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625 orders · Page 13 of 13
The Tribunal held that the AO had passed the assessment order without basic verification of the excess expenditure claimed from the corpus fund, which was not allowable. Therefore, the Pr.CIT rightly directed the AO to re-do the assessment.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's second revision order was invalid as it was based on a previous revision order that had been quashed by the ITAT. Therefore, the entire foundation of the second round of revisionary proceedings was without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the cash flow statement of the company, which showed the seized cash as an opening balance, could not be ignored. It noted that ignoring this would lead to double taxation.
The Tribunal held that amendments to Section 14A by the Finance Act 2022 are prospective and do not apply retrospectively. It also upheld the deletion of disallowance under Section 14A from book profits, following previous tribunal decisions.
The Tribunal held that Section 10 provides for income-specific exemptions, while Sections 11-13 are application-based. Income exempt under Section 10 cannot be brought to tax by applying Sections 11-13.
The Tribunal held that depreciation was not allowable as the assets were not put to use for business due to contract termination. However, the matter of quantifying the claim as a business loss was restored to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the option agreement with HRPL was a normal business transaction and not a sham. The difference in prices was attributable to various factors like timing, market conditions, and floor levels, and HRPL was a B2B customer. The addition made by the AO was unjustified.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal was misconceived as it only challenged the merits of the addition, without challenging the CIT(A)'s finding on the invalidity of the reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The tribunal has rectified a typographical error in its previous order. The date "24th September 1991" has been corrected to "24th September 2021" in the last sentence of paragraph 10.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to record the requisite dissatisfaction as mandated by Section 14A(2) of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 14A read with Rule 8D could not be invoked.
The Tribunal upheld the penalty levied under Section 271E for the violation of Section 269T. No material was presented to contradict the findings of the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the non-compete fee qualifies as an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This decision was based on judicial precedents, including a Bombay High Court ruling.
The Tribunal held that the 'right to collect toll' is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. It also upheld the assessee's claim for provisions for periodic maintenance charges, finding them to be based on a scientific calculation and the matching principle.
The Tribunal held that since the sales turnover declared by the assessee was accepted by the Revenue, only the profit element embedded in the bogus transactions can be brought to tax, not the entire purchase amount. Therefore, the disallowance restricted to 12.5% by the CIT(A) was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the 'right to collect toll' is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. It also upheld the assessee's claim for provisions for periodic maintenance charges, finding them to be based on a scientific calculation and the matching principle.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the present appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that provisions for certain expenses like property tax, waterproofing, society formation, generator expenses, and audit fees were not to be disallowed outright. It found that the disallowance of property tax under Section 43B was not appropriate as the liability might fall on purchasers. The addition of Rs. 1,80,000/- from Viom Networks was upheld.
The tribunal has corrected a typographical error in its previous order. The date '24th September 1991' has been substituted with '24th September 2021'. This corrigendum forms part of the original order.
The Tribunal held that the 'right to collect toll' is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. It also upheld the assessee's claim for provisions for periodic maintenance charges, finding them to be based on a scientific calculation and the matching principle.
The Tribunal held that the draft financial statements, even though in draft form and provided to a third party for finalization, continued to belong to the assessee. Therefore, the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was valid.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to re-examine several grounds of appeal, including income from house property, unexplained loan, and unexplained investments in land and property, by calling for further evidence and giving the assessee an opportunity to substantiate claims. One ground was dismissed as not pressed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for interest/dividend income from a co-operative bank. The Supreme Court decision in Totgars was found to be distinguishable on facts.
The Tribunal held that the non-filing of the audit report was a procedural defect and a bonafide error. The assessee should not be denied the benefit of Section 11 if otherwise eligible, especially when the report was available and filed later.
The Tribunal held that once the commission paid to the Indian subsidiary was found to be at arm's length, no further income should be attributed to the PE in India. This decision followed previous rulings by the same Tribunal in the assessee's own cases for earlier assessment years.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) became functus officio after passing the initial order and lacked the authority to recall it. The Tribunal found that the allegation of fraud was not proven according to law, and the CIT(A) could not be the judge of her own allegations.