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534 orders · Page 5 of 11
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the AO for de novo assessment, directing the AO to provide the witness statement and an opportunity for cross-examination. The AO was also instructed to consider documents submitted by the assessee.
The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to quash the assessment proceedings, finding that the reopening was based on an incorrect fact regarding the non-filing of the return, which was readily available in the ITD database. It affirmed that reassessment initiated without proper application of mind or on an erroneous assumption of facts, especially when the correct facts were available, is not sustainable. Thus, the appeal by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was vitiated as it was based on borrowed satisfaction and lacked application of mind by the AO. The assessee had provided all necessary details during the original assessment.
The Tribunal held that, in light of the assessee's admitted liquidation under the I&B Code, the present appeal could not be proceeded with and was consequently dismissed. However, the Tribunal granted the assessee liberty to approach it for a recall of the order if the Liquidator later decides to pursue the appeal.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A), noting that the assessee admittedly deposited the Employee's Contribution to PF/ESI after the prescribed due dates. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in M/s. Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the disallowance and held it to be just and proper.
The Tribunal condoned the 113-day delay in filing the appeal, accepting the Chartered Accountant's affidavit. It found that the CPC had erred by sending the intimation to a wrong email address. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the issue to the files of the Assessing Officer for fresh examination and decision in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal held that surcharge income is taxable only upon actual receipt, not merely on accrual, following established judicial precedents. For disallowances under Section 14A, additional evidence was admitted and the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged its primary onus by providing ITRs, bank statements, and confirmations of the lenders. The AO failed to conduct independent inquiries using powers under sections 133(6) or 131 despite the assessee's request. The Tribunal noted that the lenders were existing parties with previously accepted transactions and their financial documents supported their creditworthiness, thus deleting the addition under section 68 and the consequential penalty under section 271(1)(c).
The Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged its primary onus by providing ITRs, bank statements, and confirmations of the lenders. The AO failed to conduct independent inquiries using powers under sections 133(6) or 131 despite the assessee's request. The Tribunal noted that the lenders were existing parties with previously accepted transactions and their financial documents supported their creditworthiness, thus deleting the addition under section 68 and the consequential penalty under section 271(1)(c).
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities, including conferences and seminars, fall under the purview of general public utility and education. It reasoned that the generation of surplus does not automatically disqualify an entity for registration, and the Competent Authority erred in narrowly interpreting 'education' and denying registration.
The Tribunal admitted an additional ground challenging the addition without incriminating material found during the search. Citing the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd., the Tribunal held that no addition could be made in a completed assessment under Section 153A unless based on incriminating material found during the search. As no such material was found, the addition of Rs. 50 lakhs was not sustainable.
The Tribunal observed that the cash withdrawals made by the assessee and her sister from earlier assessment years exceeded the cash deposits in the bank account. Following precedents, including the case of the assessee's mother, the Tribunal held that the source of the deposits was explained. The burden was on the Revenue to prove the withdrawn funds were utilized elsewhere, which they failed to do, and thus deleted the addition.
The Tribunal held that a penalty notice issued under Section 271(1)(c) without specifying the exact limb (concealment or inaccurate particulars) is bad in law. This is because penal provisions must be construed strictly, and ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the assessee.
The tribunal found the assessee's reasons for non-appearance genuine, noting the lack of objection from the DR. It quashed the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the CIT(A) to pass a reasoned order after giving the assessee a fresh opportunity of being heard and considering all evidence.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. CIT Vs. ABC Papers Ltd., the Tribunal held that jurisdiction for appeals against an AO's order lies with the ITAT bench corresponding to the Assessing Officer who originally passed the order. Since the rectification order was issued by a Mumbai AO, the appeal was not maintainable before the ITAT Delhi Bench, regardless of the subsequent transfer of assessee's jurisdiction.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision to sustain the disallowance. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in *Checkmate Services Private Limited vs. CIT*, clarifying that employee contributions to PF/ESI must be deposited by the due dates specified under the respective welfare enactments to qualify for deduction under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal held that surcharge income is taxable only upon realization and not on accrual, following precedent. For Section 14A, additional evidence was admitted and the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that when the assessee establishes the identity of the creditors and the Revenue accepts the genuineness of a part of the transaction, it is not justified to disbelieve the remaining part merely based on suspicion or 'happy coincidence'. The burden shifts to the Revenue to provide substantive evidence. As a part of the loan transaction from the same persons was admitted as genuine, the CIT(A)'s findings sustaining the addition were not upheld.
The Tribunal held that surcharge income is taxable only upon actual receipt, not merely on accrual, following established judicial precedents. For disallowances under Section 14A, additional evidence was admitted and the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence (PF notification) and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer (AO). The AO was directed to verify the notification and the deposit date; if the deposit for December 2016 was made prior to 20.01.2017, the contributions are to be allowed as a deduction under section 43B of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the rental income from the commercial complex, which involved complex commercial activities and exploitation of business assets, should be taxed under the head 'income from business and profession'. Depreciation on the building was allowed.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's claim that notices were sent to a different address than specified in Form 35, leading to a lack of proper service and opportunity. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment, ensuring that the assessee is provided with an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The tribunal quashed the CIT(Exemption)'s order, restoring the matter for a fresh decision. It directed the CIT(Exemption) to grant the assessee a further opportunity of being heard and to pass a reasoned order after considering all evidence, with the caveat that non-cooperation by the assessee would allow the CIT(Exemption) to proceed as per law.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the orders of the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). It found that the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the genuineness of the long-term capital gains transactions, which were established to be pre-planned manipulations based on investigations by SEBI and the Directorate of Investigation.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, sustaining the penalty. The tribunal found that the assessee's turnover clearly exceeded the limit requiring a tax audit under Section 44AB, and the assessee failed to provide reasonable cause or evidence to support their claim that the transactions were investments.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's affidavit and the DR's lack of objection. It held that the matter should be restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, ensuring that the assessee is provided with adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that surcharge income is taxable only upon actual receipt, not merely on accrual, following established judicial precedents. For disallowances under Section 14A, additional evidence was admitted and the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that there was no abnormal jump in sales in October 2016 and the difference in cash deposits was reconciled. The disallowance under Section 40A(3) was also deleted due to lack of specific instances of purchases exceeding the threshold.
The Tribunal held that the issues forming the basis of reassessment (depreciation and written-off stores) were already part of the record and the assessee had fully and truly disclosed all material facts. Consequently, the reassessment notice issued under Section 148 after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was deemed invalid, and the entire assessment was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 67 is a procedural/directory requirement, and its late submission does not extinguish the assessee's substantive right to claim FTC under Section 90 of the Income Tax Act, read with the India-USA DTAA (Article 25). Citing precedents, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the foreign tax credit, limited to the proportion of Indian tax payable.
The Tribunal found that the issue was squarely covered by earlier decisions of the ITAT and the Delhi High Court in the assessee's own case for previous assessment years (AY 2009-10, 2010-11, 2012-13). The Delhi High Court had consistently dismissed the revenue's appeals, affirming the assessee's eligibility for exemption. Since there was no change in material facts or legal proposition, the present appeal by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal observed that the same commission income had already been added on a substantive basis and confirmed by a Co-ordinate Bench of ITAT in the hands of the operator, Sh. Praveen Jain. Therefore, taxing the same income again in the assessee's hands would constitute double taxation, and the addition made in the assessee's hands was deleted.
The Tribunal observed that the same commission income had already been added on a substantive basis and confirmed by a Co-ordinate Bench of ITAT in the hands of the operator, Sh. Praveen Jain. Therefore, taxing the same income again in the assessee's hands would constitute double taxation, and the addition made in the assessee's hands was deleted.
The Tribunal, relying on precedents from the Hon'ble High Courts of Delhi and Mumbai, held that penalty under section 270A is not warranted when an assessee voluntarily corrects a bona fide mistake and pays the due taxes and interest before the conclusion of assessment proceedings. The Tribunal emphasized that such actions align with the legislative intent of encouraging fast-track settlement and reducing litigation, and there was no misreporting of income. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order deleting the penalty.
The Tribunal found that the previous order was indeed passed without providing the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard. It ruled that granting such an opportunity would not prejudice the revenue. Thus, the matter was remanded to the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication (de novo) after duly notifying the assessee and allowing them to present their submissions.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal *in limine* without effective representation from the assessee and without any findings on merit. To ensure natural justice and provide a fair opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal in limine without considering its merits due to lack of effective representation. To ensure natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal observed that the same commission income had already been added on a substantive basis and confirmed by a Co-ordinate Bench of ITAT in the hands of the operator, Sh. Praveen Jain. Therefore, taxing the same income again in the assessee's hands would constitute double taxation, and the addition made in the assessee's hands was deleted.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that there was no warrant of authorization under Section 132 issued in the name of the assessee, Muskan Medical Centre Pvt. Ltd. It clarified that panchnamas for other entities could not justify the assessment under Section 153A for the assessee. The assessment made under Section 153A was therefore annulled due to the absence of a valid warrant of authorization, with liberty granted to the Revenue for future recourse if proof emerges.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition. It was held that the entire amount of Rs. 3.04 Crores, pertaining to the sale of land and building, had already been included by the assessee in the Income Tax Return for A.Y. 2009-10 under the capital gain schedule.
The CIT(A) found that no satisfaction note u/s 153C had been recorded for AY 2017-18. Citing a CBDT Circular and Supreme Court precedent, the CIT(A) quashed the assessment, holding that recording satisfaction is mandatory. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision, as the revenue failed to provide evidence of such satisfaction.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.
The ITAT held that Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be levied for defaults occurring after June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision to charge such fees prior to that date. Therefore, the levy of fees for defaults before this date was unjustified.