Loading ITAT cases…
189 orders · Page 4 of 4
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, citing a reasonable cause and bona fide circumstances on the part of the assessee, emphasizing that technicalities should not defeat substantive justice. The Tribunal also noted that this was the second round of litigation and the issue of deduction u/s 80P needed to be reconsidered in light of recent Supreme Court decisions.
The Tribunal noted that the sale deed mentioned cheques issued in favour of a confirming party, Mr. Reddy Veeranna, and that the vendors acknowledged receipt of consideration. However, the confirmation from Mr. Reddy Veeranna indicated that the cheques were not presented due to lack of funds, and the assessee was shown as a debtor. The bank statements revealed a complex series of transactions involving transfers and withdrawals.
The Tribunal held that Section 2(22)(e) was not applicable as there was no direct payment or loan made by the company to the assessee during the assessment year. The investment in the Conakry entity was made in an earlier financial year and was still shown as an outstanding debt.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee has the right to choose the valuation method (DCF), the valuation report lacked valid assumptions and empirical data to justify the projections. The assessee failed to discharge its onus to substantiate the valuation.
The Tribunal held that the AO cannot make an ad-hoc disallowance without rejecting the assessee's audited books of account. Relying on various High Court and Tribunal precedents, the Tribunal deleted the addition.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's net profit rate was comparable to previous years, but acknowledged that self-made vouchers could lead to inflated expenditures. Citing a High Court judgment that allowed deductions for similar payments made for business expediency, the Tribunal found that a complete disallowance was not justified.
The Tribunal held that if the investments made by the cooperative society are out of compulsion under the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act and relevant Rules, the interest income earned from such investments should be considered business income and eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The matter was restored to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that under Section 159(2) of the Income Tax Act, proceedings do not abate upon the death of the assessee and can be continued against the legal representative. Therefore, the assessment order passed in the name of the deceased was not ab initio void.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271D and 271E was not justified. It found that the transactions were genuine, between family members, and there was a reasonable cause for accepting cash, especially since the amounts were reflected in the accounts of all parties.
The Tribunal, following its own previous decisions and the Delhi High Court's ruling, held that non-rural bad debts written off under Section 36(1)(vii) need not be adjusted against the provision allowed under Section 36(1)(viia). The Tribunal also allowed the assessee's ground regarding the non-applicability of Section 115JB to nationalized banks.
The Tribunal referred to the Apex Court judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. case, holding that co-operative societies are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for income from credit facilities provided to members, including nominal members. The issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) was restored to the AO for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal referred to the Apex Court judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. case, holding that co-operative societies are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for income from credit facilities provided to members, including nominal members. The issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) was restored to the AO for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal observed that the delay of 24 seconds was minuscule and due to technical reasons in acknowledgment generation, not the assessee's fault. Non-consideration of such circumstances is pedantic and leads to hardship.
The Tribunal, by a majority opinion (Third Member agreeing with the Vice President), held that there was no valid search under Section 132 of the Act in the case of the assessee company. Consequently, the precondition for issuing a notice under Section 153A of the Act was not satisfied. The search was conducted at the residential premises of the directors, not the company's premises, and the warrant of authorization was issued in the name of the company. The Tribunal relied on judicial pronouncements, including those from the Delhi Tribunal and the Bombay High Court, which emphasize that a valid search initiated in the assessee's own case is a prerequisite for invoking Section 153A. The Tribunal found that the survey under Section 133A conducted at the company's premises could not be converted into a search under Section 132 without a consequential warrant, and that assessment proceedings under Section 153A could not be initiated based solely on a survey. The question regarding Section 153C was not answered as it did not arise from the orders of the lower authorities. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed, and the order of the CIT(A) was upheld.
The Tribunal noted that issues related to capital gains on slump sale under Section 50B require document verification and cannot be disallowed under Section 143(1). Since the Ld.CIT(A) could not remand the issue, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Ld.AO for fresh consideration with proper opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to bonafide reasons. On merits, the Tribunal noted that the assessee could not properly represent its case before the lower authorities due to circumstances arising from the COVID-19 period. The addition made by the AO was based on estimation of sales.
The Tribunal noted a significant time gap between the assessee's death and the CIT(A)'s order. Considering the death of the assessee, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the legal heir for making submissions before the CIT(A) and set aside the issue for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal referred to the Apex Court judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. case, holding that co-operative societies are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for income from credit facilities provided to members, including nominal members. The issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) was restored to the AO for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that the subscription fees received by the assessee do not amount to 'royalty' for the use of or right to use any 'copyright'. The Tribunal relied on various judicial precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in *Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited v. CIT*, and decisions from the AAR and ITAT in cases like *Elsevier BV*, *Dow Jones & Company Inc.*, and *DIT(IT) vs. Dun & Bradstreet Information Services India (P.) Ltd.*. The reasoning was that the assessee grants only a limited, non-exclusive, and non-transferable right to access the platform, which constitutes the sale of a copyrighted article. The Tribunal distinguished between the use of a platform and the use of the copyright or intellectual property in the platform. It was also held that the payments are not for the use of industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment, as customers have no access, right, or control over the servers. The Tribunal allowed grounds 4 to 12 in favour of the assessee. Regarding ground 3 concerning the DIN, the judgment states that the appeal is partly allowed, implying this procedural ground was not the sole basis for the decision, and the substantive issue of royalty was decided in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal dismissed grounds 14 and 15 as infructuous.
The Tribunal, following its own prior decisions in similar cases involving the assessee, held that the reimbursements for seconded employees did not constitute FTS and that the assessee was not in default for non-deduction of tax at source. Consequently, the disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) was not sustainable.
The Tribunal, following its own prior decisions in similar cases involving the assessee, held that the reimbursements for seconded employees did not constitute FTS and that the assessee was not in default for non-deduction of tax at source. Consequently, the disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) was not sustainable.
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee failed to provide evidence for expenses, treating the disallowed agricultural expenses as income from other sources was incorrect. The disallowance should have resulted in an increase in agricultural income, not treated as income from a different head.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was not deliberate and that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations. The Tribunal condoned the delay and remitted the issue back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(Appeals) by accepting the reasons provided by the assessee, including the involvement of a representative and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The case was remitted back to the AO for re-examination of the agricultural income.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to issue a notice under Section 143(2) after the assessee filed a return in response to the Section 148 notice. This procedural lapse renders the reassessment proceedings void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the AO had made inquiries, and the PCIT cannot substitute his own opinion for that of the AO when two views are possible. The Tribunal emphasized the distinction between lack of inquiry and inadequate inquiry, stating that the latter does not warrant revision under Section 263.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the AO had made inquiries and the PCIT failed to conduct further inquiries himself before setting aside the assessment order. The PCIT cannot direct a de novo assessment without a clear finding that the original order was erroneous.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to issue a notice under Section 143(2) after the assessee filed a return in response to the Section 148 notice. This procedural lapse renders the reassessment proceedings void ab initio. The AO also failed to dispose of the assessee's objections to the assumption of jurisdiction by way of a separate order.
The Tribunal held that a manufacturing company cannot be a comparable for a trading segment. It also directed the AO to consider the carry forward of losses and to re-examine the financial guarantee loss after verification. The disallowance under Section 14A was deleted as there was no exempt income, and miscellaneous expenses were remitted for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the buyer, Mr. Parasmal Lodha, whose statement was relied upon by the AO. The issue was remitted to the AO for fresh inquiry and to provide the cross-examination opportunity.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide necessary documentation for both unexplained imports and stock difference. However, considering the assessee's plea for another opportunity, both issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration.
The Tribunal held that if the cost of additional fixed and movable assets was not claimed as an application of income in the current year, the assessee is entitled to depreciation. The issue of capital expenditure and loan repayment as application of income was also remitted to the AO for examination.
The Tribunal noted that the reasons provided for the delay were sufficient and, in the interest of justice and following the Apex Court's judgment in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. MST. Katiji and Others, condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(Appeals).
The Tribunal noted that the property was acquired under the KIADB Act 1966, not the RFCTLAAR Act 2013. It relied on a previous Tribunal decision that held similar acquisitions under the KIADB Act do not qualify for exemption under the RFCTLAAR Act.
The Tribunal noted that only one notice of hearing was issued post-COVID. Considering recent Supreme Court decisions, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue to the AO for necessary verification and to consider the claim in accordance with the law, ensuring the assessee is granted a proper opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that an agriculturist is not required to maintain detailed bills and vouchers for day-to-day local sales, especially when the revenue failed to establish any other source of income for the assessee. The ad hoc disallowance of expenditure at 25% was found to be without basis and based on surmises and conjectures.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 601 days, citing the Supreme Court's liberal approach to condoning delays and the assessee's reasonable cause. On merits, the Tribunal noted that the lower authorities did not consider CBDT circulars regarding demonetized cash deposits. Therefore, the issue was remitted to the Assessing Officer (AO) to verify sales made by the assessee that were deposited in bank accounts, considering the relevant CBDT circulars.
The Tribunal held that the succession of the business by the assessee company from the erstwhile partnership firm did not constitute 'reconstruction' or 'splitting up' of the business. Therefore, the assessee was not disentitled to the deduction under Section 80-IB(10) on this ground.
The Tribunal noted that Mr. Prashanth Shetty provided a declaration stating he did not offer income from the business nor claimed TCS credit for it. The business was managed by the assessee under a mutual understanding. Relying on previous consistent rulings and the declaration, the Tribunal found no reason to uphold the impugned order.