ITAT Delhi Judgments — August 2025

The Tribunal held that communication gaps at various levels might have prevented the assessee from effectively presenting their case. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication with three effective opportunities of hearing.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. It held that joining and committed bonuses were capital in nature but directed the disallowance to be restricted. The disallowance of support services fees was sustained to the extent of 5% on an ad-hoc basis.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act must be accorded separately for each assessment year, even for a single assessee. Citing various precedents, the Tribunal found the approval granted in this case to be invalid.

The Tribunal held that the failure of the Assessing Officer to specify the exact limb (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) in the penalty show-cause notices vitiates the penalty proceedings. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents for this decision.

The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are vitiated. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in PCIT Vs. Sahara India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (2021) 432 ITR 84 (Del.) and PCIT Vs. Gopal Kumar Goyal (2023) 153 taxmann.com 534 (Del.). The reasoning was that the Assessing Officer had failed to specify the corresponding limb (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income) in the penalty show-cause notices. This failure, being a clinching fact that went unrebutted by the Revenue, renders the penalty proceedings invalid. Consequently, all other pleadings on merits have become academic. The appeals were allowed in these terms.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's application to withdraw the appeal due to business closure and the absence of objection from the Department. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the disallowance to the GP element of the alleged bogus purchases. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s well-reasoned findings, considering the case law cited and the peculiar facts.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act must be accorded separately for each assessment year, even for a single assessee. Citing various precedents, the Tribunal found the approval granted in this case to be invalid.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act must be accorded separately for each assessment year, even for a single assessee. Citing various precedents, the Tribunal found the approval granted in this case to be invalid.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act must be accorded separately for each assessment year, even for a single assessee. Citing various precedents, the Tribunal found the approval granted in this case to be invalid.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the disallowance to the GP element of the alleged bogus purchases. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s well-reasoned findings, considering the case law cited and the peculiar facts.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the disallowance to the GP element of the alleged bogus purchases. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s well-reasoned findings, considering the case law cited and the peculiar facts.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act must be accorded separately for each assessment year, even for a single assessee. Citing various precedents, the Tribunal found the approval granted in this case to be invalid.

The Tribunal held that a disallowance based on a highly debatable issue cannot be made under section 143(1) processing. The assessee's argument regarding the nature of the issue was found to have merit.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act must be accorded separately for each assessment year, even for a single assessee. Citing various precedents, the Tribunal found the approval granted in this case to be invalid.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee had not fully proven all facts nor could the department's contentions be fully accepted, a lumpsum addition of Rs. 5 lakhs should be confirmed as a matter of justice. Regarding Section 115BBE, it was noted that the provision applies from 01.04.2017 onwards.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the disallowance to the GP element of the alleged bogus purchases. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s well-reasoned findings, considering the case law cited and the peculiar facts.

The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are vitiated. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in PCIT Vs. Sahara India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (2021) 432 ITR 84 (Del.) and PCIT Vs. Gopal Kumar Goyal (2023) 153 taxmann.com 534 (Del.). The reasoning was that the Assessing Officer had failed to specify the corresponding limb (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income) in the penalty show-cause notices. This failure, being a clinching fact that went unrebutted by the Revenue, renders the penalty proceedings invalid. Consequently, all other pleadings on merits have become academic. The appeals were allowed in these terms.

The Tribunal held that the impugned reassessment proceedings were not sustainable in law. The primary reason was the failure of the lower authorities to obtain the necessary approval under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The assessment year in question was 2017-18, and the show-cause notice under Section 148A(d) was dated 29.07.2022. Since more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, the requirement was to obtain approval under Section 151(ii), which mandates a higher level of authority for sanction. The Tribunal relied on the decision in Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal, which clarified that non-compliance with the strict time limits prescribed under Section 151 affects the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed as infructuous, and the assessee's cross-objection was allowed.

The Tribunal found that the appeal was time-barred by 10 days and condoned the delay. The Tribunal upheld the action of the CIT(A) in restoring the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing an opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to a reasonable cause. The issues in dispute were remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) to be decided afresh after giving the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are vitiated. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in PCIT Vs. Sahara India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (2021) 432 ITR 84 (Del.) and PCIT Vs. Gopal Kumar Goyal (2023) 153 taxmann.com 534 (Del.). The reasoning was that the Assessing Officer had failed to specify the corresponding limb (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income) in the penalty show-cause notices. This failure, being a clinching fact that went unrebutted by the Revenue, renders the penalty proceedings invalid. Consequently, all other pleadings on merits have become academic. The appeals were allowed in these terms.

The Tribunal, in a majority decision, quashed the reopening of assessment under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The primary reason for quashing was that the AO had relied solely on the audit objection without applying his own independent mind to form a belief that income had escaped assessment. The Tribunal held that the reopening was invalid as it was based on the opinion of another authority (audit party) and not on the AO's own reasoned belief, free from external pressure. Consequently, the assessment framed under Section 147 was held to be illegal, erroneous, and without jurisdiction. The appeal of the assessee was allowed. The issue regarding the treatment of expenses on the abandoned Phase-3 project as capital expenditure was rendered academic due to the invalidity of the reopening proceedings.

The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding no merit in the Revenue's grounds. It was noted that the assessee's name did not appear in the agreement dated 04.04.2011, which was the basis for the undisclosed investment addition.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 3,00,000/- made in the hands of the assessee was not sustainable as the source of the funds should have been explained by the assessee's daughter and wife, not solely by the assessee himself.

The Tribunal found that the AO passed an ex-parte order and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without proper verification. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the issues back to the CIT(A) to decide afresh after verifying the genuineness of the transactions and passing a speaking order.

The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice, decided to restore the appeals for both assessment years back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Assessing Officer is directed to first decide the appellant's entitlement to be impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased assessee, as per section 2(29) of the Act read with section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer is to re-adjudicate the remaining issues afresh, preferably within three effective opportunities of hearing. All other legal issues and issues on merits between the parties are kept open at this stage. The appeals are allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted that the notices were sent to the wrong email address as per the assessee's Form No. 35. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeal back to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to make submissions.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause. It held that dismissal for non-prosecution by the CIT(A) was not permissible. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order. The assessee was not given a fair opportunity to make submissions before the AO due to non-service of notices. Therefore, the CIT(A) rightly restored the case to the AO for fresh assessment.

The Tribunal held that Smt. Kaushalya Devi did not meet the criteria of a legal representative as per the Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, her application for substitution was declined.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was bad in law as it was based on a change of opinion and not on any tangible material or fresh facts. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents establishing that a mere change of opinion does not confer jurisdiction for reopening.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) adopted a pedantic and hyper-technical approach in dismissing the appeal on grounds of limitation. Citing Apex Court judgments, the Tribunal stated that acceptance of reasons for delay should be the rule and refusal an exception, emphasizing liberal construction of 'sufficient cause'.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without proper application of mind by the AO and the PCIT, as incorrect and non-existent provisions of Section 147 were cited. The approval was also mechanical and undated.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. The Tribunal remitted the issue back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(A) to pass a speaking order after verifying the genuineness of the cash deposit transactions.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's assessment and penalty orders did not independently discuss the applicability of TDS provisions. The Revenue's reliance on the tax audit report was considered insufficient proof. The Tribunal found that the assessee had a reasonable cause for not deducting TDS.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed an additional evidence application to place on record details of the investor, Mr. Li, for the entire amount. The Tribunal found this evidence crucial and, in the interest of justice, decided to restore the appeal.

The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice, decided to restore the appeals for both assessment years back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Assessing Officer is directed to first decide the appellant's entitlement to be impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased assessee, as per section 2(29) of the Act read with section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer is to re-adjudicate the remaining issues afresh, preferably within three effective opportunities of hearing. All other legal issues and issues on merits between the parties are kept open at this stage. The appeals are allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the reasonable grounds provided by the assessee. However, instead of deciding on merits, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the lower appellate authority to decide the issue afresh after providing an opportunity of being heard and allowing the assessee to present relevant documents.

The Tribunal confirmed the disallowance in principle but restored the matter to the AO to verify the assessee's claim of payments being made within due dates, with delays due to server errors. If verified, only payments made after the due date would be disallowed.

The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, holding that the assessment was barred by limitation. The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, agreeing that the six-year period for Section 153C should be computed with reference to the date of recording satisfaction, not the date of search.

The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeal regarding the disallowance of deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) had already been allowed in favour of the assessee by a co-ordinate bench. Therefore, the consequential penalty does not survive.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and professional lapse by the consultant as sufficient cause. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal noted the submission regarding the Assessee's opt-in to the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and dismissed the appeal. A liberty was granted to get the appeal restored if the scheme application fails.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 5,04,500 related to cash deposits during demonetization was sufficiently explained as arising from cash sales and thus deserved deletion. The disallowance of salary expenses was also deleted due to sufficient documentation.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order was not reasoned and did not effectively deal with the documents placed before it, giving a blanket approval to the Assessing Officer's additions. The Tribunal noted that similar issues in previous years were set aside by the ITAT.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) wrongly invoked Section 263 as the AO had already examined the issues and taken a plausible view. The revision amounted to a change of opinion, which is impermissible.

The tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the assessee liberty to recall the order if they are unsuccessful in completing the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme.

The Tribunal held that the AO had invoked Section 145(3) before referring to the DVO, but the assessee's objections to the DVO's report were not properly addressed. Regarding depreciation, the Tribunal followed the Supreme Court's ruling that the amendment to Section 11(6) was prospective, allowing depreciation claims.

The Tribunal held that the provision for site restoration obligation (SRO/ARO) is a real and not contingent liability, crystallized at the time of entering the lease agreement. The provision was made on a scientific basis and is allowable as a business expenditure.