479 orders · Page 4 of 10
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee do not constitute royalty under the DTAA, as the customers only get access to broadband width and do not gain control over the transponders. The Finance Act, 2012, does not affect the interpretation of 'royalty' in the DTAA.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal as withdrawn, subject to the condition that if the dispute is not resolved under the VSV Act, the assessee can seek reinstitution of the appeal.
The Tribunal allowed the disallowance of interest on price difference, relying on its own previous year's decisions. It upheld the disallowance of gifts, finding the assessee failed to prove their exclusive business purpose. The disallowance of interest on excise duty was restored to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal held that the transaction was a gift completed before the effective date of Section 56(2)(vii)(b). The subsequent transfer deed was merely for legal title creation and did not alter the nature of the original gift.
The Tribunal found that the initial application was made in the relevant financial year for AY 2016-17, and the assessee was deprived of registration without fault. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for re-examination.
The Tribunal held that the reopening notice under Section 148 was null and void due to fundamental defects in the reasons recorded. The corrigendum issued to rectify these defects was also not sustainable in law, rendering the reassessment proceedings without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that income from sub-licensing of 'Designated Rights' for live transmissions of sporting events is not royalty. It followed the decision of the jurisdictional High Court and co-ordinate benches, distinguishing between copyright and broadcasting rights.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn based on the assessee's request to avail the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The assessee is at liberty to seek restoration if they fail to avail the scheme for bonafide reasons.
The Tribunal held that an appeal against an order passed under section 119(2)(b) is not maintainable before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal referred to section 253 of the Act which specifies the orders appealable before it.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities failed to follow established legal principles regarding the presumption of utilizing interest-free funds for investments when available. It also noted the lack of reasoning for deviating from previous years' favorable decisions for the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid because the AO initiated them based on a faulty premise that the return was not filed. Furthermore, the addition made under Section 68 was deleted as the cash deposits were found to be part of the assessee's legitimate business of currency exchange, supported by substantial cash withdrawals.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, with liberty to restore it if the dispute is not settled under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. Both parties agreed to this.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) has no power to decline an appeal solely for not being filed electronically, as there is no express prohibition. The CIT(A) should have treated the deficiency as a rectifiable defect.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 1,47,000. It agreed with the CIT(A) that the cash deposit by the lender immediately before advancing the loan raised serious concerns about the genuineness of the transaction, and the assessee failed to provide concrete evidence to rebut the AO's finding.
The Tribunal found that the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) had not adjudicated the issue of comparable companies on its merits. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the DRP for a proper adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance on account of discounts to distributors was not sustainable, following its own precedents. Similarly, the disallowance for IUC charges paid to non-resident telecom operators was also deleted, as these payments were not considered royalty or fees for technical services under the Act and DTAA.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) and restored the appeal to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment. The assessee is to be provided with an adequate opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal found that the entire purchase consideration was assessed in the hands of the assessee, despite the property being jointly owned. As the assessee did not produce sufficient documents before the Assessing Officer, the matter was remanded back for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that the rejection was arbitrary, especially since the assessee had already been granted registration under Section 12AA on the same date. It was also noted that approval was granted for subsequent years, indicating established genuineness.
The Tribunal held that assessment orders passed on non-existing entities are void ab initio. The AO's failure to comply with DRP directions and pass the order in the correct name rendered the assessment unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that assessment orders passed on non-existing entities are void ab initio. The AO's failure to comply with DRP directions and pass the order in the correct name rendered the assessment unsustainable.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition. The revenue's appeal was dismissed as the issue had been decided in favour of the assessee in prior years, and the department's SLP on the matter was dismissed by the High Court.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition. The revenue's appeal was dismissed as the issue had been decided in favour of the assessee in prior years, and the department's SLP on the matter was dismissed by the High Court.
The Tribunal held that the interest of justice would be served by remanding the issue back to the AO. The AO was directed to reconsider the matter afresh in light of the assessee's submissions and documents, and provide an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was bad in law due to a faulty satisfaction note and lack of conclusive evidence. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was therefore deleted.
The Tribunal held that the 'make available' condition, as per more restrictive treaties like India-Portugal and India-Canada, should be applied to the India-Israel DTAA. Since the assessee did not make available technical knowledge to the subsidiary, the payments were not FTS.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition as the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the capital contribution were sufficiently explained with supporting documents. The Tribunal also upheld the deletion of an ad-hoc disallowance of salary expenses, finding no basis for the 75% disallowance.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was bad in law due to a faulty satisfaction note and lack of conclusive evidence. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was therefore deleted.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The Revenue did not object to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was not maintainable due to the tax effect being below the monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT circulars for filing appeals. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the 'make available' condition, as per more restrictive treaties like India-Portugal and India-Canada, should be applied to the India-Israel DTAA. Since the assessee did not make available technical knowledge or skills to the subsidiary, the payments were not FTS.
The Tribunal held that CAM charges are contractual payments for services rendered and do not fall under the definition of 'rent' as per Section 194I. Therefore, TDS deduction under Section 194C at 2% was appropriate.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While acknowledging the CIT(A)'s findings, the Tribunal felt the assessee should have been given an opportunity to furnish confirmations from his wife and other persons. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessment should have been made under Section 153C, not Section 153A, as the incriminating material was found from a separate search on a third party. The presumption under Section 132(4A) cannot be extended to documents found elsewhere without corroboration.
The Tribunal held that the assessment should have been made under Section 153C, not Section 153A, as the incriminating material was found from a separate search on a third party. The presumption under Section 132(4A) cannot be extended to documents found elsewhere without corroboration.
The Tribunal admitted the revised tax audit report as additional evidence. It restored the issue to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide afresh after considering the additional evidence and providing a hearing opportunity.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not served notice for reopening the assessment and had indeed disclosed the pension income in their return. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal held that since the issue of the existence of a PE and the resultant income attribution was debatable, as evidenced by substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) could not be sustained. The deletion of penalty by the CIT(A) was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the assessment should have been made under Section 153C, not Section 153A, as the incriminating material was found from a separate search on a third party. The presumption under Section 132(4A) cannot be extended to documents found elsewhere without corroboration.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer cannot make an addition for a completely different item of income than the one for which the assessment was reopened, without addressing the original reason for reopening. Therefore, the addition made was unsustainable.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the CIT(A) had correctly deleted the additions. The Tribunal relied on previous year's decisions where similar issues were decided in favor of the assessee, noting that the facts and circumstances remained the same.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in adding the LTCG solely based on a generic investigation report without establishing a nexus with the assessee. The extraordinary long holding period of the shares was a crucial factor exonerating the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had omitted certain cash withdrawals from the bank statement. Including these omitted withdrawals would eliminate the discrepancy, rendering the addition unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was invalid due to the AO's mechanical application of mind and lack of nexus between the information and the belief formed. Furthermore, the AO could not make additions unrelated to the reason for reopening.
The Tribunal found lapses on both sides: the Assessing Officer did not conduct sufficient inquiry, and the assessee failed to provide complete details to substantiate the claim. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the revenue cannot go behind the Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) issued by the Singapore tax authorities. Furthermore, the transaction qualified for exemptions under the domestic GAAR provisions (Rule 10U(1)(a) and (d)), overriding the GAAR provisions invoked by the AO/DRP.
The Tribunal held that the assessment should have been made under Section 153C, not Section 153A, as the incriminating material was found from a separate search on a third party. The presumption under Section 132(4A) cannot be extended to documents found elsewhere without corroboration.
The tribunal held that since the quantum addition for education expenses was remanded for fresh consideration, the penalty on that addition does not survive. The penalty on prior period expenses was also deleted as there was no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn due to being infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had made due inquiry and the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. The non-filing of Form 67 was considered a directory requirement, and other issues raised by the PCIT were adequately explained by the assessee.