69 orders · Page 1 of 2
The Tribunal held that derivative transactions are generally considered commodities for the purpose of Section 43(5). However, it directed the Assessing Officer to consider that losses from derivative transactions exceeding the total export turnover should be treated as speculative.
The Tribunal held that 'tied-up grants' received for specific purposes are not part of the assessee's income and should be excluded from computation. Expenses incurred under these grants should also be excluded.
The Tribunal held that the assessee acted as an agent and was entitled to commission only. The addition of the full sale proceeds was deleted, confirming the addition only to the extent of the commission earned.
The Tribunal held that letting out property is the business of the assessee, following the Apex Court's judgment. For the TDS credit, the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer to consider the TDS certificates.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) deleted the addition without proper basis and that the assessee might have lowered profits in non-80IB units to reduce tax liability. The issue was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the comparison of the property's location with Ambattur Industrial Estate for determining fair market value was inappropriate. The valuation of the building based on PWD rates was confirmed as reasonable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel only provided financial statements, not ledger accounts, making it difficult to ascertain how subscription charges were accounted for. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's (Appeals) decision, agreeing that the Assessing Officer's disallowance was based on presumption rather than evidence. The Tribunal found the assessee's claim of agricultural income to be reasonable and supported by comparable cases.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act can only be applied to a shareholder of the lending company, not to a concern that is not a shareholder. Since the assessee company was not a shareholder in the lending company, the deemed dividend could not be taxed in its hands.
The Tribunal held that 'tied-up grants' received for specific purposes are not part of the assessee's income and should be excluded from computation. Expenses incurred under these grants should also be excluded.
The Tribunal held that the assessee acted as an agent and was entitled to commission only. The addition of the full sale proceeds was deleted, confirming the addition only to the extent of the commission earned.
The Tribunal held that the expenditure was incurred for business purposes and confirmed the genuineness of the payments. The subcontractors had executed the work, raised bills, and payments were made through banking channels.
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's (Appeals) decision, agreeing that the Assessing Officer's disallowance was based on presumption rather than evidence. The Tribunal found the assessee's claim of agricultural income to be reasonable and supported by comparable cases.
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's (Appeals) decision, agreeing that the Assessing Officer's disallowance was based on presumption rather than evidence. The Tribunal found the assessee's claim of agricultural income to be reasonable and supported by comparable cases.
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's (Appeals) decision, agreeing that the Assessing Officer's disallowance was based on presumption rather than evidence. The Tribunal found the assessee's claim of agricultural income to be reasonable and supported by comparable cases.
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's (Appeals) decision, agreeing that the Assessing Officer's disallowance was based on presumption rather than evidence. The Tribunal found the assessee's claim of agricultural income to be reasonable and supported by comparable cases.
The Tribunal held that investments in subsidiary companies and investments yielding no income should not be considered for disallowance under Section 14A. The issue was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for recomputation.
The Tribunal held that the mere pendency of a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court is not a ground to disregard a binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the CIT(Appeals) rightly allowed the deduction.
The Tribunal held that receiving cash from close relatives for urgent commercial necessity, with immediate deposit into the bank to honor cheques, constitutes a reasonable cause. Therefore, the penalty levied under Section 271D was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the issue of whether the Working Women Hostel activity is incidental to the predominant object of education needs re-examination. Regarding depreciation, it was held that since the cost of the asset was allowed as application of income under Section 11 (Chapter III), depreciation under Section 32 (Chapter IV) cannot be claimed as Section 11 overrides Section 32.
The Tribunal held that the assessee received gold bullion worth ₹9,97,00,000/- after transferring funds to Mohan Lal Jewellers. Since the assessee could not substantiate their claim of merely facilitating a transaction for a commission, the entire amount was treated as the assessee's income.
The Tribunal held that the issue of whether the Working Women Hostel activity is incidental to the predominant object of education needs re-examination. Regarding depreciation, it was held that since the cost of the asset was allowed as application of income under Section 11 (Chapter III), depreciation under Section 32 (Chapter IV) cannot be claimed as Section 11 overrides Section 32.
The Tribunal held that the deficit stock figure arrived at by the lower authorities after reconciliation was reasonable. The estimation of income at 5.2% of the deficit stock was also considered appropriate for the line of business. The grounds raised by the assessee were rejected.
The Tribunal held that depreciation cannot be claimed on assets used for charitable activities if it leads to double deduction. It also ruled that excess application of funds over income cannot be carried forward as it likely arises from corpus or accumulated funds, which are already exempt.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that the CIT(Appeals) erred in not considering the additional ground regarding deemed dividend and directed the CIT(Appeals) to admit the additional ground and decide the issue afresh, along with the Section 14A disallowance.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had a justified reason for the delay in filing the audit report as their books were with the department. Therefore, the penalty under Section 271B was not attracted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) & (iv). This was based on a co-ordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case, which held that classifying members to deny deduction is beyond the tax statute.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided details before the CIT(Appeals) and before the Tribunal, and in the interest of justice, granted one more opportunity. The matter was set aside and remitted back to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and granted the assessee one more opportunity to submit necessary details to the Commissioner. The CIT was directed to decide the issue afresh.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's role was limited to providing stadium facilities for matches conducted by BCCI and that its primary activities were aimed at promoting sports, not engaging in business. Therefore, the proviso to Section 2(15) was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's role was limited to providing stadium facilities for matches conducted by BCCI and that its primary activities were aimed at promoting sports, not engaging in business. Therefore, the proviso to Section 2(15) was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's role was limited to providing stadium facilities for matches conducted by BCCI and that its primary activities were aimed at promoting sports, not engaging in business. Therefore, the proviso to Section 2(15) was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that tax deduction under Section 40(a)(ia) is attracted on amounts paid or credited during the year, not just those payable at the year-end. It found the CIT(Appeals) order to be unjustified by respectfully following the judgments of the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts.
The Tribunal held that the jetty was a temporary structure erected for business purposes, falling under the definition of 'building' for which 100% depreciation is prescribed. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to 100% depreciation.
The Tribunal upheld the denial of 100% depreciation on the RO Plant, allowing only 15%. The issue of the correct loss figure was remitted back to the Assessing Officer. The issue of contract receipts was also remitted back to the Assessing Officer for reconciliation.
The Tribunal upheld the denial of 100% depreciation on the RO Plant, allowing only 15%. The issue of the correct loss figure was remitted back to the Assessing Officer. The issue of contract receipts was also remitted back to the Assessing Officer for reconciliation.
The Tribunal held that the issue of advance for land sale needed further investigation by the AO. For unsubstantiated liabilities, the Tribunal found the AO's method incorrect and remitted the issue for fresh adjudication with directions for the assessee to provide reconciliation. For advance received for vehicle sale, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s reasoning incorrect and remitted the issue back to the AO for fresh inquiry.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that the matter needed reconsideration by the Assessing Officer in light of the newly filed details. The orders of the lower authorities were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A did not empower the Assessing Officer to levy fees under Section 234E. The amendment effective from June 1, 2015, enabled such adjustments.