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343 orders · Page 6 of 7
The Tribunal held that corpus donations should not be treated as rental receipts and that the surplus funds generated from the community hall were fully utilized for charitable activities. Therefore, the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 11 was upheld.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim for depreciation on printers and software, and also allowed the deduction for stamp duty charges. The disallowance of secondment payments to employees was deleted.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to adhere to the principles of natural justice by not providing a proper opportunity for the assessee to be heard. Therefore, the order was set aside to allow the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal held that corpus donations should not be treated as rental receipts and that the surplus funds generated from the community hall were fully utilized for charitable activities. Therefore, the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 11 was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was based on the same material available during the original assessment, constituting a mere change of opinion, which is impermissible. Therefore, the assessment order could not be sustained.
The Tribunal noted a subsequent CBDT circular extending the due date for such applications. Considering this development, the assessee was given an opportunity to re-approach the CIT(E) for reconsideration.
The Tribunal held that the application should not be rejected on mere technical grounds, and the assessee should be given an opportunity to rectify the error. The CIT(E) was directed to allow the assessee to correct the mistake and then decide the application on merits.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's claim for interest deduction of Rs. 2,00,000/- on a self-occupied property was allowable under Section 24 of the Act. The AO had rightly allowed this claim.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's microfinance activities, which involved borrowing from banks at interest and lending to self-help groups at a higher rate, constituted business and did not qualify as charitable under Section 2(15) due to the proviso. The activities were not considered incidental to the stated objectives.
The Tribunal held that the application should be considered on merits, referencing a co-ordinate bench decision and a Madras High Court ruling that found certain circulars regarding time limits to be illegitimate. A recent CBDT circular also extended the deadline.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's microfinance activities, which involved borrowing from banks at interest and lending to self-help groups at a higher rate, constituted business and did not qualify as charitable under Section 2(15) due to the proviso. The activities were not considered incidental to the stated objectives.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee society was notified under Section 10(23C) of the Act, the conditions prescribed under Section 13 are not applicable. Therefore, the AO could not make disallowances under Section 11.
The Tribunal held that the salary income accrued to the assessee for work performed in a foreign jurisdiction would not be taxable in India, whereas salary received for work performed in India would be taxable in India. The benefit of the DTAA would be available. The Tribunal noted that the proportionate salary for services rendered in India had already been offered to tax in India, and the balance salary had been offered to tax in China. The China tax had been paid by the foreign entity. The Tribunal found that the facts were similar to the case of Paul Xavier Antonysamy (ITA No.2233/Chny/2018), where it was held that Section 5(2) is subject to other provisions of the Act, and salary income is deemed to accrue or arise in India only if earned in India. The Tribunal also noted that the decisions relied upon by the revenue (Swaraminathan Ravichandran and Dennis Rozaria) were distinguishable. The AO was directed to re-compute the income of the assessee. The appeal was allowed in terms of this order, directing the AO to allow the benefit of exemption under Article 15(1) of the India-China DTAA. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the salary income accrued to the assessee for work performed in a foreign jurisdiction would not be taxable in India, whereas salary received for work performed in India would be taxable in India. The benefit of the DTAA would be available. The Tribunal noted that the proportionate salary for services rendered in India had already been offered to tax in India, and the balance salary had been offered to tax in China. The China tax had been paid by the foreign entity. The Tribunal found that the facts were similar to the case of Paul Xavier Antonysamy (ITA No.2233/Chny/2018), where it was held that Section 5(2) is subject to other provisions of the Act, and salary income is deemed to accrue or arise in India only if earned in India. The Tribunal also noted that the decisions relied upon by the revenue (Swaraminathan Ravichandran and Dennis Rozaria) were distinguishable. The AO was directed to re-compute the income of the assessee. The appeal was allowed in terms of this order, directing the AO to allow the benefit of exemption under Article 15(1) of the India-China DTAA. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer cannot substitute their judgment for that of a businessman regarding expenditure reasonableness. Unless excessive or unreasonable payment is proven with material evidence, no disallowance can be made under Section 40A(2)(b).
The Tribunal found that the assessment orders were passed in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the orders of the lower authorities were set aside.
The Tribunal found that the assessment orders were passed in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the orders of the lower authorities were set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding sufficient cause. It held that the proviso to Section 50C(1) applies retrospectively, allowing the circle rate on the agreement date to be used for capital gains calculation.
The Tribunal held that the recovery of stolen gold ornaments should be taxed in the hands of the person lawfully liable, which was the erstwhile proprietor. Taxing the company again would amount to double taxation.
The Tribunal held that the issue of taxability of guarantee fees received from its Indian subsidiaries was squarely covered by a previous decision of a Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case for Assessment Years 2014-15 and 2015-16. In that prior decision, the Tribunal had held that the guarantee fee is not taxable in the hands of the assessee. The reasoning in the prior order was that by virtue of Article 23 of the Indo-Korea DTAA, 'other income' is taxable only in the contracting state, which in this case is Korea, not India. Therefore, taxability under the Income Tax Act was not desirable. The Tribunal deleted the addition of guarantee fees amounting to Rs 5,78,12,677 and allowed the appeal. The operative direction was the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order was not time-barred due to extensions granted by the CBDT in light of COVID-19. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal found that the assessee, as the Power of Attorney holder who received the cash, was responsible for the contravention of Section 269SS and thus liable for the penalty.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A)-NFAC failed to adjudicate the appeal on merits and passed a non-speaking order. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A)-NFAC was set aside.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s estimation reasonable but decided to further restrict the addition. The Tribunal reduced the addition to Rs. 5,00,000/-, providing further relief to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that since the quantum assessment order and the CIT(A) order were set aside and remanded, the penalty order would not survive. The AO was permitted to initiate fresh penalty proceedings if warranted.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order, noting the assessee's potential lack of familiarity with digital communication and the CIT(A)'s failure to provide a hearing. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A)'s file for a fresh adjudication.
The assessee pleaded to withdraw the appeal as the registration under Section 12A was granted. The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notice was bad in law as it did not specify the exact limb of Section 271(1)(c) under which the penalty was proposed. Consequently, the penalty levied was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the second reassessment was invalid as it was based on a mere change of opinion and not on any new material. Therefore, the quantum additions and penalty levied were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's explanation that the deposits were from cash on hand from accountable sources before demonetization, and the delay was due to bank rush, was plausible. The AO had not found any discrepancy in the assessee's books of accounts.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s ex parte orders were not sustainable as they were not speaking orders. The appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication after providing a proper opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal found a violation of natural justice as the CIT(A) passed an ex parte order without properly considering the assessee's submissions or granting adequate opportunity. The Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, an elderly housewife, had explained the cash deposits as sale proceeds from agricultural land. Despite the purchasers' statement to the AO, the Tribunal found that the assessee's explanation for the cash deposit was plausible given the circumstances.
The Tribunal found the ex parte order of the CIT(A) to be unsustainable. The order was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal set aside the ex parte order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeal back to the CIT(A). The assessee was directed to participate and file submissions, and the CIT(A) was instructed to pass a speaking order.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order regarding verification and modified it to direct the AO to verify the assessee's claims of double disallowance and TDS credit. The AO is to provide an opportunity to the assessee for reconciliation and verification.
The Tribunal held that the second reassessment was invalid as it was based on a mere change of opinion and not on any new material. Therefore, the quantum additions and penalty levied were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal was not maintainable due to the low tax effect. The assessee's cross-objection was withdrawn.
The Tribunal is hearing appeals concerning the denial of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for a Co-operative Credit Society. The appeals are based on similar facts and issues.
The Tribunal held that the AO should have corrected the double disallowance under Section 43B as the assessee had already offered the amount in its return. However, the disallowance under Section 36(1)(va) for late payment of employee contributions to PF and ESI was upheld, following the Supreme Court's decision in M/s. Checkmate Services P. Ltd.
The Tribunal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, held that reopening under Section 147 is permissible even if materials were found during a search, and Section 153C is an enabling provision. The case was remanded to the CIT(A) to decide on merits.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order regarding verification and modified it to direct the AO to verify the assessee's claims of double disallowance and TDS credit. The AO is to provide an opportunity to the assessee for reconciliation and verification.
The Tribunal held that the second reassessment was invalid as it was based on a mere change of opinion by the Assessing Officer, without any new information. Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) was also not sustainable.
The Tribunal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, held that reopening under Section 147 is permissible even if materials are found during a search, and Section 153C is an enabling provision. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for deciding on merits.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) could not be sustained. This was due to the absence of satisfaction recorded by the AO in the assessment order and the fact that the addition was purely on an estimated basis.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's revision order lacked sound footing as the only interest expenditure claimed was Rs. 87,649/- on a car loan, which had a direct nexus and did not warrant disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii). Therefore, the revision order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the appellate authority has the power to direct the Assessing Officer to consider a claim even if it was not made in the original return. The compensation for land acquisition was clarified as exempt from income tax by CBDT circular.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer did not ask for books of account during remand proceedings, though the assessee was ready to produce them. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer cannot make a separate addition for SBNs when income has already been estimated at 8% of turnover. It directed the Assessing Officer to adopt 4% of the total turnover plus the SBN amount for determining net profit.
The ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order as it was not adjudicated on merits. The tribunal directed the CIT(A) to pass a speaking order after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal is hearing appeals concerning the denial of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for a Co-operative Credit Society. The appeals are based on similar facts and issues.