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100 orders · Page 2 of 2
The Tribunal held that the assessee's explanation for the cash deposit was not satisfactory and lacked human probability. The conflicting statements regarding the relationship between the assessee and the uncle, and the uncle withdrawing retirement benefits in tranches without returning the full amount, further weakened the assessee's claim.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee did not claim any deduction for interest paid on supplier's credit and had no revenue from operations, the AO could not make any addition based on Transfer Pricing adjustment for this item. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 2,52,454/- was vacated.
The Tribunal considered the rival contentions and perused the affidavit and medical records furnished by the assessee. While the assessee had provided prescriptions and MRI reports related to his back pain in 2023, the Tribunal found that he had not substantiated a continuous incapacity or bedridden condition covering the entire 751-day delay period. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's Authorized Representative failed to demonstrate that the assessee was bedridden and incapable of initiating legal proceedings during the full period of the delay. The Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the reasons cited by the assessee were not sufficient to condone such an inordinate delay and did not inspire confidence that the assessee was diligently pursuing the matter. The delay was deemed excessive and unexplained for substantial periods. Therefore, the petition for condonation of delay was rejected. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed in limine as barred by limitation.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A)'s file, directing a fresh adjudication. This was because the assessee's failure to appear before the CIT(A) was attributed to bonafide reasons beyond their control.
The Tribunal found that notices and the assessment order were indeed sent to the tax consultant's email, supporting the assessee's claim of bonafide delay. Citing a precedent, the Tribunal condoned the 168-day delay, set aside the CIT(A)'s order which was dismissed in-limine, and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing due opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in remanding the matter back to the AO without adjudicating the specific ground raised by the assessee regarding the validity of the AO's jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal emphasized that while Section 251(1) of the Act, particularly the proviso, empowers the CIT(A) to set aside a best judgment assessment order and refer it back to the AO, this power cannot be used to validate an assessment framed without a valid assumption of jurisdiction. The Tribunal found substance in the assessee's argument that remanding without addressing the jurisdictional issue would effectively give the AO a second inning to frame an assessment despite a potential lack of valid jurisdiction. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the CIT(A)'s file with a direction to adjudicate the specific ground concerning the AO's jurisdiction under the first proviso to Section 147. The Tribunal refrained from expressing any view on the merits of the addition or other grounds of appeal, allowing the appeals for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the extraordinary delay in filing the appeal. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was actively participating in NCLT proceedings, indicating awareness of tax matters, yet failed to explain the delay in filing the appeal before the First Appellate Authority.
The Tribunal held that while the initial invocation of Section 270A(9)(c) by the AO was incorrect, the assessee's admitted unaccounted expenditure, not recorded in books, constituted under-reporting of income under Section 270A(2)(a). Consequently, penalty was upheld at 50% of the tax evaded.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in remanding the matter without adjudicating the assessee's grounds challenging the AO's jurisdiction, particularly regarding the time-bar for reassessment. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for adjudication of the jurisdictional issue.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A)'s order was not a 'speaking order' as it only partially considered the assessee's explanations for the cash deposits (including salary, mortgage loan, chit fund, NRE gifts, husband's property sale, and rental income) without providing reasoned adjudication for the rejected claims. Deeming the CIT(A)'s order lacking reasoning, the Tribunal remanded the matter back for reconsideration and a speaking order after providing the assessee a proper hearing.
The Tribunal held that Section 54F is a beneficial provision and should be interpreted liberally in favour of the assessee. It found that the assessee had fulfilled the substantive requirements for exemption, and the denial was based on technical grounds.
The Tribunal held that since the Assessing Officer had accepted the source of cash from agricultural land sale and an addition under Section 269SS for the same was settled under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, a subsequent addition under Section 69A for the same amount, merely due to a time gap, constitutes double addition. The Tribunal directed the deletion of the Section 69A addition.
The Tribunal held that the arbitrary estimation of savings by the Assessing Officer was not based on evidence. It was determined that 50% of the reported income could be considered as savings, thus explaining Rs. 7,59,400/- of the cash deposit.
The Tribunal noted a significant discrepancy between the cash deposit figure considered by the AO and the amount reflected in the assessee's bank statement. It also highlighted the lack of adequate opportunity provided to the assessee by both the AO and CIT(A) for substantiating the deposits. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo consideration with proper opportunity given to the assessee.
The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation regarding the source of the cash deposit from gold loans and subsequent re-deposits, supported by bank statements, to be bonafide and reasonable. It concluded that both the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) erred in making and sustaining the addition under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE without appreciating the relevant facts. The Tribunal therefore set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that the cash received was the final payment at the time of registration and not an advance or loan. Relying on a coordinate bench decision, it was decided that Section 269SS does not apply to final payments made at the time of registration.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee ought to have been vigilant, the reasons provided for the delay, primarily work pressure as a salaried employee and learning about the assessment late, were bonafide. The CIT(A) should have adopted a justice-oriented and liberal approach, as supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Vidya Shankar Jaiswal vs. The Income Tax Officer, Ward-2, Ambikapur, and condoned the delay instead of dismissing the appeal at the threshold. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed him to condone the delay and dispose of the appeal on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely for want of prosecution without adjudicating the specific issues raised by the assessee. While acknowledging the assessee's failure to appear before the CIT(A), the Tribunal found that this did not justify a summary dismissal without considering the merits of the appeal. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Benny D'Souza and Others Vs. Melwin D'Souza and Others, and the Bombay High Court's judgment in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), which emphasize that appellate authorities are obligated to decide appeals on merits. The Tribunal distinguished the applicability of Order XLI, Rule 17 of the CPC to quasi-judicial authorities like the CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) with a direction to re-decide the appeal after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal decided to set aside the issues concerning the additions made by the AO and deleted by the CIT(A) for M/s Hyderabad Constructions Company Pvt. Ltd., M/s Jagadambha Cotton Industries Pvt. Ltd., M/s Premium Foods, and M/s SanjayUdyog, and remanded them to the AO for fresh examination and adjudication. For M/s Hyderabad Constructions Company Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal noted the AO's finding that the company had not filed returns for eight years and had closed operations. However, it also considered the assessee's submission that the transaction was verifiable from bank accounts and that there might be a mistake in the company's financials. For M/s Premium Foods, the Tribunal found that the amount was reflected in the company's financial statements, albeit under a wrong head, and that the transaction was verifiable from bank accounts. For M/s SanjayUdyog, the Tribunal observed that while the AO disallowed the addition due to the investment not being reflected in the balance sheet, the amount was shown under 'loan, advances and deposits'. In all these cases, the Tribunal found that the issues required proper verification and examination at the AO's level to ascertain the correct nature of the transactions. The Tribunal upheld the AO's order in favour of the Revenue regarding Kolkata-based companies in its earlier order dated 06.01.2022.
The Tribunal found a mismatch in the Net Operating Profit (NOP) figures provided by the assessee for the support service segment, necessitating a fresh verification by the TPO/AO. The Tribunal also directed the AO to allow the claims for unabsorbed depreciation under Section 35(4) and MAT credit under Section 115JB, subject to verification.
The Tribunal held that the Supreme Court's extension of due dates due to the COVID-19 pandemic applied to the filing of Form 10IC, making it within the extended period. The adjustment made by the AO under Section 143(1) without issuing an intimation was also found to be procedurally flawed.
The Tribunal noted the contradictory stances taken by the assessee and the lack of evidence that interest income from these advances was offered to tax in prior years as business income. It clarified that the assessment order for AY 2016-17, cited by the assessee, was a summary acceptance of returned income without detailed examination, thus not serving as a precedent for the current claim. Concluding that a proper verification was required regarding the nature of the loan and whether interest income was taxed as business income, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that while the club's income might be exempt under the principle of mutuality, it was still required to file an application to the CIT(A) explaining reasons for not paying advance tax or filing returns. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter to the AO for de novo consideration, directing the assessee to provide evidence for cash deposits and the principle of mutuality.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s order rejecting the application was cryptic and lacked application of mind. The Tribunal found that running an engineering college is a charitable activity and set aside the CIT(E)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee did not get sufficient opportunity to explain his case before the CIT(A) due to a discrepancy in the email-ID used for issuing notices. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the fault of not downloading Form-35 cannot be attributed to the assessee unless the CIT(A) demonstrates corruption of the uploaded files. The dismissal on technical grounds was set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A). It upheld the denial of exemption under Section 11 due to lack of 12A registration but directed that only the net surplus, after allowing permissible expenses, should be taxed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A). It upheld the denial of exemption under Section 11 due to lack of 12A registration but directed that only the net surplus, after allowing permissible expenses, should be taxed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A). It upheld the denial of exemption under Section 11 due to lack of 12A registration but directed that only the net surplus, after allowing permissible expenses, should be taxed.
The Tribunal noted that the breakup of the Rs. 58.09 crores disallowance was not explicit, requiring factual verification. The matter was restored to the AO to verify if the Rs. 21.97 crores was indeed disallowed by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was not maintainable as the 'tax effect' involved was below the monetary ceiling prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 09/2024. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on this ground.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It was observed that both lower authorities passed ex-parte orders without providing the assessee with adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) rejected the application casually without appreciating the documentary evidence and submissions by the assessee. The CIT(E) also did not dispute that the assessee's activities were in line with its objectives and did not violate Section 80G(v).
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) rejected the application without providing adequate opportunity of hearing or properly considering the evidence. It also noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal in a casual manner. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication after granting a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A). It upheld the denial of exemption under Section 11 due to lack of 12A registration but directed that only the net surplus, after allowing permissible expenses, should be taxed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee submitted additional evidence, including correspondence and proof of TDS, which indicates the AE offered the income to tax in India, suggesting it's not a case of profit shifting. Consequently, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the TPO to verify the additional evidence and re-determine the ALP for the said services, emphasizing that the TPO should consider the agreement and provided formulas.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A). It upheld the denial of exemption under Section 11 due to lack of 12A registration but directed that only the net surplus, after allowing permissible expenses, should be taxed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not admitting additional evidence filed by the assessee, considering the peculiar facts including the AO's ex-parte order and the assessee's initial unawareness of the proceedings. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication after admitting the evidence.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred in making an ad-hoc disallowance without bringing on record any comparable evidence to prove that the payments made to the related parties were excessive and unreasonable. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to pass a speaking and reasoned order, adjudicating the specific grounds raised by the assessee, particularly concerning the validity of the notice u/s 148. The order was found to be non-speaking and dismissed for non-compliance without addressing the merits.
The Tribunal condoned a 449-day delay in filing the appeal, noting the assessee's bona fide belief regarding the appealable order. It held that Section 2(22)(e) requires the recipient to hold not less than 10% voting power, but the assessee held only 4.48% equity shares. Therefore, the PCIT's invocation of Section 263 without satisfying this condition precedent was unsustainable in law, and the assessment order was not erroneous.
The Tribunal decided on the following issues: Regarding Ground 4 (exclusion of companies), the assessee pressed for the exclusion of 7 companies. The Tribunal specifically addressed the exclusion of Infobeans Technologies Limited. Upon perusal of its financial statements, particularly Note 43 regarding quantitative details and Note 1(c) and 35 concerning services rendered, the Tribunal found that Infobeans was primarily engaged in Software Development Services (SDS) and provided only services. Therefore, the Tribunal held that Infobeans is a good comparable to the assessee and rejected the assessee's request for its exclusion. The judgment indicates that the Tribunal dealt with other companies mentioned in Ground 4 but the detailed reasoning for each is not fully provided in the excerpt. However, the Tribunal noted that the assessee was pressing for exclusion of 5 companies based on turnover filter (Tata Elxsi, L&T, Persistent Systems, Infosys, Cybage) and 2 companies based on functional dissimilarity (Infobean, Thirdware). Regarding Ground 8(a) (working capital adjustment - WCA), the Tribunal considered the rival contentions. The Ld. AR argued that WCA is a legitimate adjustment to neutralize differences in working capital levels affecting margins, and it should be granted based on average opening and closing balances from annual reports, as granular data is not publicly available. The Ld. DR argued that the assessee failed to furnish necessary data. The Tribunal found that differences in working capital levels do affect margins and profitability. It held that insisting on daily/monthly data of third-party comparables is unjustified when such data is not in the public domain. The assessee cannot be expected to obtain information beyond its reach. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the Ld. TPO to grant appropriate WCA based on the average of opening and closing working capital balances of comparables available from their annual reports. This ground was allowed for statistical purposes. Other grounds were either not pressed or dismissed. The judgment explicitly states that ground no.1 is general, ground no.9 is consequential, and grounds 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8(b), 10, 11, and additional grounds were dismissed as not pressed. The judgment does not record a decision on additional grounds 12, 13, and 14.
On the issue of excluding 12 comparable companies based on turnover variation, the Tribunal, following its own precedents and the Karnataka High Court's decision in Obopay Mobile Technology (supra), held that turnover is a relevant criterion for determining comparability in transfer pricing cases. The Tribunal reaffirmed that a turnover filter of 10 times (both upward and downward) is a valid criterion. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to apply this 10-times turnover filter for a fresh search, allowing the assessee's ground for statistical purposes. Regarding Global Healthcare, the Tribunal found that the P&L statement showing 'Revenue from sale of services' as 'Nil' might be an inadvertent mistake, given the 'disclosure of principal product or services' indicating Rs.116.37 crores from services. The Tribunal set aside this issue to the AO/TPO for verification of the correctness of revenue from sale of services and to decide inclusion as per law. For management fees, following its own order in the assessee's case for AY 2018-19, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO/TPO for re-examination in light of the findings in ITA-TP No.198/Hyd/2021. Similarly, for Tax Consultation Fee, the Tribunal set aside the issue to the AO/TPO with a direction to verify the supporting evidence and re-adjudicate. For advance tax and TDS credit, the Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to verify the entitlement and grant credit as per law. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that a turnover filter of 10 times (upward and downward) is a valid criterion for determining comparability, allowing exclusion of companies with significantly different turnovers. It also directed the AO/TPO to apply the LIBOR rate plus 200 basis points for benchmarking interest on trade receivables.
The Tribunal directed the exclusion of several companies, including Tata Elexis Limited (Seg), E-Infochips Ltd, Larsen and Tourbo Infotech Limited, Infosys Ltd, Persistent Systems Limited, Infobeans Technologies Limited, and Thirdware Solutions Limited, from the set of comparables. This was due to functional dissimilarity and lack of segmental details.
The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeals for non-prosecution and non-compliance, without deciding them on merits. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's submission that the non-prosecution was not deliberate but due to a conflict with the counsel. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld.CIT(A) and remanded the matters back to the Ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, after providing appropriate opportunities of hearing to the assessees. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific grounds regarding section 153C, section 69, evidentiary value of documents, and cross-examination were not adjudicated on merits by the CIT(A) and therefore, were not decided by the Tribunal in this order.
The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeals for non-prosecution and non-compliance, without deciding them on merits. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's submission that the non-prosecution was not deliberate but due to a conflict with the counsel. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld.CIT(A) and remanded the matters back to the Ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, after providing appropriate opportunities of hearing to the assessees. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific grounds regarding section 153C, section 69, evidentiary value of documents, and cross-examination were not adjudicated on merits by the CIT(A) and therefore, were not decided by the Tribunal in this order.
The Tribunal observed that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without adjudicating them on merits. Considering the assessee's explanation regarding the conflict with counsel and upholding principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and remanded all appeals for fresh adjudication on merits, ensuring proper opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeals for non-prosecution and non-compliance, without deciding them on merits. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's submission that the non-prosecution was not deliberate but due to a conflict with the counsel. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld.CIT(A) and remanded the matters back to the Ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, after providing appropriate opportunities of hearing to the assessees. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific grounds regarding section 153C, section 69, evidentiary value of documents, and cross-examination were not adjudicated on merits by the CIT(A) and therefore, were not decided by the Tribunal in this order.
The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeals for non-prosecution and non-compliance, without deciding them on merits. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's submission that the non-prosecution was not deliberate but due to a conflict with the counsel. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld.CIT(A) and remanded the matters back to the Ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, after providing appropriate opportunities of hearing to the assessees. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific grounds regarding section 153C, section 69, evidentiary value of documents, and cross-examination were not adjudicated on merits by the CIT(A) and therefore, were not decided by the Tribunal in this order.