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The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition to 10% of the unaccounted turnover was rational and based on scientific views from seized materials and comparable cases. The AO's estimation of net profit at 75% was not considered probable.
The Tribunal held that reopening of assessment after four years without a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts, or without any fresh material, is invalid and amounts to a change of opinion. The reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment for AY 2015-16 was beyond the six-year block period prescribed under Section 153C, as interpreted by the Delhi High Court in Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, the assessment was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) for AY 2014-2015 was erroneous, as it should have been passed u/s 153C. The period of six years for assessment u/s 153C was to be reckoned from the date of recording the satisfaction note, not the date of search. The amendment regarding retrospective application of section 153C was also considered.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee chose not to carry forward the losses to future assessment years, the adjusted losses had no impact on taxable income. Therefore, there was no intention to conceal income or furnish inaccurate particulars, and the penalty was not required.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was justified, agreeing that the assessee was denied the opportunity for cross-examination, which violated principles of natural justice. The statement of the entry operator could not be relied upon without such opportunity.
The Tribunal noted that the lower appellate authority failed to adjudicate the substantive grounds raised by the assessee on merits, violating the mandate of section 250(6). Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Act for multiple assessment years in a consolidated manner was not in consonance with the statutory requirement, which mandates individual approval for each assessment year. Relying on various High Court decisions, the Tribunal found the approval exercise to be mechanical and without proper application of mind.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer were unjustified as the cash deposits represented business sales already accounted for in the profit and loss account. The CIT(A) had rightly deleted these additions, considering the real income and accounting principles.
The Tribunal held that the minimum guarantee payments made by the assessee were not in the nature of rent under Section 194I of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the disallowance of these expenses and the related TDS liability were deleted.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was a mechanical and perfunctory exercise, lacking application of mind and not specifying the subject matter of additions. A single approval was granted for multiple assessment years, which vitiates the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that foreign exchange gain/loss should be considered as operating income for computing operating margins, following High Court decisions. It also upheld the allowance of working capital adjustment.
The Tribunal held that agreements to sell, along with details of sellers and buyers, provided a plausible explanation for the source of funds. The Tribunal noted that non-execution of sale deeds due to disputes in joint landholding should not automatically doubt the transaction.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid as they were initiated against a non-existent company. The company, M/s BEC Finance Pvt. Ltd., had already amalgamated with M/s BEC Impex International Pvt. Ltd. in 2004, ceasing to exist as a separate entity.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes and remitted the issue back to the AO, granting the assessee another opportunity to explain the source of the cash deposits.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's findings were not based on adequate material or legal reasoning. The Tribunal found that withdrawals from the capital account were not income, the receivables/creditors ratio was explained by business operations, and the source of funds had been examined by the AO. The Tribunal concluded that the PCIT's order was erroneous.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee's predominant object was film production and no business activity was carried out, expenses claimed under 'income from business' were not allowable. However, regarding capitalized interest, the Tribunal admitted additional evidence and restored the issue to the AO for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal partly allowed the Revenue's appeal regarding disallowance of expenses to subcontractors, remanding the issue to the AO for further examination and cross-examination. Other grounds were either dismissed or partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had furnished necessary documents to establish the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the investor companies. The AO had not made sufficient efforts to verify the information or summon the directors of the investor companies.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had provided only three opportunities to the assessee, with adjournments sought on two occasions and a missed hearing on the third. Considering that the assessee failed to make a representation on only one occasion, the Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice, set aside the appellate order of the CIT(A). The appeal was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal clarified that if the assessee fails to represent their case or furnish documentary evidence, the CIT(A) is free to decide the appeal in accordance with the law. No specific amount in dispute was recorded. The issue of the additions made by the AO was not decided on merits.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is not leviable in this case. The primary reasoning is that the assessments framed under Section 148 read with Section 147 and Section 143(3) were accepted by the Assessing Officer without making any additions to the income declared by the assessee in the returns filed during these proceedings. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's reliance on Mak Data Ltd Vs. CIT, distinguishing it by noting that the present case involves accepted returns, unlike the cited precedent. The Tribunal also noted that the initial deletion of penalties by the CIT(A) was correct in principle, given that the penalty provision itself was not attracted. Consequently, the Revenue's appeals were dismissed on merits, and the assessee's cross-objections and subsequent appeals were also dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of staff welfare expenses by the AO was not sustainable without specific findings. It also noted that Section 14A is not attracted if no dividend income is part of the total income.
The Tribunal held that certain comparable companies were incorrectly excluded by the TPO and others were incorrectly included. The matter was set aside for re-determination of ALP adjustments based on the correct set of comparables.
The Tribunal held that the possibility of communication gaps, especially with the newly introduced virtual hearing mechanism, could not be entirely ruled out. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the impugned lower appellate order did not effectively comply with Section 250(6) of the Act, which mandates the framing of points of determination and detailed adjudication. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to set aside the appeal and restore it to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to provide three effective opportunities of hearing to the appellant, at the appellant's risk and responsibility. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that the assignments of land and investments did not constitute an 'undertaking' as prescribed in Section 2(19AA), thus amounting to a transfer of capital assets. The Tribunal also found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of disallowance of staff welfare expenses.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of staff welfare expenses by the AO was not sustainable without specific findings. It also noted that Section 14A is not attracted if no dividend income is part of the total income.
The Tribunal held that reopening of assessment after four years without a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts, or without any fresh material, is invalid and amounts to a change of opinion. The reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order passed by the Assessing Officer on 28th February, 2019, was barred by the statutory limitation prescribed under section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal referred to section 275(1)(a), which states that the penalty order must be passed within six months from the end of the month in which the order of the appellate tribunal is received by the prescribed authority, or after the expiry of the financial year in which the proceedings are completed, whichever is later. The Tribunal noted that the ITAT's quantum order was pronounced on 29th June, 2018. Citing the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Odeon Builders (P.) Ltd., the Tribunal held that the date of service of the tribunal's order can be taken from the date of pronouncement. Therefore, the six-month period from the end of June 2018 expired before 28th February, 2019. Consequently, the penalty order was found to be beyond the statutory limitation, rendering it non-est in the eyes of law and quashed accordingly. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal. It adopted the reasoning from its coordinate bench's decision in ITO Vs. Shri Bhairavnath Multistate Cooperative Credit Society Ltd. (Pune Trib.) (2024) 164 taxmann.com 382. This decision, following the Pune Tribunal's ruling in Nashik Road Nagari Sahkari Patsanstha Limited Vs. ITO, held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments of surplus funds made with cooperative banks qualifies for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. Furthermore, it was held that such interest also qualifies for exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i) as it is attributable to the activities of the society. The Tribunal noted that while there was a cleavage of judicial opinion among High Courts, the coordinate bench had followed the view favorable to the assessee, citing the Karnataka High Court's decision in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd. Vs. ITO. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order to be in conformity with this settled position of law and therefore affirmed the order, directing the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i)/80P(2)(d) on the interest income earned on investments made out of surplus funds.
The Tribunal held that the possibility of communication gaps at various levels could not be ruled out. In the larger interest of justice, it was deemed appropriate to set aside the appeal and restore it to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The assessee would be given three effective opportunities of hearing, at their risk and responsibility, for consequential proceedings. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the lower authorities. The ratio decidendi is that where there is a possibility of procedural lapses or communication gaps hindering a fair hearing, the appellate authority should restore the matter to the lower authority for a fresh adjudication, ensuring adequate opportunities for the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal held that the AO had valid reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment and that the assessee's objections to the reopening were belated. The Tribunal also found that the sale proceeds were not adequately explained and upheld the addition made under Section 68.
The Tribunal held that the interest income derived from parking surplus funds in fixed deposits with scheduled/nationalized banks cannot be considered as derived from an eligible business activity under Section 80P(2).
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn based on the assessee's application to settle the issues under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. Liberty was granted to revive the appeal if the scheme application fails.
The Tribunal noted that substantial additions in the case of Sh. Atul Tyagi were confirmed by the Ld. CIT(A) and no further appeal was preferred by him, meaning those additions had reached finality. Consequently, the present appeal challenging the protective additions did not survive.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions made by the AO regarding cash credit and disallowed interest on unsecured loans. The Tribunal also upheld the deletion of additions made under Section 41(1) and disallowed expenses under Section 37(1), finding the AO's additions to be uncalled for.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, noting that the AO had issued notices under Section 133(6) and received confirmations from the parties. These parties had offered receipts to tax, and TDS was deducted by the assessee. Considering the specialized nature of the assessee's business and the services provided, the CIT(A)'s finding of genuineness was confirmed as the Revenue failed to controvert these facts.
Citing a Madras High Court decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the assessee liberty to apply for its restoration if the declaration filed under the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme is not accepted by the Revenue.
Following the precedent of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. It granted the assessee liberty to restore the appeal by filing a miscellaneous application if the declaration under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, is not accepted by the Revenue for any reason.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal because the tax effect involved was below the prescribed limit of Rs. 60 lacs, as per CBDT Circular No. 09/2024 dated 17.09.2024, rendering the appeal non-maintainable.
The tribunal remitted the case back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, instructing the CIT(A) to provide the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the CIT(A) proceedings.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's decision to resolve the matter through the DTVSVS 2024. Consequently, noting the assessee's choice, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
Following the assessee's submission of having opted for the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. However, it granted liberty to the assessee to seek restoration of the appeal by filing a miscellaneous application, should their declaration under Section 4 of the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme Act not be accepted by the Revenue.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(E) rejecting the application, noting that the assessee claimed non-receipt of electronic notices and thus being denied adequate opportunity of hearing. The matter has been restored to the Ld. CIT(E) for a fresh decision in accordance with law, and the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
Following a precedent from the Madras High Court, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. However, it granted the assessee liberty to seek restoration of the appeal if the declaration filed under the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme is not accepted by the Revenue authorities.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, acknowledging the assessee's decision to opt for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The Tribunal granted the assessee liberty to apply for restoration of the appeal if their declaration under the scheme is not accepted by the Revenue, aligning with a precedent set by the Madras High Court.
The Tribunal found cogency in the assessees' contention regarding non-appearance. It remitted all 8 appeals back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh consideration, ensuring both parties receive adequate opportunity of being heard and directing the assessees to cooperate.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal. The primary issue was the taxability of interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as part of land acquisition compensation. The Revenue contended it should be taxed as income from other sources, citing High Court decisions. However, the Tribunal noted its own recent decision in Pawan Kumar vs. PCIT (ITA No.1655/Del/2023), which had already rejected the Revenue's stand. The Tribunal found that the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Ghanshyam HUF (2009), holding that interest under Section 28 is an accretion to the value and part of enhanced compensation, has been affirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions like UOI vs. Hari Singh (2018). The Tribunal distinguished the case of Mahender Pal Narang (P&H High Court) by noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Hari Singh was not brought to the notice of the P&H High Court when it rendered its decision. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the dismissal of an SLP by the Supreme Court does not constitute a binding precedent. The Tribunal concluded that the AO's order, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Ghanshyam HUF, was at best debatable, and the PCIT could not assume revisional jurisdiction based solely on an audit objection. Therefore, the order of the PCIT was quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding the assessee's reasons bonafide as service of notices was not evident from the record. It restored the matter to the CIT(E) for de novo consideration of the Section 12A application, directing that the assessee be given a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Following a precedent set by the Hon'ble Madras High Court, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. However, it granted the assessee liberty to restore the appeal if the declaration filed under the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme is not accepted by the Revenue.
Following a precedent from the Hon'ble Madras High Court, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. However, it granted liberty to the assessee to seek restoration of the appeal if the declaration filed under the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme is not accepted by the Revenue.