ITAT Chennai Judgments — October 2026

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had a sufficient cause due to his father's medical condition and the provided medical records. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had not appeared before the AO and that the impugned issues (quantum additions and penalties) had not been examined on merits by the lower authorities. Therefore, in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present the case on merits. The appeals were remitted back to the AO with a direction to call for necessary details and decide the issues concerning both quantum additions and penalties for AYs 2015-16 and 2016-17 in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to cooperate and submit required details without seeking unnecessary adjournments. A cost of Rs. 10,000 was imposed on the assessee, payable to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had a sufficient cause due to his father's medical condition and the provided medical records. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had not appeared before the AO and that the impugned issues (quantum additions and penalties) had not been examined on merits by the lower authorities. Therefore, in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present the case on merits. The appeals were remitted back to the AO with a direction to call for necessary details and decide the issues concerning both quantum additions and penalties for AYs 2015-16 and 2016-17 in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to cooperate and submit required details without seeking unnecessary adjournments. A cost of Rs. 10,000 was imposed on the assessee, payable to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority.

The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the CPC under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act for disallowing the employees' contribution to PF/ESI on account of delayed remittance was unsustainable in law. The Tribunal noted that the issue was debatable at the relevant time, especially before the Supreme Court's decision in *Checkmate Service (P) Ltd.*, and therefore, could not be a subject matter of adjustment under Section 143(1)(a). The Tribunal relied on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court of Madras in *CIT vs. Industrial Security and Intelligence India Pvt Ltd*, which held that remittances made before the due date of filing the return of income under Section 139(1) were allowable as a deduction. The Tribunal also referred to its own decisions in *M/s. SRC Projects Pvt Ltd* and *Transsys Solutions Pvt Ltd*, which followed the ratio of the Chhattisgarh High Court in *Raj Kumar Bothra*. The Tribunal acknowledged conflicting decisions but applied the principle that where two reasonable constructions of a taxing provision are possible, the one favouring the assessee should be adopted, citing *CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd*. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and directed the AO/CPC to delete the impugned addition of Rs. 55,30,492/-.

The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's failure to respond to statutory notices, strongly deprecating the nonchalant attitude. However, considering the submissions of the authorized representative and in the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication. The AO was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the Revenue and avoid seeking unnecessary adjournments. The Stay Application was dismissed as infructuous since the appeal was disposed of. The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 211 days in filing the appeal, imposing a cost of Rs. 5,000 on the assessee, which was remitted to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Authorities. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's plea regarding his educational background and the alleged breach of trust by his CA, which led to ex-parte orders. The Tribunal noted that both the AO and CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders. Considering the affidavit, undertaking by the assessee's counsel to appear and file submissions, and the reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal decided to grant one last opportunity to the assessee. Consequently, the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the assessment was restored to the file of the AO for de-novo assessment. The assessee was directed to file written submissions and produce documents, and the AO was to frame a fresh assessment after hearing the assessee.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had initially resided in Pollachi before shifting to Coimbatore. While the assessee had informed the department of the new address by filing a return for AY 2018-19 on 30.08.2018, the AO had issued notices to the old Pollachi address. Consequently, the assessee did not participate in the assessment proceedings or respond to the notices. The Tribunal found that the assessee could not be faulted for non-participation under these circumstances. Therefore, the Tribunal was inclined to grant one more opportunity to the assessee by restoring the assessment to the file of the AO. As a condition for further compliance, the assessee was directed to remit Rs. 10,000/- to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority, which was complied with. The assessee also undertook to appear, file written submissions, and produce documents to prove the nature and source of the credit card payment of Rs. 21,48,065/-. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) and restored the assessment for de novo assessment by the AO, directing the assessee to file written submissions and produce documents, and the AO to frame a fresh assessment after hearing the assessee. The issue of the nature and source of the credit card payment was expressly left to be decided in the de novo assessment.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) for AY 2020-21. While acknowledging the assessee's responsibility for vigilance, the Tribunal considered the severe ill health and subsequent demise of the Chartered Accountant, Shri S. Rajendran, as a significant factor. The Tribunal directed the assessee to remit Rs. 10,000/- to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority, proof of which was taken on record. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the assessment order was passed by the AO on 19.02.2025, making an addition of Rs. 5,52,85,267/- without hearing the assessee. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in TIN Box Co. v. CIT [2001] 249 ITR 216 (SC), the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) and restored the assessment back to the file of the AO for de novo assessment. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 153 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), acknowledging the assessee's status as a public charitable and religious trust and the administrative changes within its management. The Tribunal found it unacceptable that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without considering the grounds on merits. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee did not receive a proper opportunity before the AO. Citing the Supreme Court decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the assessment to the file of the AO for de novo assessment. The Tribunal granted one more opportunity to the assessee to present relevant documents before the AO and expressed trust that the appointed chartered accountant would ensure necessary compliance. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 575 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(Appeals), acknowledging the assessee's explanation of ill health and business difficulties, and the assessee's willingness to cooperate. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) and restored the matter to the file of the AO for de novo assessment. The AO was directed to examine the issues afresh, consider the explanations and supporting documentary evidence to be furnished by the assessee, and pass a speaking order after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the additions, leaving all issues open for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to cooperate fully during the remand proceedings, and the AO was liberty to proceed in accordance with law in case of further non-compliance. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee should be granted one more opportunity to present its case before the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal noted that the AO had passed an ex-parte order. While acknowledging the assessee's registration under Section 12A and its administrative control by the Government of Tamil Nadu (HR & CE), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's plea that a change in executive officers led to a lack of awareness regarding the income tax proceedings and the inability to upload requested details. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee, being a registered charitable trust with statutory audits, would not benefit from non-participation. Therefore, to facilitate the presentation of all relevant facts and explanations regarding the cash and time deposits, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) and restored the assessment to the file of the AO for a de novo assessment. The assessee was directed to file all relevant documents and written submissions without fail. The AO was instructed to pass an assessment order after hearing the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the reason provided by the Ld. CIT(E) for rejecting the application for approval under Section 80G was unsustainable. The assessee had submitted the required documents, including a trust deed, Form 10AC, prior 80G approval, and financial statements, vide a letter dated February 25, 2026, in response to the notice dated February 24, 2026. Evidence of this submission was found in the paper book. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(E). The application was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) with a direction to consider the evidence filed by the assessee. If deemed necessary, the Ld. CIT(E) was further directed to call for other relevant documents and then decide on the grant of approval under Section 80G in accordance with the law after hearing the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's application, filed on 28.09.2025, should be treated as having been filed under Clause (iv)(B) of the 1st Proviso to Section 80G(5) of the Act. The reasoning was that Clause (iv) was inserted into the 1st Proviso to Section 80G(5) by the Finance Act, 2024, effective from 01.10.2024, allowing applications to be filed at any time after the commencement of activities. The CIT(E) had passed the order rejecting the application on 28.03.2026, after this amendment came into force. The Tribunal noted that this provision is distinct from the earlier timeline governed by Clause (iii). The CIT(E) was directed to treat the application as filed under the new clause and decide in accordance with the law after hearing the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted the conflicting claims regarding compliance with notices. Considering the objective of the assessee's society to provide relief to the poor and the fact that it had previously enjoyed registration, the Tribunal was of the view that proper opportunity should have been given before rejection. The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(E) ought to have provided a proper opportunity to the assessee-society before rejecting its application. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to place all relevant documents before the Ld. CIT(E) for examination of its objectives and genuineness of activities. The impugned orders were set aside, and the applications were restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(E). The assessee was advised to file a physical copy of the application under the correct provision, and the Ld. CIT(E) was directed to consider it after affording a proper opportunity and then decide the applications for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G in accordance with law. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 212 days in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's explanation of medical reasons supported by evidence. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal noted that the AO and CIT(A) had passed ex parte orders. The assessee's main plea was non-receipt of notices due to internet issues. Since the entire addition of Rs. 1,04,71,500/- was made without hearing the assessee, and the assessee was allegedly unaware of the proceedings, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the assessment was restored to the file of the AO for a de novo assessment. The assessee was directed to file written submissions and relevant documents to substantiate the nature and source of the cash deposit, and the AO was instructed to pass an assessment order after hearing the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s action of issuing a final show cause notice on 24.03.2026 and passing the impugned order on 30.03.2026, within a short span of six days, was not justifiable, especially considering the assessee's prior compliance. The Tribunal found that the assessee ought to have been granted a reasonable opportunity to explain its position and adduce evidence to substantiate its claim of genuine charitable activities. Consequently, the Tribunal was inclined to grant one more opportunity to the assessee. The impugned orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the applications were restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh processing after hearing the assessee. The assessee was directed to file all relevant documents and provide explanations for the queries raised by the CIT(E) on 24.03.2026, and the CIT(E) was directed to pass an order in accordance with law after hearing the assessee. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s action of issuing a final show cause notice on 24.03.2026 and passing the impugned order on 30.03.2026, within a short span of six days, was not justifiable, especially considering the assessee's prior compliance. The Tribunal found that the assessee ought to have been granted a reasonable opportunity to explain its position and adduce evidence to substantiate its claim of genuine charitable activities. Consequently, the Tribunal was inclined to grant one more opportunity to the assessee. The impugned orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the applications were restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh processing after hearing the assessee. The assessee was directed to file all relevant documents and provide explanations for the queries raised by the CIT(E) on 24.03.2026, and the CIT(E) was directed to pass an order in accordance with law after hearing the assessee. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that it was inclined to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case before the Ld. CIT(E). The reasoning was that the assessee would not benefit from not participating in the proceedings, and the ex parte order was passed due to non-compliance. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the Ld. CIT(E) and restored the applications for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G. The Ld. CIT(E) was directed to call for relevant documents, examine them, and pass an order in accordance with the law after hearing the assessee. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that it was inclined to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case before the Ld. CIT(E). The reasoning was that the assessee would not benefit from not participating in the proceedings, and the ex parte order was passed due to non-compliance. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the Ld. CIT(E) and restored the applications for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G. The Ld. CIT(E) was directed to call for relevant documents, examine them, and pass an order in accordance with the law after hearing the assessee. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submissions. It noted that the reopening was done after four years from the end of the assessment year, requiring satisfaction of the additional conditions under the first proviso to Section 147, which were not met. Furthermore, the reopening on the same facts and for the same issue examined in the original scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) amounted to a change of opinion, which the AO cannot undertake. The Tribunal also observed that the Ld. CIT(A)'s order was cryptic, failing to appreciate the legal issues raised by the assessee and not providing reasons for ignoring case laws cited. Consequently, the Ld. CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the appeals were remitted back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to pass a reasoned order after considering all grounds raised by the assessee.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submissions. It noted that the reopening was done after four years from the end of the assessment year, requiring satisfaction of the additional conditions under the first proviso to Section 147, which were not met. Furthermore, the reopening on the same facts and for the same issue examined in the original scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) amounted to a change of opinion, which the AO cannot undertake. The Tribunal also observed that the Ld. CIT(A)'s order was cryptic, failing to appreciate the legal issues raised by the assessee and not providing reasons for ignoring case laws cited. Consequently, the Ld. CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the appeals were remitted back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to pass a reasoned order after considering all grounds raised by the assessee.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed the appeal against the penalty order dated June 30, 2025, directly before the ITAT without exhausting the statutory remedy available before the first appellate authority (CIT(A)). When this procedural defect was pointed out, the assessee's Authorized Representative (AR) expressed the desire to withdraw the appeal. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's plea for withdrawal. The appeal was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty granted to the assessee to file an appeal before the first appellate authority. The Tribunal further directed that if the assessee files the appeal within 30 days from the receipt of the order, the first appellate authority shall not raise the issue of limitation. Consequently, the instant appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 212 days in filing the appeal before the Learned CIT(A), considering the assessee's submission that he was employed as a marine engineer and was outside the territorial waters of India during the relevant period, which hindered his ability to file the appeal. The Tribunal restored the appeal back to the file of the Learned CIT(A) with a direction to adjudicate the grounds of appeal, including the legal issue raised against the reopening of the assessment. The assessee was directed to file written submissions and documents, and the Learned CIT(A) was instructed to decide the grounds of appeal in accordance with the law after hearing the assessee. The ratio decidendi is that a delay caused by unavoidable circumstances related to employment, especially overseas, can be condoned to ensure a fair hearing on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the late fees levied by the CPC (TDS) under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2013-14 (Q2) and AY 2014-15 (Q2 & Q3) were not sustainable. The Tribunal found that Section 200A of the Act, which grants the power to levy such fees, was inserted only with effect from 01.06.2015. Consequently, for the assessment years in question, the CPC did not possess the authority to impose late fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements under Section 200A. The Tribunal relied on the binding decision of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in M/s. Sri Rujula International. The Tribunal further noted that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal on the ground of delay, as the original order of the CPC was null and void (non-est in the eyes of law) due to lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the question of condoning delay against a non-existent order did not arise. The impugned actions of the CPC (TDS) were set aside. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the late fees levied by the CPC (TDS) under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2013-14 (Q2) and AY 2014-15 (Q2 & Q3) were not sustainable. The Tribunal found that Section 200A of the Act, which grants the power to levy such fees, was inserted only with effect from 01.06.2015. Consequently, for the assessment years in question, the CPC did not possess the authority to impose late fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements under Section 200A. The Tribunal relied on the binding decision of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in M/s. Sri Rujula International. The Tribunal further noted that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal on the ground of delay, as the original order of the CPC was null and void (non-est in the eyes of law) due to lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the question of condoning delay against a non-existent order did not arise. The impugned actions of the CPC (TDS) were set aside. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the late fees levied by the CPC (TDS) under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2013-14 (Q2) and AY 2014-15 (Q2 & Q3) were not sustainable. The Tribunal found that Section 200A of the Act, which grants the power to levy such fees, was inserted only with effect from 01.06.2015. Consequently, for the assessment years in question, the CPC did not possess the authority to impose late fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements under Section 200A. The Tribunal relied on the binding decision of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in M/s. Sri Rujula International. The Tribunal further noted that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal on the ground of delay, as the original order of the CPC was null and void (non-est in the eyes of law) due to lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the question of condoning delay against a non-existent order did not arise. The impugned actions of the CPC (TDS) were set aside. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that the assessee had participated in the assessment proceedings and provided explanations to the AO. Giving the benefit of doubt to the assessee, considering the possibility of internet glitches causing non-receipt of notices, and acknowledging the assessee's past conduct before the AO, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate the grounds of appeal after providing a proper opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to file written submissions and relevant documents before the CIT(A). The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 23,43,86,527/- as Capital Gains. The Tribunal found that the assessee, by virtue of the Agreement for Sale dated 21.03.2020 and the subsequent Power of Attorney (POA) executed on 24.03.2020 in favor of ANPPL, had effectively transferred the "right to possession" and the right to develop the land. This transfer of rights, even without a registered sale deed, constituted a "transfer" under Section 2(47)(v) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, triggering the capital gains tax incidence. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee exercised complete dominion over the property by enabling the developer to undertake development activities. The Tribunal also noted that the developer's books of accounts reflected a land cost of Rs. 43,43,86,527/-, with the difference of Rs. 23.43 Crores being credited to the assessee's account, indicating a realization of capital gains. The reliance on the MoU was also questioned as it was executed after the search operation. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and restored the order of the Assessing Officer. The issue of the MoU's validity was implicitly decided against the CIT(A)'s reliance on it.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) rejected the application for registration under Section 12AB primarily on the ground that the assessee had not furnished the registration under Section 12A of the Act obtained in the old regime. However, the Tribunal observed that the CIT(E) had not considered other details submitted by the assessee nor recorded any adverse findings regarding those details. The assessee's Authorized Representative requested one more opportunity to furnish the old Section 12A registration and any other required details. Considering the facts, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity and remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) with a direction to consider the details already furnished and to call for any other necessary details to decide the issue in accordance with law. The assessee was directed to cooperate and submit the required details. Similarly, the rejection of approval under Section 80G was for the same reason. As the issue of Section 12AB registration was remitted, the Tribunal deemed it fit to remit the issue of Section 80G approval also back to the CIT(E) to be considered along with the Section 12AB registration, with similar directions. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue stands dismissed. The Tribunal noted that the AO had made an addition by imputing notional interest on loans and advances made to related parties, not by disallowing interest under Section 36(1)(iii). The assessee contended that loans were advanced from own funds (capital and reserves) or out of business expediency, and that the interest rates charged were not lower than what was reasonable or agreed upon. The Tribunal found that the submissions made by the assessee remained uncontroverted by the Revenue's representative. The CIT(A) had analyzed each transaction and concluded that the assessee had not charged a lower rate of interest. The Tribunal found no illegality or perversity in the CIT(A)'s findings. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that there is no provision under the Income Tax Act enabling the AO to impute notional income. Since the AO's case was not that income had actually accrued but was not offered, nor was it a case of disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii), the Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's grounds of appeal.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) rejected the application for registration under Section 12AB primarily on the ground that the assessee had not furnished the registration under Section 12A of the Act obtained in the old regime. However, the Tribunal observed that the CIT(E) had not considered other details submitted by the assessee nor recorded any adverse findings regarding those details. The assessee's Authorized Representative requested one more opportunity to furnish the old Section 12A registration and any other required details. Considering the facts, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity and remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) with a direction to consider the details already furnished and to call for any other necessary details to decide the issue in accordance with law. The assessee was directed to cooperate and submit the required details. Similarly, the rejection of approval under Section 80G was for the same reason. As the issue of Section 12AB registration was remitted, the Tribunal deemed it fit to remit the issue of Section 80G approval also back to the CIT(E) to be considered along with the Section 12AB registration, with similar directions. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the assessee was infructuous. The reasoning was based on the assessee's submission that a technical defect in the initial filing, specifically the absence of a Digital Signature Certificate (DSC), was rectified by refiling the appeal within the original due date. This rectification rendered the original appeal infructuous, leading the assessee to pray for its withdrawal. The Tribunal, after perusing the submissions and material on record, dismissed the appeal as infructuous. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged his initial burden of proving the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. It reasoned that the AO's verification of Ms. Parveen's capacity based solely on her AY 2015-16 return and her proprietary concern's balance sheet was not proper. The Tribunal noted Ms. Parveen's significant immovable properties and her proprietary business, and that the source of her earlier payments comprised gifts from her father, which the Revenue had not doubted. Regarding Ms. Parveen's non-filing of returns for AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18, the Tribunal viewed this in the context of the divorce, stating that any default in her tax compliance was a matter between her and the Revenue. The Tribunal found the explanation of the assessee probable and consistent with documentary evidence, considering the transfer as a component of the mutual settlement of financial affairs upon divorce. The timing of the journal entry coinciding with the divorce agreement lent credence to its bonafides. The Tribunal also noted the AO's failure to conduct independent inquiries despite having the power to do so. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 6,33,75,822/- was set aside, and the AO was directed to delete it.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the order passed by the CIT(E) was ex-parte and that the application was rejected for non-response to the show-cause notice and non-furnishing of documents. The assessee's plea for one more opportunity was considered. In the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal was of the view that the assessee deserved another chance to present its case. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(E) and restored the matter to the CIT(E)'s file for fresh adjudication. The CIT(E) was directed to afford the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to submit necessary documents and evidence. The assessee was also directed to cooperate with the proceedings and avoid unnecessary adjournments. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal, after hearing the Ld. DR and perusing the material, noted the assessee's contention before the Ld. CIT(A) regarding its Form 10AC registration. The Tribunal observed that no copy of registration approved by the competent authority under Section 12AB of the Act was presented before them. Consequently, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the Ld. CIT(A)'s order in remanding the matter to the AO for computation of the eligible amount for setting apart. The assessee was directed to furnish the copy of the registration before the AO, who would examine it and pass an order in accordance with law. The assessee was granted liberty to file supporting evidence. The order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The cross-objection filed by the assessee was also allowed for statistical purposes as it supported the Ld. CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 78 days in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's explanation that she was prevented by sufficient and reasonable cause. The Tribunal found the averments in the affidavit seeking condonation of delay to be uncontroverted. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal by passing a cryptic order without discussing the facts or submissions, thus violating the principles of natural justice. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside. While ordinarily the matter would be remitted back to the CIT(A), in view of the assessee's plea of ignorance of assessment proceedings leading to an ex parte assessment order, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the matter required remand to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment. The Assessing Officer was directed to afford the appellant an opportunity of being heard. The addition of Rs. 55,50,000 was not decided on merits, but the case was remanded for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's submission that notices issued by the Income Tax Department went to their tax consultants who failed to inform the assessee-firm, and consequently, the assessee could not respond to the show cause notice before the Assessing Officer, remained uncontroverted. The Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from responding to the show cause notice. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Authority to the stage of issuing a show cause notice, enabling the appellant to respond and for proceedings to be completed accordingly. The penalty amount mentioned in the grounds of appeal (Rs. 1,50,000/-) and the penalty levied by the AO (Rs. 1,26,436/-) were noted, but the specific finding on the penalty sustainment was deferred due to the remand. The issue of whether the penalty under Section 271B was automatic or discretionary, and the applicability of reasonable cause under Section 273B, were implicitly left undecided pending the fresh proceedings.

The Tribunal held that the assessee deserved one more opportunity to effectively present its case and substantiate its claim. The CIT(E) had rejected the application for non-furnishing of the Trust Deed, which the assessee explained as being misplaced, and stated it could now be produced. Considering the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(E) and restored the matter to his file for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the proceedings and not seek unnecessary adjournments. The principle is that in cases of procedural lapses, particularly where a genuine explanation is offered and the assessee is willing to comply, a further opportunity should be granted to avoid miscarriage of justice, especially when the core issue is registration for charitable purposes. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had not afforded a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to explain the circumstances under which cash payments were made before invoking section 40A(3). Furthermore, the AO was not justified in treating the difference between the profit and loss account turnover and bank credits as business turnover without establishing a nexus between the cash deposits and the appellant's business. To meet the ends of justice, the Tribunal decided that the matter requires remand to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment after providing an opportunity of being heard to the appellant. The Tribunal did not decide the specific additions on merits but remanded the case for fresh consideration. The issue of non-provision of satisfaction note under section 151 was not explicitly decided.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 605 days in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's explanation that notices were sent to the tax practitioner's email who failed to respond, and the assessee was not conversant with faceless proceedings. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without entering into the merits of the additions, which is contrary to the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act. Citing the Bombay High Court decision in PCIT vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is duty-bound to dispose of an appeal on merits, even if ex-parte, and cannot dismiss it for non-prosecution. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the matter requires remand. While ordinarily it would be remitted to the CIT(A), given the assessee's plea of ignorance of proceedings, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment after affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the merits of the additions made by the AO.

The Tribunal held that the notice dated 11.04.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2015-16 is barred by limitation under the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the validity of a Section 148 notice issued after 31.03.2022 for AY 2015-16 has been consistently held as invalid by various courts and coordinate benches. While acknowledging the revenue's reliance on the Madras High Court's decision in Ravi Constructions and the fifth and sixth provisos to Section 149, the Tribunal referred to the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Appenell Holdings Ltd vs DCIT, which placed reliance on Ravi Constructions. However, the Tribunal then referred to a subsequent division bench decision of the Madras High Court in Shanmugha Arts, Science Technology and Research Academy v. ACIT, which reversed the earlier view. This division bench, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal, held that a notice under Section 148 of the new regime cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the notice. The Tribunal found that the time limit for issuing notice under the old regime of Section 149 for AY 2015-16 expired on 31.03.2022, and the notice was issued on 11.04.2022, thus being beyond the six-year period. The Tribunal concluded that the first proviso to Section 149 must be tested independently of the fifth and sixth provisos for AY 2015-16, as the six-year period did not fall within the TOLA relaxation period. Consequently, the notice and the consequent reassessment proceedings were quashed. As the legal contention was allowed, the grounds on merits became academic.

The Tribunal held that the handing over of the 16 flats by the developer to the assessee did not constitute a fresh transfer giving rise to long-term capital gains in AY 2021-22. The Tribunal reasoned that these flats formed part of the 30% share of the built-up area to which the assessee was already entitled under the JDA. The supplementary agreement dated 20.08.2020 merely changed the mode of satisfaction of this existing entitlement, from remittance of sale proceeds to delivery of the flats. The AO himself noted that the supplementary agreement did not materially change the original transaction except the mode of consideration. The Tribunal found that the consideration for the land transferred in AY 2010-11 had already been taxed and settled under the DTVSV. Taxing the handing over of these flats would amount to taxing the same consideration twice. The Tribunal also noted that the capital gains offered in the original return were inadvertently made and corrected through the revised return. The reliance on TDS by the developer was considered a compliance by the payer and not determinative of income in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 2,41,57,554/-.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee was a non-filer and had compliance issues, the AO's application of an 8% profit rate on total deposits of Rs. 1,22,80,265 was not justified. The Tribunal emphasized that income tax is chargeable only on real income, not notional income, and that the nature of the assessee's business (distribution of milk and curd) is inherently low-margin. The Tribunal found that the figures of gross turnover and the existence of the business were not under challenge. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the AO to recompute the business income based on a profit rate of 4% on the total deposits of Rs. 1,22,80,265, and also considered Rs. 44,730 as interest income. The orders of the AO and CIT(A) were set aside to this extent. The Tribunal condoned the 203-day delay in filing the appeal due to the medical reasons provided by the assessee. The appeal was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not undertake a detailed examination of the issues on merits, relying primarily on the assessee's failure to controvert the Assessing Officer's findings. The Tribunal noted that substantial documentary evidence was claimed to have been furnished by the assessee, which required examination and a reasoned finding, especially given the significant additions and the assessee's dispute of the character and source of the amounts. The Tribunal also found merit in the assessee's plea of not being afforded an adequate opportunity. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication. The Assessing Officer was directed to examine the issues afresh, providing an effective opportunity to the assessee to submit evidence regarding the source and nature of deposits, business receipts, agricultural income, and alleged double taxation. The Tribunal explicitly stated it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the additions or the assessee's claims.

The Tribunal held that the issue relating to purchase expenditure could not be decided solely on the invoice date. The assessee's claim that goods were shipped on 02.04.2018 and the Bill of Entry was dated 05.04.2018, supported by documents, required factual verification by the AO. The Tribunal noted that if the purchase was wrongly accounted for in an earlier year, the closing stock would also need adjustment, impacting the profit and loss account. Therefore, the AO was directed to verify the entire transaction, including shipment date, Bill of Lading, Bill of Entry, accounting, and closing stock, to determine the correct year of recognition. Regarding employee compensation, travelling, and business promotion expenses, the Tribunal found the disallowances to be largely ad hoc and without specific findings identifying non-genuine or personal expenses. While acknowledging the assessee's failure to provide complete evidence earlier, the Tribunal restored these issues to the AO for fresh verification, directing the assessee to furnish all relevant documents. The AO was instructed not to make ad hoc disallowances without specific material and to allow genuine expenses incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance of Rs. 4,89,58,868 under Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that a primary requirement for invoking Section 14A is that there must be expenditure incurred in relation to income which does not form part of the total income. In this case, there was no dispute that the assessee did not earn any exempt income during AY 2018-19. The Tribunal referred to the jurisdictional High Court of Madras decision in *CIT v. Chettinad Logistics Pvt. Ltd.*, which held that no disallowance under Section 14A could be made if no exempt income was earned. Therefore, the disallowance made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was set aside. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The judgment also discusses other issues related to disallowance of expenditure and cash deposits under Section 69A, which were restored to the file of the AO for verification.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals and allowed the assessee's appeal. Regarding the additions under Section 69 for AYs 2009-10 to 2015-16, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) correctly deleted them. The Tribunal held that while statements from third parties and investigation reports can be intelligence inputs, they cannot, by themselves, prove that a particular assessee availed of a mechanism for accommodation entries. Tangible evidence linking the assessee to the alleged arrangement, such as evidence of cash payment, commission payment, statements from brokers or entry operators, or seized correspondence, was absent. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had furnished documentary evidence for the share transactions, including purchase consideration, transfer documents, demat statements, contract notes, broker ledger, and bank statements, routed through recognized stock exchanges and banking channels. The AO's doubt based on market price movement was insufficient to discard genuine documentary evidence. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional Madras High Court's decision in CIT vs. Sohanraj Uttamchand, which held that mere steep appreciation in share price does not justify treating capital gains as bogus if shares are traded on a recognized stock exchange, consideration is routed through banking channels, and there's no cogent finding of price manipulation complicity. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 6,22,49,095/- under Section 68 for AY 2014-15 was also deleted, as the Tribunal found no evidence linking the assessee to any manipulation or accommodation-entry arrangement in the sale of M/s. Surabhi Chemicals & Investments Ltd. shares.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on 09.04.2022 for AY 2015-16 is barred by limitation. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of ACIT vs. Nehal Ashit Shah and Deepak Steel and Power Ltd., has held that notices issued after six years from the end of the assessment year, i.e., on or after 31.03.2022, do not survive. The Tribunal distinguished the decision in Ravi Constructions, stating that in the present case, the six-year period applicable under the old regime had expired on 31.03.2022, and the amended provisions could not revive or extend the already expired limitation. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the notice under Section 148 and held that all consequent actions are non est in the eyes of law. The appeal of the Revenue on merits was dismissed as the assessee's appeal was decided in favour of the assessee on the legal issue.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) was not justified in re-computing the Long-Term Capital Gains (LTCG) based on the Department Valuation Officer's (DVO) valuation of Rs. 395/- per sq. ft. The Tribunal noted that the DVO's own working indicated a value of Rs. 465/- per sq. ft., and the reduction to Rs. 395/- was made without any stated reason or basis. The difference between the assessee's adopted value of Rs. 405/- per sq. ft. and the DVO's final value of Rs. 395/- per sq. ft. was marginal (approximately 2.5%). The Tribunal found no proper justification for displacing the value supported by the registered valuer's report. Accordingly, the AO was directed to delete the addition made in this regard and re-compute the LTCG using the registered valuer's valuation. The alternative contention regarding the scope of reference to the DVO was left undecided. Regarding the disallowance of the cost of improvement, the Tribunal observed that payments were made both before and after demonetization, and the assessee had provided supporting evidence. The lower authorities had not recorded adverse findings regarding the genuineness of these payments, and the revenue did not present any contrary material. Therefore, the disallowance was deemed untenable, and the AO was directed to delete it. The appeals were allowed for both assessees.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals, upholding the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions made under Section 69 for AYs 2009-10 to 2015-16. The Tribunal found that while investigation reports provide intelligence, they cannot, by themselves, prove an assessee availed of a particular mechanism. Tangible evidence linking the general modus operandi to the assessee was absent, such as evidence of cash payment, commission payment, statements from brokers or purchasers admitting pre-arrangement, or statements from entry operators identifying the assessee's transaction. The Tribunal noted the assessee had furnished documentary evidence for share transactions routed through recognized stock exchanges via banking channels. The AO doubted the transactions due to market price movement but did not find the documentary evidence forged or fictitious. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional Madras High Court decision in CIT vs. Sohanraj Uttamchand, which held that mere steep appreciation in share price does not justify treating capital gains as bogus if shares are traded on a recognized stock exchange, consideration is routed through banking channels, and there's no cogent finding of price manipulation complicity by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted similar decisions from the Mumbai Bench concerning the same company's shares. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 6,22,49,095 made under Section 68 for AY 2014-15 was also deleted. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed, and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals, upholding the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions made under Section 69 for AYs 2009-10 to 2015-16. The Tribunal found that while investigation reports provide intelligence, they cannot, by themselves, prove an assessee availed of a particular mechanism. Tangible evidence linking the general modus operandi to the assessee was absent, such as evidence of cash payment, commission payment, statements from brokers or purchasers admitting pre-arrangement, or statements from entry operators identifying the assessee's transaction. The Tribunal noted the assessee had furnished documentary evidence for share transactions routed through recognized stock exchanges via banking channels. The AO doubted the transactions due to market price movement but did not find the documentary evidence forged or fictitious. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional Madras High Court decision in CIT vs. Sohanraj Uttamchand, which held that mere steep appreciation in share price does not justify treating capital gains as bogus if shares are traded on a recognized stock exchange, consideration is routed through banking channels, and there's no cogent finding of price manipulation complicity by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted similar decisions from the Mumbai Bench concerning the same company's shares. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 6,22,49,095 made under Section 68 for AY 2014-15 was also deleted. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed, and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.