SUDHAKAR ARORA,DELHI vs. ADIT, CPC, BENGALURU

That under the facts and circumstances, the Ld. CIT (A) now NFAC Delhi has not considered the Hon'ble ITAT order on the same issue for AY 2019-20.”

The checkmate case was passed by the A.O. U/s 143(3); however, our case was passed by CPC u/s 143(1)(a).

In the case of FIL India Business & Research Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2023] 154 taxmann.com 251 (Delhi - Trib.)/[2023] 105 ITR(T) 82 (Delhi - Trib.)[17-01-2023], the ITAT held that since assessee had initially deposited employees dues before prescribed due dates but due to glitches at end of respective authorities, the amounts were reversed by bank, assessee could not be penalized with addition on account of delayed deposits.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.”

The Ld. DR supported the orders of the authorities below.

We have heard both the parties and perused the material available on record. Similar facts and grounds of appeal had come up before the Co- ordinate Bench of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of M/s Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs DCIT in ITA No.68/Ahd/2023. The grounds of appeal raised in the cited case are reproduced as under:-

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed.”

The next argument of the Counsel for the assessee is that in the Audit Report, the auditor has not made any specific observation regarding inadmissibility of the claim u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act which was required to be made by the auditors in the Tax Audit Report and the Auditors have only mentioned the “actual dates” and “due dates” of remittance. Accordingly, in view of the Mumbai ITAT decisions in the case of PR Packaging in and Kalpesh Synthetics 137 Taxmann.com 475 (Mumbai), this claim of deduction u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act cannot be disallowed u/s 143(1) of the Act (more specifically under sub-clause (d) to 143(1) of the Act). Secondly, the counsel argued that the issue at the time when the disallowance was made, issue was debatable and accordingly could not be the subject matter of disallowance under section 143(1) of the Act.

Regarding the argument that the auditors did not specifically mention in the audit report regarding inadmissibility of claim with respect to contributions received from the employees for various funds as referred to in section 36(1)(va) of the Act, it would be useful to reproduce section 143(1) of the Act, which reads as under: “Assessment. 143. (1) Where a return has been made under section 139, or in response to a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142, such return shall be processed in the following manner, namely:— (a) the total income or loss shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:— (i) any arithmetical error in the return; (ii) an incorrect claim, if such incorrect claim is apparent from any information in the return; (iii) disallowance of loss claimed, if return of the previous year for which set off of loss is claimed was furnished beyond the due date specified under sub-section (1) of section 139; (iv) disallowance of expenditure [or increase in income] indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return; (v) disallowance of deduction claimed under 69[section 10AA or under any of the provisions of Chapter VI-A under the heading "C.— Deductions in respect of certain incomes", if] the return is furnished beyond the due date specified under sub-section (1) of section 139; or (vi) addition of income appearing in Form 26AS or Form 16A or Form 16 which has not been included in computing the total income in the return: A perusal of section 143(1) of the Act shows that the words used are “(iv) disallowance of expenditure …indicated in the audit report”

Therefore, there is no specific requirement under section 143(1) of the Act that the auditor has to make a specific observation regarding “admissibility/inadmissibility” with regard to any claim of expenditure and all that is required under section 143(1) of the Act is that disallowance of such expenditure should be “indicated in the audit report”. Now, on going through the specific clauses of the Tax Auditors Report in Form Number 3CD issued under section 44AB of the Act, we observe that serial number 20(b) of Form Number 3CD, which is specific to allowability of claim of deduction u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act, does not require the auditor to make any specific observation regarding admissibility of the amount under section 36(1)(va) of the Act. At the same time, when we observe several other parts of the tax audit report viz. serial number 21(b)-amounts inadmissible under section 40(a), serial number 21(c)-amounts inadmissible under section 40(b)/40(a)(ia) of the Act (ba), serial number 21(e)- the provision for payment of gratuity not allowable under section 40A(7), serial number 21(f)- any sum paid by the assessee as an employer not allowable under section 40A(9), serial number 21(h) amount of deduction inadmissible in terms of section 14A etc, there is a specific requirement that the auditor has to mention whether the expenditure is admissible/allowable or not. However, so far as section 36(1)(va) of the Act, the audit report does not require the auditor to make a specific observation regarding “admissibility/inadmissibility” of the above expenditure.

Therefore, once the auditor has mentioned the “actual” dates of ESI/PF remittance and the “due” dates of ESI/PF remittance by the assessee u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act at serial number 20(b) of the audit report, then, in our considered view, the requirement of section 143(1) of the Act viz. “disallowance of expenditure ….indicated in the tax audit report” stands satisfied and the Department is permitted to make disallowance in terms of section 143(1) of the Act.

Regarding the alternate argument of the Counsel for the assessee that the claim of the assessee is allowable under Section 37 of the Act, we would like to refer to the decision of Hon’ble Jodhpur ITAT, in the case of Tarun Construction Company vs. ITO 157 taxmann.com 727 (Jodhpur – Tribunal) and the relevant extracts of the ruling are reproduced for ready reference:- “From the plain reading of the section it can be noted that 'due date' has been defined in the Explanation to mean the date by which assessee is required to credit the employees contribution in the relevant fund under any Act, rule, order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise. The section nowhere provides that the due date means the date by which the amount is to be deposited under the relevant Statue. For this reason Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in case of CIT v. Sabari Enterprises (2008) 298 ITR 141 at para 12 & 13 of its order held as under:- "12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have carefully examined the above statutory provisions of the Act including the definition of sections 2(24)(x) and s. 36(1)(va) and 43B(b), which read thus : 2. (24) 'income' includes,— (x) any sum received by the assessee from his employees as contributions to any provident fund or superannuation fund or any fund set up under the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or any other fund for the welfare of such employees." 43(b) any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any provident fund or superannuation fund or gratuity or any other fund for the welfare of employees, or"."36.(1) The deductions provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred to in s. 28—. . (va) any sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions subclause (x) of clause (24) of s. 2 apply, if such sum is credited by the assessee to the employee's account in the relevant fund or funds on or before the due date. Explanation.—Fur the purposes of this clause, 'due date' means the date by which the assessee is required as an employer to credit an employee's contribution to the employee's account in the relevant fund under any Act, rule, order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise."

This clause is inserted by the Finance Act with effect from 1st April, 1988. The Explanation to this clause is read very carefully. "Due date" has been explained stating that : means the date by which the assessee is required as an employer to credit contribution to the employees' account in the relevant fund under any Act, rule or order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise." Prior to the above clause was inserted to s. 36 giving statutory deductions of payment of tax under the provisions of the Act, s. 43B(b) was inserted by the Finance Act, 1983, which came into force with effect from 1st April, 1984. Therefore, again the provision of s. 43B(b) clearly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the other provisions of the Act including s. 36(1) clause (va) of the Act, even prior to the insertion of that clause the assessee is entitled to get statutory benefit of deduction of payment of tax from the Revenue. If that provision is read along with the first proviso of the said section which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, which came into effect from 1st April, 1988, the letters numbered as clause (a), or cl. (c) or cl. (d) or cl. (e) or cl. (f) are omitted from the above proviso and therefore deduction towards the employees contribution paid can be claimed by the assessee. The Explanation to clause (va) of s. 36(1) of the Income-tax Act further makes it very clear that the amount actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in this case at the time of submitting returns of income under s. 139 of the Act to the Revenue in respect of the previous year can be claimed by the assessees for deduction out of their gross income. The above said statutory provisions of the Income-tax Act abundantly makes it clear that, the contention urged on behalf of the Revenue that deduction from out of gross income for payment of tax at the time of submission of returns under s. 139 is permissible only if the statutory liability of payment of provident fund or other contribution funds referred to in cl. (b) are paid within the due date under the respective statutory enactments by the assessees as contended by learned counsel for the Revenue is not tenable in law and therefore the same cannot be accepted by us. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2022) 218 DTR 401 while deciding this issue has observed at Para 51 to 54 held as under:- "51. The analysis of the various judgments cited on behalf of the assessee i.e., CIT v. AIMIL Ltd. &Ors. (2010) 229 CTR (Del) 418 : (2010) 35 DTR (Del) 68 : (2010) 321 ITR 508 (Del), (Delhi High Court); CIT v. Sabari Enterprises (2007) 213 CTR (Kar) 269 : (2008) 2 DTR (Kar) 394 : (2008) 298 ITR 141 (Kar) (Karnataka High Court).; CIT v. Pamwi Tissues Ltd. (2008) 215 CTR (Bom) 150 : (2008) 3 DTR (Bom) 66 : (2009) 313 ITR 137 (Bom) (Bombay High Court); CIT vs. Udaipur Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd. (2014) 265 CTR (Raj) 59 : (2014) 98 DTR (Raj) 109 : (2013) 35 taxmann.com 616 (Raj) [Rajasthan High Court] and Nipso Polyfabriks (supra) would reveal that in all these cases, the High Courts principally relied upon omission of second proviso to s. 43B(b). No doubt, many of these decisions also dealt with s. 36(va) with its Explanation. However, the primary consideration in all the judgments, cited by the assessee, was that they adopted the approach indicated in the ruling in Alom Extrusions. As noticed previously, Alom Extrutions did not consider the fact of the introduction of s. 2(24)(x) or in fact the other provisions of the Act.

When Parliament introduced s. 43B, what was on the statute book, was only employer's contribution [s. 36(1)(iv)]. At that point in time, there was no question of employee's contribution being considered as part of the employer's earning. On the application of the original principles of law it could have been treated only as receipts not amounting to income. When Parliament introduced the amendments in 1988-89, inserting s. 36(1)(va) and simultaneously inserting the second proviso of s. 43B, its intention was not to treat the disparate nature of the amounts, similarly. As discussed previously, the memorandum introducing the Finance Bill clearly stated that the provisions-especially second proviso to s. 43B-was introduced to ensure timely payments were made by the employer to the concerned fund (EPF, ESI, etc.) and avoid the mischief of employers retaining amounts for long periods. That Parliament intended to retain the separate character of these two amounts, is evident from the use of different language. Sec. 2(24)(x) too, deems amount received from the employees (whether the amount is received from the employee or by way of deduction authorized by the statute) as income-it is the character of the amount that is important, i.e., not income earned. Thus, amounts retained by the employer from out of the employee's income by way of deduction etc. were treated as income in the hands of the employer. The significance of this provision is that on the one hand it brought into the fold of "income" amounts that were receipts or deductions from employees income; at the time, payment within the prescribed time- by way of contribution of the employees' share to their credit with the relevant fund is to be treated as deduction [s. 36(1)(va)]. The other important feature is that this distinction between the employers' contribution [s. 36(1)(iv)] and employees' contribution required to be deposited by the employer [s. 36(1)(va)] was maintained - and continues to be maintained. On the other hand, s. 43B covers all deductions that are permissible as expenditures, or outgoings forming part of the assessees' liability. These include liabilities such as tax liability, cess duties etc. or interest liability having regard to the terms of the contract. Thus, timely payment of these alone entitle an assessee to the benefit of deduction from the total income. The essential objective of s. 43B is to ensure that if assessees are following the mercantile method of accounting, nevertheless, the deduction of such liabilities, based only on book entries, would not be given. To pass muster, actual payments were a necessary precondition for allowing the expenditure.

The distinction between an employer's contribution which is its primary liability under law-in terms of s. 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it [s. 36(1)(va)] is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers' income, and the latter retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of s. 2(24)(x) - unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to s. 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts the employer's liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees' income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under s. 43B.

In the opinion of this Court, the reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer's obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee's income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of s. 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees' contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer's income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others' income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such interpretation were to be adopted, the non obstante clause under s. 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee's contribution on or before the due date as a condition for deduction. With utmost regard to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is submitted that it did not take into consideration that Explanation to section 36(1)(va) nowhere provides that due date means the date by which employees contribution to be deposited in the relevant fund under relevant statute but only provides that the amount is to be deposited under the relevant fund under any Act, rule, order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise. Thus, even if the amount is deposited with delay as per the time limit provided under the relevant fund/law but deposited within the permissible time as provided under the Act, it should be allowed as a deduction to the assessee. Hence, this decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court vis-à-vis the amendment made in section 36(1)(va) by introducing Explanation 2 by Finance Act, 2021 is applicable from AY 2021-22 and not for earlier AYs. Amount is allowable as an expenditure under section 37 of the Act 10. Without prejudice to above, it is submitted that the amount of employees contribution paid by the assessee should be treated as an expenditure allowable as deduction under section 37 of the Act due to the reason that the employees contribution is treated as income of the assessee under section 2(24)(x) of the Act. Further the said amount is allowable as a 'deduction' under section 36 of the Act wherein section 36(1) provides 'The deductions provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred to in section 28'.

Accordingly, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above in our view, the issue stands decided against the assessee.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed.”

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed as indicated above.