the assessment proceedings were concluded, and the new management was unaware of the transaction. Due to the lack of effective opportunity for the incumbent directors to represent the case, the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee had suo motu disallowed some interest, the calculation and justification were lacking. Therefore, the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) has a statutory obligation to dispose of an appeal on merits, irrespective of whether the assessee appears. Section 250 of the Act requires the CIT(A) to decide on merits and not dismiss summarily.
The Tribunal restored the issues back to the CIT(A) with directions for the assessee to file necessary applications and documentary evidence. This was done to provide the assessee with an opportunity to present their case properly.
The Tribunal noted that previous High Court and Supreme Court decisions, as well as CBDT circulars, supported the assessee's claim. The AO's grounds for disallowance, including the commencement date and the size of the plot for building 'E', were found to be without merit in light of previous favorable judgments.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate the nature of advances received and loans given. Consequently, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication with directions to the assessee to furnish necessary details.
The Tribunal held that since the substantive additions forming the basis of the penalty were either remanded or unsubstantiated, the penalty levied on the amount of unexplained cash credit (Rs. 1,30,85,423/-) does not survive. Similarly, the penalty on account of the corpus fund (Rs. 2,92,589/-) was also deemed unsustainable as the AO had not dealt with it independently and the substantive addition was set aside.
The Tribunal held that dividend income referred to in Section 115-O is exempt in the hands of the shareholder under Section 10(34). The non-payment of dividend distribution tax by the payer does not disentitle the recipient to the exemption. Consequently, such exempt dividend cannot be included in book profit for MAT purposes.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in re-opening the assessment. The re-opening was made after four years without any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts, and there was no new material to justify the re-opening. The issue of share premium had already been examined during the original scrutiny assessment.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) observed that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte due to the assessee's non-compliance, but acknowledged there could be valid reasons for non-appearance. Upholding principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee another opportunity to present their case. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the entire disputed issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, with a directive for the assessee to cooperate.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had subsequently been granted registration in Form No. 10AC from AY 2022-23 to AY 2016-17. Since this registration covers the AY 2023-24 in question, the grievance of the assessee was deemed to no longer survive.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee repeatedly failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate its expenses across multiple stages of assessment and appeal. Despite opportunities, the AO was not convinced of the genuineness of the expenses claimed. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to maintain proper evidence for the claimed expenses.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was done without proper application of mind, as the Assessing Officer failed to conduct adequate enquiries and verify the assessee's return. The initial reason for reopening, regarding bogus Long Term Capital Gain, was found to be incorrect. Consequently, all additions made based on this reopening were deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed the cash deposit represented savings and was for emergency requirements due to her age and health. However, the AO and CIT(A) rejected this explanation, citing the assessee's limited means and the small scale of her business. A significant issue raised was the denial of a proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee due to multiple notices and transfer of the case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had treated the shares as stock-in-trade, offered the profits from their sale as business income, and paid tax on it. Therefore, the reopening was based on incorrect facts, and the addition under Section 68 was not justified.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the decision of the CIT(A), sustaining the addition of Rs. 54,50,000 as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Act. The tribunal found the assessee's explanation for keeping such a large sum of cash for 3 to 8 years to be unreasonable and illogical, especially in the absence of documentary evidence from the trusts or proof of withdrawal of prior deductions. The assessee also failed to appear for the hearing before the ITAT.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had already deleted the penalty in a similar, duplicate appeal concerning the same impugned order. The Tribunal observed that additions based on stamp valuation where no material suggested otherwise, do not automatically attract penalty for inaccurate particulars.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a credit co-operative society and not a co-operative bank, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income received from its investments with other co-operative societies, including co-operative banks. Section 80P(4) does not apply to the assessee.
The Tribunal, in its corrigendum, clarifies that the details of the order passed for the Assessment Year 2010-11 were incorrectly stated as Assessment Year 2007-08. The correction replaces the incorrect citation with the accurate Assessment Year 2010-11 and corresponding ITA numbers.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition. It held that profit recognition under the Percentage Completion Method requires the transfer of significant risks and rewards, which occurs upon the execution of a sale agreement, not merely the receipt of an advance or allotment letter.
The Tribunal held that the difference between the property value determined by the DVO and the transaction value was less than 10% of the consideration. Therefore, no addition was required to be made in the hands of the assessee, and the addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal has corrected a mistake where "Assessment Year 2007-08" was incorrectly stated instead of "Assessment Year 2010-11" for a previous appeal. Additionally, "Assessment Year" was incorrectly used instead of "Financial Year" when referring to deductions for specific years.
The Tribunal, in its corrigendum, clarifies that the details of the order passed for the Assessment Year 2010-11 were incorrectly stated as Assessment Year 2007-08. The correction replaces the incorrect citation with the accurate Assessment Year 2010-11 and corresponding ITA numbers.
The Tribunal held that the gift from the brother was proved in terms of identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness and is not chargeable to tax. The Tribunal also found that the addition of Rs. 40,500 was a double addition and directed its deletion.
The Tribunal held that hardship allowance paid by a developer due to dispossession is not a revenue receipt and is not liable to be taxed. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Sarfaraz S. Furniturewalla, the Tribunal allowed the appeal.
The Tribunal, in its corrigendum, clarifies that the details of the order passed for the Assessment Year 2010-11 were incorrectly stated as Assessment Year 2007-08. The correction replaces the incorrect citation with the accurate Assessment Year 2010-11 and corresponding ITA numbers.
The Tribunal has corrected a mistake where "Assessment Year 2007-08" was incorrectly stated instead of "Assessment Year 2010-11" for a previous appeal. Additionally, "Assessment Year" was incorrectly used instead of "Financial Year" when referring to deductions for specific years.
The Tribunal found that there was a 'sufficient cause' for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The rejection under section 249(2) r.w.s. 249(3) was considered unjustified. However, the assessee had not filed an affidavit explaining the delay.
The Tribunal held that software license expenditure is recurring in nature and revenue in character, following its own precedents. It also held that the deletion of disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) by the CIT(A) was justified as the assessee had duly complied with TDS provisions, with only minor short deductions which were suo motu disallowed by the assessee.
The Assessing Officer (AO) rectified the order under Section 154 of the Act, withdrawing interest granted for the period April 2006 to January 2008, citing a delay attributable to the assessee. The Tribunal held that such a withdrawal was not permissible under Section 154 as it does not amount to a mistake apparent from record, especially considering the relevant amendment to Section 244A was effective from June 1, 2016.
The Tribunal noted that the penalty notice issued by the AO under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) was vague. It did not specify under which limb of section 271(1)(c) the penalty proceedings were initiated. This lack of specificity renders the notice bad in law, as held by the Supreme Court in M/s SSA's Emerald Meadows and other High Court decisions.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not given an effective hearing due to the circumstances explained in the affidavit. Therefore, the interest of justice requires an opportunity for the assessee to present its case.
The Tribunal held that the 'Reserve for Unexpired Risks' is not an unascertained liability to be added back for computing book profit under Section 115JB. It is a mandatory reserve created as per insurance regulations, representing future income, and not a provision for a future liability as contemplated under Section 115JB(2) Explanation 1(b) or (c). Furthermore, this reserve was not debited to the Profit & Loss account. The Tribunal also noted that the provision for unexpired risk was offered to tax in subsequent years, negating the non-taxing argument.
The First Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on grounds of delay without considering the merits. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not decide the issue on merits.
The Tribunal held that since the entire sale consideration was invested in new properties with prior permission from the Charity Commissioner, there was no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings. Regarding the carried forward loss, it was noted that it had been allowed in previous AYs by appellate authorities, and there was no evidence of artificial creation of deficit by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal declined to interfere.
The Tribunal noted that the assessment order and the subsequent CIT(A) order were passed concerning the assessee's husband, not the assessee herself. Therefore, the appeal filed in the assessee's name was dismissed as infructuous, but the delay in filing was condoned.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal was based on the Vivad se Vishwas Act, but the assessee argued that they had mistakenly submitted penalty order documents instead of quantum appeal documents. The Tribunal found that the impugned order did not pertain to the quantum appeal.
The Tribunal held that since the quantum appeal allowing the quashing of the assessment order under Section 147 was passed, the levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained. The CIT(A)'s order on penalty was passed without considering the ITAT's decision on the quantum appeal. Relying on judicial precedents where penalties were deleted in similar circumstances, the Tribunal found it appropriate to decide the matter in favor of the assessee.
The ITAT found the assessee's explanation credible: notices were sent to an email ID operated by a former employee who had disassociated, and the assessee only became aware of the proceedings when its bank account was frozen. The Tribunal concluded that no effective hearing took place and that the assessee deserved an opportunity to present its case in the interest of justice, as per Section 250(2) of the Act. Consequently, the matter for all three assessment years is restored to the Assessing Officer, with a direction for the assessee to file its response within 90 days.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that income declared under the IDS Scheme is to be treated separately from regular book income, dismissing the assessee's ground. The Tribunal also upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions related to accounting practices, allowing the Revenue's ground on this aspect.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that income declared under the IDS Scheme is to be treated separately from regular book income, dismissing the assessee's ground. The Tribunal also upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions related to accounting practices, allowing the Revenue's ground on this aspect.
The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) admitted a new stand from the assessee regarding property transaction consideration without confronting the AO and without obtaining a remand report. This violated Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules.