119 orders · Page 3 of 3
The Tribunal admitted an additional ground of appeal concerning the limitation of issuing a notice under section 142(1). Following a precedent and a CBDT circular, the Tribunal held that the notice was issued beyond the prescribed period, rendering the assessment proceedings void ab initio.
The Tribunal restored the issues in dispute to the file of the Assessing Officer for a denovo assessment. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass a fresh order after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal, while dealing with the appeals for Assessment Years 2018-19 and 2020-21, noted that the issue of deduction under Section 80P concerning interest earned by co-operative societies on investments, particularly those statutorily required to be kept in bank deposits or government securities, had been a subject of judicial scrutiny. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Cooperative and other High Court and ITAT judgments which held that interest earned by a Co-operative Society on deposits, which are statutorily required to be kept, are attributable to the business of an assessee. However, the Tribunal found that the figures regarding interest attributable to statutory reserves and the examination of the assessee's bye-laws required further scrutiny by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the issue of deduction under Section 80P for readjudication by the Assessing Officer. The AO, after remand, accepted the principle that interest income arising from investments in statutory reserve funds and other funds as per Sections 58 and 59 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act is "attributable" to the main activities of the Society. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal related to the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P and restored the matter to the AO for re-computing the admissible deduction with reference to interest earned on investments made in accordance with the relevant provisions of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act and Rules. The issue of penalty proceedings under Section 270A was not discussed in the provided excerpt.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Both parties agreed that the matter should be restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment. The AO was directed to pass a denovo order after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Both parties agreed that the matter should be restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment. The AO was directed to pass a denovo order after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal restored the issues in dispute back to the Assessing Officer for a denovo assessment. This was to be done after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal restored the issues in dispute back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment. This was to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to present their case and for the AO to consider all relevant facts and submissions.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to present their case before the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). Therefore, the case was restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that while the AO's satisfaction for invoking Section 14A was justified, the disallowance computed under Rule 8D(2)(ii) should not exceed the exempt income earned. Therefore, the disallowance was restricted to the exempt income.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC and restored the case to the Assessing Officer to provide the assessee one last opportunity to present her case. The assessee was cautioned to comply with the AO's directions.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the issue of the addition to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment. This was done to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to present their case and substantiate their explanations.
The Tribunal found that the assessee deserved another opportunity to present its case. The appeal was restored to the NFAC with directions to consider the delay and hear the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal found that there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), and the CIT(A) erred in not condoning the delay. The impugned order was set aside, and the issue of TDS credit was remanded to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal restored the issue of salary income to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification and a denovo order. The AO was directed to pass an order in accordance with law after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence filed by the assessee, which was crucial for determining the case. Considering the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to provide the assessee with another opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had unjustly rejected the assessee's request for condonation of delay. The Tribunal also noted that both the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) had passed orders without providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal for failure to file concise grounds of appeal as per ITAT Rules. The Tribunal also noted that the appeal was barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was not maintainable due to being barred by limitation and having unrectified defects. The assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the delay or non-appearance.
The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation satisfactory, considering her status as a housewife, sole heir, and the circumstances of her parents keeping cash at home. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted.