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Facts
The assessee, Cosmo Films Ltd., filed appeals challenging final assessment orders for A.Y. 2009-10 to 2012-13. The assessee contended that these orders were time-barred as they were passed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Section 153(1) read with Section 153(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Held
The Tribunal, following the ratio laid down by the Madras High Court in the case of Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd. and other co-ordinate benches, held that Section 144C and Section 153 of the Act are mutually inclusive and interdependent, and the time limits prescribed under Section 153 are applicable to assessment proceedings even when Section 144C is involved. The Tribunal found that the assessment orders were indeed passed beyond the statutory limitation period.
Key Issues
Whether the final assessment orders passed under Section 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) were barred by limitation as per Section 153 r.w. Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Sections Cited
143(3), 144C(13), 144B, 153(1), 153(4), 153, 144C, 153(2A), 144C(12), 144C(4)
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI
Before: YOGESH KUMAR U.S. & SHRI KRINWANT SAHAY
ORDER
PER YOGESH KUMAR, U.S. JM:
The captioned appeals are filed by the Assessee challenging the respective Final Assessment Orders passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) r.w. Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act in short) dated 08/02/2014 pertaining to A.Y 2009-10, dated 29/12/2014 for A.Y 2010-11, dated 19/05/2015 for A.Y 2011-12 and 27/01/2017 pertaining to A.Y 2012-13 respectively and Revenue has also filed Appeal for A.Y 2009-10 by challenging the Assessment order dated 08/02/2014.
The Assessee has raised Additional Grounds of Appeal in the Appeal filed for A.Y 2009-10 to 2012-13 contending that the impugned Final Assessment orders are time barred by limitation and are bad in law, as the same have been passed beyond the time frame prescribed under section 153(1) read with section 153(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ('Act' for short). The Ld. Assessee's Representative relying on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Roca Bathroom Products (P.) Ltd. [2022] 445 537 (Madras) and also plethora of orders passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench sought for allowing the Additional Ground of Appeal of the Assessee.
3. Per contra, the Ld. Department's Representative submitted that the issue of limitation arising from the interplay between Section 144C and Section 153 of the Act is presently unsettled and pending adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ACIT Vs.
Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.
20569-20572/2023 therefore, deciding the very same issue by this Tribunal at this stage would be premature, thus submitted that the Tribunal cannot decide the issue of limitation in terms of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of Roca Bathroom Products (P) Ltd. (supra). Accordingly, the Ld. Department's Representative sought for deferral of adjudication of the present Appeal and also the issue of limitation. The Ld. Department's Representative has also filed detail written submission.
The identical submissions of the parties have been considered by us in the case of Teva Pharmaceutical & chemical Industries India Private Limited Vs. Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department/DCIT in vide order dated 19/01/2026. The Co- ordinate Bench of the Tribunal while and rejected the preliminary objection raised by the Revenue and also the request of the Department for deferring the hearing of the Appeal and decided the Appeal by dealing with the issue of limitation. By following the ratio laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Teva Pharmaceutical & Chemical Industries India Private Limited (supra), we reject the preliminary objection raised by the Revenue and the request of the Department for deferring the hearing.
The Ld. Assessee's Representative filed date chart and contended that the outer statutory time limit for completion of assessment u/s 153(1) r.w.s 153(4) of the Act for Assessment Year 2009-10 expired on 31/03/2013, for A.Y 2010-11 expired on 31/03/2014, for A.Y 2011-12 expired on 31/03/2015 and for A.Y 2012-13 expired on 31/03/2016.
However, the impugned Final assessment orders came to be passed u/s 143(3) r.w. Section 144C(13) of the Act on 08/02/2014 for A.Y 2009- 10, 29/12/2014 for A.Y 2010-11, 19/05/2015 for A.Y 2011-12 and for A.Y 2012-13 the Final Assessment order passed on 27/01/2017, which are beyond the statutory limitation prescribed u/s 153 r.w. Section 144C of the Act. Thus submitted that, the impugned Final assessment orders are barred by limitation as per Section 153 r.w. Section 144Cof the Act, void ab initio and liable to be quashed.
For the sake of ready reference, date Charts filed by the Assessee is reproduced as under:
ITA No.2348/DEL/2014 (A.Y. 2009-10)
S. No. Particulars Relevant Date 1 Date of filing of income tax return 30/03/2011 (Revised) 2 A.Y ending on 31/03/2010 3 Prescribed date as per Section 153(1)-36 months from the end of A./Y (including 12 months for TP reference)
4 Prescribed date as per S 153(1) 31/03/2013 5 Date of draft order 11/03/2013 6 Date of DRP directions 26/12/2013 08/02/2014 7 Date of final order
S. No. Particulars Relevant Date 1 Date of filing of income tax return 29/09/2011 (Revised) 2 A.Y ending on 31/03/2011 3 Prescribed date as per Section 153(1)-36 months from the end of A.Y (including 12 months for TP reference) 4 Prescribed date as per S 153(1) 31/03/2014 5 Date of draft order 26/03/2014 6 Date of DRP directions 12/11/2014 29/12/2014 7 Date of final order (A.Y. 2011-12) S. No. Particulars Relevant Date 1 Date of filing of income tax return 31/01/2013 (Revised) 2 A.Y ending on 31/03/2012 3 Prescribed date as per Section 153(1)-36 months from the end of A./Y (including 12 months for TP reference) 4 Prescribed date as per S 153(1) 31/03/2015 5 Date of draft order 30/12/2014 6 Date of DRP directions 21/04/2015 19/05/2015 7 Date of final order (A.Y. 2012-13) S. No. Particulars Relevant Date 1 Date of filing of income tax return 30/11/2012 (Revised) 2 A.Y ending on 31/03/2013 3 Prescribed date as per Section 153(1)-36 months from the end of A./Y (including 12 months for TP reference)
4 Prescribed date as per S 153(1) 31/03/2016 5 Date of draft order 29/03/2016 6 Date of DRP directions 21/12/2016 27/01/2017 7 Date of final order
The Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd (supra) held that, time limit prescribed u/s 153 of the Act has to be adhered to and that both Section 144C and 153 of the Act are mutually inclusive and interdependent. The presence of notwithstanding clause in Section 144C(13) of the Act would not exclude the operation of Section 153 of the Act. The relevant portion of the Judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd (supra)is reproduced as under:-
“Discussions and findings: 18. The main contentions of the Department, through their counsel are that Section 144C is a code in itself and hence on remand by the ITAT, the power of DRP to take up the dispute on additions by TPO, is not circumscribed by Section 153 and that in the absence of any express time limits contemplated under the Act, the time limits under Section 153 for reassessment cannot be read into Section 144C more particularly when the provisions of Section 153 are excluded by the non-obstante clause in section 144C(13) and hence the proceedings are not barred by limitation. Per contra, it has been contended by the learned senior counsels appearing for the respondent(s)/assessees that the outer time limit under Section 153 is applicable to every proceedings on remand and the department having slept over the issue for several years, cannot now redo the proceedings afresh, after certain rights have vested with the assessees. Even if specific provisions are not there to deal with this situation, the proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable time and hence the impugned proceedings are liable to be struck down and rightly done so by the learned Judge.
19. Admittedly, the facts including the dates are not under dispute. As regards the appeal in W.A.No.1854 of 2021, even though the remand was on 24.01.2013 and the assessee had received the order on 08.02.2013, the first notice by the DRP was issued on 19.02.2014 and the first hearing in the Chennai office was on 10.03.2014. Therefore, it is lucid that the DRP had the knowledge of the order before 19.02.2014. The matter was heard on various dates in Chennai office and written submissions were also filed. Thereafter, the files have been transferred to Bengaluru by the CBDT notification dated 31.12.2014. The Learned Judge relying upon the findings in the batch of cases which was decided first and rendered additional findings, which have been extracted in paragraphs 10 and 11 above, has allowed the writ petitions holding that the time limit under Section 153 (2A) was not adhered to and in any case, the proceedings have not been concluded within a reasonable time.
As rightly contended by the learned senior counsels and affirmed by the Learned Judge, the DRP proceedings is a continuation of assessment proceedings. To put it further, it is a part of assessment proceedings, once the objections are filed and under section 144C (12) a period of 9 months is prescribed, within which, directions are to be issued by the DRP, failing which any directions are to be treated as otiose. As seen from the timeline discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the original assessment proceedings are to be completed within 21 months and the additional time of 12 months is granted when proceedings before TPO is pending. The TPO has to pass orders before 60 days prior 19 to the last date. Then 30 days time is given to the assessee to file their objection before the DRP and the DRP is given 9 months time and thereafter, within one month from the end of the month of receipt of directions from DRP, the final order is to be passed. This court is not in consonance with the contention of the learned senior panel counsel for the appellants/ revenue that the time period of 33 months, provided initially is for the draft order and not for the final order. A careful perusal of the timeline would indicate that the time limit is for the final assessment and not for the draft order. The anomaly in the argument is that in the present cases, no fresh draft order was passed, but the DRP had issued the notices. If the contention of the appellants / revenue was to hold some water, they must have passed the draft assessment order immediately on receipt of the order from the Tribunal, but instead, notice was issued by the DRP. In any case, it is a far cry for the revenue as because no order has been passed for more than 5 years.
21. As held above, the assessment has to be concluded within 21 months when there is no reference and when there is a reference, it has to be concluded within 33 months. In the additional 12 months, the draft order is to be passed, the objections have to be filed, the DRP has to issue the directions and the final order is to be passed. The provisions under section 144C and section 153 are not mutually exclusive as both contain provisions relating to Section 92CA and are inter-dependent and overlapping. On remand, prior to amendment as per Section 153 (2A), the Assessing officer is given 12 months to pass a fresh assessment order. Therefore, it is incumbent on him to do so, irrespective of the fact that DRP has completed the hearing and issued the directions or not. As rightly held by the learned judge, we are of the view that the DRP ought to have concluded the proceedings within 9 months from the date of receipt of the Tribunal’s order, when it had issued a notice on 19.02.2014 and conducted the hearing as early as on 10.03.2014 and on several dates. The DRP at Chennai, in fact ought to have passed orders before 19.11.2014, even if the date of receipt of the notice is taken as 19.02.2014. In that event, the assessing officer ought to have passed the order before 31.12.2014 or at the latest before 31.03.2015 considering that the order was received during the financial year 2013-14. The transfer of the files to Bengaluru, after the lapse of the time, will not indefinitely extend the time and can have no impact on the time lines. It is an inter-department arrangement and it cannot defeat the rights of the assessee.
Insofar as the non-obstante clause in Section 144C(13) is concerned, we concur with the view of the Learned Judge. The exclusion of applicability of Section 153 or Section 153 B is for a limited purpose to ensure that dehors larger time is available, an order based on the directions of the DRP has to be passed within 30 days from the end of the month of receipt of such directions. The section and the sub-section have to be read as a whole with connected provisions to decipher the meaning and intentions. At this juncture it would be useful to refer to the following decisions: (i) Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373 at page 381: 21 “11. The statute has to be read as a whole to find out the real intention of the legislature.
12. In Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R. [1898 AC 735 : 67 LJPC 126] , Lord Davy observed: “Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject- matter.” ……….
This rule of construction which is also spoken of as “ex visceribusactus” helps in avoiding any inconsistency either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute.
15. On a conspectus of the case-law indicated above, the following principles are clearly discernible: (1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them. (2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them. (3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, 22 if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of “harmonious construction”.
(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a “dead letter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction. (5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose.” (ii) CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1226: “16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin[(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408]).
The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be 23 interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507 : AIR 1992 SC 81] .) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006]).” (iii) Franklin Templeton Trustee Services (P) Ltd. v. AmrutaGarg, (2021) 6 SCC 736 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 88 at page 752: “ 17. The concept of “absurdity” in the context of interpretation of statutes is construed to include any result which is unworkable, impracticable, illogical, futile or pointless, artificial, or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief [ SeeBennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., p.969.] . Logic referred to herein is not formal or syllogistic logic, but acceptance that enacted law would not set a standard which is palpably unjust, unfair, unreasonable or does not make any sense. [Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., p. 986.] When an interpretation is beset with practical difficulties, the courts have not shied from turning sides to accept an interpretation that offers a pragmatic solution that will serve the needs of society [Id, p. 971, quoting Griffiths, L.J.] .Therefore, when there is choice between two interpretations, we would avoid a “construction” which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the “construction” based on the view that draftsmen would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. We must strive as far as 24 possible to give meaningful life to enactment or rule and avoid cadaveric consequences [See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 14th Edn., p. 50.]”
Further, similar non-obstante clause is also used in section 144C(4) with a same limited purpose to imply, even though there might be a larger time limit under Section 153, once the order of TPO is accepted or not objected to, causing a deeming fiction of acceptance, the final order is to be passed immediately. The object is to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and the authority need not wait for the last date to pass the orders. The limitation prescribed under the statute is for the assessing officer and therefore, it is his duty to pass order in time irrespective of whether the directions are received from DRP or not. As held by us above, the DRP will have no authority to issue directions after nine months and a further period of one month as per section 144C (13) and three months under section 153 (2A) is available, within which period no orders have been passed in the present cases. The reference made by the learned senior counsels on the judgments in Nokia India Private Ltd (supra) and Vedanta Ltd (Supra) is well founded. The timeline given under the Act is to be strictly followed.
In so far the show cause notice issued is concerned, though generally, the Court wit will be circumspect at the stage of show cause notice, the law on the point is well belled with exception carved in the following cases: a. when the nonce is without authority, b. when notion is without authority c. when notice is issued without following the procedures under the applicable Act of the rules framed there under and d. when the notice is issued with a prejudiced mind. The challenge must be available ex-facie leaving no room for the court to peruse or discuss intricate facts in the present case, the challenge is on the ground of limitation and hence, we hold that the proceedings under Article 226 of the constitution are maintainable.
As regards the relief sought in other appeals viz., W.A.No. 1517/2021 etc. batch, the findings rendered above are equally applicable. In these cases, for the assessment year 2009-10, the order of remand to the Assessing officer was passed on 18.12.2015 and insofar as the assessment year 2010-11 is concerned for one issue, it was passed on 18.12.2015 and for other two issues, it was passed on 23.09.2016 after the amendment, by which time, the time limit was brought down to 9 months. As such, fresh orders ought to have been passed before 31.03.2017 for the assessment year 2009- 10 and for one issue relating to the assessment year 2010-11 reckoning the 12 months from the financial year 2015-16 and on or before 31.12.2017 reckoning 9 months from the financial year 2016- 17. Therefore, the Assessing officer ought to have passed a draft assessment order immediately and asked the assessee to file their objections with the DRP. For the mistake and the lapse of the Assessing officer, the vested right of the Assessee cannot be taken away.
We are not oblivious of the fact that any finding on the aspect of reasonableness in time in passing orders when no time is provided would be superfluous in view of our decision in earlier paragraphs. It is necessary to decide on the issue as in this case, the revenue has taken more than 5 years in one appeal and 4 years in other appeals, which is unacceptable as rightly held by the learned judge. We are not alone on this issue and are fortified by the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard.
(i) Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. State of Haryana, [(1988) 3 SCC 478: 1988 SCC (Tax) 409 at page 4871 15. Before we part with the case, we would like to indicate that assessment of tax should be completed with expedition. It involves the revenue to the State. In the case of a registered dealer who collects sales tax on behalf of the State, there is no justification for him to withhold the payment of the tax so collected. If a timely assessment is completed, the dues of the State can be conveniently ascertained and collected. Delay in completion of assessment often creates problems. The assessee would be required to keep up all the evidence in support of his transactions. Where evidence is necessary, with the lapse of time, there is scope for its being lost. Oral evidence as and when required to be produced by the assessing authority may not be available if a long period intervenes between the transactions and the consideration of the matter by the assessing authority Long delay thus is not in the interest of either the assessee or the State. In view of the fact that a period of limitation has been prescribed for bringing the escaped turnover into the net of taxation, such an eventuality cannot be grappled with appropriately unless timely assessment is completed. In several taxing statutes, even in a situation like this, where assessment under Section 11(3) or 28(3) of the respective Acts is contemplated, a period of limitation is provided. Until by statute, such a limitation is provided, it is proper for the State Governments to require, by statutory rules or appropriate instructions, to ensure completion of assessments with expedition and reasonable haste but subject to rules of natural justice" (ii) Govt. of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, [(1989) 3 SCC 483 1989 SCC (Tax) 464 at page 487] 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents urged that Rule 12 is unreasonable and violative of Article of for the recovery of duty. He urged that in the absence of any prescribed period for recovery of the duty as contemplated by Rule 12. the officer may act arbitrarily in recovering the amount after lapse of long period of time. We find no substance in the submission While it is true that Rule 12 does not but that by itself does not render the rule unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution prescribed any period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated by the rule is to be made. in the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period What would be reasonable period, would depend upon the facts of each case Whenever a question regarding the inordinate delay in issuance of notice of demand is raised, it would be open to the assessee to contend that it is bad on the ground of delay and it will be for the relevant officer to consider the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case notice of demand for recovery was made within reasonable period. No hard and fast rules can be laid down in this regard as the determination of the question will depend upon the facts of each case (iii) (State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd., [(2007) 11 SCC 363: 2007SCC OnLine SC 1254 at page 367] 17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor the same would not mean that the suomotu power can be exercised at any time 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.
Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinanly be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years.
In SB Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India ((1976) 2 SCC 181 1976 SCC (Tax) 177: (1976) 37 STC 425] Untwalia, J., speaking for the Bench, opined (SCC p. 188, para 15)
Apropos the fourth and the last submission of the appellant, suffice it to say that even assuming that the revisional power cannot be exercised suomotu after an unduly long delay, on the facts of this case it is plain that it was not so done. Within a few months of the passing of the appellate order by the Assistant Commissioner, the Commissioner proceeded to revise and revised the said order. There was no undue or unreasonable delay made by the Commissioner. It may be stated here that an appeal has to be filed by an assessee within the prescribed time and so also a time- limit has been prescribed for the assessee to move in revision. The appellate or the revisional powers in an appeal or revision filed by an assessee can be exercised in due course. No time-limit has been prescribed for it. It may well be that for an exercise of the suomotu power of revision also the revisional authority has to initiate the proceeding within a reasonable time. Any unreasonable delay in exercise may affect its validity. What is a reasonable time, however, will depend upon the facts of each case" 23. The question at would be the reasonable period did not fall for consideration there The binding precedent of this Court, some of which had been referred to us heretobefore had not The counsel appearing for the parties were remissin bringing the same to the notice of the Court Furthermore from a perusal of the impugned notice dated 4-9-2006 is Apparent that the resvisional authority did not assign any reason as to why such a notice was being issued considered after a period of 53% years" Generally no hard and fast rule can be laid down to indicate what a reasonable time is. It though depends upon the facts of the each case drawing a clue from Article 113 of the Limitation Act the residual entry, it would be reasonable to conclude that in such cases, action is to be concluded within 3 years Needless to say if the statute prescribes shorter period, the doctrine of reasonable time will not be applicable and the timeline under the statute is to be strictly followed 27. For the reasons set out before, we conclude as under:- (a) The provisions of Sections 144C and 153 are not mutually exclusive, but are rather mutually Inclusive. The period of limitation prescribed under Section 153 (24) or 153 (3) is applicable, when the matters are remanded back irrespective of whether it is to the Assessing Officer of TPO or the DRP, the duty is on the assessing officer to pass orders. (b) Even in case of remand, the TPO or the DRP have to follow the time limits as provided under The Act. The entire proceedings including the hearing and directions have to be issued by the ORP within 9 months as contemplated under Section 144C (12) of the Income Tax Act. (c) Irrespective of whether the DRP concludes the proceedings and issues directions or not, within 9 months, the Assessing officer is to pass orders within the stipulated time. (d) In matter involving transfer pricing. upon remand to DRP, the Assessing officer is to pass a de-nova draft order and the entire proceedings as in the original assessment, would have to be completed within 12 months, as the very purpose of extension is to ensure that orders are passed within the extended period, as otherwise the extension becomes meaningless. (e) The outer time limit of 33 months in case of reference to TPO under Section 153, would not refer to draft order, but only to final order and hence, the entire proceedings would have to be concluded within the time limits prescribed. (f) The non-obstante clause would not exclude the operation of Section 153 as a whole. It on implies that irrespective of availability of larger time to conclude the proceedings, final orders are to be passed within one month in line with the scheme of the Act. (g) When no period of limitation is prescribed, orders are to be passed within a reasonable time, which in any case cannot be beyond 3 years. However, when the statute prescribes a particular period within which orders are to be passed, then such period, irrespective of whether it is short or long, shall be applicable.”
The above ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd (supra) and also the Interim Order passed in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering the overall circumstances, the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal of Hyderabad in plethora of orders decided the issue of limitation in favour of the Assessee by safeguarding the interest of the parties by granting liberty.
Further the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Teva Pharmaceutical & chemical Industries India Private Limited Vs. Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department/DCIT(supra), by following the binding judicial precedent of the Judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd (supra) and also the orders of Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal Hyderabad, quashed the assessment orders.
In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of Roca Bathroom Products Pvt. Ltd (supra), also relying on the plethora of orders passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal of Hyderabad Bench (supra) and the decision of the Co- ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Teva Pharmaceutical & chemical Industries India Private Limited Vs. Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department/DCIT(supra), in order to follow the principals of consistency as mere keeping the captioned Appeal pending in the Tribunal will not serve any purpose, by respectfully following those binding precedents, we hold that the impugned Final Assessment Orders passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Act dated 08/02/2014 pertaining to A.Y 2009-10, dated 29/12/2014 for A.Y 2010-11, dated 19/05/2015 for A.Y 2011-12 and 27/01/2017 pertaining to A.Y 2012-13 respectively are barred by limitation as per Section 153 r.w. Section 144C of the Act. Accordingly, the impugned Final Assessment Orders challenged in Appeal filed by the Assessee are hereby quashed.
As we have quashed the Assessment order pertaining to A.Y 2009-10, Appeal filed by the Revenue in is dismissed for having become in-fructuous.
Further, since above issue of Limitation is pending adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. (supra) and to be reached finality by the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we grant liberty to the parties to get the present Appeals revived for adjudication of the other issues on merits if the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this issue necessitates modification of this order. Accordingly, we dispose-off the captioned appeal on the limited legal issue of limitation with liberty as mentioned above to the parties and keep open other issues raised by the Assessee on merits, subject to the outcome of the Judgment of the larger bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. (supra).
In the result, appeals of the Assessees are allowed.