ITAT Delhi Judgments — January 2026

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation as per Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the final assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the provisions of Sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive and the time limits prescribed therein are binding. Consequently, the final assessment orders were found to be barred by limitation.

The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal, holding that the assessment orders were passed beyond the time frame prescribed under Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the impugned final assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation as per Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the final assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the impugned final assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment orders were quashed on this limited legal issue.

The Tribunal held that the seized document was not incriminating material as the entries were duly recorded in the assessee's books of account and the explanation for the Rs. 100 crore entry as an investment was not rebutted. Consequently, the assessment under Section 153A was deemed invalid.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, these orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were indeed barred by limitation, following the ratio laid down by the Madras High Court and other co-ordinate benches. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders on this limited legal issue.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, these orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were indeed barred by limitation, following the ratio laid down by the Madras High Court and other co-ordinate benches. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders on this limited legal issue.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, these orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the addition could not be made in the hands of the assessee because the locker was not in its name. The matter was remitted to the AO to verify the ownership of the locker and decide the issue afresh after providing an opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.

The tribunal noted that the assessment was framed under section 147 r.w.s. 254 r.w.s. 144B, and the tribunal's earlier bench had restored the matter. The assessment framed on 18.03.2024 was found to be time-barred as per the statutory limitation of 12 months from the end of the financial year under section 153(3) r.w. Proviso.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, these orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal in the larger interest of justice. Considering the facts presented, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the appeal back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the issue of bogus purchases has been decided with divergent views in various recent judicial precedents. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to allow a lumpsum disallowance at 5% of the assessee's alleged bogus purchases, amounting to Rs. 17,82,500/-. This disallowance is to be made with a specific rider that it shall not be treated as a precedent for future cases. The necessary computation of this disallowance shall follow as per law. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the CPC, Bengaluru under section 143(1) of the Act for the late deposit of PF and ESI was not legally sustainable. The Tribunal referenced previous judgments and the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services P. Ltd. vs. CIT-I, concluding that the issue was debatable at the time of intimation and should not have been processed under section 143(1).

The Tribunal decided on the commission expenses issue by upholding the deletion made by the CIT(A). The Tribunal agreed that the commission paid for arranging a new tenant was an expenditure incurred for the purpose of business and was allowable in the year it was incurred. The Tribunal found the assessee's argument that identifying a new tenant in advance to avoid a gap in rental income was a normal business practice to be logical. It also noted that the possession of the property was handed over during the relevant financial year, and the rent-free period was a standard business practice. The Tribunal distinguished the facts from the case of Taparia Tools Ltd., emphasizing that ordinary revenue expenditure incurred exclusively for business purposes should be allowed in the year of incurrence. Regarding the claim of long-term capital loss on the sale of properties, the Tribunal dismissed the assessee's grounds. The Tribunal observed that the initial agreement to sell was cancelled, and subsequent MOUs were not supported by legally enforceable documents. The Tribunal noted that funds received were recorded as advances against property in the balance sheet, indicating the original agreement was not acted upon. Therefore, without legally enforceable documents, the assessee's claim of holding rights over the property could not be substantiated, and the findings of the lower authorities were upheld. The issues concerning interest expenditure and housekeeping/security expenses were not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt, but the overall outcome suggests they were also decided in favor of the assessee based on the final order.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order was barred by limitation, following the ratio of the Madras High Court in Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd. and other co-ordinate bench decisions. The impugned order was quashed on the limited issue of limitation.

The Tribunal decided to condone the substantial delay in filing the appeals before the Learned CIT (Appeals) for both Assessment Years 2016-17 and 2018-19. The reasoning was that the delay was not intentional or deliberate, and it was beyond the assessee's control. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee would not benefit from intentionally delaying the filing. For the sake of complete justice, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The matter was remitted back to the file of the Learned CIT (Appeals) to decide the issues on merits after giving the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal directed the assessee to make proper submissions and cooperate with the tax authorities. The issue of whether the eligible claim for AY 2016-17 was wrongly disallowed and gross receipts were taxed as income was not decided on merits by the ITAT, as it was remitted to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the impugned assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was accordingly quashed.

The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte as the assessee failed to make compliance to the notices. In the interest of justice, the matter is remanded to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, after giving due opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal decided on the commission expenses issue by upholding the deletion made by the CIT(A). The Tribunal agreed that the commission paid for arranging a new tenant was an expenditure incurred for the purpose of business and was allowable in the year it was incurred. The Tribunal found the assessee's argument that identifying a new tenant in advance to avoid a gap in rental income was a normal business practice to be logical. It also noted that the possession of the property was handed over during the relevant financial year, and the rent-free period was a standard business practice. The Tribunal distinguished the facts from the case of Taparia Tools Ltd., emphasizing that ordinary revenue expenditure incurred exclusively for business purposes should be allowed in the year of incurrence. Regarding the claim of long-term capital loss on the sale of properties, the Tribunal dismissed the assessee's grounds. The Tribunal observed that the initial agreement to sell was cancelled, and subsequent MOUs were not supported by legally enforceable documents. The Tribunal noted that funds received were recorded as advances against property in the balance sheet, indicating the original agreement was not acted upon. Therefore, without legally enforceable documents, the assessee's claim of holding rights over the property could not be substantiated, and the findings of the lower authorities were upheld. The issues concerning interest expenditure and housekeeping/security expenses were not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt, but the overall outcome suggests they were also decided in favor of the assessee based on the final order.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage. Section 153's general limitation provisions do not apply to the final assessment order passed under Section 144C(13).

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) observed that the AO had conducted detailed inquiries and verifications during the original assessment proceedings regarding the issues raised by the PCIT, and no adverse view was taken. The ITAT concluded that the PCIT failed to appreciate that proper inquiry and examination was made, and therefore, the AO's order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Consequently, the ITAT quashed the PCIT's order under section 263.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation as per Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the final assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments post-draft order. The time consumed in DRP proceedings is not to be subsumed within the general limitation period of Section 153, as Section 144C is intended to offer an alternate dispute resolution mechanism.

The Tribunal decided to condone the substantial delay in filing the appeals before the Learned CIT (Appeals) for both Assessment Years 2016-17 and 2018-19. The reasoning was that the delay was not intentional or deliberate, and it was beyond the assessee's control. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee would not benefit from intentionally delaying the filing. For the sake of complete justice, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The matter was remitted back to the file of the Learned CIT (Appeals) to decide the issues on merits after giving the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal directed the assessee to make proper submissions and cooperate with the tax authorities. The issue of whether the eligible claim for AY 2016-17 was wrongly disallowed and gross receipts were taxed as income was not decided on merits by the ITAT, as it was remitted to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, these orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessments involving the DRP, and its timelines are distinct from the general limitation period under Section 153. The assessment orders were not barred by limitation.

The Tribunal held that Section 69C of the Act is applicable when an assessee fails to explain the source of expenditure. In this case, the AO had disallowed the purchases as bogus under Section 37(1) of the Act, not on the grounds of unexplained source of expenditure. The Tribunal found that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 69C and Section 115BBE as the AO's action of disallowance under Section 37(1) was a plausible view.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were indeed barred by limitation, following the ratio laid down by the Madras High Court and other co-ordinate benches. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders on this limited legal issue.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC's decision to restrict the disallowance of bogus purchases to 6% was not illegal or irregular. The Tribunal acknowledged that various recent judicial precedents had decided the issue of bogus purchases with divergent views. However, the Tribunal found no fault with the lower appellate authority's discussion and conclusion in limiting the impugned bogus purchase disallowance to 6%. The Tribunal's reasoning appears to be based on the acceptance of the CIT(A)/NFAC's finding, which itself was influenced by the divergent views in various High Court and Tribunal decisions on the quantum of disallowance for bogus purchases. The ratio decidendi is that where there are divergent judicial views on the quantum of disallowance for bogus purchases, the appellate authority's decision to restrict it to a certain percentage, if not found illegal or irregular, would be upheld. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The Tribunal quashed the impugned orders, following the ratio laid down by the Madras High Court and other coordinate benches.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had reversed the addition because the issue was already decided in the assessee's favor in previous orders. The Tribunal found no distinction in facts or law from prior connected matters where similar additions were held to be unsubstantiated.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order was not sustainable as the AO's view was based on Supreme Court decisions affirming that interest under Section 28 is part of enhanced compensation. The Tribunal distinguished the High Court decisions relied upon by the PCIT and noted that the SLP dismissal did not constitute a binding precedent.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The Tribunal quashed the impugned orders, following the ratio laid down by the Madras High Court and other coordinate benches.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as it was passed beyond the time prescribed under Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was accordingly quashed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation as per Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the final assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The Tribunal quashed the impugned assessment orders on this ground.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT had not pointed out any specific error in the AO's order and the reliance on Explanation 2(a) to section 263 was misplaced as the AO had indeed called for and examined all requisite details. The PCIT's order was considered to be without basis.

The Tribunal held that the impugned amounts of Rs. 25.40 lakhs each were not unexplained cash loans. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had entered into a development agreement with developers, and a letter dated 18.08.2012, though outside the relevant assessment years, pertained to this agreement and the impugned amount. The Tribunal found that this factual position, that the sum was related to the development agreement, went unrebutted by the Revenue. Furthermore, the Tribunal concluded that the impugned sum was more in the nature of damages awardable to the assessee in case of non-fulfillment of the development agreement, rather than cash loans advanced. Consequently, the Tribunal decided that the findings of the lower authorities treating the impugned cash loans and any accrued interest as unexplained money deserved to be deleted. The appeals were allowed in these terms.

The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's stand. It noted that the impugned amount related to a development agreement dated 18.08.2012, which did not fall within the assessment years in question. The sum was more akin to damages for non-fulfillment of the agreement rather than cash loans.

The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's stand. It noted that the impugned amount related to a development agreement dated 18.08.2012, which did not fall within the assessment years in question. The sum was more akin to damages for non-fulfillment of the agreement rather than cash loans.

The Tribunal held that the impugned final assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment orders were quashed on this limited legal issue.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order was barred by limitation, following the ratio laid down by the Madras High Court in Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd. and other co-ordinate benches. The impugned assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal allowed the grounds raised by the assessee. It noted that the AO of the assessee recorded satisfaction on 10.05.2022, making AY 2023-24 the searched assessment year. As per the Fourth Proviso to Section 153A, assessment can be made under Section 153A only if undisclosed assets found during the 7th to 10th year preceding the searched assessment year exceed Rs. 50 lakhs. In this case, the amount for which satisfaction was recorded by the AO of the searched person was Rs. 34,71,289/-, which is less than Rs. 50 lakhs. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision in Pratishtha Garg vs. ITO, which, in turn, followed Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The principle established is that the precondition of Rs. 50 lakhs or more constitutes a sine qua non for initiating action for the extended ten-year block, and this condition is satisfied if the escaped income cumulatively or in aggregate meets the minimum benchmark of Rs. 50 lakhs. Therefore, the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153C for AY 2014-15 were quashed.