ITAT Agra Judgments — October 2026

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the CIT(A)'s order was passed without considering the written submissions and list of documents filed in compliance with the notice under Section 250. The Tribunal noted that the E-Acknowledgement of these documents, placed on record, supported the assessee's claim. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the order of the CIT(A) could not be sustained. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, and the matter was set aside and restored back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to consider the submissions and documents filed by the assessee and to allow a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was also granted liberty to file further details or evidence. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the addition itself, as the primary issue was the procedural lapse by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not provided adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee during the first appellate proceedings, which is a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had sought revised computation of income and financial documents from the assessee, overlooking the fact that the assessee had filed a return based on presumptive income under Sections 44AD/44ADA. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to be diligent and cooperative in attending hearings and making submissions. The CIT(A) was directed to ensure observance of the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) rejected the assessee's applications solely on the ground of delay without adjudicating on the merits. The Tribunal took note of CBDT Circular No. 1/2026 dated 23.03.2026, which clarifies that the proviso to Section 12A(1)(ac) grants power to the PCIT to condone delays and that eligible trusts should not be denied registration solely due to delay. The Tribunal considered the assessee's explanation for the delay as reasonable. Consequently, the Tribunal deemed it just and proper to condone the delay of 65 days for the Section 12A application and 69 days for the Section 80G application. The matters were remitted back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) to decide the applications afresh on their merits after affording the assessee sufficient opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal clarified that its order proceeded solely on the question of limitation and reasonable cause, without making any finding on the genuineness of the applicant's activities or its entitlement to registration on merits.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) rejected the assessee's applications solely on the ground of delay without adjudicating on the merits. The Tribunal took note of CBDT Circular No. 1/2026 dated 23.03.2026, which clarifies that the proviso to Section 12A(1)(ac) grants power to the PCIT to condone delays and that eligible trusts should not be denied registration solely due to delay. The Tribunal considered the assessee's explanation for the delay as reasonable. Consequently, the Tribunal deemed it just and proper to condone the delay of 65 days for the Section 12A application and 69 days for the Section 80G application. The matters were remitted back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) to decide the applications afresh on their merits after affording the assessee sufficient opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal clarified that its order proceeded solely on the question of limitation and reasonable cause, without making any finding on the genuineness of the applicant's activities or its entitlement to registration on merits.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee had been provided with several opportunities for hearing during the first appellate proceedings but failed to respond. Consequently, the CIT(A) was compelled to pass an ex-parte order. While the Tribunal did not appreciate the assessee's non-cooperative conduct, it deemed it just and appropriate, in the interest of justice, to restore the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative in attending hearings and making submissions before the CIT(A) for expeditious disposal. The CIT(A) was also directed to ensure observance of the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed a belated return and claimed a short-term capital loss, which was disallowed for carry forward by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A) based on Section 80 read with Section 139(3). The Tribunal, respectfully following the order of the Chandigarh Tribunal in a similar case concerning business loss carry forward under Section 35D, reversed the order of the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that the AO/CPC should not deny the carry forward of the current year's loss simply because the return was filed belatedly. The determination of the loss is one aspect, and its carry forward is another. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the carry forward of the short-term capital loss of Rs. 1,45,00,000/-. However, the Tribunal clarified that this decision does not reflect on the merit of invoking Section 74 of the Act, and the application of Section 74 would be open for consideration by the AO in the subsequent year when the assessee claims set off of this capital loss. The other grounds of appeal were left undecided as they became academic.

The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(E) erred in rejecting the assessee's application for renewal of registration solely on the ground of delay. The Tribunal took note of CBDT Circular No. 1/2026 dated 23.03.2026, which clarifies that the Principal Commissioner has the power to condone delays and that eligible trusts should not be denied registration benefits solely due to delay. Consequently, the Tribunal deemed it just and proper to condone the delay of 369 days. The matter was remitted back to the file of the CIT(E) to decide the application afresh on merits, after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The appeal concerning Section 80G(5) registration was also remitted as it was consequential to the Section 12AB registration. The issue regarding the rejection of the application on grounds of delay was decided in favour of the assessee.

The Tribunal acknowledged that this was the second round of litigation and that the assessee had failed to appear before the CIT(A) despite opportunities, compelling the CIT(A) to pass an ex-parte order. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's conduct was not commendable. However, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with two more opportunities to appear before the CIT(A) and cooperate in the first appellate proceedings. The matter was restored back to the CIT(A), who was directed to provide these two opportunities and pass an order afresh in accordance with the law after hearing the assessee. The appeal was thus allowed for statistical purposes. No finding was given on the merits of the addition of Rs. 50,30,000/-.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee's non-cooperative conduct was not appreciated, in the interest of justice, it was deemed appropriate to restore the matter back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative in attending hearings and making submissions before the CIT(A) for expeditious and effective disposal. The CIT(A) was also directed to ensure the observance of the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific finding on the merits of the addition of Rs. 49,21,444/- was not decided, as the matter was remanded.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee's non-cooperative conduct was not appreciated, in the interest of justice, it was deemed appropriate to restore the matter back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative in attending hearings and making submissions before the CIT(A) for expeditious and effective disposal. The CIT(A) was also directed to ensure the observance of the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific finding on the merits of the addition of Rs. 49,21,444/- was not decided, as the matter was remanded.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee's non-cooperative conduct was not appreciated, in the interest of justice, it was deemed appropriate to restore the matter back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative in attending hearings and making submissions before the CIT(A) for expeditious and effective disposal. The CIT(A) was also directed to ensure the observance of the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific finding on the merits of the addition of Rs. 49,21,444/- was not decided, as the matter was remanded.

The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(E) erred in rejecting the assessee's application for renewal of registration solely on the ground of delay. The Tribunal took note of CBDT Circular No. 1/2026 dated 23.03.2026, which clarifies that the Principal Commissioner has the power to condone delays and that eligible trusts should not be denied registration benefits solely due to delay. Consequently, the Tribunal deemed it just and proper to condone the delay of 369 days. The matter was remitted back to the file of the CIT(E) to decide the application afresh on merits, after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The appeal concerning Section 80G(5) registration was also remitted as it was consequential to the Section 12AB registration. The issue regarding the rejection of the application on grounds of delay was decided in favour of the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was compelled to pass an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-response to notices. However, noting that the original assessment order was also passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice, deemed it appropriate to restore the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh assessment in accordance with the law. The Tribunal stated that the appeal was liable to be allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original assessment or the CIT(A)'s order, as the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication. The operative direction was to restore the case to the AO.

The ITAT held that the delay of approximately 950 days in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) should be condoned. The Tribunal reasoned that the object of procedural law, including limitation periods, is to advance the cause of justice, and substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the ITAT emphasized that procedural law should not be an obstruction but an aid to justice, and courts should be able to meet extraordinary situations for the ends of justice. Therefore, the Tribunal found it just and proper to condone the delay. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, with a direction to ensure substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of approximately 132 days in filing the appeal. The reasoning was based on the uncontroverted affidavit filed by the assessee, which provided sufficient cause for the delay. The Secretary of the trust, Mr. Shabd Sukh Baijal, was suffering from acute blindness and underwent surgery during the relevant period. Upon partial recovery, he became aware of the impugned order and filed the appeal belatedly. The Tribunal found the cause shown to be sufficient and admitted the appeal for hearing. The judgment does not address the substantive grounds of appeal concerning the conditional registration granted by the CIT(E) as the provided text is incomplete.

The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition of Rs. 12,20,000/- (for AY 2020-21) and Rs. 10,45,000/- (for AY 2021-22) as unaccounted cash. The reassessment proceedings were initiated based on information from a search on the Bansal Group, which allegedly found documents indicating cash received by the assessee. However, the assessment order did not specify the nature of these incriminating documents or loose papers. Crucially, there was no record to suggest that copies of these documents were ever furnished to the assessee. The Tribunal found that the AO made the addition merely on guesswork, reasoning that since the assessee had business dealings with Bansal Construction Works Pvt. Ltd., the cash payment could not be ruled out. The Tribunal concluded that the foundation of the detection was not disclosed, and there was no prima facie documentary or oral evidence to sustain the impugned additions. Therefore, the additions were deleted, and the impugned orders confirming them were deemed unsustainable. The principle established is that additions based on undisclosed incriminating material, without providing the same to the assessee, are not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition of Rs. 12,20,000/- (for AY 2020-21) and Rs. 10,45,000/- (for AY 2021-22) as unaccounted cash. The reassessment proceedings were initiated based on information from a search on the Bansal Group, which allegedly found documents indicating cash received by the assessee. However, the assessment order did not specify the nature of these incriminating documents or loose papers. Crucially, there was no record to suggest that copies of these documents were ever furnished to the assessee. The Tribunal found that the AO made the addition merely on guesswork, reasoning that since the assessee had business dealings with Bansal Construction Works Pvt. Ltd., the cash payment could not be ruled out. The Tribunal concluded that the foundation of the detection was not disclosed, and there was no prima facie documentary or oral evidence to sustain the impugned additions. Therefore, the additions were deleted, and the impugned orders confirming them were deemed unsustainable. The principle established is that additions based on undisclosed incriminating material, without providing the same to the assessee, are not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that the appeal should be dismissed as withdrawn. This decision was based on the assessee's prayer to withdraw the appeal as not pressed, citing the settlement of their tax dues under the Vivad se Vishwas scheme. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had paid the due tax of Rs. 1,19,41,549/- and submitted the relevant forms under the scheme. The reasoning is that once the assessee has opted for and completed the settlement process under a scheme like VSVS, the pending appeals become infructuous. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn if the underlying dispute is resolved through a statutory settlement scheme. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.

The Tribunal noted that the impugned order passed by the learned CIT(A) was ex-parte on merits. The Tribunal emphasized that justice is the goal of jurisprudence and that technical justice cannot supersede substantial justice. The principles of natural justice are considered fundamental to the functioning of quasi-judicial authorities. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's reason for non-participation in the first appellate proceedings, specifically the demise of Mr. Radhey Shyam Rathore, a key person. In light of these circumstances, the Tribunal deemed it just and proper to restore the matter to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, after providing the assessee with an opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative in future hearings. It was clarified that no observations on the merits of the case were made. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(E) rejected the assessee's application on a technical ground without affording a proper opportunity of hearing, which is a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal observed that the main point for determination was whether the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the application filed on 30.09.2025 for registration under section 80G(5)(ii) in Form No. 10AB on the basis that Form 10A for provisional registration was not filed. The Tribunal found that the rejection was based on a technicality without giving the assessee a chance to explain its position. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the file of the learned CIT(E). The CIT(E) is directed to decide the matter afresh on merits after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the delay of 82 days in filing the application for renewal of registration is condonable. The Tribunal took note of CBDT's Circular No. 1/2026 dated 23.03.2026, which clarifies that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) has been entrusted with the power to condone delay following the insertion of the proviso to Section 12A(1)(ac) w.e.f. 01.10.2024. The Board observed that eligible trusts or institutions should not be denied the benefit of registration solely on account of delay. Therefore, the Tribunal deemed it just and proper to condone the delay. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the file of the CIT(E) to decide the application for renewal of registration afresh on its merits, in accordance with the law, after affording the assessee a sufficient opportunity of hearing. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in refusing to condone the delay of 72 days in filing the first appeal. The Tribunal took judicial notice of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court's order dated 10.01.2022, which restored its order dated 23.03.2020 and extended the limitation period for all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022. The Tribunal emphasized that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and that parties should not be deprived of the opportunity to participate in justice dispensation. Therefore, the delay in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) was condoned. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT (Exemption) erred in rejecting the assessee's application for renewal of approval under Section 80G. The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT (Exemption) had not properly appreciated the charitable activities carried out by the trust. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's grounds of appeal highlighted substantial charitable activities such as free food distribution, gaushala operations, and public utility services, which were allegedly ignored. The Tribunal also considered the assessee's argument that the trust was not established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste and was open to the general public. The Tribunal's reasoning implies that the Ld. CIT (Exemption) incorrectly focused solely on the religious aspects without giving due weight to the charitable components. The ratio decidendi would be that a trust engaged in substantial charitable activities for the public benefit should not be denied Section 80G approval merely because it also conducts incidental religious activities, provided it meets the other conditions of the section. The operative direction was to set aside the order of the Ld. CIT (Exemption) and direct the approval to be granted.

The Tribunal held that the levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was not tenable. The Tribunal noted that the deposits of Rs. 53,82,000/-, on which the penalty was levied, were accepted by the assessee from the public at large under the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975, which was not disputed by the AO. While the amounts were added under Section 68 due to the failure to confirm the depositors' identity and creditworthiness, there was no other information on record from external sources or AO's inquiry to suggest that the assessee had introduced its undisclosed income through these fixed deposits. The Tribunal also considered the assessee's submission that some deposits were renewals of old deposits not relating to the assessment year under consideration, and that complete details of depositors were furnished. The Tribunal placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in CIT Vs Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd., wherein it was held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not leviable on similar facts. Accordingly, the levy of penalty of Rs. 16,50,000/- by the AO under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted. Ground no. 1 of the appeal was allowed, and other grounds were left academic.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 30.03.2022 was bad in law and void ab initio. The reasoning was that the AO, in the order passed under Section 148A(d), failed to record a specific finding that the material in his possession suggested the quantification of escapement of income was Rs. 50,00,000/- or likely to exceed Rs. 50,00,000/-. This finding is a pre-condition as per Section 149(1)(b) for reopening the case after the lapse of three years from the end of the assessment year. The Tribunal disagreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that the information about cash deposits alone was sufficient to establish the threshold. The AO must categorically record the amount of escapement of income upon verification, which was absent. Consequently, the approval obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax without such a finding was also considered invalid. The assessment order dated 11.03.2023 was held to be invalid and quashed. The Tribunal allowed Ground No. 2 of the original appeal and grounds No. 1.1 & 1.2 of the additional grounds. Other grounds were left open as academic.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee's non-cooperative conduct in not responding to the notices issued by the CIT(A) was not appreciated, in the interest of justice, it was deemed appropriate to restore the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative in attending hearings and making submissions before the CIT(A) for an expeditious and effective disposal. It was also emphasized that the CIT(A) must ensure the observance of the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was given on the addition of Rs. 62,21,000/- as the matter was remanded.

The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed by the CIT(A)/NFAC was liable to be set aside due to the violation of the principles of natural justice. While acknowledging the non-cooperative conduct of the assessee and the ex-parte nature of both the assessment order and the first appellate order, the Tribunal deemed it just and appropriate to restore the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative in attending hearings and making submissions before the AO for expeditious disposal. The AO was also directed to ensure observance of the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. Regarding Ground No. 1, challenging the reopening under Section 147, the Tribunal dismissed the ground as unsustainable because the assessee failed to submit the reasons recorded or the approval granted for reopening. Regarding Ground No. 2, concerning the denial of video conferencing, this was implicitly addressed by the Tribunal proceeding to hear the appeal on merits, but no specific finding was recorded on this procedural issue. For Ground No. 3, concerning the addition of Rs. 30,35,850/-, the Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee claimed the deposits were business receipts but found no supporting evidence. The Tribunal noted that cash deposits were followed by withdrawals and payments by cheque, and that the AO had not disputed withdrawals. Considering the magnitude of deposits, the assessee's status, and the lapse of time, the Tribunal determined a lump sum total income of Rs. 3,00,000/- for the year, including the Rs. 1,95,520/- declared by the assessee, and deleted the balance addition of Rs. 27,35,850/-. The ratio is that in the absence of substantiating evidence for large cash deposits claimed as business income, and considering the time elapsed, a reasonable lump sum addition can be made, balancing the revenue's interest and the assessee's inability to provide proof.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank cannot be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the bank was judicially bound by the interim directions of the Madras High Court, which prevented it from deducting tax at source on LFC reimbursements involving foreign travel. The Tribunal found that the subsequent order of the Supreme Court, while deciding the substantive legal issue, could not retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The Tribunal respectfully agreed with the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal and the Kerala High Court's reasoning, which distinguished the Supreme Court's judgment based on the assessment year and the period of interim protection. Consequently, the interest under Section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under Section 201(1), cannot survive. The orders passed under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside, and the demands raised were deleted. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg was acknowledged as concluded against the assessee, but this did not affect the finding that the bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period of judicial restraint.

The Tribunal held that the additional evidence sought to be produced by the assessee, including a cash ledger/book and bank statement, was necessary for a just adjudication of the issue. The Tribunal agreed that these additional evidences needed to be admitted for the adjudication of the issue involved in the present appeal. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the AO for a fresh assessment on this issue. The AO was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and proceed in accordance with law. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issue on merits but remanded the matter for fresh consideration based on the admitted additional evidence.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank cannot be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the bank was judicially bound by the interim directions of the Madras High Court, which prevented it from deducting tax at source on LFC reimbursements involving foreign travel. The Tribunal found that the subsequent order of the Supreme Court, while deciding the substantive legal issue, could not retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The Tribunal respectfully agreed with the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal and the Kerala High Court's reasoning, which distinguished the Supreme Court's judgment based on the assessment year and the period of interim protection. Consequently, the interest under Section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under Section 201(1), cannot survive. The orders passed under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside, and the demands raised were deleted. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg was acknowledged as concluded against the assessee, but this did not affect the finding that the bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period of judicial restraint.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank cannot be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the bank was judicially bound by the interim directions of the Madras High Court, which prevented it from deducting tax at source on LFC reimbursements involving foreign travel. The Tribunal found that the subsequent order of the Supreme Court, while deciding the substantive legal issue, could not retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The Tribunal respectfully agreed with the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal and the Kerala High Court's reasoning, which distinguished the Supreme Court's judgment based on the assessment year and the period of interim protection. Consequently, the interest under Section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under Section 201(1), cannot survive. The orders passed under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside, and the demands raised were deleted. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg was acknowledged as concluded against the assessee, but this did not affect the finding that the bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period of judicial restraint.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank cannot be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the bank was judicially bound by the interim directions of the Madras High Court, which prevented it from deducting tax at source on LFC reimbursements involving foreign travel. The Tribunal found that the subsequent order of the Supreme Court, while deciding the substantive legal issue, could not retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The Tribunal respectfully agreed with the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal and the Kerala High Court's reasoning, which distinguished the Supreme Court's judgment based on the assessment year and the period of interim protection. Consequently, the interest under Section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under Section 201(1), cannot survive. The orders passed under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside, and the demands raised were deleted. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg was acknowledged as concluded against the assessee, but this did not affect the finding that the bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period of judicial restraint.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not submitted before the AO or the PCIT that the amounts of Rs. 1,74,70,476/- and Rs. 48,32,118/- relating to Shri Panna Lal Jain and Smt. Sarala Jain were unsecured loans advanced by the assessee, rather than loans taken. The assessee presented this claim for the first time before the Tribunal, supported by Schedule-J of the balance sheet showing 'sundry loans and advances' on the asset side. However, the Tribunal also observed that comparative figures for these loans in the balance sheet for the period ending March 31, 2021, to substantiate the claim of opening balance from the previous year, were not available on record. Additionally, an unsecured loan of Rs. 9,21,587/- from Shri Ratan Lal Jain was shown as a liability. Given these facts, the Tribunal was satisfied that the new claim required fresh examination by the PCIT. Accordingly, the order of the PCIT was set aside, and the matter was restored to the PCIT's file for re-examination and verification of the assessee's claims, with a direction to pass a fresh order after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank cannot be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the bank was judicially bound by the interim directions of the Madras High Court, which prevented it from deducting tax at source on LFC reimbursements involving foreign travel. The Tribunal found that the subsequent order of the Supreme Court, while deciding the substantive legal issue, could not retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The Tribunal respectfully agreed with the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal and the Kerala High Court's reasoning, which distinguished the Supreme Court's judgment based on the assessment year and the period of interim protection. Consequently, the interest under Section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under Section 201(1), cannot survive. The orders passed under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside, and the demands raised were deleted. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg was acknowledged as concluded against the assessee, but this did not affect the finding that the bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period of judicial restraint.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not submitted before the AO or the PCIT that the amounts of Rs. 1,74,70,476/- and Rs. 48,32,118/- relating to Shri Panna Lal Jain and Smt. Sarala Jain were unsecured loans advanced by the assessee, rather than loans taken. The assessee presented this claim for the first time before the Tribunal, supported by Schedule-J of the balance sheet showing 'sundry loans and advances' on the asset side. However, the Tribunal also observed that comparative figures for these loans in the balance sheet for the period ending March 31, 2021, to substantiate the claim of opening balance from the previous year, were not available on record. Additionally, an unsecured loan of Rs. 9,21,587/- from Shri Ratan Lal Jain was shown as a liability. Given these facts, the Tribunal was satisfied that the new claim required fresh examination by the PCIT. Accordingly, the order of the PCIT was set aside, and the matter was restored to the PCIT's file for re-examination and verification of the assessee's claims, with a direction to pass a fresh order after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals without adjudicating the issues on merits. The CIT(A) dismissed the first appeal (No. CIT(Appeals)-1, Agra/10346/2019-20) based on the assessee's request to consider it null and void, but this was conditional on merging it with the second appeal (No. CIT(Appeals)-1, Agra/10433/2019-20). The CIT(A) failed to effect this merger and then dismissed the second appeal on the grounds that the rectification order under Section 154 did not contain a mistake apparent from the record. The Tribunal found this approach to be contrary to equity and justice. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order dated 10.03.2026 in appeal No. CIT(Appeals)-1, Agra/10433/2019-20 and restored the matter to the CIT(A)'s file. The CIT(A) is directed to decide the appeal on merits concerning the addition of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- on account of cash deposits, after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Grounds 1 to 3 of the appeal were allowed. Ground 4 became academic. Ground 5, concerning the merits of the addition, was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank cannot be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the bank was judicially bound by the interim directions of the Madras High Court, which prevented it from deducting tax at source on LFC reimbursements involving foreign travel. The Tribunal found that the subsequent order of the Supreme Court, while deciding the substantive legal issue, could not retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The Tribunal respectfully agreed with the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal and the Kerala High Court's reasoning, which distinguished the Supreme Court's judgment based on the assessment year and the period of interim protection. Consequently, the interest under Section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under Section 201(1), cannot survive. The orders passed under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside, and the demands raised were deleted. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg was acknowledged as concluded against the assessee, but this did not affect the finding that the bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period of judicial restraint.

The Tribunal held that the assessee bank cannot be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the bank was judicially bound by the interim directions of the Madras High Court, which prevented it from deducting tax at source on LFC reimbursements involving foreign travel. The Tribunal found that the subsequent order of the Supreme Court, while deciding the substantive legal issue, could not retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The Tribunal respectfully agreed with the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal and the Kerala High Court's reasoning, which distinguished the Supreme Court's judgment based on the assessment year and the period of interim protection. Consequently, the interest under Section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under Section 201(1), cannot survive. The orders passed under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside, and the demands raised were deleted. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg was acknowledged as concluded against the assessee, but this did not affect the finding that the bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period of judicial restraint.

The Tribunal held that the ex gratia compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS), 2019, was fully exempt from tax under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Pune, ITAT Ahmedabad in *Vishnu Mohan T Nair v. Income Tax Officer*, and ITAT Chandigarh in *Harish Kumar (BSNL Employee) vs. ITO*. The Tribunal found support from the principle that substance matters over form in determining retrenchment compensation, as per the Supreme Court's observation in *Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd.*, and that a pragmatic approach should be taken for employees in lower rungs. The Tribunal set aside the impugned findings of the CIT(A) and allowed the grounds of appeal. The assessee was directed to place revised computation of income before the jurisdictional Assessing Officers claiming the exemption under Section 10(10B), after which the Revenue authorities were to compute the tax liability and grant any refund due after verification. The issue of whether the claim was a fresh claim not permissible in appeal was implicitly addressed by allowing the exemption based on precedent.

The ITAT held that the ex-parte dismissal of the appeal by the Ld. CIT(A) could not be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the first eight notices were issued during the COVID-19 pandemic and the exclusion period, which provided sufficient reason for the assessee's inability to respond. For the subsequent notices, the assessee provided reasons such as his counsel's severe illness and hospitalization, and his own accident, which prevented him from effectively presenting his case. The Tribunal found these reasons to be sufficient and bonafide. The ITAT relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in CIT Vs Jansampark Advertising & Marketing (P) Ltd. and the Supreme Court in Raheem Shah & ANR Vs Govind Singh & Ors, emphasizing a justice-oriented approach over a rigid technical one. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to present his case and that the CIT(A)'s order violated the principle of natural justice. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded to the Ld. CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication on the taxability of capital gains and deductibility of exemption claimed, in accordance with the law and after providing a speaking order.

The Tribunal upheld the rejection of the assessee's books of accounts under Section 145(3) of the Act. It reasoned that the non-maintenance or non-production of shop-wise item/product-wise trading/stock or inventory records, along with ledger accounts of purchases/sales and expenses, constitutes a substantial defect in the accounts, making them incomplete and incorrect. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents like 'Dhondiram Dalichand Vs CIT', 'Bastiram Narayandas Vs CIT', and 'Kachwala Gems Vs Jt. CIT' to support this view. However, the Tribunal found that the estimation of Net Profit (NP) by the AO at 14.72% and its subsequent restriction to 8% by the CIT(A) lacked a proper rationale. The Tribunal noted that neither authority provided justification for the estimation percentage, nor did they consider industry standards or market conditions. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the estimation of NP and directed the AO to re-determine it based on the simple average NP earned by the assessee in the five assessment years preceding AY 2017-18. The addition on account of sundry creditors under Section 68 was also partly allowed, with the Tribunal granting the assessee one more opportunity to furnish necessary evidence and explanations regarding the nature and source of the change in audited figures. The Tribunal stated that no addition would be permissible if the re-computed NP falls below the declared NP, and any addition would not exceed the differential amount based on the re-computed NP.

The Tribunal held that the additions made for the block period of six assessment years (AY 2009-10 to 2014-15) were impermissible in the absence of specific incriminating material for each of those years. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT Vs Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd., which mandates that assessments under Section 153A must be grounded on incriminating material with a direct, year-wise connection. Since the incriminating material found during the search did not specify the year of the transactions, extrapolating it to multiple years was unlawful. Consequently, the addition on account of estimated net profit attributable to unaccounted production/sale for these six years was set aside. Regarding the addition for AY 2015-16 (search year) concerning excess stock valuation, the Tribunal found that the AO had correctly identified a discrepancy in the valuation of physical stock compared to the books. The CIT(A)'s deletion of this addition was based on an oversight of quantitative details rather than the valuation discrepancy. Therefore, the addition of the differential value of stock was restored. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals for AY 2009-10 to 2014-15 and allowed the appeal for AY 2015-16.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 13,24,500 under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was made due to the difference between the stamp duty value (Rs. 26,37,000) and the sale consideration (Rs. 13,12,500). It was noted that the Assessing Officer did not refer the matter to the DVO as provided under Section 50C(2), despite the assessee's request. Furthermore, the CIT(A) did not consider the approved valuer's report submitted by the assessee during the first appellate proceedings, stating that no reason was given for not furnishing it before the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal found it just and appropriate to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer. The valuation report dated 11.11.2024 was admitted as additional evidence. The Assessing Officer was directed to refer the matter to the DVO and pass a fresh order after considering both valuation reports and affording the assessee an adequate opportunity of hearing. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the ex gratia compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS), 2019, was fully exempt from tax under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Pune, ITAT Ahmedabad in *Vishnu Mohan T Nair v. Income Tax Officer*, and ITAT Chandigarh in *Harish Kumar (BSNL Employee) vs. ITO*. The Tribunal found support from the principle that substance matters over form in determining retrenchment compensation, as per the Supreme Court's observation in *Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd.*, and that a pragmatic approach should be taken for employees in lower rungs. The Tribunal set aside the impugned findings of the CIT(A) and allowed the grounds of appeal. The assessee was directed to place revised computation of income before the jurisdictional Assessing Officers claiming the exemption under Section 10(10B), after which the Revenue authorities were to compute the tax liability and grant any refund due after verification. The issue of whether the claim was a fresh claim not permissible in appeal was implicitly addressed by allowing the exemption based on precedent.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. Regarding the excess stock addition of Rs. 54,85,429, the Tribunal deleted the additions of Rs. 27,30,000 (amanat gold ornaments belonging to Shri Shiv Kumar Agarwal and Smt. Urmila Agarwal, supported by an affidavit), Rs. 5,19,437 (difference in value due to lesser deduction for 22K gold ornaments, as the DVO's deduction was arbitrary compared to the deduction in the sister concern's case), and Rs. 20,22,325 (difference in value due to lesser margin deduction for 18K gold ornaments, for similar reasons). However, the remaining difference of Rs. 1,13,667 was confirmed as unexplained. Regarding the Rs. 20,00,000 cash addition, the Tribunal confirmed it, noting the inconsistent explanation from the assessee and the fact that the cash was not contemporaneously entered in M/s Soni Jeweller's cash book, only post-search. The Tribunal found no honest effort to explain the urgency of the meeting. The judgment also noted that for ITA No. 86/Agr/2026 (M/s Soni Jewellers), certain issues regarding jewellery disclosed under IDS-2016 and differences in gross/net weight calculations needed verification by the AO, leading to a remand for that appeal.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A), while passing the impugned order, mentioned the correct details of the appellant, Sunita Agarwal, for AY 2011-12, including her PAN. However, the order itself pertained to another assessee with the same name but a different PAN and AY. The Tribunal found this to be a perverse order. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the assessee for AY 2011-12. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal as time-barred without passing a speaking order and in proceeding to decide the appeal on merits after declining the prayer for condonation of delay. The Tribunal emphasized that the adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to the justice dispensation system and that the issue of condonation of delay must be decided first. If the delay is condoned, the appeal can be decided on merits. If rejected, the proceedings automatically fail, and the appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to entertain a time-barred appeal without condoning the delay. The Supreme Court's observation in Union of India & Anr. v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) was cited, stating that while the length of delay is relevant, courts should not start with the merits of the main matter when considering condonation. The Tribunal condoned the nominal delay of approximately 14 days in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) in the interest of substantial justice. Consequently, the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) to pass a fresh order on merits after considering the assessee's submissions, directing the assessee to be diligent and cooperative, and the Assessing Officer to observe principles of natural justice. The additions on merits were not decided by the ITAT.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. Regarding the excess stock addition of Rs. 54,85,429, the Tribunal deleted the additions of Rs. 27,30,000 (amanat gold ornaments belonging to Shri Shiv Kumar Agarwal and Smt. Urmila Agarwal, supported by an affidavit), Rs. 5,19,437 (difference in value due to lesser deduction for 22K gold ornaments, as the DVO's deduction was arbitrary compared to the deduction in the sister concern's case), and Rs. 20,22,325 (difference in value due to lesser margin deduction for 18K gold ornaments, for similar reasons). However, the remaining difference of Rs. 1,13,667 was confirmed as unexplained. Regarding the Rs. 20,00,000 cash addition, the Tribunal confirmed it, noting the inconsistent explanation from the assessee and the fact that the cash was not contemporaneously entered in M/s Soni Jeweller's cash book, only post-search. The Tribunal found no honest effort to explain the urgency of the meeting. The judgment also noted that for ITA No. 86/Agr/2026 (M/s Soni Jewellers), certain issues regarding jewellery disclosed under IDS-2016 and differences in gross/net weight calculations needed verification by the AO, leading to a remand for that appeal.