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534 orders · Page 3 of 11
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are indeed cooperative societies as defined under the relevant acts. Therefore, interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The adjustment made by the AO under Section 143(1)(a) was also found to be impermissible.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the CPC under section 143 (1) (a) was not sustainable as it was not an 'incorrect claim' as defined and that the assessee was indeed eligible for deduction under section 80 P (2) (d) as cooperative banks are also cooperative societies. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee was not given an opportunity to be heard before the adjustment.
The Assessing Officer assumed the assessee should have earned interest at 15% and added the difference (3%) to the total income. The Tribunal found that the actual interest received was at 12%, supported by loan confirmations and form 26AS. The payers of interest also confirmed payment at 12%. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was deemed incorrect.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A require incriminating material found during the search. Statements alone, especially if retracted, may not suffice as incriminating material. The Tribunal also considered the validity of notices and assessment orders.
The Tribunal, respectfully following the decisions of coordinate benches and various High Courts, held that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P. The assessee is a cooperative society providing credit facilities to its members and not a co-operative bank as defined under Section 80P(4).
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding no illegality or perversity. They noted that the CIT(A)'s decision was well-reasoned and consistent with previous years where similar additions were restricted to 12.5%.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the cooperative society from fixed deposits, which were made from surplus funds not immediately required for lending to members, is attributable to its business of banking and providing credit facilities. Therefore, the assessee is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.
As per Section 14 of IBC-2016, no proceedings can continue against a corporate debtor during the CIRP. Therefore, it is not appropriate to proceed with the revenue's appeal, as keeping it pending also constitutes a continuation of proceedings.
The Tribunal held that additions made in unabated assessment years following a search action cannot be sustained without the aid of incriminating material. Relying solely on statements without corroborating evidence was deemed insufficient.
The Tribunal held that additions made in unabated assessment years following a search action cannot be sustained without the aid of incriminating material. Relying solely on statements without corroborating evidence was deemed insufficient.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal due to lack of prosecution, without deciding on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to approach the AO with relevant information to substantiate the cash deposits, restoring the appeal to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks, as defined under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, are indeed cooperative societies. Therefore, the interest income earned by the assessee from such cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80 P (2) (d). The Tribunal noted that Section 80 P (4) was not applicable as the assessee itself is not a cooperative bank.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly deleted the disallowances made by the Assessing Officer concerning service charges, deputation charges, and reimbursement of expenses. The Tribunal found no reason to deviate from its previous decisions on identical issues for the assessee in preceding assessment years.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a co-operative housing society, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned from cooperative banks. The Tribunal noted that Section 80P(4) only excludes cooperative banks functioning as commercial banks, not cooperative societies depositing funds in them.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly deleted the disallowances made by the Assessing Officer concerning service charges, deputation charges, and reimbursement of expenses. The Tribunal found no reason to deviate from its previous decisions on identical issues for the assessee in preceding assessment years.
The Tribunal found that the AO/CPC disallowed payments made to an approved gratuity fund without prior intimation, which was against the law and principles of natural justice. Therefore, the order of the AO/CPC was set aside.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's pleas regarding the nature of the interest income and eligibility for Section 80P(2)(c) deduction were not adequately considered by the lower authorities, and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal due to non-prosecution. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the entire issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing the AO to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee and consider all explanations and details.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) as an incorrect claim via Section 143(1) intimation is not permissible. The interest income earned by the cooperative society from cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) as cooperative banks are also considered cooperative societies.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are also cooperative societies, and thus the interest income derived by the assessee from investments with them is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. It further ruled that the disallowance was not permissible under Section 143(1)(a) as the claim was neither an 'incorrect claim apparent from information in the return' nor a deduction exceeding a specified statutory limit, nor was it due to late filing.
The Tribunal held that additions made in unabated assessment years following a search action cannot be sustained without the aid of incriminating material. Relying solely on statements without corroborating evidence was deemed insufficient.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had made submissions to the CIT(A) within the due date, contrary to the CIT(A)'s finding that no submissions were made. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had not represented their case before the Assessing Officer. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the issue was set aside to the file of the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the payment of lease rent to the related party was reasonable, as the revenue failed to provide any incriminating evidence to controvert the assessee's valuation report. Therefore, the exemption under Section 11 could not be denied.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of deduction under Section 143(1) was not permissible. Cooperative banks are also cooperative societies, and interest income earned by the assessee from such banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The adjustment made by the CPC was incorrect.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made under section 143(1)(a)(v) was not permissible as the reason for disallowance was not related to non-furnishing of the return within the due date. Furthermore, the Tribunal clarified that cooperative banks are indeed cooperative societies, and interest income derived from them is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 7,86,760/- was wrongly made by the Assessing Officer under Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal observed that for invoking the provisions of Section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) in cases where a property is received for consideration, the difference between the stamp duty value and the purchase price must exceed the higher of Rs. 50,000 or 10% of the consideration. In the present case, 10% of the consideration amounted to Rs. 2,59,87,074/-. The actual difference in stamp duty value and purchase price was Rs. 7,86,760/-, which is significantly less than the 10% threshold. Therefore, the conditions for invoking Section 56(2)(x) were not met. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and deleted the addition made by the AO. The ratio decidendi is that the threshold limit of 10% of consideration for invoking Section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) must be satisfied for an addition to be made when a property is acquired for consideration and the stamp duty value exceeds the consideration.
The Tribunal held that the assessee society is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) in respect of the interest of Rs. 5,19,119/- earned from co-operative banks during the year under consideration. The Tribunal's reasoning was based on the fact that the issue has been decided by various co-ordinate benches of the ITAT and non-jurisdictional High Courts on similar facts. Specifically, the Tribunal referred to the decision in Rekab Co-operative Hsg. Society Ltd. (supra), which held that even though a co-operative bank may not be entitled to deduction under Section 80P due to the insertion of sub-section (4), it continues to be a co-operative society registered under the Cooperative Society Act. Therefore, interest income earned by a co-operative society from its investments held with a co-operative bank would be eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal respectfully followed these co-ordinate bench decisions. The operative direction is to allow the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the AO made additions solely based on an investigation report without independent inquiry and failed to prove the assessee's involvement in price rigging. The Tribunal noted that the assessee provided documentary evidence for the transactions and is a regular investor.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of deduction under section 143(1)(a) was not permissible as it was not an 'incorrect claim' apparent from the return, nor was it due to non-furnishing of return within the due date. Furthermore, cooperative banks are considered cooperative societies, making the interest income derived from them eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the adjustment made under Section 143(1) disallowing the deduction under Section 80 P (2) (d) was not permissible. The court also observed that cooperative banks are a type of cooperative society, and interest income earned by a cooperative society from another cooperative society is eligible for deduction under Section 80 P (2) (d).
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in other cooperative banks is allowable as a deduction under section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed the decision of a coordinate bench and set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee could not prove the genuineness of purchases, there was a one-to-one correlation between alleged bogus purchases and sales. Following the principle of adding only the profit on untainted purchases, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to recalculate the addition based on the difference in gross profit earned.
The Tribunal held that MEDA is entitled to exemption under Section 10(23C)(iv) of the Act, dismissing the Revenue's appeal. Certain funds credited to the Development Fund and Infrastructure Road Maintenance Fund were directed to be treated as corpus or not as income, while other funds were to be examined for their nature as income.
The tribunal held that the disallowance under section 143(1) was not permissible as the claim for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) was not an "incorrect claim" or exceeding a statutory limit. It clarified that cooperative banks qualify as "co-operative societies" under section 2(19) and 80P(2)(d), making the interest income eligible for deduction. All three appeals for assessment years 2013-14, 2018-19, and 2019-20 were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the CPC under section 143(1) for disallowing the deduction under section 80 P(2)(d) was not permissible. Cooperative banks, by doing banking business, do not lose their status as cooperative societies. Therefore, interest income derived by the assessee from such cooperative banks is deductible under section 80 P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the adjustment disallowing the 80P(2)(d) deduction under section 143(1) was not permissible as it did not constitute an 'incorrect claim' under the Act. It further ruled that cooperative banks qualify as cooperative societies for the purpose of section 80P(2)(d), making the assessee eligible for the deduction on interest income from such banks. All three appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are indeed cooperative societies, clarifying that their banking business does not alter this status. Consequently, the interest income earned by the assessee from investments in such cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The deduction claimed by the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench in the assessee's own case for AY 2014-15 had held that the reopening of assessment was factually incorrect as the income was already disclosed. The Tribunal found the facts for the current year to be identical and followed the coordinate bench's decision.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, acknowledging that the communication not reaching the assessee due to an ex-employee's retired email address constitutes a reasonable cause. The case was restored to the CIT(Exemption) for a decision on merits after providing further opportunities.
The Tribunal, relying on precedents from the High Court and its own coordinate bench, held that the filing of Form 67 under Rule 128 is directory and not mandatory, and rules cannot override the substantive provisions of the Income Tax Act for claiming FTC. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order, quashed the impugned demand, and remanded the matter back to the AO to verify and allow the FTC claimed by the assessee after proper verification.
The Tribunal found that the AO did not provide the assessee with an opportunity to be heard before making the addition and did not examine the books of account. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO.
The CIT(A) held that the transfer of opening 'stock-in-trade' to 'fixed assets' would not impact the Profit & Loss Account, except for the claim of depreciation, and therefore, no addition was required. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, agreeing that such a transfer does not increase the assessee's income or impact the P&L account.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities. Procedural law is subservient to justice, and any interpretation that frustrates justice should not be followed. The object of e-filing is to expedite proceedings and advance the cause of justice.
The Tribunal held that the addition on which the penalty was levied was non-existent as the assessment order itself was quashed. Although the Revenue challenged the ITAT's order in the High Court, there was no stay against the ITAT's order. Therefore, the Tribunal found no perversity or illegality in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities were in furtherance of its objects of general public utility and were not purely commercial. The Tribunal relied on its own previous orders in the assessee's case and dismissed the Revenue's appeals.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without a meritorious adjudication and without considering submissions made during prior physical hearings, especially given the transition to a faceless regime. Citing the provisions of Section 250, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) must pass a speaking order on merits. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for de novo meritorious adjudication, with directions for the assessee to be diligent.
The Tribunal held that the addition on which the penalty was levied was non-existent as the assessment order itself was quashed. Although the Revenue challenged the ITAT's order in the High Court, there was no stay against the ITAT's order. Therefore, the Tribunal found no perversity or illegality in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities, including conducting exhibitions, were in furtherance of its objects of promoting trade and business, falling under the general public utility category. The Tribunal found no deviation from the assessee's main objects and relied on previous decisions in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(Exemptions) had indeed rejected the application without considering the extensive submissions made by the assessee through e-proceedings. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Exemptions) with directions to duly consider all submissions already on record and grant registration in accordance with the provisions of law, ensuring the assessee receives a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal observed that although the assessee's conduct was non-compliant, the reply and documents were essential for proper adjudication. Therefore, for substantial justice, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to substantiate her claim. The case was remanded to the CIT for a fresh decision.