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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, S M C BENCH, CHENNAI
Before: SHRI N.R.S. GANESAN
per the Memorandum, the predominant object of the assessee-
society is education. It is not clear from the orders of the lower
authorities whether the assessee was running any educational
institution. Even though the Ld.counsel claims that the assessee is
providing funds to the students, it is not clear from the orders of the
lower authorities whether such funds are provided by way of or
scholarship or any other form of assistance. This Tribunal is of the
considered opinion that the activity of the assessee-society has to
be examined in the light of the Memorandum of the assessee-
society before examining the claim under Section 11 of the Act. It
also needs to be examined whether the establishment of Working
Women Hostel would fall under the head “public utility service”
under Section 2(15) of the Act. Since these aspects were not
examined by the authorities below and the facts are not clear from
the orders of the lower authorities with regard to activity of the
assessee, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the
Assessing Officer has to re-examine the issue and he has to bring
out the entire facts with regard to object and activity of the
assessee-society on record.
5 I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/14 I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/14 6. Accordingly, the orders of the lower authorities are set aside
and the entire claim of deduction under Section 11 of the Act is
remitted back to the file of the Assessing Officer. The Assessing
Officer shall re-examine the issue afresh in the light of the
Memorandum of the assessee-society and the activity which is
actually carried on by the assessee and thereafter decide the issue
in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity to the
assessee.
Now coming to the Revenue’s appeal in I.T.A.
No.2222/Mds/2014, the only issue arises for consideration is with
regard to the claim of depreciation on the asset on which the
assessee claims deduction under Section 11 as application of
income.
Sh. P. Radhakrishnan, the Ld. D.R., submitted that the
assessee claimed depreciation under Section 32 of the Act.
However, the Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee
on the ground that the investment made by the assessee for
acquiring capital asset was already allowed under Section 11 as
application. Therefore, the cost of asset becomes NIL. The Ld.
D.R. further submitted that the depreciation has to be computed
only on the Written Down Value of the capital asset. Since the
6 I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/14 I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/14 Written Down Value is NIL, on allowing the entire cost as application
of income under Section 11 of the Act, the computation itself fails.
The Ld. D.R. has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court
in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Union of India (1993) 199 ITR 43 and also
the judgment of Kerala High Court in Lissie Medical Institutions v.
CIT (2012) to taxmann.com 9.
On the contrary, Sh. A.S. Sriraman, the Ld.counsel for the
assessee, submitted that the taxable income of the assessee has to
be computed in a commercial form after allowing all permissible
deductions under the provisions of Income-tax Act. According to
the Ld. counsel, depreciation under Section 32 of the Act is an
allowance that has to be deducted for arriving at taxable income. If
anything remains after allowing depreciation, the same has to be
allowed under Section 11 of the Act as application of income.
Referring to the decision of this Bench of the Tribunal in ITO v.
KGISL Ltd. in I.T.A. No.1813/Mds/2012 dated 3.6.2013, the
Ld.counsel submitted that on identical circumstances, this Tribunal
found that there are divergent judicial opinions by the various High
Courts, therefore, by following the judgment of Apex Court in the
case of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1973) 88 ITR 192, allowed
the claim of the assessee.
7 I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/14 I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/14
I have considered the rival submissions on either side and
perused the relevant material on record. It is not in dispute that the
cost of acquisition of capital asset was allowed under Section 11 of
the Act as application of income. Therefore, in the books, the cost
of capital asset on which the assessee has claimed depreciation
has to be taken as NIL. Section 11 of the Act, on which the
assessee earlier claimed deduction on the cost of asset as
application of income, falls in Chapter III of the Act. In fact, Chapter
III of the Act deals with income which does not form part of the total
income. Therefore, when a charitable institution applies its income
for acquisition of capital asset, the same cannot form part of the
total income since Section 11 provides for exemption as application
of income. It is not in dispute that the assessee claimed the cost of
the asset as application of income under Section 11 of the Act.
Whereas, Section 32 of the Act, which provides for
depreciation on capital asset falls under Chapter IV (D) of the Act.
In fact, Chapter IV of the Act provides for computation of total
income. Therefore, for the purpose of computation of total income,
the expenditures provided in Sections 28 to 44DB of the Act have to
be allowed depending upon the activity of the assessee. Section 32
of the Act which provides for depreciation is also falling in Chapter
8 I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/14 I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/14 IV (D) of the Act. Therefore, for the purpose of computation of total
income, depreciation has also to be allowed on the capital asset. In
fact, depreciation has to be allowed on the value of the capital
asset. This Tribunal is of the considered opinion that Chapter III of
the Act deals with an income which does not form part of total
income, while Chapter IV deals with situation for computation of
total income. Hence, an income which does not form part of total
income as the same was exempted under Section 11 as application
of income, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the
assessee cannot claim depreciation under Section 32 of the Act. In
other words, Section 11 which falls in Chapter III overrides Section
32 which falls in Chapter IV(D) of the Act. Therefore, this Tribunal is
of the considered opinion that the assessee cannot claim
depreciation, especially when the cost of asset was allowed as
application of income under Section 11 of the Act. In fact, the Apex
Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd.(supra) had examined the issue and
observed as follows at para 11:-
“For the reasons discussed above we are of the view that, even before the 1980-amendment, the Act did not permit a deduction for depreciation in respect of the cost of a capital asset acquired for purposes of scientific research to the extent such cost has been written off under section 10(2)(xiv)/35(1) and (2). Prior to 1968, such assets qualified for an allowance of one-fifth of the cost of the asset in five
9 I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/14 I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/14
previous years starting with that of its acquisition and during these years the assessee could not get any depreciation in relation thereto. In respect of assets acquired in previous year relevant to the assessment year 1968-69 and thereafter, their cost was written off in the previous year of acquisition and no depreciation could be allowed in that year. This is clear from the statute. Equally, it is not envisaged, and indeed, it would be meaningless to say, that depreciation could be allowed on them thereafter with a further absurdity that it could be allowed starting with the original cost of the asset despite its user for scientific research and the allowances made under the 'scientific research' clause. In our view, there was no difficulty at all in the interpretation of the provisions. The mere fact that a baseless claim was raised by some over- enthusiastic assessees who sought a double allowance or that such claim may perhaps have been accepted by some authorities is not sufficient to attribute any ambiguity or doubt as to the true scope of the provisions as they stood earlier. We are, for the reasons discussed above, unable to approve of the cryptic view expressed by the Karnataka High Court in Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. 's case (supra) or the view taken by the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Mico Products (P.) Ltd. [1991] 187 ITR 517.”
A division Bench of this Tribunal had an occasion to consider this issue in The Anjuman-E-Himayath-E-Islam v. ADIT in I.T.A.No.
2271/Mds/2014 dated 02.06.2015 and considered this aspect
elaborately and observed as follows:-
“6.3 We have heard both the parties and carefully perused the materials available on record. Chapter-III refers to “income which does not form part of total income”. Section-11 of the Act placed under Chapter-III deals with ‘income from property held for charitable or religious purpose’. Section-11(1)(a) provides that income derived from the property held under trust wholly for
10 I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/14 I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/14
charitable or religious purpose, to the extent to which such income is applied, shall not be included in its total income. The Act also provides that upto 15% of the gross income received is accumulated and then the same shall also be exempt from the income of the trust. From the above it is clear that provision of the Act in Chapter-III deals with the manner in which the income of the assessee trust has to be applied in order to exempt such income from the total income. It is not a case of computation of income chargeable to tax as per the provisions Chapter IV under the head “C-Income from house property”. Therefore while determining the “income” of the assessee trust and its “application of income” for the purpose of claiming exemption U/s.11(1)(a) of the Act, the provisions of Chapter-IV - Sections 22 to 27 of the Act which is applicable for computing the income chargeable to tax under the head ‘income from house property’ will not be attracted. However, provisions of section 22 to 27 of the Act will come into play when the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of Section-11(1)(a) of the Act and when such income of the Trust is chargeable to tax under the head “income from house property”. It is pertinent to mention here that Hon’ble Calcutta High Court supra has held that income contemplated by the provisions of section 11 is the real income and not the income as assessed or assessable. Accordingly, while arriving at the rental income of the assessee-trust any expenditure incurred whatsoever related to the rental income has to be allowed as deduction and the net income which is the real income, will be treated as the income of the Trust. From our above discussion the ground raised by the assessee on this issue will not survive and therefore, the order of the Revenue is upheld.”
In view of the above, the decision of this Tribunal in KGISL
Trust may not be applicable to the facts of the case. Accordingly,
the order of the CIT(Appeals) is set aside and that of the Assessing
Officer is restored. A similar view was taken by Cochin Bench of
11 I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/14 I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/14 this Tribunal in Shri Thomas George Muthoot v. ACIT in I.T.A. No.63 & 64/Coch/2014 dated 28.08.2014.
In the result, the appeal of the assessee in I.T.A. No.1965/Mds/2014 is allowed for statistical purposes and the appeal of the Revenue in I.T.A. No.2222/Mds/2014 is allowed.
Order pronounced on 21st August, 2015 at Chennai.
sd/- (एन.आर.एस. गणेशन) (N.R.S. Ganesan) �या�यक सद�य/Judicial Member
चे�नई/Chennai, �दनांक/Dated, the 21st August, 2015.
Kri.
आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत/Copy to: 1. Assessee 2. Assessing Officer 3. आयकर आयु�त (अपील)/CIT(A)-I, Coimbatore 4. आयकर आयु�त/CIT-I, Coimbatore 5. �वभागीय ��त�न�ध/DR 6. गाड� फाईल/GF.