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189 orders · Page 3 of 4
The Tribunal held that the cash deposits into the bank account were received from sundry debtors whose names were available in the previous year's and current year's books of accounts, which were accepted by the AO for the prior assessment year. The Tribunal found reasonable explanation for these deposits and hence, invoking Section 68 was not correct for these amounts. However, for an addition of Rs. 1,30,000/-, the assessee failed to provide supporting documents.
The Tribunal noted that while there was a time gap between the father's withdrawal and the assessee's deposit, the assessee consistently maintained that the funds originated from his father. The Department failed to provide evidence that the father utilized the withdrawn cash for other purposes. Therefore, the Tribunal found the addition unsustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court's judgment in New Noble Educational Society, relied upon by the CIT(A), was prospective and not applicable to the assessment year in question. The Tribunal also observed that if surplus funds from educational activities are utilized for educational purposes within 5 years, as per proviso 3 to section 10(23C), exemption is not barred.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 6,90,000 as unexplained cash deposit under section 69 r.w.s. 115BBE of the Act was not justified. The assessee had provided confirmation and affidavit from his son, and the AO did not controvert this evidence. The First Appellate Authority also failed to consider the additional evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee presented a chart to justify the source of cash deposits, but these documents were not verified by the lower authorities. To ensure justice, the Tribunal decided to provide another opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the sole dispute concerned the adjustment of Rs.30,33,560 towards interest on delayed trade receivables from the AE. It also observed that the assessee was given two opportunities for compliance during the appellate proceedings before the CIT(Appeals), but there was no compliance. Considering the facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue to the CIT(Appeals) for fresh consideration and decision. The assessee was directed to update its contact details and file necessary documents to substantiate its case. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was cautioned that further default would not entitle it to any leniency. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed before the CIT(A) was not maintainable against the intimation under section 143(1) as the demand had merged with the subsequent order under section 154. However, liberty was granted to the assessee to file a fresh appeal against the section 154 order.
The Tribunal held that Section 45(5A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which was introduced later and applies to individuals/HUFs, could not be invoked. The transaction involved conversion of a capital asset into stock-in-trade, making Section 45(2) applicable, and the income should have been taxed in AY 2009-10, not AY 2017-18.
The Tribunal held that the conversion of capital asset into stock-in-trade occurred on January 17, 2008, when the JDA was executed. Therefore, any capital gains arising from this conversion should be taxed in the year of conversion. The subsequent sale of stock-in-trade (constructed area) would be treated as business income in the year of sale. The Tribunal also ruled that the assessment proceedings were initiated without a mandatory notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, rendering the assessment order void ab initio. The AO's reliance on the occupancy certificate for taxation in AY 2017-18 was deemed incorrect.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, observing that the reason for the delay was a reasonable cause. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had decided the appeals without considering all disputed points, violating Section 260(6) of the Act.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, observing that the reason for the delay was a reasonable cause. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had decided the appeals without considering all disputed points, violating Section 260(6) of the Act.
The Tribunal considered the submissions and, in the interest of justice, remitted the issue back to the CIT(Appeals) for fresh consideration. The assessee was directed to update their contact details and cooperate with the proceedings, with a warning against future defaults.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's negligence in compliances but noted that income should be determined scientifically. Considering the AR's undertaking to handle necessary compliances and afford one more opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s finding.
The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) invoked Section 263, setting aside the assessment order for being erroneous and prejudicial, and directed the AO to obtain a fresh valuation report. The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order was without jurisdiction, as the DVO's failure to provide a report was not a valid ground for revision under Section 263, and the assessment order was not erroneous.
The Tribunal held that the presence of incriminating material is a prerequisite for making assessments under Section 153A for years that were not abated. Since no incriminating material was found, and only a statement from the Manager Accounts was considered, which is not incriminating material on its own, the additions made by the AO were not tenable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after imposing a cost of Rs. 2000/- on the assessee for the negligent approach. The issue was set aside to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, observing that the reason for the delay was a reasonable cause. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had decided the appeals without considering all disputed points, violating Section 260(6) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to produce the actual approval document under Section 153D, making it impossible to determine if it was mechanical. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to call for the assessment records and examine the approval.
The assessee's AR admitted a mistake in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority against the intimation instead of the rectification order passed u/s 154. The AR requested the appeal be dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh appeal.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 320 days in filing the appeal, finding sufficient and reasonable cause for the delay, citing Supreme Court judgments that advocate for a liberal approach to condone delays to ensure substantial justice. The Tribunal also noted that no hearing notice was served to the assessee and directed the CIT(A) to provide the remand report to the assessee for further proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to produce the actual approval document under Section 153D, making it impossible to determine if it was mechanical. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to call for the assessment records and examine the approval.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to produce the actual approval document under Section 153D, making it impossible to determine if it was mechanical. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to call for the assessment records and examine the approval.
The Tribunal noted from the assessee's affidavit that there was no malafide intention for non-appearance before the Ld.CIT(A). In the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to remand the issue back to the Ld.CIT(A), ensuring a proper opportunity of being heard is granted.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 111 days in filing the appeal due to the counsel's ill health and delayed services of a new counsel. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte without considering the merits because the assessee did not respond to notices.
The Tribunal held that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, substantial justice should be preferred. The assessee's reason for the delay was considered bonafide and sufficient, thus the delay was condoned. However, the Tribunal refrained from commenting on the merits of the issue at this stage.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had issued a hearing notice to an incorrect email ID provided by the assessee. Although the AO passed a best judgement assessment due to the assessee's non-response on merits, the Tribunal found it appropriate to remand the issue to the AO for a fresh consideration.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed deduction under Chapter VIA and had additions made for demonetization period cash deposits. While the FAA gave multiple opportunities, there was no response from the assessee. In the interest of justice, the issue is remitted to the CIT(Appeals) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 359 days in filing the appeal before the FAA, considering the circumstances including the pendency of the VSV Scheme, 2024, and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for decision on merits.
The Tribunal found no malafide intention on the part of the assessee for the delay. It was held that the assessee had made out a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the Supreme Court's principles in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., emphasizing substantial justice over technicalities. The matter was then remitted back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the accumulation of income should be allowed as claimed, as the purposes mentioned in Form 10 were within the objects of the Trust Deed. The use of 'OR' did not invalidate the claim for exemption.
The Tribunal found no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and held that there was a reasonable cause for the delay. The delay was condoned based on Supreme Court precedents.
The Tribunal, while deprecating the assessee's nonchalant attitude, decided to provide one more opportunity in the interest of justice and equity. The issues were restored to the file of the First Appellate Authority (FAA).
The Tribunal noted that the assessment order was passed during the COVID period and the Director's death caused a lack of awareness among successors. The Tribunal found the assessee's reason for delay to be deserving of empathetic consideration.
The Tribunal, referring to Supreme Court decisions, stated that income from providing credit facilities to members is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). For interest income from deposits, the AO is directed to verify if the investments were made with cooperative societies. If so, the income may be eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). If considered as income from other sources, Section 57 relief should be granted. The issue is restored to the AO for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee has presented a reasonable cause for the delay, supported by Supreme Court judgments emphasizing a liberal approach to condoning delays to ensure substantial justice. The Tribunal found no contrary intention from the revenue and therefore condoned the delay of 112 days in filing the appeals before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) occurred during the COVID period, and the Supreme Court had extended the limitation period. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee was not given an opportunity to explain the delay and that no notice of hearing was issued by the CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal for AY 2019-20.
The Tribunal noted that the authorities below did not consider relevant CBDT circulars. The Assessing Officer is directed to verify the demonetised cash deposits and the assessee is to provide depositor details. The grounds raised by the assessee are partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that Section 45(5A) of the Income Tax Act, which makes the occupancy certificate date relevant, was applicable from AY 2018-19 and could not be applied retrospectively. Possession was received on 08/05/2017, making AY 2018-19 the correct year for taxation.
The Tribunal held that it is appropriate to remit the issue to the NFAC/CIT(A) to decide on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The delay in filing the return along with Form 9A was within the time limit permitted under Section 139(4) of the Act.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed an adjournment application which was not considered by the Addl/JCIT(A) before passing the ex-parte order. In the interest of justice, it was deemed appropriate to provide the assessee another opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal held that there were good and sufficient reasons for the assessee's failure to pay advance tax at the time of filing the appeal, considering the partner disputes and financial non-cooperation. The payment of admitted taxes was also noted. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) occurred during the COVID period, and the Supreme Court had extended the limitation period. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee was not given an opportunity to explain the delay and that no notice of hearing was issued by the CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal for AY 2019-20.
The Tribunal held that statements recorded under Section 132(4) alone cannot constitute incriminating material for making additions without corroborative evidence. The addition was deleted as it was based solely on WhatsApp messages and a retracted statement, violating principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the capital gains liability arose in AY 2018-19, as possession was received on 08/05/2017, and the occupancy certificate for commercial and residential portions was received in FY 2017-18. It was also held that Section 45(5A) of the Act, which makes the occupancy certificate date relevant, applies from AY 2018-19 and cannot be applied retrospectively. The revenue's appeals regarding the full value of consideration and cost of acquisition were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that Section 45(5A) of the Income Tax Act, which makes the occupancy certificate date relevant, was introduced from AY 2018-19 and could not be applied retrospectively to AY 2017-18. The Tribunal accepted the date of possession as the trigger for capital gains tax.
The Tribunal held that Section 45(5A) of the Income Tax Act, which makes the occupancy certificate date relevant, was introduced from AY 2018-19 and could not be applied retrospectively to AY 2017-18. The date of possession, supported by documentation, was considered the correct trigger for capital gains.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, citing a reasonable cause and bona fide circumstances on the part of the assessee, emphasizing that technicalities should not defeat substantive justice. The Tribunal also noted that this was the second round of litigation and the issue of deduction u/s 80P needed to be reconsidered in light of recent Supreme Court decisions.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding that the assessee had made out a reasonable cause and there was no malafide intention. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. for condoning the delay to do substantial justice.
The Tribunal held that statements recorded under Section 132(4) alone cannot constitute incriminating material for making additions. The addition was deleted as it was based on WhatsApp messages and a retracted statement without corroborative evidence, violating principles of natural justice.