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744 orders · Page 8 of 15
The Tribunal held that the provision requiring application within six months of commencement of activities applies to trusts that had not started activities before provisional registration. For trusts that had already commenced activities, the time limit should not lead to an absurd situation where they can never apply.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals without adjudicating on merits, especially considering the assessee's submission that communication issues prevented compliance. The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merit, with a direction to provide adequate opportunity and for the assessee to comply fully.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals without adjudicating on merits, especially considering the assessee's submission that communication issues prevented compliance. The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merit, with a direction to provide adequate opportunity and for the assessee to comply fully.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not granted adequate time for hearing by the CIT(A)/NFAC, receiving notices with insufficient time to prepare and present their case. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeals to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that while the delay in filing Form 10B was confirmed, various judicial precedents establish that filing such a report is a directory provision, not mandatory, and can be uploaded during appellate proceedings. The Tribunal also referred to a previous ruling stating there is no precondition for an assessee to file for condonation before the CIT(Exemption).
The Tribunal noted that while the CIT(A)/NFAC afforded multiple opportunities, the findings did not meet the rigor of Section 250(6) of the Act. Consequently, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for proper adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that while the delay in filing Form 10B was confirmed, various judicial precedents establish that filing such a report is a directory provision, not mandatory, and can be uploaded during appellate proceedings. The Tribunal also referred to a previous ruling stating there is no precondition for an assessee to file for condonation before the CIT(Exemption).
The Tribunal held that if the original reason for reopening the assessment is deleted, the entire reassessment proceeding initiated under Section 148 is unsustainable in law, even if other additions were made and upheld. A valid notice under Section 148 is a prerequisite for reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's matter was ex-parte before the Assessing Officer, and the CIT(A) had not addressed the core issues. Consequently, the Tribunal found it necessary to provide the assessee with another opportunity to present their case before the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals, holding that disallowance under section 14A does not apply when there is no exempt income, relying on the Bombay High Court decision. It further clarified that the Explanation to section 14A, inserted by the Finance Act, 2022, is prospective and not retrospective, thus not applicable to the assessment years 2014-15 & 2015-16.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had bonafide reasons for non-compliance with the show-cause notice and that the application was filed within the extended time limit as per a CBDT circular. However, it also noted that 80G registration is contingent on 12AB registration.
The Tribunal acknowledged the inactive email as a reasonable cause for non-compliance. It set aside the CIT(Exemption)'s order and restored the case for fresh adjudication on merits, providing another opportunity to the assessee for compliance after noting the new email ID.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) inadvertently noted no written submissions were filed by the assessee, despite evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and restored the matters to the file of the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) inadvertently noted no written submissions were filed by the assessee, despite evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and restored the matters to the file of the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) inadvertently noted no written submissions were filed by the assessee, despite evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and restored the matters to the file of the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A)/NFAC dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without formally determining the legal representative status of the appellant, Mrs. Dayaki Jetha Chavada. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) to first ascertain her status as a legal representative and then decide the appeal on its merits according to law.
The Tribunal held that filing of Form 67 is a procedural and directory requirement, not mandatory. Violation of procedural norms does not extinguish the substantial right of claiming FTC. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the FTC credit, stating that Rule 128(9) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, does not provide for disallowance of FTC due to delay in filing Form 67, and DTAA overrides the provisions of the Act and Rules.
The Tribunal held that filing Form 67 is a procedural and directory requirement, not mandatory, and a delay in its filing does not extinguish the substantial right to claim FTC. It clarified that Rule 128(9) of the Income Tax Rules does not provide for disallowance solely due to delayed filing and that the DTAA overrides the Act and Rules in this context. The Tribunal, relying on a Madras High Court judgment, directed the AO to allow the FTC claim.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities had incorrectly determined the cost of acquisition and had not made a statutory reference under section 50C(2) of the Act. Given these omissions, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the appeal to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had correctly rejected the application as it was filed under the incorrect provision. However, the CIT(E) had granted liberty to the assessee to reapply in the prescribed format.
The Tribunal held that stating 'scholarship to students' is a specific enough purpose for accumulation under Section 11(2), provided it falls within the trust's objects. Details like student names or amounts per student were not required.
The Tribunal held that the exemption under Section 10(35) for dividend income was allowable. For AY 2016-17, the issue of exemption under Section 10(23FB) was restored to the Assessing Officer for examination of a newly introduced proviso.
The Tribunal held that the exemption under Section 10(35) for dividend income was allowable. For AY 2016-17, the issue regarding Section 10(23FB) was restored to the AO for examining the applicability of a newly introduced proviso.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 101 days in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A), finding the reasons to be bonafide and not intentional. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was negligent and failed to produce books of account before any authority. Despite opportunities, the assessee did not cooperate. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to impose a cost of Rs.10,000 on the assessee and remit the matter back to the AO for de novo verification, ensuring the assessee gets a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the sale transactions of shares were genuine as evidenced by banking channels, demat account entries, and stock exchange platforms. The additions made under Section 68 and Section 69C were deleted.
The ITAT noted that while the AO mentioned inaccurate particulars of income in the assessment order, the show cause notice for penalty was vague as it did not strike off the irrelevant clause (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars). Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh, the Tribunal held that an omnibus notice suffers from vagueness and penal provisions must be construed strictly.
The Tribunal held that the assessee society is entitled to the benefit of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. Relying on various judicial precedents, including decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts, it was concluded that the assessee, not being a primary cooperative bank and primarily dealing with its members, qualifies for the deduction.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not granted adequate time for hearing by the CIT(A)/NFAC, receiving notices with insufficient time to prepare and present their case. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeals to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that while the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex-parte due to non-compliance, there could be various reasons for the assessee's non-appearance. Applying principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity for hearing.
The Tribunal held that additional evidence regarding corpus donations should be admitted and the issue restored to the AO for fresh examination. Regarding house property income deductions, the Tribunal also found it appropriate to restore the issue to the AO for verification of double benefit claims.
The Tribunal held that the right to acquire the flats was a capital asset, and its surrender/extinguishment constituted a transfer. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to claim the long-term capital loss arising from this transaction.
The Tribunal held that the right to acquire the flats was a capital asset, and its surrender/extinguishment constituted a transfer. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to claim the long-term capital loss arising from this transaction.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For both assessment years, the disallowance of purchases from non-genuine parties was reduced from 12.5% to 5% of the total non-genuine purchases, considering the nature of business and judicial pronouncements.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For both assessment years, the disallowance of purchases from non-genuine parties was reduced from 12.5% to 5% of the total non-genuine purchases, considering the nature of business and judicial pronouncements.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of Rs. 1,05,73,465/- under Section 14A read with Rule 8D is tenable. The assessee earned exempt income of Rs. 26,34,54,660/- from partnership firms, which is excluded from its total income under Section 10(2A). The AO rightly invoked Section 14A and computed the expenditure attributable to exempt income using Rule 8D, having recorded his dissatisfaction, which is a prerequisite for invoking Rule 8D(2). The Tribunal noted that the AO calculated the disallowance based on the average value of investments, which included Rs. 2,23,65,60,504/- and Rs. 1,99,38,07,811/-. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *Maxopp Investment Ltd. Vs. CIT* which held that the objective of holding investments is immaterial, and disallowance applies irrespective of whether held as stock-in-trade or investment. The Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s order, which excluded investments in group/subsidiary companies and calculated the disallowance. The Tribunal concluded that the computation of expenditure cannot be limited to the assessee's taxable income and that the facts of the cited case laws were distinguishable. The issue was decided against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the reasons recorded for reopening (investment in mutual funds) differed from the addition made in the assessment order (disallowance of exemption under Section 10(35)). Consequently, the reassessment was held to be invalid.
The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the interest expenses were correctly treated as part of work-in-progress and that the assessee had sufficient own funds to cover the advance given. The disallowance under Section 14A was also deleted as there was no exempt income.
The Tribunal held that if the original reason for reopening the assessment is deleted, the entire reassessment proceeding initiated under Section 148 is unsustainable in law, even if other additions were made and upheld. A valid notice under Section 148 is a prerequisite for reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal observed significant procedural anomalies at both assessment and first appellate stages, leading to the case not being decided on merits. To ensure a fair adjudication and prevent further litigation, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the entire matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration on merits, with proper examination and verification of supporting documents.
For A.Ys. 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2021-22, the tribunal restored the appeals to the Assessing Officer, accepting the Section 158A declaration and directing the AO to apply the High Court's decision. For A.Ys. 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16, where the CIT(A) had disposed of the appeals ex-parte without adjudicating on merits, the tribunal found that the assessee deserved an opportunity for a hearing. These appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for decision on merits.
The Tribunal, noting the assessee's argument about the lack of opportunity to substantiate the source of the credit card payments, decided to restore the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The CIT(A) is directed to decide the issue afresh after providing due opportunity to the assessee.
For A.Ys. 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2021-22, the tribunal restored the appeals to the Assessing Officer, accepting the Section 158A declaration and directing the AO to apply the High Court's decision. For A.Ys. 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16, where the CIT(A) had disposed of the appeals ex-parte without adjudicating on merits, the tribunal found that the assessee deserved an opportunity for a hearing. These appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the AO incorrectly calculated the capital gain on the insurance policy surrender by not allowing the indexation benefit, directly contravening the DRP's directions and the AO's own remand report. The Tribunal upheld the assessee's claim for indexation on capital gain. Regarding the refund with interest, the Tribunal directed the AO to compute and grant any refund due, along with interest, once the correct tax liability is determined, deeming the interest claim premature until then.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A)-NFAC for fresh adjudication. This was conditional on preliminary factual verification of self-assessment tax payment, followed by adjudication on merits. The taxpayer bears the onus to prove all relevant facts.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A)-NFAC for fresh adjudication. This was conditional on preliminary factual verification of self-assessment tax payment, followed by adjudication on merits. The taxpayer bears the onus to prove all relevant facts.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A)-NFAC for fresh adjudication. This was conditional on preliminary factual verification of self-assessment tax payment, followed by adjudication on merits. The taxpayer bears the onus to prove all relevant facts.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) inadvertently noted no written submissions were filed by the assessee, despite evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and restored the matters to the file of the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A)-NFAC for fresh adjudication. This was conditional on preliminary factual verification of self-assessment tax payment, followed by adjudication on merits. The taxpayer bears the onus to prove all relevant facts.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) inadvertently noted no written submissions were filed by the assessee, despite evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and restored the matters to the file of the Assessing Officer.