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238 orders · Page 3 of 5
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) should have examined the source of the cash deposits, which were duly recorded in the assessee's cash book as business proceeds, rather than scrutinizing the application of the funds. Therefore, the addition sustained by the CIT(A) was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the interest expenditure was related to the multiple businesses carried on by the assessee. Since the assessee had already voluntarily disallowed a portion of the interest for personal purposes, the disallowance made by the lower authorities was not warranted.
The Tribunal held that the land sold was agricultural land and not a capital asset as it was situated more than 10 Kms from the nearest municipality, as evidenced by a certificate from the Village Administrative Officer. Therefore, the gains arising from its sale were not taxable as capital gains.
The Tribunal held that the CPC ought not to have denied the exemption without giving proper opportunity and that there was a violation of natural justice. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the assessee to file an application for condoning the delay.
The Tribunal found that the Ld.CIT(A) passed the order without application of mind by overlooking the condonation order of the Ld.CCIT. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal, considering principles of natural justice, decided to grant the assessee an opportunity to file submissions and evidence. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the AO for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 1,00,000/- made by the A.O. on account of cash credit entries without proper identity and source is confirmed. However, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the share capital of Rs. 10,25,00,000/- was satisfactorily explained as the payments were made through banking channels by Senthamarai Transport on behalf of shareholders and the source of funds was reflected in Senthamarai Transport's balance sheet.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Considering the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee an opportunity to file submissions and evidence. The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was restored to the file of the A.O. for a fresh hearing on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the assessment order was passed ex-parte. Considering that the assessee had deposited 20% of the demand and claimed the funds were from agricultural savings, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee one more opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the AO's assessment, based on available bank statements and business enquiries, was a possible view and not erroneous. Therefore, the revisionary order under Section 263 was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities erred in treating the cash deposits as unexplained. The assessee had provided details of cash withdrawals from her husband's bank account prior to demonetization, which were deposited into her account.
The Tribunal held that the non-issuance of a notice under Section 153C of the Act for AY 2019-20 vitiated the assessment proceedings, rendering the order void ab initio. This was because the assessment year was abated, and the assessee was deprived of the opportunity to file a fresh return and make new claims.
The Tribunal held that the non-issuance of a notice under Section 153C for an abated assessment year (AY 2019-20) deprived the assessee of substantive rights, such as filing a fresh return and making new claims. This vitiated the assessment proceedings.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities did not properly consider interbank transfers and cash withdrawals. Observing principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the matter to the AO for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the dividend income was directly credited to the assessee's bank account without any staff involvement, and the solicitation was from the bank. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation reasonable and bonafide, and therefore, the penalty imposed under Section 270A was unsustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the AO made the addition without considering cash withdrawals and that the CIT(A) also failed to examine cash withdrawals and the source of the deposit. In the interest of natural justice, the assessee should be given another opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal noted that the CBDT Circular No.09 of 2024 increased the monetary limit for filing appeals to Rs. 60 lakhs, stating that appeals with tax effect not exceeding this limit should not be filed.
The Tribunal held that the Ld.PCIT's order was passed ex parte without giving proper opportunity to the assessee, which is a violation of natural justice.
The tribunal held that passing an ex parte order by the Ld.PCIT without considering the assessee's adjournment request was a violation of natural justice. Therefore, the tribunal set aside the impugned order.
The tribunal noted that a previous order from a coordinate bench had already set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed fresh adjudication of all issues. Therefore, the present appeal filed by the Revenue was rendered infructuous.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not properly examine the assessee's assertion of a typographical error in mentioning the section for the suo-moto disallowance. Given that the employer's contribution was paid within the due date, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the issue back to the AO to verify the assessee's claim. However, regarding the interest payment disallowance, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s action, relying on Supreme Court precedents.
The tribunal acknowledged the delay in filing the appeal and excused it. While agreeing partly with the respondent's submissions, the tribunal invoked the principle of natural justice and granted the assessee an opportunity to file submissions and evidence. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the AO for a de novo assessment on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's application should be considered under the newly amended clause (iv)(B) of the first proviso to Section 80G(5), which allows for submission at any time after the commencement of activities. The CIT(E) was directed to decide the application based on this provision.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging the need for natural justice, decided to grant the assessee an opportunity to file submissions and evidence. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the AO for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was framed under incorrect provisions of the Act (u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144 instead of u/s 153C) despite the issuance of a notice u/s 153C. This jurisdictional defect made the assessment order bad-in-law and consequently, the revision order was also unsustainable. The argument that the AO failed to verify bank statements was rejected as the assessment was fundamentally flawed in its jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that no addition can be made under Section 153A for a completed assessment unless incriminating material is found during the search. The AO did not point to any such material for the agricultural income or capital gains. The additions were based on a lack of evidence, not incriminating material, and were therefore not justified.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not filed a return of income or a reply to the notice under Section 148, nor provided material evidence for the cash deposits. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition, finding that the additional evidence provided was not supported by tangible details. However, the assessee's representative requested an opportunity to present evidence before the Assessing Officer, and the Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, decided to remit the matter for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal noted that the payer company was indeed in liquidation, and the rental income had not been received or accrued to the assessee. However, considering the payer accepted the liability, the assessee was directed to offer the income to tax at the time of realization.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, subject to the condition that the assessee pays a cost of ₹.50,000/- to the State Legal Aid Authority within 30 days.
The Tribunal noted that the payer company was indeed in liquidation, and the rental income had not been received or accrued to the assessee. However, considering the payer accepted the liability, the assessee was directed to offer the income to tax at the time of realization.
The Tribunal noted that the payer company was indeed in liquidation, and the rental income had not been received or accrued to the assessee. However, considering the payer accepted the liability, the assessee was directed to offer the income to tax at the time of realization.
The Tribunal noted that the payer company was indeed in liquidation, and the rental income had not been received or accrued to the assessee. However, considering the payer accepted the liability, the assessee was directed to offer the income to tax at the time of realization.
The Tribunal found no representation from the assessee and no adjournment petition. Given the lack of response and proper representation, the appeal was dismissed in limine as not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee cannot be deemed an assessee in default for short deduction of tax as the mistake was bonafide and tax was deducted and paid. Therefore, the imposition of interest under Section 201(1A) was not justified.
The Tribunal, considering the facts and circumstances, decided to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer in the interest of justice. This was subject to the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 2,000/- to the State Legal Aid Authority and ensuring the Assessing Officer provides reasonable opportunities for being heard.
The Tribunal held that since the reopening was beyond four years from the end of the assessment year and the original assessment was under Section 143(3), the reopening was bad in law unless there was a failure by the assessee to disclose material facts. As no such failure was established, the reopening was quashed.
The Tribunal, following the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Union of India Vs. Ashish Agarwal, held that notices issued u/s 148 under the unamended Act but dispatched after the amendment came into force should be treated as show-cause notices under section 148A. The jurisdictional issue and the merits are restored back to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration.
On the issue of railway siding expenditure, the Tribunal held that the facts and nature of expenditure are identical to the assessee's own case for AY 2014-15, where the co-ordinate bench allowed the expenditure as revenue. Respectfully following that decision, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to treat the expenditure as revenue expenditure, deleting the disallowance. The ratio is that if an asset does not belong to the assessee and is similar to prior year's treatment, it should be allowed as revenue. Regarding disallowance of expenses relatable to exempt income under section 14A, the Tribunal deleted the disallowance of interest expenditure under Rule 8D(2)(ii) as the investments were out of the assessee's own funds. For administrative expenses under Rule 8D(2)(iii), the issue was restored to the AO to include the value of investments giving rise to exempt income for computation, thus partly allowing the issue for statistical purposes. The ratio is that disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii) is not sustainable if investments are out of own funds, and for Rule 8D(2)(iii), computation must be restricted to relevant investments. On the issue of disallowance while computing book profit under section 115JB, the Tribunal held, following the Special Bench decision in ACIT Vs. Vireet Investments Private Ltd., that computation under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2) is to be made without resorting to section 14A read with Rule 8D. Therefore, the disallowance was directed to be deleted. The ratio is that section 14A disallowances are not applicable for book profit computation under section 115JB.
The Tribunal held that the deletion of the addition of unsecured loan as deemed dividend was justified, as the assessee was not a shareholder in the lender company, and the appeal before the Supreme Court on this issue was withdrawn. However, regarding the employees' contribution to PF & ESI, the Tribunal held that the disallowance was to be confirmed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services P. Ltd. vs. CIT.
The Tribunal found that the AO passed an ex-parte order without examining the books of account. To uphold principles of natural justice, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The assessee applied for withdrawal of the appeal due to the relief obtained under section 154. The revenue's DR did not object to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's order was cryptic, incoherent, and lacked application of mind. The appellant's counsel requested the matter to be restored to the AO for readjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel admitted the case might fall under the amended Section 2(15) but sought to distinguish based on a recent Supreme Court decision. The Tribunal found the matter needed re-examination in light of the Supreme Court's ruling.
The Tribunal held that the substantial expenditure incurred on salaries, staff welfare, rent, accounting, and consultancy charges were necessary for the continuance of the corporate entity, even if no business was actively carried out. The expenditure for earning house property income was already disallowed by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that if a revisionary order passed u/s 263 is quashed, any consequential assessment order passed by the AO would be void ab initio and cannot stand judicial scrutiny. The Ld. CIT(A)'s decision to annul the assessment order was found to be based on a correct understanding of facts.
The Tribunal held that if a revisionary order passed u/s 263 is quashed, any consequential assessment order passed by the AO would be void ab initio and cannot stand judicial scrutiny. The Ld. CIT(A)'s decision to annul the assessment order was found to be based on a correct understanding of facts.
The Tribunal held that if a revisionary order passed u/s 263 is quashed, any consequential assessment order passed by the AO would be void ab initio and cannot stand judicial scrutiny. The Ld. CIT(A)'s decision to annul the assessment order was found to be based on a correct understanding of facts.
The Tribunal held that if a revisionary order passed u/s 263 is quashed, any consequential assessment order passed by the AO would be void ab initio and cannot stand judicial scrutiny. The Ld. CIT(A)'s decision to annul the assessment order was found to be based on a correct understanding of facts.
The Tribunal held that if a revisionary order passed u/s 263 is quashed, any consequential assessment order passed by the AO would be void ab initio and cannot stand judicial scrutiny. The Ld. CIT(A)'s decision to annul the assessment order was found to be based on a correct understanding of facts.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel admitted the case might fall under the amended Section 2(15) but sought to distinguish based on a recent Supreme Court decision. The Tribunal found the matter needed re-examination in light of the Supreme Court's ruling.