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321 orders · Page 2 of 7
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the circumstances explained by the assessee, including being an agriculturist, illiterate, and having a communication gap with the consultant. On merits, the Tribunal noted that the assessee remained non-compliant during assessment proceedings and failed to furnish substantial evidence regarding the sale of immovable property. To ensure justice, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to strictly comply with the Assessing Officer's notices and furnish all relevant supporting documents, including bank statements, confirmations, and identity proofs of concerned parties. The Assessing Officer was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard before deciding the issue afresh. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, it was fit and proper to restore the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh consideration. This decision was based on the fact that the matter had gone completely unrepresented before the CIT(A). The Tribunal directed the assessee to submit all relevant details and submissions without undue delay or seeking unnecessary adjournments. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee for statistical purposes. No specific issue was left undecided; the primary decision was to remand the matter for a proper hearing.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not produced requisite evidence before the AO due to certain unavoidable circumstances. While the assessee had furnished details before the CIT(A), the application for additional evidence was rejected, and the additions were confirmed. The Tribunal considered that the interests of justice would be served by giving the assessee an opportunity to present their case before the CIT(A). For the negligence in not producing evidence before the AO, the assessee was burdened with a cost of Rs. 5,000/-. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a proper and adequate opportunity to the assessee to furnish requisite details and evidence, and if deemed fit, to call for a remand report from the AO before deciding the case on merits. The appeal was treated as allowed for statistical purposes. The specific findings on each ground of appeal were not made as the matter was remanded.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were without jurisdiction and thus not sustainable. The reasoning was that Section 153C of the Act mandates that if seized material during a search pertains to a person other than the searched person, it should be forwarded to that person's AO. The AO of the other person must then record satisfaction that the seized material impacts the determination of total income and can proceed under Section 153C. The Tribunal noted that Sections 153A and 153C contain non-obstante clauses that give them an overriding effect over general provisions like Section 147. This view is supported by decisions of the Gujarat High Court in 'Paras Chandreshbhai Koticha vs. ITO' and the Rajasthan High Court in 'Tirupati Construction vs. ITO' and 'Shyam Sunder Khandelwal vs. ACIT'. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed. No adjudication was made on the factual matrix as it became academic.
The Tribunal held that both the assessee and the CIT(E) failed to discharge their respective responsibilities under Section 12AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee's applications were not accompanied by relevant supporting documents, and the CIT(E) rejected the applications without granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal acknowledged that in some cases, the tax authority did not have sufficient time to await compliance due to the time-bound nature of the disposal of applications. This resulted in unintended consequences for charitable organizations. To serve the interest of justice and protect the rights of both parties, the Tribunal set aside the impugned rejection orders. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, with directions for a fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to provide correct contact details, furnish all supporting documents, and respond to queries without unnecessary adjournments. The CIT(E) was directed to adjudicate the applications afresh after granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard and considering the submitted documents. It was clarified that if the assessee fails to comply, the CIT(E) can adjudicate based on the available material. For Section 80G applications, the assessee must provide the status of Section 12AB registration.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were without jurisdiction and thus not sustainable. The reasoning was that Section 153C of the Act mandates that if seized material during a search pertains to a person other than the searched person, it should be forwarded to that person's AO. The AO of the other person must then record satisfaction that the seized material impacts the determination of total income and can proceed under Section 153C. The Tribunal noted that Sections 153A and 153C contain non-obstante clauses that give them an overriding effect over general provisions like Section 147. This view is supported by decisions of the Gujarat High Court in 'Paras Chandreshbhai Koticha vs. ITO' and the Rajasthan High Court in 'Tirupati Construction vs. ITO' and 'Shyam Sunder Khandelwal vs. ACIT'. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed. No adjudication was made on the factual matrix as it became academic.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the PCIT. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer and Additional CIT had clearly held that interest on loans was camouflaged as donations. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not carried out any activities genuinely or in accordance with the conditions of registration, and had failed to prove its involvement in animal welfare activities, animal aid and rescue, or distribution of food and clothing to the economically weaker sections. The Tribunal concluded that the case fell within the ambit of a specified violation under clause (e) of the Explanation to Section 12AB(4) of the Act, based on the details of the 'specified violation'. Therefore, the Tribunal declined to interfere with the PCIT's order and dismissed the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that both the assessee and the CIT(E) failed to discharge their respective responsibilities under Section 12AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee's applications were not accompanied by relevant supporting documents, and the CIT(E) rejected the applications without granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal acknowledged that in some cases, the tax authority did not have sufficient time to await compliance due to the time-bound nature of the disposal of applications. This resulted in unintended consequences for charitable organizations. To serve the interest of justice and protect the rights of both parties, the Tribunal set aside the impugned rejection orders. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, with directions for a fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to provide correct contact details, furnish all supporting documents, and respond to queries without unnecessary adjournments. The CIT(E) was directed to adjudicate the applications afresh after granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard and considering the submitted documents. It was clarified that if the assessee fails to comply, the CIT(E) can adjudicate based on the available material. For Section 80G applications, the assessee must provide the status of Section 12AB registration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and proceeded to adjudicate the issue on merits. The Tribunal noted that the issue was covered by the decision of a co-ordinate bench in ITA No. 289/Ahd/2025 in the case of Goverdhan D Bhambhani Vs. ITO, and also referred to a CBDT Notification regarding Section 10(10AA) which was deemed to have come into force from April 1, 2023, stating no person is adversely affected. The Tribunal further relied on its own consolidated order dated 09.07.2026 in ITA No. 1273/Ahd/2026 in the case of Pravinkumar Ramibhai Patel Vs. ITO. The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Act for the entire amount of retrenchment compensation (named as VRS compensation) and leave encashment, if any. The Assessing Officer was directed to grant the consequential relief. The Tribunal found no change in the factual matrix or legal position from the cited precedents. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were without jurisdiction and thus not sustainable. The reasoning was that Section 153C of the Act mandates that if seized material during a search pertains to a person other than the searched person, it should be forwarded to that person's AO. The AO of the other person must then record satisfaction that the seized material impacts the determination of total income and can proceed under Section 153C. The Tribunal noted that Sections 153A and 153C contain non-obstante clauses that give them an overriding effect over general provisions like Section 147. This view is supported by decisions of the Gujarat High Court in 'Paras Chandreshbhai Koticha vs. ITO' and the Rajasthan High Court in 'Tirupati Construction vs. ITO' and 'Shyam Sunder Khandelwal vs. ACIT'. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed. No adjudication was made on the factual matrix as it became academic.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and proceeded to adjudicate the issue on merits. The Tribunal noted that the issue was covered by the decision of a co-ordinate bench in ITA No. 289/Ahd/2025 in the case of Goverdhan D Bhambhani Vs. ITO, and also referred to a CBDT Notification regarding Section 10(10AA) which was deemed to have come into force from April 1, 2023, stating no person is adversely affected. The Tribunal further relied on its own consolidated order dated 09.07.2026 in ITA No. 1273/Ahd/2026 in the case of Pravinkumar Ramibhai Patel Vs. ITO. The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Act for the entire amount of retrenchment compensation (named as VRS compensation) and leave encashment, if any. The Assessing Officer was directed to grant the consequential relief. The Tribunal found no change in the factual matrix or legal position from the cited precedents. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessment years, adopting a liberal approach as per the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC). A cost of Rs. 10,000/- for each AY was imposed on the assessee, payable to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund, due to negligence in proper representation before lower authorities. The Tribunal noted that both assessment and first appellate proceedings were completed ex-parte. For AY 2012-13, the Tribunal found substance in the assessee's contention regarding the reopening under section 147, stating it required examination in accordance with law, especially concerning the validity of the notice and disclosure of material facts. For AY 2017-18, the Tribunal observed that the additions were factual and required verification of supporting documents. In the interest of substantial justice, and to provide an effective opportunity to the assessee to substantiate her claims, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Assessing Officer was directed to examine all documentary evidence and explanations to be furnished by the assessee and pass a speaking order after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Grounds 1 to 3 for AY 2012-13 were allowed for statistical purposes. For AY 2017-18, the disallowance of agricultural income was remanded for similar verification as in the other appeal, and the other additions (unexplained investment u/s 69A, unsecured loan u/s 68, and disallowance of expenses) were also remanded for factual verification. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed Grounds 3 and 4, deleting the addition of INR 30,00,000/- made by the AO under Section 69 of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the property was purchased for INR 30,00,000/- by cheque, and while the HUF did not have a separate bank account at the time, the funds were provided by the Karta, Shri Girish C. Amin, from his personal bank account. The Tribunal found that a Karta is not prohibited from advancing funds to the HUF and that the Karta's bank statement showed sufficient funds. The Tribunal also noted that identical facts and documents were placed before the AO. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the source of funds was explained and Section 69 was not applicable. As the addition was deleted on merits, Grounds 1 and 2 challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings were dismissed as infructuous. The operative direction was the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 29.07.2022, was invalid as it was issued beyond the surviving period. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. The original notice under Section 148, issued on 30.06.2021, was treated as a notice under Section 148A(b). Following the directions in Ashish Agarwal, the period for issuing the reassessment notice under Section 148 of the new regime was to be calculated based on the time surviving under the Income Tax Act read with the Taxation and Other Laws Ordinance, 2020 (TOLA), and extended by the period granted for compliance under Section 148A. In this case, the surviving period for issuing the notice under Section 148 was up to 06.07.2022. Since the notice was issued on 29.07.2022, it was beyond the limitation period. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 148 were quashed as time-barred, and the impugned assessment order was also quashed and set aside. The Tribunal did not decide on the addition on account of alleged cash deposit under Section 69A.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that various Benches of the ITAT have consistently held that the failure to make a claim in the original return was due to a lack of awareness of the legal provision. The Tribunal found that the precedents cited by the CIT(A), namely Chandra Ranganathan vs. CIT and CIT vs. Koodathil Kallyatan Ambujakshan, were not applicable as they dealt with Section 10(10C) and did not have occasion to deal with Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of Co-ordinate Benches, including its own Ahmedabad Bench decisions, which allowed exemption under Section 10(10B) for compensation received under the same BSNL VRS-2019 scheme, even when the claim was not made in the original return. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee's claim for exemption of the entire amount received as compensation under the BSNL VRS-2019 for AYs 2020-21 and 2021-22. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The ITAT, while acknowledging the assessee's non-compliance during assessment proceedings, decided to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) in the interest of justice. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals on grounds of delay without adjudicating the issues on merits. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the quantum assessment order for AY 2012-13 and restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment. The assessee was directed to furnish all relevant documents and explanations. For the penalty appeal related to AY 2012-13, since the quantum appeal was set aside, the penalty appeal was also set aside to the AO. Regarding the penalty appeal for AY 2010-11, the Tribunal noted that the corresponding quantum appeal was pending before the CIT(A) and therefore, treated the penalty appeal as premature, allowing the assessee to approach the Tribunal for revival after the disposal of the quantum appeal. All appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal for non-compliance with notices without adjudicating the substantive issue on merits. The Tribunal referred to Section 250(6) of the Act, which mandates that an appellate order must state the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision. It also cited the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT vs. Premkumar Arjun Das Luthra (HUF) (2016), which held that a CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of an appeal in accordance with Sections 250 and 251 and cannot simply dismiss it for want of prosecution. The Tribunal found that while the CIT(A) was entitled to proceed ex-parte due to non-compliance, this should still involve a decision on merits. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the proceedings without fail, failing which the CIT(A) could decide ex-parte on merits, complying with Section 250(6). The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the AO treated the entire difference in sundry creditors as bogus for want of evidence, despite not doubting purchases, sales, or trading results, and not rejecting the books. The Tribunal reasoned that if purchases are accepted, corresponding trade creditors cannot be treated as unexplained tax credits under section 68. The Tribunal also noted that the disallowance of Rs. 3,36,025/- was made based on a Form 3CD report without verifying all facts, and that other issues were not deliberated upon by the AO or CIT(A). In the interest of justice, the case was set aside to the AO for fresh examination of all materials, with a due opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to comply with notices promptly, failing which the AO could pass orders based on available material. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had incorrectly relied on Supreme Court and Bombay High Court judgments (Chandra Ranganathan vs. CIT and CIT vs. Koodathil Kallyatan Ambujakshan) which dealt with Section 10(10C) and the eligibility of compensation under an Optional Early Retirement Scheme (OERS) based on Rule 2BA, and did not have occasion to deal with Section 10(10B). The Tribunal found that various Benches of the ITAT, including Co-ordinate Benches of the Ahmedabad Bench, have consistently held that the failure to make the claim in the original return was due to a lack of awareness of the legal provision. Therefore, respectfully following these decisions, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee's claim for exemption of the entire amount received as compensation under the BSNL VRS-2019 for AYs 2020-21 and 2021-22. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that a reasonable opportunity of being heard was not granted, noting that only a single notice was issued before the rejection. The Tribunal also addressed the CIT(E)'s refusal to condone the delay, referencing the Ahmedabad Bench decision in Shree Maruti Seva Foundation Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax(Exemption), ITA No.2345/AHD/2025, which condoned delay in filing Form 10B and directed the CIT(E) to adjudicate the application. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application to the file of the CIT(E). The CIT(E) is directed to adjudicate the application afresh after granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and considering all relevant documents and submissions. The assessee is directed to cooperate and submit necessary documents promptly. Ground No. 1 was allowed, and Ground No. 2 was dismissed as infructuous without a finding on merits.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that various Benches of the ITAT have consistently held that the failure to make a claim in the original return was due to a lack of awareness of the legal provision. The Tribunal found that the precedents cited by the CIT(A), namely Chandra Ranganathan vs. CIT and CIT vs. Koodathil Kallyatan Ambujakshan, were not applicable as they dealt with Section 10(10C) and did not have occasion to deal with Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of Co-ordinate Benches, including its own Ahmedabad Bench decisions, which allowed exemption under Section 10(10B) for compensation received under the same BSNL VRS-2019 scheme, even when the claim was not made in the original return. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee's claim for exemption of the entire amount received as compensation under the BSNL VRS-2019 for AYs 2020-21 and 2021-22. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for renewal of registration under Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was based on only one notice of hearing. The Tribunal was of the view that, in the interest of justice, the assessee should be given a fair opportunity to present its case before the CIT(E). Therefore, the impugned order of the CIT(E) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on the application. The CIT(E) was directed to provide a proper and adequate opportunity to the assessee to present its case and thereafter decide the application on merits in accordance with the law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the technical ground of limitation without condoning the delay. The Tribunal found that the affidavit submitted by the trustee provided a reasonable explanation for the significant delay, attributing it to bonafide ignorance, lack of technical understanding, and a mistaken belief regarding the enforceability of tax demands against a registered charitable trust. The Tribunal emphasized that when technical lapses due to lack of knowledge are pitted against substantial justice, the latter must prevail. Citing *Mst. Katiji* and *N. Balakrishnan*, the Tribunal ruled that there was sufficient and bonafide cause for the delay. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, the delay was condoned subject to the deposit of INR 10,000/- in the Prime Minister National Relief Fund within 21 days, and the appeals were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. Ground No. 1 was allowed, while other grounds were dismissed without findings on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of delay without examining the issues on merits. Considering the facts and circumstances and in the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with the law after affording adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was directed to furnish all relevant documentary evidence and explanations and not seek unnecessary adjournments. The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes. The specific findings on the merits of grounds 2 to 6 were not made as the matter was remanded.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The Tribunal noted that the assessment was reopened based on information regarding an alleged accommodation entry of Rs. 54,54,942/- from Shri Shripal Vora. However, no addition was made on this specific ground. Instead, the AO made an addition of Rs. 1,18,90,480/- under Section 68 for unexplained credits in the assessee's bank account. The Tribunal, respectfully following the decisions of the Hon'ble jurisdictional Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Mohmed Juned Dadani and the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT v. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., held that where no addition is made on the ground on which the assessment was reopened, the AO cannot make an addition on a different ground. Therefore, the impugned addition could not have been made in the reassessment proceedings. The addition of Rs. 1,18,90,480/- was deleted by the CIT(A) and this deletion was upheld. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The ITAT, while acknowledging the assessee's non-compliance during assessment proceedings, decided to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) in the interest of justice. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals on grounds of delay without adjudicating the issues on merits. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the quantum assessment order for AY 2012-13 and restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment. The assessee was directed to furnish all relevant documents and explanations. For the penalty appeal related to AY 2012-13, since the quantum appeal was set aside, the penalty appeal was also set aside to the AO. Regarding the penalty appeal for AY 2010-11, the Tribunal noted that the corresponding quantum appeal was pending before the CIT(A) and therefore, treated the penalty appeal as premature, allowing the assessee to approach the Tribunal for revival after the disposal of the quantum appeal. All appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had incorrectly relied on Supreme Court and Bombay High Court judgments (Chandra Ranganathan vs. CIT and CIT vs. Koodathil Kallyatan Ambujakshan) which dealt with Section 10(10C) and the eligibility of compensation under an Optional Early Retirement Scheme (OERS) based on Rule 2BA, and did not have occasion to deal with Section 10(10B). The Tribunal found that various Benches of the ITAT, including Co-ordinate Benches of the Ahmedabad Bench, have consistently held that the failure to make the claim in the original return was due to a lack of awareness of the legal provision. Therefore, respectfully following these decisions, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee's claim for exemption of the entire amount received as compensation under the BSNL VRS-2019 for AYs 2020-21 and 2021-22. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the very basis of the impugned assessment proceedings, the order passed by the Ld. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax under Section 263 of the Act dated 30.03.2021, had been challenged by the assessee in ITA No.105/Ahd/2021. This earlier appeal was disposed of by the Tribunal on 09.10.2024. In that order, the Tribunal observed that the proceedings under Section 263 were initiated and completed within a short period of 12 days and that the Ld. PCIT had not adequately demonstrated the alleged lack of enquiry by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Ld. PCIT for fresh adjudication after providing due opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the original order passed by the Ld. PCIT under Section 263, which formed the basis for the consequential assessment order, no longer constituted a valid foundation for the present assessment proceedings. The Tribunal concluded that the assessment order passed under Section 144 r.w.s. 263 r.w.s. 144B of the Act and the consequential penalty proceedings arising therefrom could not survive for independent adjudication. Accordingly, the appeals were rendered infructuous, and no adjudication on the grounds raised by the assessee was called for. The operative direction was to dismiss both appeals.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessment years, adopting a liberal approach as per the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC). A cost of Rs. 10,000/- for each AY was imposed on the assessee, payable to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund, due to negligence in proper representation before lower authorities. The Tribunal noted that both assessment and first appellate proceedings were completed ex-parte. For AY 2012-13, the Tribunal found substance in the assessee's contention regarding the reopening under section 147, stating it required examination in accordance with law, especially concerning the validity of the notice and disclosure of material facts. For AY 2017-18, the Tribunal observed that the additions were factual and required verification of supporting documents. In the interest of substantial justice, and to provide an effective opportunity to the assessee to substantiate her claims, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Assessing Officer was directed to examine all documentary evidence and explanations to be furnished by the assessee and pass a speaking order after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Grounds 1 to 3 for AY 2012-13 were allowed for statistical purposes. For AY 2017-18, the disallowance of agricultural income was remanded for similar verification as in the other appeal, and the other additions (unexplained investment u/s 69A, unsecured loan u/s 68, and disallowance of expenses) were also remanded for factual verification. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 66 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was to be condoned. The Tribunal noted that the statutory notices were sent to an official email address that had been deactivated after the assessee's retirement, and the assessee was residing outside India. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, the Tribunal emphasized the liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' under Section 249(3) of the Act to advance substantial justice. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s reliance on Lava International Ltd. v. CBDT misplaced as that case dealt with Section 119, not Section 249(3). Therefore, the Tribunal overturned the CIT(A)'s decision and condoned the delay. Regarding the ex-parte assessment, the Tribunal noted that it was framed without considering departmental/employer records like Form 16 and Form 26AS. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned additions and restored the entire assessment to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to file all relevant submissions and update contact details, and the Assessing Officer was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Grounds 1 and 2 were allowed, and Grounds 3 to 6 were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the core issue was whether the agricultural land sold by the assessee was a capital asset. The assessee argued that the distance from municipal limits should be calculated as of January 6, 1994, as per Notification No. 9447, and that the village population was below 10,000. The Assessing Officer (AO) and CIT(A) relied on later-dated information for distance calculation, including Google Maps and reports from PMRDA and Public Works Sub Division, Khed, which showed distances less than 8 km. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had not considered the assessee's reliance on the January 6, 1994 notification and that there were no specific findings on it. In the interest of natural justice and to allow the assessee to substantiate their claim, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the issue back to the AO. The AO is directed to examine and verify the assessee's claim, calculate the distance as per the said notification, and adjudicate afresh after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity of hearing. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The ITAT, while acknowledging the assessee's non-compliance during assessment proceedings, decided to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) in the interest of justice. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals on grounds of delay without adjudicating the issues on merits. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the quantum assessment order for AY 2012-13 and restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment. The assessee was directed to furnish all relevant documents and explanations. For the penalty appeal related to AY 2012-13, since the quantum appeal was set aside, the penalty appeal was also set aside to the AO. Regarding the penalty appeal for AY 2010-11, the Tribunal noted that the corresponding quantum appeal was pending before the CIT(A) and therefore, treated the penalty appeal as premature, allowing the assessee to approach the Tribunal for revival after the disposal of the quantum appeal. All appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal considered the prayer made by the assessee's counsel and, in the larger interest of justice, with no strong objection from the Departmental Representative, decided to restore the issues raised in the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication under Section 250(6) of the Act. The CIT(A) was directed to allow a reasonable opportunity to the assessee in the set-aside proceedings. The assessee was also directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant. The impugned order passed by the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was made on the merits of the addition of Rs. 7.00 lakh.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the technical ground of limitation without condoning the delay. The Tribunal found that the affidavit submitted by the trustee provided a reasonable explanation for the significant delay, attributing it to bonafide ignorance, lack of technical understanding, and a mistaken belief regarding the enforceability of tax demands against a registered charitable trust. The Tribunal emphasized that when technical lapses due to lack of knowledge are pitted against substantial justice, the latter must prevail. Citing *Mst. Katiji* and *N. Balakrishnan*, the Tribunal ruled that there was sufficient and bonafide cause for the delay. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, the delay was condoned subject to the deposit of INR 10,000/- in the Prime Minister National Relief Fund within 21 days, and the appeals were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. Ground No. 1 was allowed, while other grounds were dismissed without findings on merits.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) had made a factual mistake in rejecting the assessee's application for registration under Section 80G(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The sole ground for rejection was the alleged lack of valid registration under Section 12AB of the Act. However, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(E) himself had granted registration under Section 12AB read with Section 12A of the Act to the assessee vide his order dated 25.03.2026. This clearly indicated that the assessee possessed the required valid registration under Section 12AB. The Tribunal also observed that the Ld. CIT(E) had not pointed out any infirmity in the documents submitted by the assessee, such as the Trust Deed, earlier registration, and Balance Sheets for the last three years, which were part of Form No. 10AB. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee was eligible for registration under Section 80G(5) and directed the Ld. CIT(E) to grant the registration. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the provisions for charging late fee under Section 234E are applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal noted that the amendments to Section 200A, which allow for the computation and intimation of fees under Section 234E, were brought into effect from June 1, 2015, and should be read as having prospective effect. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, the Tribunal found that the demand for late fees under Section 200A for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E for the assessment years in question, as the financial years involved were prior to June 1, 2015. The appeals were allowed in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals within the prescribed statutory period due to the prolonged illness and surgery of their chartered accountant, supported by medical reports. Consequently, the ITAT overturned the CIT(A)'s orders, condoned the delays of 466 days for AY 2020-2021 and 143 days for AY 2021-2022, and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate the substantive issues on merits. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals solely on limitation without deciding the merits. For AY 2020-2021, Ground No. 1/1.0 (regarding condonation of delay) was allowed, while grounds dealing with merits (2 to 3) were disposed of as allowed for statistical purposes without findings. For AY 2021-2022, the same directions were applied. The ratio is that significant medical incapacitation of a key professional handling tax matters can constitute sufficient cause for delay in filing appeals, warranting condonation.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the technical ground of limitation without condoning the delay. The Tribunal found that the affidavit submitted by the trustee provided a reasonable explanation for the significant delay, attributing it to bonafide ignorance, lack of technical understanding, and a mistaken belief regarding the enforceability of tax demands against a registered charitable trust. The Tribunal emphasized that when technical lapses due to lack of knowledge are pitted against substantial justice, the latter must prevail. Citing *Mst. Katiji* and *N. Balakrishnan*, the Tribunal ruled that there was sufficient and bonafide cause for the delay. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, the delay was condoned subject to the deposit of INR 10,000/- in the Prime Minister National Relief Fund within 21 days, and the appeals were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. Ground No. 1 was allowed, while other grounds were dismissed without findings on merits.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that sufficient time was not granted to make a proper representation before the CIT(E). The second notice was issued on 16/09/2025, requiring a reply by 19/09/2025, and the assessee's request for adjournment on 19/09/2025 was not allowed. The CIT(E) proceeded to pass the order on 24/09/2025, citing the limitation period expiring on 30/09/2025. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order dated 24/09/2025 passed by the CIT(E). The CIT(E) is directed to adjudicate the application afresh after considering all relevant documents and submissions and granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee is directed to submit relevant documents and cooperate with the proceedings. Ground No. 1 is allowed for statistical purposes without findings on merits. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the provisions for charging late fee under Section 234E are applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal noted that the amendments to Section 200A, which allow for the computation and intimation of fees under Section 234E, were brought into effect from June 1, 2015, and should be read as having prospective effect. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, the Tribunal found that the demand for late fees under Section 200A for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E for the assessment years in question, as the financial years involved were prior to June 1, 2015. The appeals were allowed in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the very basis of the impugned assessment proceedings, the order passed by the Ld. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax under Section 263 of the Act dated 30.03.2021, had been challenged by the assessee in ITA No.105/Ahd/2021. This earlier appeal was disposed of by the Tribunal on 09.10.2024. In that order, the Tribunal observed that the proceedings under Section 263 were initiated and completed within a short period of 12 days and that the Ld. PCIT had not adequately demonstrated the alleged lack of enquiry by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Ld. PCIT for fresh adjudication after providing due opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the original order passed by the Ld. PCIT under Section 263, which formed the basis for the consequential assessment order, no longer constituted a valid foundation for the present assessment proceedings. The Tribunal concluded that the assessment order passed under Section 144 r.w.s. 263 r.w.s. 144B of the Act and the consequential penalty proceedings arising therefrom could not survive for independent adjudication. Accordingly, the appeals were rendered infructuous, and no adjudication on the grounds raised by the assessee was called for. The operative direction was to dismiss both appeals.
The Tribunal held that the provisions for charging late fee under Section 234E are applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal noted that the amendments to Section 200A, which allow for the computation and intimation of fees under Section 234E, were brought into effect from June 1, 2015, and should be read as having prospective effect. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, the Tribunal found that the demand for late fees under Section 200A for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E for the assessment years in question, as the financial years involved were prior to June 1, 2015. The appeals were allowed in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeals within the prescribed statutory period due to the prolonged illness and surgery of their chartered accountant, supported by medical reports. Consequently, the ITAT overturned the CIT(A)'s orders, condoned the delays of 466 days for AY 2020-2021 and 143 days for AY 2021-2022, and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate the substantive issues on merits. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals solely on limitation without deciding the merits. For AY 2020-2021, Ground No. 1/1.0 (regarding condonation of delay) was allowed, while grounds dealing with merits (2 to 3) were disposed of as allowed for statistical purposes without findings. For AY 2021-2022, the same directions were applied. The ratio is that significant medical incapacitation of a key professional handling tax matters can constitute sufficient cause for delay in filing appeals, warranting condonation.
The Tribunal held that the provisions for charging late fee under Section 234E are applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal noted that the amendments to Section 200A, which allow for the computation and intimation of fees under Section 234E, were brought into effect from June 1, 2015, and should be read as having prospective effect. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, the Tribunal found that the demand for late fees under Section 200A for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E for the assessment years in question, as the financial years involved were prior to June 1, 2015. The appeals were allowed in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 649 days in filing the appeals, citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, emphasizing that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations and that there is no presumption of deliberate delay. On merits, the Tribunal noted that no representation was made before the CIT(A) after the appeals were filed. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to grant the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to adjudicate the grounds raised afresh. The assessee was directed to update its contact details. Ground No. 1 (regarding validity of reopening) was allowed for statistical purposes without findings on merits. Grounds 2 and 3 (regarding objections to reopening and additions under Section 68) were dismissed as infructuous due to the remand. The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that for levying penalty under Section 270A for under-reporting of income in consequence of misreporting, the Assessing Officer is required to establish that misreporting has occurred and that such misreporting falls within the specific cases enumerated in Section 270A(9)(a) to 270A(9)(g). The Tribunal concluded that the Assessing Officer must specify the particular limb of Section 270A(9) under which the assessee is held to have misreported its income. This specification should be evident from the penalty order itself or unambiguously discernible from its reading. In the present case, the Assessing Officer levied penalty under Section 270A(9) without specifying the sub-limb, rendering the levy unsustainable. The Tribunal also noted that a Co-ordinate Bench had deleted penalty in similar circumstances in the case of Hiro Mulchand Tanwani Vs. ITO and Nisha Yogeshkumar Darji Vs. Income Tax Officer. Consequently, the penalty of INR 4,99,200 was deleted. All grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution and non-compliance without deciding the substantive issues on merit. The Tribunal noted that while the assessee failed to appear on several occasions, this does not relieve the CIT(A) of the duty to decide the appeal on merits. Citing Section 250(6) and the Bombay High Court judgment in CIT vs. Premkumar Arjun Das Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal stated that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of the appeal in accordance with Sections 250 and 251 and cannot simply dismiss it for want of prosecution. The Tribunal found that although the CIT(A) mentioned the appeal was decided on merits, there was no discussion on the issues and grounds of appeal. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to promptly comply with all notices, and in case of further default, the CIT(A) was at liberty to pass an order based on available material. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issues raised by the assessee regarding the addition under Section 69 and the applicability of Section 115BBE.
The Tribunal held that the application for approval under Section 80G of the Act was dismissed by the Learned CIT(E) without granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It was noted that only a single notice was issued on 25/02/2026 before the rejection order was passed. Finding merit in the assessee's contention regarding lack of adequate opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order. The application was restored to the file of the Learned CIT(E) with directions to adjudicate it afresh after considering relevant documents and submissions and granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was directed to submit necessary documents and cooperate. Ground No. 2 was allowed, and Ground No. 1 was allowed for statistical purposes without findings on merits. The operative direction is to restore the application to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the primary contention of the assessee was the incorrect translation of the trust deed by the CIT(E). Considering this, and the assessee's submission of an English translation and request for another opportunity, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to set aside the impugned order. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(E) for adjudication of the application. The CIT(E) was directed to consider the relevant documents, including the English translation of the trust deed, and any submissions filed by the assessee. The assessee was directed to file the necessary documents and cooperate in the proceedings, and was assured a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Grounds 1 to 4 were dismissed as infructuous without findings on merits, while Ground 5 was allowed.