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245 orders · Page 5 of 5
The Tribunal held that the order rejecting the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A of the Act was passed without providing adequate opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal noted the agreement from the learned DR that only two opportunities of hearing were given. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to reconsider the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A of the Act. This reconsideration is to be done after giving due opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The ratio decidendi is that an application for registration under Section 12A cannot be rejected without adhering to the principles of natural justice, which includes providing sufficient opportunities for the assessee to present their case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified in upholding the AO's order. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the valuation report of the merchant banker based on the DCF method was wrongly rejected by the AO, who then adopted the NAV method. The Tribunal reiterated that as per Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, the option to choose between the DCF or NAV method rests with the assessee. It is judicially settled that the AO cannot reject the assessee's chosen method unless grave errors are pointed out. The Tribunal noted that the AO's basis for rejecting the DCF valuation was that the assessee showed unreasonable future projections while incurring losses. However, the Tribunal found that the AO's conclusion was merely a passing remark based on figures in the report, without any inquiry or investigation into the justification for the projections provided by the merchant valuer. This was deemed insufficient to reject the expert valuation. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 18,57,73,482/- made under Section 56(2)(viib) was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee cannot be held to be an assessee in default under Section 201 of the Act. The reasoning is based on the chronology of events and judicial pronouncements, particularly those of the Hon'ble Madras High Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Tribunal noted that the assessee bank was prevented from deducting TDS on LTC paid to its employees for foreign travel due to interim orders from the Hon'ble Madras High Court. Specifically, an interim order dated 16.02.2015 clarified that during the pendency of a stay on the bank's circular withdrawing LTC for overseas travel, any LTC paid would not be considered income for TDS purposes. This order barred the bank from deducting TDS. Although the Supreme Court decision in AY 2013-14 held the bank liable to deduct TDS, the ITAT and Kerala High Court decisions for AY 2016-17 and AY 2017-18 (the present case's period) found the assessee not in default because it was prevented by the Madras High Court's order. The Tribunal emphasized that while the Apex Court decision lays down the law, the fact that the assessee was precluded from deducting TDS due to a court order is a vital fact that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the demand raised by the AO under Section 201(1) and 201(1A) is set aside. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned assessment year (AY 2016-17) was issued without the authority of law and was barred by limitation. The reasoning was based on the interpretation of Section 153C read with its first proviso and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in CIT vs Jasjit Singh. The Tribunal noted that the notice under Section 153C was issued to the assessee on 13.10.2023, which, as per the proviso to Section 153C, is to be treated as the date of initiation of the search for the purpose of reckoning the six-year period for assessment. Since the search on the 'Friends SPS Group Kota' was conducted on 01.08.2019, and the notice was issued on 13.10.2023, the period of six assessment years prior to the year of search initiation (which would be AY 2024-25, considering the notice date) would extend up to AY 2018-19. Therefore, the assessment for AY 2016-17 was beyond the permissible scope. The AO's report did not controvert these facts or the legal position. Consequently, the jurisdiction assumed by the AO to frame the assessment under Section 153C for AY 2016-17 was held to be invalid, and the assessment order was quashed as void ab initio. Ground No. 1 was allowed. As the assessment order was quashed, other grounds were rendered academic and not dealt with.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed by the CIT(E) was to be set aside. The reasoning was that the approval under Section 80G of the Act is consequential to registration under Section 12AB. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had already applied for registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, and that the matter had previously been remanded for a fresh decision on Section 12AB registration. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to send the case back to the CIT(E) to decide afresh after providing the appellant with an adequate opportunity of being heard, contingent upon the registration under Section 12AB. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed by the CIT(E) was bad in law as it appeared that adequate opportunity of being heard had not been granted to the appellant. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's case for registration under Section 12AB had already been remanded back to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision after providing an adequate opportunity of being heard. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Tribunal found no option but to send the case back for consequential approval under Section 80G of the Act, subject to the appellant obtaining registration under Section 12AB upon production of necessary evidence. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes by setting aside the impugned order and directing the CIT(E) to decide the matter afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's first ground of appeal, holding that the assessment order was barred by limitation. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in UOI Vs. Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal Vs. UOI. It was noted that the original notice under the old regime was issued on 23.06.2021, and the extension of limitation as per TOLA was up to 30.06.2021, leaving only seven days of surviving period for the AO. The assessee filed a reply to the Section 148A(b) notice on 18.06.2022. Following the ratio in Rajeev Bansal, the AO ought to have issued the notice under Section 148 of the new regime by 25.06.2022. However, the notice was issued on 25.07.2022, making it time-barred. Consequently, the assessment order passed by the AO was quashed as void ab initio for lack of valid jurisdiction. As the assessment order was quashed, the other grounds of appeal were rendered academic and not dealt with.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel filed a written application seeking withdrawal of the appeal. The application clearly stated the intention to withdraw one of the two appeals filed. The Revenue's representative had no objection to this request. Therefore, in light of the assessee's explicit request for withdrawal and the Revenue's acquiescence, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided; the entire appeal was disposed of based on the withdrawal request.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 53 days in filing the appeal was condoned. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee had complied with all notices during the appellate proceedings before the Ld. CIT(A), and the delay occurred due to a bona fide non-awareness of the impugned order, which was not received on the counsel's email. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., the Tribunal emphasized that 'sufficient cause' should be interpreted liberally to advance substantial justice, and that technical considerations should not outweigh the cause of justice. The Tribunal found that the delay was unintentional and beyond the assessee's control. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had remained non-compliant with notices before the Assessing Officer and had made no submissions on the merits before the Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A) had passed an ex parte order. Given that the assessee had remained unheard throughout, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice, restored the issue back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate the appeal afresh after providing the assessee with a due opportunity of hearing and then pass an order in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the solitary issue pertains to the applicability of Section 56(2)(x) of the Act to the transaction of purchase of immovable property, resulting in an addition of Rs. 3,89,98,000/-. Section 56(2)(x) states that if a person receives immovable property for consideration less than the stamp duty value, the excess of the stamp duty value over the actual consideration is treated as income from other sources. The assessee firm, M/s Mama Foods, purchased property No. SP-9-MIA, Alwar, from M/s Eicher Goodearth Pvt. Ltd. for Rs. 8,17,94,000/- via a sale deed dated 27.03.2019. The excess of the stamp duty value over the actual consideration was Rs. 3.89 crores. The judgment does not record the Tribunal's specific findings or reasoning on the two grounds of appeal, nor does it mention any operative directions or issues left undecided. The provided text is incomplete and does not contain the Tribunal's decision.
The Tribunal, after considering the materials on record, including the Registration Certificate dated 12.02.2026 issued by the RPT authority and the assessee's undertaking to file all necessary documents, decided to set aside the matters. The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The principle derived is that if an assessee provides evidence of compliance (like registration under state law) and undertakes to furnish remaining documents, the authorities should grant an opportunity for rectification rather than outright denial, especially in the interest of justice. The operative direction is to remand the matters to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and grant of registration as per law, provided the assessee cooperates by filing the required documents. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the order dated 30.03.2017 passed by the AO under section 201(1) of the Act for the financial year 2009-10 was indeed passed after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under section 201(3) of the Act. The assessee had filed TDS statements for all four quarters of the financial year 2009-10, with the last statement filed on 30.05.2010. Under section 201(3)(i) as it stood before 01.10.2014, the limitation for passing an order expired on 31.03.2013. The substituted provision by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, which extended the period to seven years, came into effect from 01.10.2014. On this date, the limitation under the earlier provision had already expired, and a right to plead the bar of limitation had accrued to the assessee. The Tribunal, following the Gujarat High Court's decision in Tata Teleservices v. Union of India, held that the substituted provision did not revive a period that had already expired. Consequently, the order under section 201(1) was quashed as being without jurisdiction. The consequential interest under section 201(1A) was also set aside. Grounds relating to the merits of the demand under section 194C and the CIT(A)'s refusal to consider evidence were rendered academic and left undecided.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(E) and restored the application to the CIT(E)'s file for a fresh decision. Regarding the first issue, the Tribunal held that while the objects of the trust are relevant, the insertion of section 80G(5B) with effect from 01.04.2000 means that the presence of a religious object is no longer decisive if religious expenditure is within five per cent of total income. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s conclusion that all objects were religious or related to a particular community was not supported by the trust deed, which included charitable objects like running a hospital and dispensaries. The CIT(E) also misread section 80G(5B) and did not deal with the assessee's reply. On the second issue, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had not quantified the religious expenditure or identified the base (total income) as required by section 80G(5B). The assessee's claim of bifurcation and inclusion of charitable expenditure needed examination. The Tribunal rejected the assessee's claim that the impugned order mentioned a fifty per cent limit. For the third issue, the Tribunal acknowledged that registration under section 12A is relevant, but since the outcome of the renewal application was not on record, this aspect also needed fresh examination by the CIT(E). The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to examine all aspects, call for necessary material, and provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the plea for condonation of delay, formally placed before the authority, deserves a decision with reasons. While the learned CIT(E) believed the provisional approval expired in March 2025, making the application filed on 27.09.2025 late by nearly a year, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to resolve this dispute. Even if the CIT(E)'s view on expiry was accepted, the delay was of a nature that the Tribunal, following consistent precedents like BR Nath Pai Shikshan Sanstha v. CIT(E) and Kachchh Kerala Samajam v. CIT, has condoned in its appellate jurisdiction when the explanation is bona fide and the rejection is solely on grounds of delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay, treating the application as filed within time and maintainable. Consequently, the cancellation of the provisional approval was set aside. The matter was restored to the learned CIT(E) for a fresh decision on merits, including examination of the genuineness of activities and fulfillment of conditions under section 80G(5), after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The prayer for direct approval was not accepted as it requires satisfaction on merits. The ground of appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the common thread in the CIT(E)'s rejection was the assessee's silence. The finding on genuineness was based on the inability to determine it due to lack of documents, not on any adverse material. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's failure to respond was due to an inoperative email address, a curable defect. While the assessee was not without blame for not keeping contact details current, a rejection based on a curable default without examining actual material was disproportionate. The Tribunal set aside the order rejecting the application for registration under Section 12AB and restored it to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision, directing the assessee to cooperate and provide necessary documents. The Tribunal explicitly refrained from expressing any view on the merits of the three reasons for rejection, leaving the issue of registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act open for the CIT(E) to decide based on future material. Regarding the Section 80G application, since its rejection was solely based on the Section 12AB rejection, and that order was set aside, the foundation for the second order no longer survived. The Section 80G application was also restored to the CIT(E) to be decided afresh after the Section 12AB application is decided. The Tribunal also clarified that the CIT(E)'s observation regarding the admissibility of appeals under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act was beyond his authority.
The Tribunal held that the common thread in the CIT(E)'s rejection was the assessee's silence. The finding on genuineness was based on the inability to determine it due to lack of documents, not on any adverse material. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's failure to respond was due to an inoperative email address, a curable defect. While the assessee was not without blame for not keeping contact details current, a rejection based on a curable default without examining actual material was disproportionate. The Tribunal set aside the order rejecting the application for registration under Section 12AB and restored it to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision, directing the assessee to cooperate and provide necessary documents. The Tribunal explicitly refrained from expressing any view on the merits of the three reasons for rejection, leaving the issue of registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act open for the CIT(E) to decide based on future material. Regarding the Section 80G application, since its rejection was solely based on the Section 12AB rejection, and that order was set aside, the foundation for the second order no longer survived. The Section 80G application was also restored to the CIT(E) to be decided afresh after the Section 12AB application is decided. The Tribunal also clarified that the CIT(E)'s observation regarding the admissibility of appeals under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act was beyond his authority.
The Tribunal, after considering the materials on record, including the Registration Certificate dated 09.10.2025 issued by the RPT authority and the assessee's undertaking to provide necessary details, decided to set aside the matter. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to grant one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to cooperate by filing the required documents and details before the Ld. CIT(E) for passing the order of registration under Section 12AB and Section 80G(5) of the Act. The Tribunal found it fit in the interest of justice to allow the appeals for statistical purposes, remanding the issue back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal, after considering the materials on record, including the Registration Certificate dated 09.10.2025 issued by the RPT authority and the assessee's undertaking to provide necessary details, decided to set aside the matter. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to grant one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to cooperate by filing the required documents and details before the Ld. CIT(E) for passing the order of registration under Section 12AB and Section 80G(5) of the Act. The Tribunal found it fit in the interest of justice to allow the appeals for statistical purposes, remanding the issue back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the impugned orders of the learned CIT(E) could not be sustained. Regarding the delay in filing the applications, the Tribunal condoned the delay for both the section 12AB and section 80G applications, treating them as filed within time, as the reasons for delay were common and bona fide. Concerning the characterization of activities as business or commercial, the Tribunal noted that the learned CIT(E) did not identify the specific limb of section 2(15) under which the activities fell or examine the applicability of the proviso. The Tribunal found that these were questions of fact requiring examination of the assessee's objects, MOUs, project proposals, utilization certificates, and accounts, which should be done by the learned CIT(E) in the first instance. Therefore, no finding was recorded on this issue, leaving it open for a fresh decision. On the issue of honorarium paid to a director, the Tribunal referred to section 13(1)(c) read with section 13(2)(c) of the Act, stating that the statute does not forbid payment for services rendered, but the test is whether services were rendered and if the amount is reasonable. The absence of a degree was one circumstance, but the reasonableness of the amount and other factual aspects required proper examination. The Tribunal set aside both orders of the learned CIT(E) and restored the applications to the file of the learned CIT(E) for a fresh decision on merits. The learned CIT(E) was directed to examine the nature and genuineness of activities, the honorarium, and any other relevant aspect, and to grant a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The cancellation of provisional registration and approval was also set aside, to abide by the fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the impugned orders of the learned CIT(E) could not be sustained. Regarding the delay in filing the applications, the Tribunal condoned the delay for both the section 12AB and section 80G applications, treating them as filed within time, as the reasons for delay were common and bona fide. Concerning the characterization of activities as business or commercial, the Tribunal noted that the learned CIT(E) did not identify the specific limb of section 2(15) under which the activities fell or examine the applicability of the proviso. The Tribunal found that these were questions of fact requiring examination of the assessee's objects, MOUs, project proposals, utilization certificates, and accounts, which should be done by the learned CIT(E) in the first instance. Therefore, no finding was recorded on this issue, leaving it open for a fresh decision. On the issue of honorarium paid to a director, the Tribunal referred to section 13(1)(c) read with section 13(2)(c) of the Act, stating that the statute does not forbid payment for services rendered, but the test is whether services were rendered and if the amount is reasonable. The absence of a degree was one circumstance, but the reasonableness of the amount and other factual aspects required proper examination. The Tribunal set aside both orders of the learned CIT(E) and restored the applications to the file of the learned CIT(E) for a fresh decision on merits. The learned CIT(E) was directed to examine the nature and genuineness of activities, the honorarium, and any other relevant aspect, and to grant a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The cancellation of provisional registration and approval was also set aside, to abide by the fresh decision.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition of Rs 83,25,325 made under section 69A. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's audited accounts were not rejected by the AO under section 145. The AO had accepted the assessee's turnover and had not recorded any finding that the cash deposited was not recorded in its books. The Tribunal found that the AO's addition was based solely on dissatisfaction with the source of deposits, not on the absence of recording. The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's contention that no cash flow statement was filed, noting it was mentioned in the assessment order. It also found that the assessee's explanation was consistent, encompassing cash sales, withdrawals, and member recoveries. The Tribunal clarified that the CIT(A)'s examination of specific deposits was illustrative of a broader finding on all deposits. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's argument regarding cheque payments contradicting cash withdrawal claims, stating it did not affect the principal source of cash sales and recoveries. The Tribunal also rejected the Revenue's alternative prayer for remand, considering it an attempt to reinitiate assessment proceedings. The ratio is that where an assessee provides a plausible explanation for cash deposits, supported by business receipts and audited accounts, and the AO fails to demonstrate that the deposits are from an unrecorded source, the addition under section 69A cannot be sustained.
The Tribunal held that for investments in sister concerns (Ground 1), the assessee failed to demonstrate commercial expediency. While investments in group companies for controlling interest can be considered commercially expedient, the assessee did not establish that the borrowed funds were used for these investments. The Tribunal noted that the partners' capital accounts showed debit balances for most of the year, indicating that interest-bearing funds might have been diverted. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance in principle but set aside the quantum for recomputation. For partners' debit balances (Ground 2), the Tribunal found that withdrawals by partners are inherently for personal purposes. The assessee did not provide any business purpose for these interest-free advances, and the accounts did not support the claim that they came out of profits and day-to-day cash flow. Therefore, Ground 2 was dismissed. Regarding the quantum of disallowance (Ground 3), the Tribunal found that the assessee's working for partners' accounts correctly set off interest for credit periods, but it omitted interest on the opening investment. The AO's working was not on record. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the quantum of disallowance for both investments and partners' debit balances to the AO for recomputation. The AO was directed to compute interest on daily balances, allowing set-off for credit periods for partners, and on daily balances from April 1, 2015, for investments, at the rate of 12%. Ground 3 was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes, setting aside the impugned order and restoring the application to the file of the CIT(E) for a fresh decision. On the issue of opportunity of being heard (Ground No. 1), the Tribunal found that the opportunity provided was not reasonable and effective. A single letter with a very short compliance date, without a show cause notice detailing proposed reasons for rejection, was insufficient. The Tribunal noted inconsistencies in the record regarding notices and the assessee's response, which indicated an application for RPT Act registration was pending. Regarding incomplete documents (Grounds 2 & 3), the Tribunal acknowledged that Rule 17A(2)(e) required copies of prior registration orders. However, it noted these were defects curable by furnishing copies and that the CIT(E) had not doubted the existence of the prior registration. The Tribunal dismissed the contention that re-registration inquiry is limited to objects and genuineness, stating compliance with other laws is relevant under section 12AB(1)(b)(i). Ground 2 was allowed for statistical purposes. On the RPT Act registration (Ground 4), the Tribunal noted the assessee was not registered but was pursuing it. It refrained from deciding the merits, stating the CIT(E) would decide afresh on available facts. Ground 4 was allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal also addressed an observation by the CIT(E) regarding the maintainability of appeals by unregistered trusts under the RPT Act, stating it was beyond the scope of the CIT(E)'s proceedings and did not bind the Tribunal. The assessee was granted liberty to furnish documents and the CIT(E) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing, examining all issues afresh without being bound by prior observations.
The Tribunal held that the evidence now produced by the Assessee, including vouchers, beneficiary lists, and third-party letters, which were not before the CIT(E), goes to the root of the matter and is required for a proper decision. While the Tribunal admitted this evidence under Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules, it noted that it cannot be the first authority to examine and verify such primary evidence. The Tribunal found that the Assessee's reliance on cited precedents was distinguishable as the primary evidence was not produced before the lower authorities. Consequently, for the first application (ITA No. 1095/JPR/2026), the impugned order was set aside, and the application was restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on the genuineness of activities, with the Tribunal's findings on trust objects and donation sources binding the CIT(E). For the second application (ITA No. 1228/JPR/2026), the Tribunal noted that the foundation of its rejection (the rejection of the first application) had ceased to exist, and thus, this application was also restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision. The Tribunal expressed no opinion on the genuineness of activities or the evidence now produced.
The Tribunal held that the evidence now produced by the Assessee, including vouchers, beneficiary lists, and third-party letters, which were not before the CIT(E), goes to the root of the matter and is required for a proper decision. While the Tribunal admitted this evidence under Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules, it noted that it cannot be the first authority to examine and verify such primary evidence. The Tribunal found that the Assessee's reliance on cited precedents was distinguishable as the primary evidence was not produced before the lower authorities. Consequently, for the first application (ITA No. 1095/JPR/2026), the impugned order was set aside, and the application was restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on the genuineness of activities, with the Tribunal's findings on trust objects and donation sources binding the CIT(E). For the second application (ITA No. 1228/JPR/2026), the Tribunal noted that the foundation of its rejection (the rejection of the first application) had ceased to exist, and thus, this application was also restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision. The Tribunal expressed no opinion on the genuineness of activities or the evidence now produced.
The Tribunal, after considering the materials on record, including the Registration Certificate dated 12.02.2026 issued by the RPT authority and the assessee's undertaking to file all necessary documents, decided to set aside the matters. The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The principle derived is that if an assessee provides evidence of compliance (like registration under state law) and undertakes to furnish remaining documents, the authorities should grant an opportunity for rectification rather than outright denial, especially in the interest of justice. The operative direction is to remand the matters to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and grant of registration as per law, provided the assessee cooperates by filing the required documents. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the bonus of Rs 2,07,438 paid to employees is allowable as a deduction and is not hit by section 36(1)(ii) of the Act. The reasoning was that section 36(1)(ii) denies deduction only if the sum would have been payable as profits or dividend had it not been paid as bonus or commission. This restriction targets the distribution of profits to shareholders in the guise of remuneration. The Tribunal found that the payees were workers who had rendered services, and the bonus was paid at the statutory rate of 8.33% of wages, corresponding to the minimum bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities' conclusion that the payment's nature remained unexplained was based on an incorrect premise, as evidence like employee-wise bonus payment sheets and books of account were filed. Crucially, neither the CPC nor the JCIT(A) provided material to show that any payee was a shareholder or director, or would have been entitled to the amount as profits or dividend. The cited precedents relied upon by the JCIT(A) (Dalal Broacha and SRC Aviation) concerned payments to shareholder directors, distinguishable from the present case where payees are non-shareholder employees. The Tribunal directed the deletion of the disallowance. The issue of whether the adjustment could be made under section 143(1)(a)(iv) was left undecided as the appeal was decided on merits.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 3,51,000 under section 69A was not sustainable. The entire addition rested on two slips, which were considered 'loose notings' with limited evidentiary value, especially when uncorroborated and lacking crucial details like the payer, payee, purpose, or year. For Slip A, the dates (November 2020) indicated transactions belonging to FY 2020-21, not FY 2019-20, thus falling outside the assessment year under appeal. For Slip B, no year was mentioned, and the AO provided no reason for attributing it to FY 2019-20. The Tribunal found that the nexus with the assessee company was not established; the heading 'Trimurti Circle' only indicated a location, not receipt by the company. The signatory was unidentified, and no handwriting comparison or statement was obtained. Nothing in the form of cash, assets, or unrecorded stock was found, and the books of account were not rejected. The Tribunal noted that while the integrity of the electronic data was not in doubt, its probative worth was questionable. Relying on the principle that suspicion cannot replace proof and that loose sheets have little weight, the Tribunal deleted the addition. Consequently, Ground No. 5 regarding section 115BBE became infructuous. The legal grounds (reopening validity, notice issuance, Section 65B) were left undecided as the assessee succeeded on merits.
The Tribunal considered the materials on record, including the Registration Certificate dated 12.05.2026 issued by the RPT authority and a reply letter from the assessee dated 04.02.2026, which had not been considered by the Ld. CIT(E). In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) and remand the matters back to his file. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to provide the assessee with one more opportunity of hearing. The Ld. CIT(E) was further directed to grant registration under Sections 12AB and 80G(5) of the Act as per the provisions of law, provided the assessee cooperates by filing the required documents and details. The finding on the specific grounds for denial was not explicitly decided on merits but was rendered moot by the remand. The ratio is that where new evidence becomes available post-rejection, and the revenue has no objection to a remand, the matter should be reconsidered by the assessing authority.
The Tribunal considered the materials on record, including the Registration Certificate dated 12.05.2026 issued by the RPT authority and a reply letter from the assessee dated 04.02.2026, which had not been considered by the Ld. CIT(E). In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) and remand the matters back to his file. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to provide the assessee with one more opportunity of hearing. The Ld. CIT(E) was further directed to grant registration under Sections 12AB and 80G(5) of the Act as per the provisions of law, provided the assessee cooperates by filing the required documents and details. The finding on the specific grounds for denial was not explicitly decided on merits but was rendered moot by the remand. The ratio is that where new evidence becomes available post-rejection, and the revenue has no objection to a remand, the matter should be reconsidered by the assessing authority.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application for registration under section 12AB was not justified. Regarding the first ground for rejection (incomplete documentation), the Tribunal noted that the omitted documents were mostly departmental records and the absence of a self-certified copy was a curable deficiency in presentation, not a substantive eligibility issue, citing Shree Bhuwal Mataji Gaushala Sanstha v. CIT (Exemption). Concerning the second ground (non-registration under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959), the Tribunal acknowledged that compliance with other laws is a relevant consideration under section 12AB(1)(b)(i)(B), but the outright rejection of the application for such a deficiency, especially when it is being cured, requires case-specific consideration. The Tribunal distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling in Public Trust Shri Geeta Satsang Bhawan v. Nand Lal, stating that Section 29 of the RPT Act bars hearing and deciding a suit, not the maintainability of an appeal before the ITAT. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(E) had no authority to pronounce on the admissibility of an appeal against his own order. Furthermore, the impugned order was passed based on a single deficiency letter without a show cause notice, and a date mentioned for compliance preceded the letter itself. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order rejecting the section 12AB application and restored it to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee an opportunity to furnish documents and explanations. The Tribunal expressed no opinion on the merits. For ITA No. 424/JPR/2026, the rejection of the 80G application was consequential to the 12AB rejection and thus could not independently survive. This application was also restored to the CIT(E) for fresh decision after or alongside the section 12AB proceedings. The Tribunal allowed both appeals for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application for registration under section 12AB was not justified. Regarding the first ground for rejection (incomplete documentation), the Tribunal noted that the omitted documents were mostly departmental records and the absence of a self-certified copy was a curable deficiency in presentation, not a substantive eligibility issue, citing Shree Bhuwal Mataji Gaushala Sanstha v. CIT (Exemption). Concerning the second ground (non-registration under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959), the Tribunal acknowledged that compliance with other laws is a relevant consideration under section 12AB(1)(b)(i)(B), but the outright rejection of the application for such a deficiency, especially when it is being cured, requires case-specific consideration. The Tribunal distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling in Public Trust Shri Geeta Satsang Bhawan v. Nand Lal, stating that Section 29 of the RPT Act bars hearing and deciding a suit, not the maintainability of an appeal before the ITAT. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(E) had no authority to pronounce on the admissibility of an appeal against his own order. Furthermore, the impugned order was passed based on a single deficiency letter without a show cause notice, and a date mentioned for compliance preceded the letter itself. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order rejecting the section 12AB application and restored it to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee an opportunity to furnish documents and explanations. The Tribunal expressed no opinion on the merits. For ITA No. 424/JPR/2026, the rejection of the 80G application was consequential to the 12AB rejection and thus could not independently survive. This application was also restored to the CIT(E) for fresh decision after or alongside the section 12AB proceedings. The Tribunal allowed both appeals for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed Ground No. 1, quashing the reassessment proceedings. It held that the sanction for reopening the assessment for AY 2016-17 was granted on 22.07.2022, and the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 were issued on 25.07.2022. As per section 151 of the Act, since more than three years had elapsed from the end of AY 2016-17 (31.03.2017), the sanction ought to have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner (section 151(ii)). However, the sanction was granted by the Principal Commissioner (section 151(i)). The Tribunal noted that while the period of three years ended on 31.03.2020, which fell within the TOLA extension period allowing sanction up to 30.06.2021, the actual sanction and notice were issued much later on 25.07.2022. At that point, the higher authority under section 151(ii) was required. The Tribunal followed the decisions in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal and Ramesh Bachulal Mehta v. ITO, holding that non-compliance with section 151 vitiates jurisdiction and cannot be cured under section 292B. Consequently, the reassessment order was quashed. As the reassessment was quashed on the issue of sanction, Ground No. 2 (merits of addition) and Ground No. 3 (interest) were rendered academic and not adjudicated. The contentions on these issues were left open.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 157 days in filing the appeal, holding that the delay was due to bona fide and reasonable circumstances and was neither intentional nor deliberate. The Tribunal found that the assessee was prevented by a sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed period, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag &Anr. v. Mst. Katiji&Ors. (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) for a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' to advance substantial justice. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the service of a notice under Section 148 of the Act is mandatory for the valid assumption of jurisdiction to frame an assessment under Section 147. The Tribunal found that the Revenue had not suitably controverted the assessee's contention of non-service of the Section 148 notice. The fact that the notice was issued to the PAN address and sent by registered post was insufficient to demonstrate valid service. As the fact of service of notice was not established, the assessment framed was held to be without the authority of law and consequently void. The assessment order was directed to be quashed. Other grounds raised by the assessee were rendered academic and not dealt with.
The Tribunal held that the plea of limitation goes to the root of the AO's jurisdiction and arises from undisputed facts on record, thus admitting it for the first time. The reassessment notice under section 148 dated 12.04.2023 was issued after the expiry of the limitation period under section 149(1) of the Act. The source of information was a search under section 132 on a third party (RSP(S)) after 01.04.2021, which falls under clause (c) of the first proviso to section 148A. In such cases, the section 148A procedure is not contemplated, and therefore, the time allowed for the show cause notice cannot be excluded for computing limitation. Following Amit Pahuja (supra), the Tribunal quashed the notice under section 148 and the consequential reassessment order dated 23.01.2025 as being without jurisdiction. Grounds no. 2, 3, and 4 were allowed. Consequently, grounds relating to the merits of the disallowance (grounds 5 and 6) and other legal contentions (ground 8) became academic and were left open. The ratio decidendi is that a procedure excluded by statute cannot be used to extend limitation, and participation in such proceedings does not confer jurisdiction.
The Tribunal, considering the assessee's undertaking to file all bank details and confirmation letters from sundry creditors, decided to grant one more opportunity to meet the ends of justice. A cost of Rs. 5,000/- was imposed on the assessee, payable to the Income Tax Department within two weeks, with the receipt to be produced before the JAO. Upon compliance, the orders of the lower authorities were set aside. The AO was directed to provide one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee to produce necessary details and pass a fresh assessment order on merits. The assessee was directed to cooperate by filing the required documents. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide on the penalty proceedings (Grounds 3 and 4) as the matter was being remanded for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had wrongly invoked the proviso of Section 249(4)(b) of the Act before dismissing the appeal in limine. The Tribunal noted that it is an undisputed fact that the assessment was completed ex-parte under Section 144 and the entire addition of Rs. 26,78,000/- was disputed by the assessee. Relying on the decision of the Coordinate Pune Bench in Kishor Dattatray Mohite (supra), the Tribunal found that since the assessee disputed the entire addition and no other admitted income was determined by the AO, the question of payment of advance tax did not arise. Furthermore, as the assessment order was ex-parte, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice and in accordance with the amended Section 251(A) of the Act, deemed it fit to set aside the matter back to the file of the jurisdictional AO. The AO was directed to provide one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee and then pass a fresh order on merits. The assessee was directed to cooperate by filing all required documents. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee has now provided bank statements, cash book extracts, financial statements of M/s. Raghav Traders (assessee's proprietary concern), details of cash deposits, and sales/purchase invoices. Considering these materials, the Tribunal deemed it fit to set aside the matter back to the jurisdictional AO. The AO is directed to grant one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee, verify all the submitted documents, and then pass a fresh order on merits. The assessee is also directed to cooperate by filing all required documents before the AO. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the addition made by the AO or the dismissal by the CIT(A) but focused on providing an opportunity for a fresh assessment.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had requested a copy of the sale deed and Power of Attorney dated 30.11.2015. The judgment states that the assessee submitted her bank account wherein no such transaction of sale of immovable property was reflected. The Tribunal's decision on the validity of the reassessment proceedings and the alleged property sale transaction is not explicitly recorded in the provided excerpt. The excerpt ends with the assessee's request for documentation and her submission of bank account details. Therefore, the Tribunal's finding on the specific issue of reassessment validity and the treatment of the alleged income is not ascertainable from this portion of the judgment. No operative directions or specific relief granted are mentioned.
The Tribunal decided on the following issues: 1. Regarding the addition of Rs. 4,31,985/- (Issue 1), the Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed the cash deposit was partly from a gift of Rs. 6,50,000/- from her daughter-in-law, supported by an affidavit. However, the CIT(A) observed that the assessee did not produce a cash book or ledger to corroborate this specific amount and treated it as unexplained under Section 69A. The Tribunal, after hearing arguments, did not explicitly rule on this ground in the provided excerpt, but the initial grounds of appeal suggest it was contested. The judgment excerpt does not contain the final decision on this specific ground. 2. Regarding the disallowance of commission expenses of Rs. 20,88,033/- (Issue 2), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention. The assessee had provided invoices reflecting retailer and distributor commissions, along with affidavits from some retailers. The Tribunal held that the AO and CIT(A) did not point out any infirmity in the explanation or documents filed and failed to provide reasons for deeming the evidence insufficient. The Tribunal concluded that the genuineness of the commission expenses was duly established and set aside the order of the CIT(A), directing the AO to allow the claim. The ratio is that when documentary evidence and affidavits are provided to substantiate business expenses, and no specific infirmities are pointed out by the revenue, such claims should be allowed. 3. Regarding the disallowance of salary expenses of Rs. 11,58,106/- (Issue 3), the Tribunal found that while the assessee's business volume suggested the need for employees, and affidavits of some employees were filed, other crucial evidence like salary registers, vouchers, or payment proofs were not submitted. The Tribunal considered it just and reasonable to allow salary expenses to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/-, confirming the disallowance of the balance claim of Rs. 6,58,106/-. The ratio is that while some substantiation can be accepted, complete disallowance is not warranted if partial evidence exists, but the claim must be reasonably quantified based on the evidence provided. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the grounds related to the initiation of penalty proceedings (Ground 6) and the overall computation of total income (Ground 5) as they depend on the outcome of the other grounds.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2012-13 were indeed barred by limitation as per the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the notice under Section 148 was issued on 28.03.2023. It was presumed that books of accounts and documents were received by the AO of the assessee in the previous year 2022-23. Therefore, the year in which the search action was to be treated as initiated in the case of the assessee was AY 2023-24. As per Section 153C, six years prior to the search year can be assessed, which goes up to AY 2017-18. Consequently, the reopening for AY 2012-13 was found to be barred by limitation. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the issue under Section 148 was barred by limitation. The order passed as a consequence was held to be void ab initio and quashed. The order of the Ld. CIT(A) setting aside the case to the file of the AO for reconsideration was accordingly set aside as infructuous. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to rebate under Section 87A for Assessment Year 2024-25. The reasoning was based on a plain reading of the statutory provisions, which do not contain any express bar either in Section 87A or Section 111A for denial of rebate in respect of tax payable on short-term capital gains arising from the transfer of listed equity shares taxable at special rates under Section 111A. The Tribunal noted that the legislative intent is further clarified by the prospective amendment proposed in the Finance Bill, 2025, which reinforces that no such restriction was in force during the relevant assessment year. The denial of rebate by the CPC was considered to be based solely on system-driven logic, not on any statutory mandate. The Tribunal respectfully followed the ratio laid down in the case of Jayshreeben Jayantibhai Palsana vs. ITO (ITAT, Ahmedabad) and other similar decisions. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the rebate of Rs. 19,857/- claimed by the assessee under Section 87A and recompute the tax liability. The grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposit of Rs. 16,05,000 made by the assessee in his bank account between 04.02.2012 and 31.03.2012 was a gift from his mother. This gift is within the definition of relatives under Section 2(41) of the Act. The Tribunal found that the assessee's mother, in her old age, gifted part of the amount received from the sale of her gold jewellery to the assessee. This could not be doubted as it was supported by a valid, notarized Gift Deed with two witnesses, and the value of the jewellery was determined by a Registered Valuer. Therefore, the addition made by the AO on account of cash deposit was liable to be deleted. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified in rejecting the assessee's explanation for the source of cash deposits. The primary basis for the Ld. CIT(A)'s rejection was that the insurance policies submitted by the assessee did not mention his name as the agent. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee had provided a substantiated explanation for this, stating that as per Section 42(2) of the Insurance Act, 1938, he could act as an agent for only one General Insurance Company. To serve customers better and retain business, he obtained services of other agents on a commission-sharing basis. This explanation was supported by affidavits from these agents and bank statements showing receipt of commission. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had not appreciated this explanation and had wrongly rejected the assessee's explanation based on an incorrect finding of facts. Regarding the SBNs, the Tribunal held that merely not evidencing the collection of SBNs was insufficient to reject the assessee's explanation, as it is impractical to keep detailed records of the currency in which payments are collected. The Tribunal found that the assessee had sufficiently demonstrated with voluminous evidence that the cash deposits originated from his business as an insurance agent, and no infirmity was pointed out by the Department in the evidence or explanation. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 35,08,550/- was directed to be deleted.