268 orders · Page 2 of 6
The Tribunal held that the notice issued by the JAO was invalid and bad in law because it contravened the provisions of Section 151A of the Act and the mandatory Faceless Scheme notified on 29.03.2022. Consequently, the reopening of assessment and the assessment order were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order was barred by limitation as it was passed after the expiry of the six-month period from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty was initiated. The Tribunal also noted that the AO was not the competent authority to levy the penalty.
The Tribunal held that the estimation of profit at 10% by the Assessing Officer was arbitrary. It deemed it appropriate to estimate the net profit at 4% of the contract receipts. The Tribunal also directed the Assessing Officer to allow credit for TDS as reflected in Form 26AS.
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were barred by limitation as per Section 275(1)(c) of the Act, considering the date of initiation of penalty proceedings. Consequently, the appeals were allowed on this legal ground.
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were barred by limitation as per Section 275(1)(c) of the Act, considering the date of initiation of penalty proceedings. Consequently, the appeals were allowed on this legal ground.
The Tribunal held that Rule 46A does not permit the CIT(A) to scrutinize the credibility of additional evidence before admitting it. The CIT(A) should have admitted the evidence and forwarded it for a remand report.
The Tribunal observed that the AO's order was based on the CIT's order which was annulled by the ITAT. Therefore, the additions/disallowances made by the AO in the set-aside assessment were treated as allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO lacked jurisdiction to substitute the actual sale consideration with a notional market value without a specific statutory provision. Relying on Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal stated that only real income can be taxed and the Revenue has the burden to prove consideration beyond invoiced amounts.
The Tribunal noted that the issue of FTC is covered by the Madras High Court's decision in Duraiswamy Kumaraswamy, which held that filing Form 67 under Rule 128 is directory, not mandatory. Therefore, the AO was directed to grant the FTC.
The Tribunal held that the expenses incurred for repairs on rented premises were for day-to-day operations, recurring in nature, and related to normal wear and tear, not bringing about enduring benefit or new assets. The Tribunal found that the evidence demonstrated the assessee's responsibility for these repairs.
The Tribunal held that the TPO order dated 01.11.2019 is barred by limitation and is void. The Tribunal reasoned that the word 'may' in section 92CA(3A) should be construed as 'shall', and the time period fixed therein must be scrupulously followed. The proviso to the sub-section clarifies the mandatory nature of the time schedule. The Tribunal noted that the date of the TPO order and the Assessment Year were the same as in the case of Saint Gobain India (P.) Ltd. (supra). Respectfully following the binding precedents of the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal concluded that the TPO order was barred by limitation and void. Consequently, the Cross Objection filed by the assessee became infructuous. The appeal of the revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the estimation of profit at 10% by the Assessing Officer was arbitrary. It deemed it appropriate to estimate the net profit at 4% of the contract receipts. The Tribunal also directed the Assessing Officer to allow credit for TDS as reflected in Form 26AS.
The Tribunal held that the reason provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the audit report (due to a close relative's hospitalization and need for care) constituted a reasonable cause. Following jurisdictional High Court judgments, the Tribunal decided to delete the penalty.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the assessee should be given a last opportunity to appear and file evidence before the AO for a denovo assessment. The impugned orders were set aside, and the appeals were restored back to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was not issued in accordance with the e-assessment scheme, 2022, as it was issued by the JAO and not the NFAC. This was found to be contrary to the scheme and various High Court judgments.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed non-receipt of hearing notices and requested a last opportunity. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing on merits, subject to a cost of Rs. 2,000/-.
The Tribunal held that the appeal could not be proceeded with during the continuance of the proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Ghanashyam Mishra And Sons vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction and the Jurisdictional Bombay High Court's decision in Murli Industries Limited vs. ACIT, the Tribunal reasoned that once a resolution plan is approved under Section 31 of the IBC, all claims not part of the plan stand extinguished, and no proceedings can be initiated or continued. The Tribunal noted that the present case did not involve a contention from the Department that the claims were part of the resolution plan. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed in limine as not maintainable. The Tribunal granted leave to the appellant to seek restoration of the appeal if necessitated by the orders in the CIRP. The Stay Petition (SA No.56/Chny/2024) was rendered infructuous.
During the hearing, the assessee's authorized representative submitted that the assessee wished to withdraw the appeals and had filed a petition to that effect. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn.
During the hearing, the assessee's authorized representative submitted that the assessee wished to withdraw the appeals and had filed a petition to that effect. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the assessee should be given a last opportunity to appear and file evidence before the AO for a denovo assessment. The impugned orders were set aside, and the appeals were restored back to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in upholding the CPC's action without awaiting the outcome of the condonation petition. The matter was restored to the AO to decide afresh after the decision on the condonation petition.
The Tribunal found that the appeal did not fall under any exceptions to the CBDT Circular and was not maintainable due to the low tax effect.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and set aside the order of the CIT(A). The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for adjudication afresh, providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that since the delay in filing the ITR was condoned by the Competent Authority, and the assessee had submitted the necessary documents, the deduction under Section 80P should be allowed. The AO's denial was therefore set aside.
The Tribunal held that for assessment years prior to June 1, 2015, the levy of late fee under Section 234E while processing TDS returns under Section 200A was without authority and invalid. Consequently, the Assessing Officer was directed to delete such fees.
The Tribunal held that since the Transfer Pricing Order was void ab initio due to being time-barred, the assessee ceased to be an eligible assessee for the purpose of Section 144C. Consequently, the final assessment order passed beyond the normal limitation period was also void.
The Tribunal held that orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) while giving effect to appellate orders are made under Section 143 or 144 of the Act, making them appealable under Section 246(c). Therefore, the FAA's dismissal was set aside.
The Tribunal held that orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) while giving effect to appellate orders are made under Section 143 or 144 of the Act, making them appealable under Section 246(c). Therefore, the FAA's dismissal was set aside.
The Tribunal held that orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) while giving effect to appellate orders are made under Section 143 or 144 of the Act, making them appealable under Section 246(c). Therefore, the FAA's dismissal was set aside.
The Tribunal held that orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) while giving effect to appellate orders are made under Section 143 or 144 of the Act, making them appealable under Section 246(c). Therefore, the FAA's dismissal was set aside.
The Tribunal held that since the Transfer Pricing Order was void ab initio due to being time-barred, the assessee ceased to be an eligible assessee for the purpose of Section 144C. Consequently, the final assessment order passed beyond the normal limitation period was also void.
The Tribunal held that orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) while giving effect to appellate orders are made under Section 143 or 144 of the Act, making them appealable under Section 246(c). Therefore, the FAA's dismissal was set aside.
The Tribunal held that orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) while giving effect to appellate orders are made under Section 143 or 144 of the Act, making them appealable under Section 246(c). Therefore, the FAA's dismissal was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the AO had made necessary inquiries and adopted a plausible view. Furthermore, the issues in question had been decided in favor of the assessee in its own case by a coordinate bench of the Tribunal.
The ITAT found the assessee's reasons for delay (health issues and consultant's lapse) to be reasonable and condoned the 261-day delay in filing the appeal before the FAA. Despite deprecating the assessee's non-response to the AO's notices, the ITAT remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing the AO to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing and the assessee to cooperate.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not justified in dismissing the appeal on grounds of delay. The Tribunal found that the appeal was filed within the limitation period, considering the date of knowledge of the assessment order. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside and the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that for assessment years prior to June 1, 2015, the levy of late fee under Section 234E while processing TDS returns under Section 200A was without authority and invalid. Consequently, the Assessing Officer was directed to delete such fees.
The Tribunal held that for assessment years prior to June 1, 2015, the levy of late fee under Section 234E while processing TDS returns under Section 200A was without authority and invalid. Consequently, the Assessing Officer was directed to delete such fees.
The Tribunal rejected the assessee's grounds claiming deduction under Section 80-IA in respect of REC receipts. It followed the ratio decidendi from the decisions of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT Vs My Home Power Ltd and the Madras High Court, which held that carbon credits (RECs) are not directly linked to power generation but are an offshoot of environmental concerns, not directly linked to the business. Regarding the alternate plea that REC receipts are capital in nature, the Tribunal noted that the legal position changed with the introduction of Section 115BBG w.e.f. 01.04.2018, which specifically taxes the sale of carbon credits (RECs) at 10%. The Tribunal found that the decision in Satia Industries Ltd. was rendered prior to this change and thus not applicable. Coordinate Benches have treated RECs as akin to carbon credits. Therefore, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the action of lower authorities treating the income from sale of RECs as ‘other income’ and taxing it under Section 115G of the Act. The ground regarding loss on sale of machinery was dismissed as not pressed. The ground relating to MAT Credit was disposed of with a direction to the AO to re-compute it.
The Tribunal noted that the hearing notice was not received by the assessee and granted one more opportunity. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh hearing on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed by the NFAC was bad in law, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in TVS Credit Services Ltd. v. DCIT. The Tribunal quashed the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that for assessment years prior to June 1, 2015, the levy of late fee under Section 234E while processing TDS returns under Section 200A was without authority and invalid. Consequently, the Assessing Officer was directed to delete such fees.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without proper opportunity of hearing, breaching the principles of natural justice. The order passed by the CIT(A) was quashed and set aside.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was not issued in accordance with the CBDT's e-assessment scheme, which mandates automated allocation and faceless issuance. Relying on High Court judgments, the Tribunal set aside the notice.
The Tribunal held that the 'Satisfaction Note' prepared by the AO did not satisfy the legal requirement of mentioning that income represented in the form of an asset worth Rs. 50 lakhs or more had escaped assessment for AY 2014-15. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153C was bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not justified in dismissing the appeal on grounds of delay. The Tribunal found that the appeal was filed within the limitation period, considering the date of knowledge of the assessment order. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside and the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely for non-prosecution without considering the merits of the case. Citing legal precedent, the Tribunal emphasized that even an ex-parte disposal requires a decision on merits after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was not issued in accordance with the e-assessment scheme, 2022, which mandates issuance through automated allocation in a faceless manner. Following jurisdictional High Court decisions, the Tribunal set aside the impugned notice.
The Tribunal held that leave encashment received at the time of cessation of employment, even on resignation and subsequent re-employment, is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10AA) of the Act, as per judicial precedents. Denial based solely on Form 26AS mismatch during processing is not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) while giving effect to appellate orders are made under Section 143 or 144 of the Act, making them appealable under Section 246(c). Therefore, the FAA's dismissal was set aside.