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534 orders · Page 6 of 11
The Tribunal, acknowledging the assessee's repeated non-appearance before lower authorities, decided that in the interest of justice, one more opportunity for hearing should be granted. The matter is thus restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for de novo verification and assessment, with the direction for both parties to cooperate.
The Tribunal held that once the original reason for reopening the assessment (credit card payments) was satisfactorily explained by the assessee and the AO was satisfied that no income escaped assessment on that issue, the AO could not make additions on 'other issues' discovered during the reassessment proceedings that were not part of the initial recorded reasons for reopening. Relying on High Court precedents, the Tribunal allowed Ground 3, which contested the ad-hoc disallowance of expenses, as it was based on an issue not originally part of the reopening reasons.
The Tribunal upheld the additions made by the Assessing Officer, noting the assessee's consistent failure to provide evidence or appear for proceedings. The auditor's report also indicated that certain claimed expenses were capital in nature.
The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision, holding that since the AO had accepted the assessee's contentions in the remand report, the revenue had no valid grounds for further appeal. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order deleting the additions.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT observed that while the identity of the lenders was established, their creditworthiness and the genuineness of the transactions were not properly investigated, particularly due to the AO's inability to conduct a full inquiry under the new Faceless System. The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the AO for a de-novo consideration, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity to comply and allow for proper investigation.
The Tribunal held that Section 68 is not applicable as there was no actual flow of funds, only book entries adjusting loan accounts. It also held that commission expenses related to a project that commenced in the current year are allowable, even if invoiced earlier.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions, reiterating that additions could not be made for assessment years without specific incriminating material found during the search, in line with Supreme Court rulings. The Tribunal noted that the AO's additions for the impugned AYs were based on extrapolation and assumption, rather than direct incriminating evidence.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions, reiterating that additions could not be made for assessment years without specific incriminating material found during the search, in line with Supreme Court rulings. The Tribunal noted that the AO's additions for the impugned AYs were based on extrapolation and assumption, rather than direct incriminating evidence.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO was based on presumption without cogent material and that there was no applicable deeming provision in the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal also noted that subsequent amendments to the Act were not applicable.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions, reiterating that additions could not be made for assessment years without specific incriminating material found during the search, in line with Supreme Court rulings. The Tribunal noted that the AO's additions for the impugned AYs were based on extrapolation and assumption, rather than direct incriminating evidence.
The Tribunal observed that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders without providing the assessee sufficient opportunity to be heard. It set aside the impugned order, restoring the matter to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment, explicitly directing that the assessee be granted a reasonable opportunity to explain the source of cash deposits.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's claim, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rotork Controls India (P) Ltd. vs. CIT and noting the consistent practice and subsequent admission of the claim. The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee's accounting method for warranty provision was consistent with the principles laid down in Rotork Controls India (P) Ltd. vs. CIT, where excess provisions are reversed and offered to tax.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing that the assessee be provided adequate opportunity of being heard. The assessee was also directed to cooperate with the proceedings and avoid unnecessary adjournments.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing that the assessee be provided adequate opportunity of being heard. The assessee was also directed to cooperate with the proceedings and avoid unnecessary adjournments.
The Tribunal noted that while the CIT(A) had provided opportunities, the final order was passed ex parte. Considering the counsel's undertaking to cooperate, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the intimation under Section 143(1) merges with the regular assessment order passed under Section 143(3). Therefore, the appeal against the 143(1) intimation becomes infructuous, and the demand raised therein does not survive.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the assessee should be given one more opportunity of being heard. The matter is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for a de novo verification and assessment, with directions for the assessee to cooperate and for the AO to provide adequate opportunity of hearing.
The ITAT found that the assessee had furnished sufficient evidence, including bank statements and cash flow statements, to substantiate the source of the cash deposit. The tribunal observed that the lower authorities erred in disregarding these evidences which clearly showed the cash came from opening balances and withdrawals made prior to demonetization.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC had disposed of the appeal ex parte without considering the merits. Considering the assessee's explanation regarding insufficient opportunity and the filed affidavit, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) (NFAC) for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal directed that the assessee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that an assessment under section 153A can only be interfered with based on incriminating material unearthed during the search, which was absent in this case concerning the assessee's locker. Relying on similar ITAT decisions where additions under section 68 were deleted, and distinguishing the case from CIT vs. Kabul Chawla (as it involved sale of existing investments rather than fresh share application money), the Tribunal found the assessee's explanation substantiated by documentary evidence and confirmed by parties responding to section 133(6) notices.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A), finding that the assessee was not given proper opportunity and that principles of natural justice were violated. It remanded the matter back to the AO to conduct a fresh assessment after allowing the assessee to provide relevant evidence, such as bank statements, to verify the purchase expense claim.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The Tribunal upheld the validity of the notice issued under Section 148, but found that the CIT(A) erred by not independently appreciating the evidence submitted by the assessee regarding the source of funds. Considering the family background and nature of transactions, the Tribunal found the evidences provided by the assessee to establish the source of Rs. 8,17,575/- were sufficient. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal related to the sustenance of the addition.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal ex-parte without deciding on the merits and without providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing, thereby failing to comply with Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was restored for re-adjudication after granting the assessee a fresh opportunity to be heard and furnish details.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee's business involved regular cash deposits and withdrawals, characteristic of a cash-intensive retail trade. Considering the revenue had accepted an 8% profit on business income for similar cash deposits in subsequent assessment years (2016-17 and 2017-18), the Tribunal held that 8% profit should be treated as income on the unaccounted turnover of Rs. 79,33,575/-.
The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the Rs. 40 lakhs addition (Ground 1), confirming it came from land sale proceeds. For capital gains (Grounds 2 & 4), the tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that 'transfer' under Section 2(47) occurred in AY 2010-11, not AY 2007-08, as full consideration and possession were secured only after a dispute settlement in 2010, despite earlier sale deeds. However, for unexplained bank deposits (Ground 3), the tribunal found that the CIT(A) erroneously accepted all deposits as sale proceeds and remanded the issue back to CIT(A) for fresh assessment regarding specific interest income and cash deposits. The assessee's cross-objection was dismissed as not pressed.
The Tribunal observed the lack of assessee's representation before the lower authorities. Acknowledging the assessee's claim of being prevented by reasonable cause (Covid-19) and to uphold natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to provide a fresh opportunity of hearing and decide the case afresh.
The Tribunal noted the lack of active representation by the assessee before the lower authorities. Emphasizing the principle of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and restored the matter to the AO, directing a fresh decision after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not admitting additional evidence and additional grounds, mistakenly relying on Goetze (India) Ltd. vs. CIT, as the powers of CIT(A) are co-terminus with the AO. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, directing the CIT(A) to admit the additional claim and evidence, and pass a fresh order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the appellant.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to remove defects in the appeal, did not appear for the hearing, and submitted no adjournment application. Finding no useful purpose in keeping the appeal pending, the Tribunal dismissed it in limine. However, the assessee was granted liberty to revive the appeal after rectifying the defects.
The CIT(A) deleted the penalty, ruling that transactions between the merged entities were between two units of a single company and therefore outside the ambit of Section 269SS. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that no penalty under Section 271D could be imposed in such circumstances, relying on a similar decision by a Coordinate Bench.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that Section 56(2)(viib) does not apply to shares issued to foreign companies. For domestic share allotments, the valuation report based on the DCF method was accepted, and the AO's rejection due to subsequent financial variations was deemed arbitrary. Furthermore, disallowance under Section 14A was not warranted for strategic investments in a subsidiary.
The Tribunal found that the transactions were duly recorded, parties' identities were confirmed, and no unaccounted money or malafide intention was involved. Considering the appellant's business of helping farmers, its status as a young company, and the bonafide mistake concerning new legislation, the Tribunal concluded that these circumstances constituted a 'reasonable cause' under Section 273B. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the imposed penalty was quashed.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, noting that the outstanding liabilities included statutory dues (like sales tax, EPF) and trade payables, which were legitimate expenses debited to the P&L account and not unexplained cash credits under Section 68. The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that these amounts were government dues and proven liabilities, not bogus or unproven, and therefore declined to interfere.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, noting that the outstanding liabilities included statutory dues (like sales tax, EPF) and trade payables, which were legitimate expenses debited to the P&L account and not unexplained cash credits under Section 68. The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that these amounts were government dues and proven liabilities, not bogus or unproven, and therefore declined to interfere.
The Tribunal found that the PCIT exercised jurisdiction u/s 263 based on proposals from the AO/JCIT and audit objections, rather than an independent application of mind. Citing the Calcutta High Court's ruling in PCIT vs. M/s Sinhotia Metals and Minerals Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal concluded that the PCIT's invocation of revisional powers was irregular due to a lack of independent application of mind.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that Section 56(2)(viib) does not apply to shares issued to foreign companies. For domestic share allotments, the valuation report based on the DCF method was accepted, and the AO's rejection due to subsequent financial variations was deemed arbitrary. Furthermore, disallowance under Section 14A was not warranted for strategic investments in a subsidiary.
The Tribunal found that there was no effective representation on behalf of the assessee before the lower authorities. To uphold natural justice and ensure the assessee gets a proper opportunity to present their case and documentary evidence, the orders of the lower authorities were set aside. The matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.