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290 orders · Page 6 of 6
The Tribunal held that the AO's attempt to rectify the assessment order under Section 154 using the same grounds for which reassessment proceedings were dropped constituted an issue that required debate and was not a mistake apparent from the record. Therefore, the rectification order was bad in law.
The Tribunal held that since no incriminating material was found from the assessee's premises during the search, and the additions were based on a third party's statement from another search operation, the AO should have proceeded under Section 153C, not Section 153A. Therefore, the additions made under Section 153A were deleted.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 61,70,000 as unexplained cash deposits. The assessee's failure to provide evidence, even during appeal proceedings, meant the cash deposits remained unexplained.
The CIT(A) deleted the additions made by the AO, holding that the assessee had proved the identity and creditworthiness of the parties from whom the loans were received. The Tribunal's decision is not fully detailed in the provided text, but it appears to be reviewing the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 412 days in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause due to the severe illness and death of the assessee company's director's mother, who was also a director, and for which an affidavit was filed. The Tribunal found cogency in the assessee's argument that the AO had not provided sufficient opportunity to present its case. The assessee had submitted a reply on 12.03.2015 and requested more time, which was not granted. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal remitted the issues back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The AO was directed to consider the reply, documents, and evidence submitted by the assessee and provide an adequate opportunity of being heard. The Revenue's DR had no objection to this course of action. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reason provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeal before the Learned CIT(A) constituted a sufficient cause for condonation. The Tribunal found that the Learned CIT(A) had not decided the assessee's appeal on merits. Therefore, the Tribunal restored all issues back to the file of the Learned CIT(A) with a direction to decide them on merits after providing reasonable opportunities of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to participate in the appellate proceedings and file necessary replies within the time limits set by the Learned CIT(A). The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that while the expenses were not fully substantiated, they were integral to the assessee's business and reflected in the books of both parties. Therefore, a partial disallowance was deemed appropriate.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order passed under Section 271(1)(c) is liable to be deleted due to a jurisdictional defect. The notice issued under Section 274 read with Section 271(1)(c) was omnibus and failed to specify whether the penalty proceedings were initiated for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Following the precedents set by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in PCIT vs. Sahara India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. and the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Mr. Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh vs. ACIT, the Tribunal quashed the penalty. The Tribunal noted that while the CIT(A) had deleted the penalty on merits, the jurisdictional issue was decisive. Therefore, the merits of the penalty were not adjudicated as academic. The reassessment proceedings for AY 2006-07 were also upheld as unsustainable, agreeing with the CIT(A)'s findings that no proper opportunity was granted, the proceedings were completed hastily, and reassessment was initiated beyond four years without demonstrating the assessee's failure to disclose material facts. The Tribunal directed the deletion of the penalty and upheld the CIT(A)'s order quashing the reassessment. The cross objections filed by the assessee were allowed, and the Revenue's appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that protective assessments of amounts already confirmed as substantive additions in the hands of SCIPL would amount to double taxation. Therefore, such protective additions were to be deleted.
The Tribunal observed that it is an admitted fact that despite opportunities granted by the CIT(A), the assessee did not appear before the authority, leading the CIT(A) to decide the appeal without the assessee's evidence. However, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal in non-compliance, whereas the appeal should ideally be decided on merits as per law. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it proper to restore the issue to the file of the CIT(A). The CIT(A) is directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim and decide the issue based on facts and law. The assessee is also directed to appear before the CIT(A) and cooperate in the proceedings. The grounds raised by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition to 10% of the unaccounted turnover was rational and based on scientific views from seized materials and comparable cases. The AO's estimation of net profit at 75% was not considered probable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not attend the virtual hearing due to technical glitches and the CIT(A) did not provide a second opportunity. The Tribunal held that one more opportunity should have been provided and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing a personal video conferencing opportunity.
The Tribunal held that additions based solely on the statement of the group's head and inquiries from other wings, without independent investigation by the AO, are not sustainable. Enhancements made by the CIT(A) based on assumptions were also set aside.
The Tribunal held that the distinction between 'grant' and 'donation' is significant. A grant is for a specified purpose with stipulations, while a donation has no such restrictions. The payments made by the assessee were for specific charitable activities confirmed by the recipient organizations. Therefore, the disallowance was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the impugned Section 153C assessments were not sustainable in law because the satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer was based on seized material pertaining to assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15, not the assessment years under appeal (2017-18 to 2020-21).
The Tribunal held that additions based solely on the statement of the group head and inquiries by the Investigation Wing, without independent verification by the AO, are not sustainable. Enhancements made by the CIT(A) based on assumptions were also set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessments framed under Section 153A read with Section 144 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AYs 2013-14 and 2016-17 to 2019-20 are invalid. The reasoning was based on the fact that the Assessing Officer had sought a common approval from the prescribed authority under Section 153D for all seven assessment years (2013-14 to 2019-20) in a single application dated 15.04.2021. The Tribunal, relying on decisions in PCIT Vs. Shiv Kumar Nayyar, PCIT Vs. MDLR Hotels (P) Ltd., and ACIT vs. Serajuddin and Co., concluded that such a combined approval for multiple assessment years vitiates the entire assessment. Consequently, the impugned assessments were quashed in their entirety. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid because the AO cited non-existent provisions of the Income Tax Act (Section 147(a)/147(b)) for reopening, indicating a non-application of mind and thus making the assessment void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made solely based on entries in the 'Hazir Johri' software without corroborative evidence. Relying on previous judgments with similar facts, the Tribunal found no concrete evidence linking the seized data to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had a history of seeking adjournments and did not appear for the hearing. The Assessing Officer's and CIT(A)'s orders were based on the material on record. Since the assessee failed to present any arguments or new material, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings.
The Tribunal found that the matter required fresh adjudication at the AO's level. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the issues back to the AO with directions to decide them afresh after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders invalid. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C read with Section 143(3) were quashed.
The Tribunal found that the assessment order was passed pursuant to a notice under Section 143(2) issued by an AO who lacked territorial jurisdiction over the assessee. Citing judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that an assessment order based on a notice from a non-jurisdictional AO is invalid and must be quashed, as participation in proceedings does not confer jurisdiction. Ground No. 1 of the appeal was allowed, and other grounds were not pressed.
The Tribunal held that mere disallowance of claims or expenses does not automatically attract penalty under Section 271(1)(c) unless there is a finding of concealed income or inaccurate particulars. Relying on Supreme Court and High Court decisions, the Tribunal found no justification for the penalty.
The Tribunal noted that in similar cases involving the same scrips, the Coordinate Bench had found the transactions to be genuine. The AO himself had acknowledged Alankit Limited as a leading e-Governance Service Provider, and no findings indicated the assessee booked the capital gain in connivance with promoters. The sale of shares through banking channels with STT payment and demat transfer, coupled with the company's dividend history, supported the genuineness of the transaction.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) relied on a prior Tribunal order, and the Department did not provide evidence that this order was challenged or stayed by the High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s orders.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps and issues with virtual hearings, as well as the non-compliance with section 250(6). In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the appeal and restored it to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were passed without giving the assessee proper opportunity to present their case and submissions, which is contrary to the principle of natural justice. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's intention to settle the dispute under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with a caveat that it could be reinstituted if the settlement failed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It was held that the appeal should be restored to the file of the NFAC for a de novo adjudication to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of NFAC, granting one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim. The assessee was directed to appear before NFAC and cooperate in the proceedings.
The Tribunal considered the application for withdrawal filed by the assessee. As the assessee sought to withdraw the appeal and the revenue had no objection, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No specific issue was decided on merits, and the appeal was disposed of based on the assessee's request.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) passed the order without considering the documents filed by the assessee and without discussing the questionnaire. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh decision after providing an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that Section 69A is not applicable when the cash deposited is recorded in the books of account and its source (cash sales) is also accepted. The Tribunal noted that the assessee, dealing in cash sales, naturally deposited accumulated cash during demonetization to avoid issues with old currency.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause for the delay. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to decide the case afresh on its merits after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's intention to settle the dispute under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with a caveat that the assessee could seek reinstitution if the settlement was not resolved.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction for initiating proceedings under Section 153C was not properly recorded. It was found that the AO failed to demonstrate how the seized material had a bearing on the determination of the total income for the specific assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that additions based solely on the statement of the group head and inquiries by the Investigation Wing, without independent verification by the AO, are not sustainable. Enhancements made by the CIT(A) based on assumptions were also set aside.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Regarding Grounds No. 1 and 2, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. AR fairly admitted that this issue was decided against the assessee by the Special Bench of the ITAT, Mumbai in the case of DCIT vs Total Oil India (P.) Ltd. The Tribunal quoted the Special Bench's finding that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company and not a charge in the hands of the shareholder, and therefore, the DTAA is not triggered when a domestic company pays DDT under Section 115-O, unless the contracting states intend to extend treaty protection to the domestic company paying DDT. Consequently, the Tribunal rejected these grounds and dismissed them. Regarding Grounds No. 3 to 5, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. AR of the assessee did not press these grounds during the hearing. Therefore, these grounds were also dismissed. The appeal of the assessee was dismissed in its entirety.