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744 orders · Page 14 of 15
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities had given sufficient opportunity but acknowledged the circumstances leading to the assessee's inability to present their case. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the issues to the AO for a fresh decision.
The CIT(A) exceeded its jurisdiction by rejecting the additional evidence without proper reasoning and denied the assessee a reasonable opportunity. The tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the mere allegation of manipulated books of account without concrete evidence or rejection of the books of account is not sufficient to make an addition. The Tribunal agreed that while the absence of cash sales post-demonetization might raise suspicion, it cannot be a basis to disregard cash sales prior to that period without proper enquiry. The Tribunal noted that the sales invoices and books of account were available, and an enquiry to disprove cash sales should have been conducted.
The appellant sought to withdraw the appeal during the hearing. The grounds of appeal, including those related to advance pricing agreements and limitation, were not pressed by the appellant.
The Tribunal held that certain unsecured loans were brought forward from earlier years and directed their deletion. For other loans and the interest disallowance, the matter was remitted back to the AO for fresh verification, allowing the assessee an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal confirmed that the e-mails were not in the name of the assessee. It restored the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, directing the CIT(A) to provide a reasonable and adequate opportunity of being heard by serving notices at the correct e-mail ID. The assessee was also directed to provide their correct e-mail ID.
The Tribunal condoned the delay after noting the reasonable cause presented by the assessee. It held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits in other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act, following precedent from the Madras High Court and a prior decision of the same Tribunal bench.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 as the AO had already conducted inquiries and accepted the assessee's explanation during the reassessment proceedings. The revisionary order was deemed unsustainable in law because the AO had made no addition, and the PCIT failed to justify the invocation of Explanation 2 to Section 263.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had already reduced the amount of ₹4,98,70,180 while computing the book profit. Reducing it again would lead to double reduction. Therefore, the order of the learned CIT(A) was found to be without infirmity.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its primary onus by providing all necessary details and documents regarding the share subscribers and their transactions. The Assessing Officer failed to disprove the evidence presented, thus the addition was unwarranted.
The Tribunal held that the addition under Section 69D was not sustainable as there was no evidence of borrowing on Hundi and the loans were old opening balances from related parties. The second addition regarding increased house property income was also deleted as it was offered in the revised return and should not have been added again.
The Tribunal held that there is no statutory provision in the Income Tax Act (sections 240, 244A, 249, 253) for the refund of appeal filing fees, as these fees are a statutory levy and not an "amount due to the assessee as a result of any order". The Tribunal concluded it lacks the power to direct a refund of these fees, especially since the assessee had already obtained the relief sought on merits.
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee provided documents like PAN, IT Return, confirmation, and bank statements, they failed to produce the lender for examination to prove identity, capacity, and genuineness. The Tribunal distinguished the facts from a prior year's appeal where a similar addition was deleted, emphasizing that the assessee has a duty to independently prove the creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s dismissal of the appeal as infructuous due to the VSV scheme was based on an incorrect factual premise. The assessee had not opted for VSV for the penalty appeal, but for the assessment appeal. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that a delay of 36 days cannot be considered inordinate or with malafide intention, as the taxpayer gains nothing by such a delay. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the appeal was restored to the file of the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that an identical issue concerning the assessee's own case for AY 2017-18 was decided in favor of the assessee. The Tribunal found that cooperative banks are considered cooperative societies, and income earned from investments with such entities is deductible under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal also noted that Section 80P(4) was not applicable as the assessee is not a cooperative bank.
The assessee submitted a letter stating that a related appeal filed before the ITAT Chennai Bench was decided, and therefore, the present appeal should be treated as withdrawn. The Tribunal acceded to this request.
The Tribunal noted that the amount of Rs. 2,19,075/- was already included under 'other income' as per Note 21 of the audited accounts. Therefore, any further addition would amount to double addition.
The CIT(A) found that not all purchases were bogus and determined a figure of Rs. 1,06,75,368/- as potentially problematic. Considering the assessee offered an additional profit of 5%, the CIT(A) upheld a net profit rate of 7% and restricted the disallowance to Rs. 7,47,275/-. The Tribunal found no factual errors in the CIT(A)'s findings and agreed that the disallowance should be restricted.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in *Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.* It affirmed that for unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made by the AO without incriminating material found during the search operation. Since no such material was referenced by the AO, the assessment orders making the additions were quashed.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative bank is a type of cooperative society, and interest earned by a cooperative society from investments in another cooperative society (or cooperative bank) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the disallowance made by the lower authorities was incorrect.
The tribunal observed that surcharge is leviable only when the income exceeds Rs. 50 Lakhs. Since the assessee's income was Rs. 43,51,640/-, which is less than the threshold, the surcharge was not applicable.
The tribunal noted that the appellant withdrew ground no. 1 concerning the arm's length price as an APA was signed. Grounds 3 & 4 were not pressed as credit was already granted. The AO was directed to verify the issue of short grant of TDS credit (ground no. 2) and compute interest u/s. 234B (ground no. 5). The additional ground regarding limitation was also not pressed.
The Tribunal held that the AO violated the second proviso of section 143(1) of the Act by making adjustments without giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The subsequent order under section 143(3) accepted the assessee's claims, indicating a divergence in views that was not permissible.
The Tribunal held that reasonable opportunity was denied to the assessee before the authorities below. Therefore, to subserve the interest of justice, the impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not provide adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee, as evidenced by the short notice periods for hearings. Therefore, the case is restored to the CIT(A) to decide the appeal afresh on its merits after providing a proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal addressed several issues. Firstly, regarding the disallowance under Section 14A, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had enhanced the disallowance and adopted a method resembling Rule 8D, despite the rule not being applicable for the assessment year. The Tribunal did not provide a specific finding on the quantum of disallowance or the method, but the grounds suggest this issue was contested. Secondly, concerning the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) for payments to M/s Team Lease, the judgment does not record a specific decision for this ground. Thirdly, for the disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) for global overhead charges, the Tribunal did not record a specific decision. Fourthly, on the transfer pricing additions, the Tribunal overturned the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the 5% tolerance margin. It held, following a Special Bench decision in M/s IHG IT Services (India) Private Limited, that the benefit of the tolerance margin is available only if the variation is within that margin. If the variation exceeds 5%, the ALP as worked out under Section 92C(1) would be taken without any benefit. Consequently, the TPO/AO was directed to re-compute the transfer pricing addition accordingly. The assessee's cross-objection supporting the 5% deduction was dismissed. Fifthly, concerning the revenue's ground on transaction charges paid to the Stock Exchange, the Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Kotak Securities Limited. It held that transaction charges, VSAT/Leased line charges paid to stock exchanges are for facilities provided and not 'fee for technical services'. Therefore, no TDS was deductible under Section 194J, and the deletion of disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) by the CIT(A) was upheld. The revenue's grounds on this issue were dismissed. The Tribunal also dismissed a general ground raised by the revenue. The assessee's appeal was partly allowed, the revenue's appeal was partly allowed, and the assessee's cross-objection was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that an identical issue for AY 2013-14 was restored to the CIT(A) for disposal on merits. Following the co-ordinate bench's decision, the Tribunal also decided to restore the present appeal back to the CIT(A) for disposal on merit.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's valuation report using the DCF method was not acceptable due to factual inaccuracies and reliance on unsubstantiated projections of growth for a loss-making company. The TPO's adjustment based on the Net Asset Value (NAV) method was upheld.
The Tribunal held that transaction charges and VSAT/leased line charges paid to stock exchanges are for facilities provided, not technical services, thus no TDS is deductible under Section 194J. The benefit of a 5% tolerance margin in transfer pricing is only available if the variation is within that margin.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing reasonable cause and the principles of natural justice. It found that the assessee should be given an opportunity to present their case on merits, subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed the exempt income earned by the assessee. Relying on Supreme Court and High Court judgments, it was noted that amendments to Section 14A are prospective, and disallowance should be restricted to the exempt income.
The Tribunal noted that similar issues for a prior assessment year were decided by a co-ordinate bench. For Section 36(1)(viii), income from housing finance for residential purposes for less than 5 years and from temporary fund deployment was held eligible, while income from non-residential housing finance was not.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without condoning the delay, especially since a rectification application was pending. The Tribunal restored the quantum appeal to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the subsequent withdrawal of recognition of the payee institutions does not bar the assessee from claiming deduction for donations made when the institutions were approved. The assessee's claim for deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) was allowed.
The Tribunal held that provision for exchange loss on foreign currency loans is allowable on accrual basis as per mercantile system of accounting and AS-11. However, it ruled that income from housing finance for periods less than 5 years, non-residential purposes, and temporary deployment of funds are not eligible for deduction under Section 36(1)(viii).
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without condoning the delay, especially since a rectification application was pending. The Tribunal restored the quantum appeal to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal allowed depreciation on computer software at 60% based on a coordinate bench's decision. It also deleted the addition of share premium under Section 56(2)(viib), finding that the valuation was done as per Rule 11UA and the AO erred in changing the valuation method. The AO was directed to recompute the total income.
The Tribunal observed that while the assessee had filed documentary evidence, the CIT(A) had not fully verified the genuineness of the parties and the transactions. The CIT(A) also did not seek a remand report from the AO. Therefore, the issue was remanded back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was done after more than nine years from the end of the relevant assessment year, which exceeded the time limit prescribed under section 149. The Tribunal further noted that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts necessary for the assessment, and the purchases were already examined in the original assessment order.
The Tribunal decided that the provision for exchange loss on foreign currency loans is allowable as a deduction. Regarding Section 36(1)(viii), income from housing finance for residential purposes for less than 5 years and from temporary deployment of funds is eligible for deduction, but income from non-residential housing finance is not.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted additional evidence under Rule 46A, and the AO failed to provide a remand report despite several opportunities. The CIT(A) had allowed the appeal without proper verification.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer failed to provide a remand report despite several opportunities. The CIT(A) had allowed the assessee's appeal without proper verification by the AO. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the appeal order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal decided that income from housing finance for residential purposes for less than five years and income from temporary deployment of funds in investments and treasury operations are eligible for deduction under Section 36(1)(viii). However, income from housing finance for non-residential purposes is not eligible for this deduction.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee, being a non-resident, faced difficulties in compliance. Considering the arguments and the need for a fair opportunity, the Tribunal decided to admit the additional evidence and remand the case back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal, relying on a coordinate bench's decision for a prior assessment year, held that income from housing finance for residential purposes for less than five years and income from temporary fund deployment are eligible for deduction under Section 36(1)(viii). However, income from housing finance for non-residential purposes is not eligible.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is a regular trader of shares and the transactions in SVC Resources Ltd. were genuine intra-trade transactions through the stock exchange. The addition of Rs. 74,36,500 and the notional commission of Rs. 2,23,095 were deleted. The issue of reopening was treated as academic.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had adjudicated a similar issue in favor of the assessee, attributing the TDS credit shortfall to the late filing of TDS returns by customers. The Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s decision to grant the full TDS credit of Rs. 220,61,47,656/-. Therefore, following the previous ITAT decision, the Tribunal found no infirmity.
The Tribunal held that three companies (ICRA, Cyber, and ITIL) were functionally similar to the assessee and should be included in the list of comparables. Conversely, three other companies (MOIAPL, LCAPL, and MOEPAPL) were deemed not comparable and should be excluded.