840 orders · Page 16 of 17
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, vitiating the assessment orders. The assessment orders were quashed due to this procedural lapse.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, vitiating the assessment orders. The assessment orders were quashed due to this procedural lapse.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, vitiating the assessment orders. The assessment orders were quashed due to this procedural lapse.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, vitiating the assessment orders. The assessment orders were quashed due to this procedural lapse.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the CPC was a double addition and therefore deleted it. The reasoning was based on the perusal of the financial statements, which showed that the assessee had already credited the amount of INR 14,45,64,504/- to its books of accounts under the head 'Other Income' (Note 22 of the Profit & Loss account). This amount was also reported by the auditors in the tax audit report. Furthermore, the ITR-6 filed by the assessee clearly declared these amounts as income under the head 'Any other income (specify nature and amount)' as per Section 41(1) of the Act. The assessee's response to the CPC's show cause notice explicitly stated that adding this amount again would lead to double taxation. The Tribunal found the Ld. CIT(A)'s observation that the disallowance was indicated by the auditor but not taken into account by the assessee to be contrary to the facts, as the Ld. CIT(A) had not verified the evidence. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the correct amount of loss to be carried forward to the next year after deleting the addition. All grounds of appeal were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the commencement date for computation of the six/ten assessment years under Section 153C is the date of receipt of books of account/materials by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person. The satisfaction note date by the AO of the non-searched person becomes the effective date. The impugned assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14 were found to be outside the block period.
The Tribunal observed that the AO lacked cogent material and proceeded solely on estimation without sufficient evidence. The Tribunal found that the assessment was made without application of mind and inclined to delete the addition.
The Tribunal held that the commencement date for computation of the six/ten assessment years under Section 153C is the date of receipt of books of account/materials by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person. The satisfaction note date by the AO of the non-searched person becomes the effective date. The impugned assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14 were found to be outside the block period.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not provided with a proper opportunity of being heard before the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision that Assessment Year 2012-13 was beyond the six-year block period for assessment under Section 153C, as the period should be calculated from the date of recording satisfaction (20.09.2018). Therefore, the assessment was quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the cash deposit originated from a personal loan taken by the assessee for a medical emergency. The cash remained unutilized and was later deposited. The Tribunal found the explanation satisfactory and the money trail duly established.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Delhi High Court judgment in Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Limited, which stated that the ten-year block period is reckoned from the end of the AY relevant to the FY of search. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was outside the permissible block period.
The Tribunal held that the grounds challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings on account of procedural lapses (like non-service of notice u/s 143(2) and improper approval for reassessment) were dismissed. However, on merits, the Tribunal allowed the deduction for indexed cost of improvement and the exemption u/s 54 for capital gains, considering the delay in construction was due to circumstances beyond the assessee's control.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the declared jewellery in wealth tax returns exceeded the jewellery found during the search. No distinguishing facts were presented by the Revenue to deviate from this finding.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the additions as the assessee had established the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the lenders, and the transactions were through banking channels. The cross-objections were also accepted.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, vitiating the assessment orders. The assessment orders were quashed due to this procedural lapse.
The Tribunal held that the additions were made solely on the basis of statements of two individuals, without providing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine them. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had provided substantial documentary evidence to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the lenders.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) lacked material to disallow the claimed losses, as the transactions were duly recorded, disclosed in returns, and supported by documentation. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal held that the block period for assessment under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is to be calculated from the date of receipt of seized books of accounts, documents, or assets by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, not from the date of the search. Consequently, the assessments for AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13 were found to be beyond the ten-year block period and thus invalid.
The Tribunal held that the block period for assessment under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is to be calculated from the date of receipt of seized books of accounts, documents, or assets by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, not from the date of the search. Consequently, the assessments for AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13 were found to be beyond the ten-year block period and thus invalid.
The Tribunal held that the commencement date for computation of the six/ten assessment years under Section 153C is the date of receipt of books of account/materials by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person. The satisfaction note date by the AO of the non-searched person becomes the effective date. The impugned assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14 were found to be outside the block period.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not provided with a proper opportunity of being heard before the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not provided with a proper opportunity of being heard before the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not provided with a proper opportunity of being heard before the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not provided with a proper opportunity of being heard before the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the additions were made solely on the basis of statements of two individuals, without providing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine them. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had provided substantial documentary evidence to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the lenders.
The tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 on 30.07.2022 was in violation of Section 151(ii) of the Act, as it was issued without the prior approval of the specified authority under the new regime. Consequently, the notice and the reassessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred in allowing TDS credit on a proportionate basis, as the Assessee had offered the entire income to tax. The discrepancy was explained by sales returns, and the total declared turnover tallied with Form 26AS.
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision to delete the addition. It found that cash generated through RTGS payments in AY 2019-20 was also available, as evidenced by date labels on cash bundles, and that the AO's cutoff date was illogical.
The Tribunal, relying on its own previous decisions for the Assessee's own case, held that CAM charges are governed by Section 194C of the Act, while rent is governed by Section 194I. The Assessing Officer was directed to recompute the CAM charges accordingly.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred in allowing TDS credit on a proportionate basis, as the Assessee had offered the entire income to tax. The discrepancy was explained by sales returns, and the total declared turnover tallied with Form 26AS.
The Tribunal held that failure to deposit employees' contribution towards EPF and ESI within the due date prescribed in the respective Acts results in disallowance under Section 36(1)(va) of the Act, and such adjustments can be made under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by the approving authority granting approval for multiple cases on the same day without proper scrutiny. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153A were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the difference in receipts arose from updated Form 26AS reflecting receipts related to GST invoices from April and May 2018. It was concluded that this income was rightly declared in AY 2019-20 and was revenue neutral for AY 2018-19.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 153 days, finding sufficient cause in the interest of justice. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment order was passed ex-parte and restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically and without application of mind, vitiating the assessment proceedings. Following jurisdictional High Court precedents, the entire proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that both the CIT(A) and the AO had passed non-speaking and ex-parte orders, respectively, without providing adequate opportunities to the assessee. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the issues back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal granted permission to withdraw the appeal as the dispute was settled and the tax liability was deposited. The Department did not raise any objection.
The Tribunal held that the AO lacked jurisdiction to reopen the assessment as the assessee, being a non-resident earning only interest income on which TDS was deducted, was exempt from filing a return of income under Section 115A(5). The initiation of proceedings was therefore void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that in the absence of incriminating material found during a search, additions cannot be sustained in unabated assessment years, following the Supreme Court decision in Abhisar Buildwell.
The Tribunal held that in the absence of incriminating material found during a search, additions cannot be sustained in unabated assessment years, following the Supreme Court decision in Abhisar Buildwell.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's explanations regarding cash deposits lacked corroborative proof and raised doubts about human probabilities. The CIT(A) did not properly consider the assessee's explanation. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal considered the request for withdrawal of the appeal. The Department of Revenue had no objection. Accordingly, the Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal.
The Tribunal noted that both the CIT(A) and the AO had passed non-speaking and ex-parte orders, respectively, without providing adequate opportunities to the assessee. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the issues back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically and without application of mind, vitiating the assessment proceedings. Following jurisdictional High Court precedents, the entire proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal quashed the entire proceedings initiated under Section 153A due to the lack of a valid approval under Section 153D, finding it was granted mechanically and without application of mind. This decision was based on Supreme Court and jurisdictional High Court precedents.
The Tribunal held that the AO lacked jurisdiction to reopen the assessment as the assessee, being a non-resident earning only interest income on which TDS was deducted, was exempt from filing a return of income under Section 115A(5). The initiation of proceedings was therefore void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that in the absence of incriminating material found during a search, additions cannot be sustained in unabated assessment years, following the Supreme Court decision in Abhisar Buildwell.
The Tribunal held that in the absence of incriminating material found during a search, additions cannot be sustained in unabated assessment years, following the Supreme Court decision in Abhisar Buildwell.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of ownership of the new property, specifically the sale deed, despite a notice under Section 133(6). Therefore, the exemption under Section 54F could not be allowed.