ITAT Delhi Judgments — September 2025

The Tribunal held that the assessment years in question were beyond the maximum time period permissible from the date of search/satisfaction under Section 153C. Relying on judicial precedents, it was determined that the date of search, not the later date of satisfaction, is crucial for computing the time limits. Consequently, the assessments were deemed not sustainable in law.

The Tribunal held that the assessment years in question were beyond the maximum time period permissible from the date of search/satisfaction under Section 153C. Relying on judicial precedents, it was determined that the date of search, not the later date of satisfaction, is crucial for computing the time limits. Consequently, the assessments were deemed not sustainable in law.

The Tribunal held that the assessment years in question were beyond the maximum time period permissible from the date of search/satisfaction under Section 153C. Relying on judicial precedents, it was determined that the date of search, not the later date of satisfaction, is crucial for computing the time limits. Consequently, the assessments were deemed not sustainable in law.

The Tribunal held that the NFAC should have decided the appeal on merit as per Section 250 of the Act. Considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal restored the issue to the NFAC to grant one final opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the TPO's order was barred by limitation as it was passed one day beyond the prescribed time limit. Consequently, the subsequent assessment proceedings were deemed invalid.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly admitted additional evidence under Rule 46A as the AO had the opportunity to examine it and did not find any infirmity in the loans. The Tribunal also upheld the deletion of unexplained expenditure, finding that the CIT(A) had considered the assessee's submissions and documents.

The Tribunal held that the appeal should be decided on merits as per the provisions of Section 250 of the Act. It was an admitted fact that despite opportunities granted by the NFAC, the assessee did not file his submissions, leading to the dismissal of the appeal ex-parte. The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to file submissions and did not appear before the lower authorities. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to restore the issue to the file of the NFAC. The NFAC was directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim and decide the issue based on facts and law. The assessee was also directed to appear before the NFAC and cooperate in the proceedings. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. The Tribunal restored the issues to the file of the CIT(E) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim, considering the totality of facts and circumstances.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. The Tribunal restored the issues to the file of the CIT(E) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim, considering the totality of facts and circumstances.

The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment by the Principal CIT was mechanical, as it merely stated 'I am satisfied' without applying his mind to the material. Consequently, the reassessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment years in question were beyond the maximum time period permissible from the date of search/satisfaction under Section 153C. Relying on judicial precedents, it was determined that the date of search, not the later date of satisfaction, is crucial for computing the time limits. Consequently, the assessments were deemed not sustainable in law.

The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's limited education and lack of familiarity with technology. Both appeals were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for a *de novo* adjudication, with directions to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and the assessee is directed to participate.

The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's limited education and lack of familiarity with technology. Both appeals were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for a *de novo* adjudication, with directions to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and the assessee is directed to participate.

The Tribunal held that the lower authorities had carefully considered the facts and correctly interpreted the law. Since the assessee failed to present any evidence or arguments to defend its case and was consistently absent, the Tribunal found no reason to intervene.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. Grounds related to share application money were remanded to the AO for further verification. The disallowance for non-deduction of TDS was partly allowed. The addition for unsecured loans was set aside and remanded to the AO.

The Tribunal held that the impugned transactions could not be treated as bogus or non-genuine accommodation entries without specific inquiry or evidence. The CIT(A) had rightly deleted the addition by following various decisions of the ITAT where similar transactions in M/s. CCL International Ltd. shares were held to be genuine.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A), noting that no evidence was presented to demonstrate that M/s CCL International Ltd. was a penny stock company or engaged in share rigging. The Tribunal also observed that the tax effect of the appeal was below the prescribed limit for filing appeals before the ITAT.

The Tribunal held that a revisionary order u/s 263 is not permissible if the assessment order was passed with prior approval u/s 153D, unless such approval is also examined and vitiated. Since the revenue did not provide evidence to distinguish the present case from prior judgments on this point, the revisionary order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that while Instruction No. 1/2011 ordinarily vests jurisdiction for returns below Rs. 20 lakhs with the ITO, subsequent instructions allowed for monetary limit adjustments. Therefore, the notice issued by ACIT and assessment by ITO were not in violation. However, the Tribunal noted that both lower authorities passed ex-parte orders.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessee had now produced the bank statement supporting the claim. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the issue back to the A.O. for fresh adjudication after considering the bank statement.

The Tribunal found that the Departmental Representative failed to controvert the fact that the assessee fell under Gurgaon's jurisdiction. Therefore, the order passed by the Delhi ITO was deemed invalid and void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction, and the appeal was allowed on this jurisdictional ground without adjudicating on merits.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D must demonstrate an application of mind for each assessment year and cannot be a mechanical formality. Relying on High Court and Supreme Court decisions, the Tribunal found that the approval process in this case was vitiated.

The Tribunal held that AppD India is not a DAPE of the assessee as it does not meet the conditions under Article 5(4) of the India-UK DTAA. AppD India only identifies leads, and the assessee handles contract negotiations and sales.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, stating that the AO failed to follow mandatory procedures. Specifically, the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was flawed due to a lack of proper satisfaction, and the assessment order was vitiated by the non-compliance with Section 144C regarding the draft assessment order.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of assessment proceedings under Section 153C was not in accordance with the Act as the AO failed to record proper satisfaction. Furthermore, the final assessment orders were vitiated due to the AO's failure to pass a draft assessment order as required by Section 144C.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of assessment proceedings under Section 153C was not in accordance with the Act as the AO failed to record proper satisfaction. Furthermore, the final assessment orders were vitiated due to the AO's failure to pass a draft assessment order as required by Section 144C.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of assessment proceedings under Section 153C was not in accordance with the Act as the AO failed to record proper satisfaction. Furthermore, the final assessment orders were vitiated due to the AO's failure to pass a draft assessment order as required by Section 144C.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, stating that the final assessment order was vitiated due to the failure to adhere to the mandatory provisions of Section 144C(1). The Tribunal also noted the issue with the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C.

The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the assessment orders were vitiated due to the AO's failure to record proper satisfaction for initiating proceedings under Section 153C and for not issuing a draft assessment order as required by Section 144C.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of assessment proceedings under Section 153C was unlawful because the AO failed to record the necessary satisfaction that the seized documents did not belong to the person from whom they were seized. Furthermore, a consolidated satisfaction note for multiple assessees was considered a breach of settled law.

The Tribunal observed that for the very same assessment year (2023-24), the Department itself, in a scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) (order dated 11.03.2025), had already accepted the assessee as a manufacturer and applied the Section 115BAB rate. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the CPC had no basis to deny the benefit, set aside the lower authorities' orders, and directed the AO to apply the tax rate as per Section 115BAB.

The Tribunal held that the six-year period for issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act is calculated from the date of handing over of the material by the AO of the searched person. Since the satisfaction note was dated 18.04.2022, the six-year period would commence from FY 2022-23. Therefore, the assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15 fell beyond this period.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order was based on a correct understanding of the facts and judicial precedents. The Tribunal noted that the facts for the current year were identical to the preceding year, where a coordinate bench had deleted similar additions.

The Tribunal found that the disallowance was indeed due to a clerical mistake in Form No. 3CA, as reconciliation proved that payments were made within the due date. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition made under Section 143(1) of the Act, ruling that no further verification by the AO was required.

The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening was granted mechanically without independent application of mind by the Principal CIT. Therefore, the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid, and the consequent reassessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee has the choice of valuation method (DCF or NAV) and the AO cannot dispute this choice. The AO is not empowered to change the method of valuation adopted by the assessee.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's consistent absence and lack of written submissions. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, it held that when the Tribunal fully agrees with the lower authorities, it is not acting illegally by affirming their findings without repeating the reasons.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a foreign company, was an 'eligible assessee' under Section 144C(15)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was mandatorily required to issue a draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being an 'eligible assessee' under Section 144C(15)(b), required the AO to issue a draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order. Since this mandatory procedure was not followed, the final assessment orders were vitiated.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a foreign company and an 'eligible assessee' under Section 144C(15)(b) of the Income Tax Act, required the AO to pass a draft assessment order. Since this mandatory procedure was not followed, the final assessment orders were vitiated.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a foreign company and an 'eligible assessee' under Section 144C(15)(b) of the Income Tax Act, required the AO to pass a draft assessment order. Since this mandatory procedure was not followed, the final assessment orders were vitiated.

The Tribunal held that the penalty notice was ambiguous as it did not clearly specify the default for which the penalty was being levied. Consequently, the penalty was not sustainable.

The Tribunal observed that the tax effect of the appeal was below Rs. 60 lakhs, which is the revised monetary limit set by CBDT Circular No.09/2024. Therefore, the Tribunal considered the appeal not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that a penalty notice under Section 271(1)(c) must clearly specify whether it is for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars. Failure to do so renders the notice and the subsequent penalty order invalid.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 143(2) was not properly served on the assessee, rendering the assessment proceedings void due to lack of jurisdiction. The assessee's objection regarding non-service was not disposed of by the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 143(2) was not properly served on the assessee, rendering the assessment proceedings void due to lack of jurisdiction. The assessee's objection regarding non-service was not disposed of by the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal decided to adjudicate the issue of assumption of jurisdiction first, as it goes to the root of the matter. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's argument that Section 127 of the Income Tax Act pertains to the transfer of jurisdiction between Assessing Officers and not between Commissioners. The assessee also relied on CBDT Notifications No. 52 and 53 of 2014, which indicated that jurisdiction over trust cases, including those claiming exemption under Section 11 and 12, lay with the CIT(Exemption). The Tribunal noted the assessee's reliance on various ITAT decisions supporting the view that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Pr. CIT(Central) was illegal. Regarding the retrospective cancellation, the Tribunal held that while the Pr. CIT(C)'s cancellation order was retrospective from 27.09.1999, the registration could not be cancelled from a period prior to 01.10.2004, when the express power to cancel was granted. The Tribunal found that the assessee was in cohorts with its ex-president in acting as a conduit for commission/liasoning fees and converting them into cash by taking bogus bills/entries since June 2012. The assessee failed to discharge its onus to demonstrate genuine activities. Consequently, the Tribunal modified the Pr. CIT(C)'s order, making the withdrawal of registration effective from June 2012 (FY 2012-13) instead of 27.09.1999, until the date of the cancellation order. Grounds 1 to 3 were dismissed, and Ground 4 was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the cash deposits in the bank account were part of the business receipts and the assessee had sufficient cash from business receipts and earlier withdrawals. Therefore, the addition was unwarranted and deleted.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal restored all appeals to the ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, directing the CIT(A) to provide an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to make proper submissions and cooperate with the tax authorities.