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176 orders · Page 2 of 4
During the hearing, the assessee's counsel submitted an intention to withdraw the appeals. The Tribunal permitted the withdrawal and consequently dismissed the appeals as withdrawn.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that the CIT(A) was correct in dismissing the appeal on technical grounds. The assessee had failed to challenge the original Section 143(3) assessment order, which contained the detailed disallowance of the Section 80P deduction, and instead impermissibly challenged only the subsequent Section 154 rectification order on merits.
The ITAT affirmed the order of the ld. CIT(A), holding that the assessee's explanation for the 550-day delay was vague and did not constitute sufficient cause for condonation. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is an exception, particularly for government departments which have a special obligation to act with diligence.
The ITAT held that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal without considering its merits, which is contrary to settled law requiring disposal on merits even in ex-parte cases. The ITAT noted the assessee's specific plea regarding no TDS liability under Section 194H due to turnover limits under Section 44AB. Consequently, the ITAT remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh disposal on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal observed that the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax had subsequently condoned the delay in filing the return of income under Section 119(2)(b). Consequently, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment, instructing to consider the CCIT's order condoning the delay.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's own order confirmed the absence of exempt income. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in *South Indian Bank Ltd. v CIT*, the Tribunal ruled that Section 14A read with Rule 8D cannot be invoked when no exempt income has been earned. Consequently, the assessee's appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) failed to appreciate the assessee's objects in proper perspective and did not examine the main objects of the assessee. Consequently, the matter is remitted back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication in accordance with law, after granting the assessee a sufficient opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal, dismissing it as withdrawn. However, the assessee was granted liberty to revive the appeal if their application under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 (DTVSV) is rejected.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that the ld.CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delay given the circumstances of the assessee's poor health. The ITAT restored the matter to the file of the ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, ensuring the assessee is granted a meaningful opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that prior to the 2015 amendment, Section 11(2) of the Act did not prescribe a specific time limit for filing Form 10, and Rule 17 cannot override the substantive provision of the Act. Relying on Supreme Court judgments, it was concluded that filing Form 10 before the completion of assessment is sufficient for claiming exemption under Section 11. The Tribunal distinguished a prior Coordinate Bench order that did not consider the Supreme Court pronouncement.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s reasoning to be contrary to Section 155(14) and Section 219 of the Income Tax Act. It restored the matter to the AO with a direction to consider the appellant's claim for enhanced TDS credit in accordance with these statutory provisions.
The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeals, with the provision that they could be revived if the application under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, is rejected. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The ITAT confirmed the levy of late fee under Section 234E, following the binding precedents from the jurisdictional Kerala High Court. The High Court had held that late fee under Section 234E can be levied even for periods prior to the amendment of Section 200A.
The Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in Pr.CIT v. Abhisar Buildwell P.Ltd., held that no addition under Section 153A is warranted for completed assessments if no incriminating material is found during the search. Since the STCG was declared in the original return and no incriminating material was unearthed during the search, the Assessing Officer lacked jurisdiction to make the addition.
The Tribunal found the reasoning of the lower authorities implausible and remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination. The AO is directed to consider the availability of cash withdrawal by the assessee and provide a meaningful opportunity before passing any view.
The Tribunal condoned the 133-day delay in filing the appeal, finding it not willful. It held that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal in limine without disposing of it on merits, even in an ex-parte situation. The matter was therefore remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh disposal on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal ex-parte for non-prosecution, emphasizing that an appellate authority is duty-bound to dispose of an appeal on merits, even in an ex-parte situation. Citing legal precedents, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) with directions to decide the appeal afresh on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in PCIT V. Peroorkada Service Co-op. Bank Ltd., held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to the claimed deduction.
The ITAT condoned the 79-day delay in filing the appeal, finding that notices for assessment and appeal proceedings were sent to an incorrect email address, constituting a reasonable cause. The ITAT observed that the ld. CIT(A) had not dealt with the merits of the case, violating Section 250(6) of the Act, and therefore restored the matter to the ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) failed to properly examine the facts and based the rejection solely on the name of the beneficiaries. Consequently, both appeals were remanded back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration and adjudication in accordance with law, ensuring the assessee is granted a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The tribunal, relying on a Jurisdictional High Court judgment, held that the interest income received by the co-operative society from depositing its surplus funds with other banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a) of the Act. It concluded that such prudent financial conduct, where surplus funds are invested and generate interest, constitutes income attributable to the main business of providing credit facilities to its members.
The ITAT held that the ld.CIT(A) should have examined the evidences instead of rejecting them on technical reasons. The matter was restored to the file of the ld.CIT(A) for fresh examination of the documentary evidences, granting the assessee a fresh opportunity to present all relevant materials.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's absence during proceedings at both lower levels and before the ITAT, and questioned the clarity of notice service by the ld.CIT(A). In the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the file of the ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, with a directive to provide the assessee a meaningful opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to dispose of appeals on merits, even if exparte, as per Section 250(6) of the Act and established legal precedent. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for a de novo disposal on merits, ensuring a reasonable opportunity of hearing for the assessee.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) failed to address the grounds raised by the appellant and did not frame points of determination as mandated by Section 250(6) of the Act. Citing settled law that the CIT(A) must decide appeals on merits even if ex-parte, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a de novo disposal on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee failed to provide party-wise details or substantiate the reasonableness of the high commission expenditure. It upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to allow 10% of the commission as reasonable, finding no grounds to interfere with the order of the lower authority.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause. Following the jurisdictional High Court decision in *PCIT v. Peroorkada Service Co-op. Bank Ltd.*, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to a deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act for interest income received from District Co-operative Banks and Treasury.
The ITAT held that the CIT(A)'s refusal to admit additional evidence based on a perceived contradiction between Form 35 and the Rule 46A application was hyper-technical. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh disposal after properly considering the application for admitting additional evidence in accordance with law.
The Tribunal noted a CBDT instruction dated 27.02.2019 u/s 119(2)(b), which deemed returns filed until 02.08.2019 for Kerala taxpayers (due to 2018 floods) as timely filed by 31.10.2018. Therefore, the appellant's return should not be treated as belated, and the matter is remitted to the CPC to amend the rectification order.
The ITAT condoned a 7-day delay in filing the appeal, noting technical issues. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal ex-parte without framing points of determination or deciding on merits, remanding the case to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing due opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that KSEB is a state government undertaking and payments made to it fall under the exceptions enumerated in Rule 6DD(b) of the Income Tax Rules. Therefore, the disallowance made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) under Section 40A(3) was not justified and was deleted.
The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal, granting liberty to revive it if the application under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme (DTVSV) is rejected. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found no reason to disbelieve the assessee's explanation for the delay and held that the CIT(A) should have condoned it. The matter is remanded back to the CIT(A) with a direction to condone the 4-day delay and decide the appeal on merits after providing an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned a 184-day delay in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause. It held that the CIT(A) is legally obligated under Section 250(6) to dispose of appeals on merits, even ex-parte, and thus remanded the case back to the CIT(A) for a de novo decision after providing the assessee a proper hearing.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, acknowledging the assessee's option for VSVS 2024. A liberty was granted to the assessee to request reinstatement of the appeals if the dispute is not settled under VSVS in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to dispose of appeals on merits, even if heard ex parte. Citing judicial precedent, the case was remanded back to the CIT(A) with directions to dispose of the appeal de novo on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the assessee the liberty to revive the appeal if their declaration under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme is rejected for any reason whatsoever.
The ITAT found that the CIT(A)'s order was violative of natural justice for dismissing the appeal without adverting to the facts and grounds. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh disposal in accordance with law, ensuring the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned a 159-day delay in filing the appeal, finding that the assessee was unaware of the CIT(A)'s order, which was served via the Income Tax Portal. Citing Section 282(1) and a relevant High Court decision, the Tribunal ruled that notice service through the ITBA portal is not valid, deeming the CIT(A)'s order violative of natural justice. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear for the hearing. Since the CIT(A) had already set aside the core issue to the AO for which limited scrutiny was taken up, all other grounds of appeal before the Tribunal became infructuous. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.
The ITAT found no illegality or perversity in the CIT(A)'s decision to remand the issue of Section 80P(2)(d) deduction to the AO for verification. Citing settled law from the Kerala High Court, the Tribunal concluded there was no merit in the assessee's appeal, and thus dismissed it.
The ITAT held that service of notice through the ITBA portal is not a valid method of service as per Section 282(1) of the Act and Rule 127(1) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Following a High Court judgment, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh disposal after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., held that since the assessee-society does not possess a banking license, it cannot be classified as a co-operative bank. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act.
The Tribunal acknowledged that Section 80AC requires timely filing for Section 80P deduction. However, given the pending application for condonation of delay in filing the return before the PCIT/CCIT, the Tribunal remanded the case to the AO. The AO is instructed to re-evaluate the eligibility for Section 80P deduction after the outcome of the condonation petition is known.
The Tribunal, relying on the jurisdictional High Court's decision in PCIT v. Peroorkada Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., held that the assessee-society is entitled to a deduction for interest earned from investments in other co-operative banks. Consequently, the AO was directed to delete the addition of Rs.24,79,197.
The Tribunal held that ad-hoc disallowance of expenses is not justified without evidence that the expenditure is bogus. It also held that TDS is not applicable on sales promotion commission paid to employees if it constitutes salary and there is no taxable income, directing the AO to delete these additions.
The Tribunal presumed that the appellant had no explanation for the delay in presenting the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in limine on the ground of delay, without going into the merits of the case.
The Tribunal found the appellant's reasons for delay general and unconvincing, noting the lack of specific details regarding the consultant or email. Citing the importance of the law of limitation as established by the Supreme Court, the Tribunal concluded that it was not a fit case for condoning the delay.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that the CPC was justified in making the adjustment based on the original return. It stated that mistakes in the return can only be corrected by filing a revised return, as the CPC cannot go beyond the submitted information.
The Tribunal condoned a 186-day delay in filing the appeal and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to verify if the cash deposits originated from contract receipts received in cash from the government treasury; if confirmed, the deposits are to be treated as explained.