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2,295 tribunal orders from the Agra bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
Employee contributions to provident fund and ESI are allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 43B if paid before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1). This applies even if paid after the due date specified under the respective fund's statute.
A statute or amendment can apply retrospectively even without an express provision, if such application is a necessary implication from the language used, especially for clarificatory amendments or those intended to cure an acknowledged evil for the community's benefit.
Employee contributions to PF and ESIC, deposited beyond the due date under the respective Acts but within the due date for filing the income tax return under Section 139(1), are allowable deductions under Section 36(1)(va). Such disallowance cannot be made during processing under Section 143(1).
Employees' contributions to welfare funds, such as provident fund, are not allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(va) if deposited beyond the due date prescribed under the respective welfare statutes, even by a single day. Such delayed deposits are not cured even if made before the income-tax return filing due date.
Employee contributions to provident fund or ESI, even if deposited after the due date specified in the respective welfare statutes, are allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(va) if paid before the due date for filing the income-tax return. This judgment aligns the treatment of employee contributions with employer contributions under Section 43B.
Belated remittance of employees' contribution to ESI and PF, even if deposited before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1), is not allowed as a deduction. This disallowance falls under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x), as Section 43B applies only to employer's contributions.
Deduction for employees' contributions to PF and ESIC is allowable under Section 43B if paid before the due date for filing the return under Section 139(1); similarly, delayed deposits of employers' contributions to ESIC and PF are also allowable.
Employee contributions to provident fund, ESI, and other welfare funds, if deposited by the due date for furnishing the return of income under Section 139(1), are allowable as a deduction and cannot be disallowed under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x) or Section 43B, even if deposited after the due date prescribed by the respective welfare Acts.
An employer's delayed remittance of employees' contributions to provident fund (PF) or Employees' State Insurance (ESI) is deductible if the payment is made before the due date for filing the income tax return under section 139(1), applying the provisions of section 43B and notwithstanding section 36(1)(va).
Employee contributions to provident fund and ESI, if paid beyond the due date prescribed by the respective welfare fund statutes, are not allowed as a deduction under the Income Tax Act.
Deduction for employee contributions to EPF/ESI is allowable under section 43B if paid before the due date for filing the return of income under section 139(1), irrespective of the due dates under the respective welfare fund statutes.
Employees' contributions to provident fund and ESI are allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x) if deposited by the assessee before the due date for filing the income tax return.
Employee contributions to Provident Fund (PF) and Employee State Insurance (ESI) are deductible under the Income Tax Act if deposited by the assessee before the due date for filing the return of income, even if such deposits are made after the specific due dates prescribed under the respective PF and ESI Acts.
Deduction for employee contributions to provident fund and other funds is disallowed if not paid by the due date of filing the return of income, particularly when Section 2(24)(x) and Section 36(1)(va) are considered. The omission of the second proviso to Section 43B(b) does not negate this disallowance.
Contributions received from employees towards ESI are deductible as business expenditure, even if paid after the due date for payment but before the due date for filing the return of income.
Section 43B of the Income-tax Act applies to both employer and employee contributions to welfare funds, allowing deductions for these contributions only upon actual payment.
The Supreme Court affirmed that lower authorities are bound by decisions of higher authorities due to judicial discipline. It also clarified that the Commissioner, in exercising revisional power under Section 263, can conduct necessary inquiries to determine if an assessment is prejudicial to the Revenue.
The law declared by a judgment is the principle derived from reading the judgment as a whole in light of the questions it addresses. Lower authorities are bound by the orders of higher authorities due to judicial discipline.
The Assessing Officer (AO) must follow decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. An AO's order is not considered erroneous for revision under Section 263 merely because it follows a binding decision of a higher authority, even if that decision is under appeal.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action in setting aside the assessment order was sustainable only on the issue of valuation of inventory under Section 145A(ii). The Tribunal found that the assessee's submission and the auditor's note indicated that taxes, duties, and cess were accounted for separately and not included in the valuation of purchase and sale of goods or inventory. This was a direct violation of Section 145A(ii) of the Act, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue on this specific issue. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order in setting aside the AO's order concerning this point. However, for all other issues raised by the PCIT (cash deposits, liquidity, Omaxe group transactions, increased gross receipts, and declining NP/Turnover ratio), the Tribunal found that the PCIT's findings did not justify that the AO's order was either erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Therefore, the PCIT's action in setting aside the assessment order on these other issues was not sustainable and was quashed. The appeal of the assessee was partly allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 358 days in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause for the assessee's inability to file within the prescribed period. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's claim of non-receipt of notices was supported by an uncontroverted affidavit. However, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had not cooperated with the CIT(A) at the assessment stage and had failed to substantiate his grounds of appeal before the first appellate authority, as noted by the CIT(A). The Tribunal acknowledged its previous decision in ITA No. 362/Agr/2026 for AY 2018-19, where similar additions were deleted. Nevertheless, it held that the benefit of that decision could not be extended to the present case unless the assessee substantiated his grounds before the CIT(A). Therefore, in the interest of justice and to provide another opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to his file for fresh adjudication. The first appellate authority was directed to ensure substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice, and the assessee was directed to be diligent in attending hearing notices.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's first appeals solely on the technicality of delay without affording a proper opportunity of hearing. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the ITAT emphasized that procedural law is subservient to justice and should not be a barrier to meeting extraordinary situations for the ends of justice. The Tribunal found the grounds raised by the assessee before the CIT(A) for condoning the delay to be sufficient. Consequently, the ITAT condoned the delay, set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) dated 27.07.2026, and restored the matters to the file of the CIT(A) for passing a fresh order on merits after considering the precedents and ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The ITAT held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal in limine without condoning the delay. The Tribunal took judicial notice of the period of the global COVID-19 pandemic, referencing the Supreme Court's order in Misc. Application No. 21/2022, which excluded the period from March 15, 2020, to February 28, 2022, for the purpose of limitation in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The ITAT found the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay to be sufficient, especially considering the pandemic period. The Tribunal emphasized the principle that substantial justice should not be denied due to technicalities and that parties should not be ordinarily denied the opportunity to participate in justice dispensation. Consequently, the ITAT condoned the delay in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A). The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice.
The ITAT allowed the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes and set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A). The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A). The reasoning was that the delay overlapped with the COVID-19 pandemic period, and the Supreme Court had directed the exclusion of 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for limitation. The Tribunal emphasized that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and that the assessee's cause for delay appeared sufficient. Furthermore, the ITAT noted that the CIT(A) had erred by deciding the appeal on merits after rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay. The law dictates that an appeal does not legally exist until the delay is condoned, and an appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to decide a time-barred appeal on merits without condoning the delay. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh order on merits after considering the precedents, with a direction for expeditious disposal and observance of natural justice. The issue of exemption under Section 10(10AA) was not decided on merits by the ITAT.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's first appeals solely on the technicality of delay without affording a proper opportunity of hearing. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the ITAT emphasized that procedural law is subservient to justice and should not be a barrier to meeting extraordinary situations for the ends of justice. The Tribunal found the grounds raised by the assessee before the CIT(A) for condoning the delay to be sufficient. Consequently, the ITAT condoned the delay, set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) dated 27.07.2026, and restored the matters to the file of the CIT(A) for passing a fresh order on merits after considering the precedents and ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's first appeals solely on the technicality of delay without affording a proper opportunity of hearing. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the ITAT emphasized that procedural law is subservient to justice and should not be a barrier to meeting extraordinary situations for the ends of justice. The Tribunal found the grounds raised by the assessee before the CIT(A) for condoning the delay to be sufficient. Consequently, the ITAT condoned the delay, set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) dated 27.07.2026, and restored the matters to the file of the CIT(A) for passing a fresh order on merits after considering the precedents and ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's first appeals solely on the technicality of delay without affording a proper opportunity of hearing. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the ITAT emphasized that procedural law is subservient to justice and should not be a barrier to meeting extraordinary situations for the ends of justice. The Tribunal found the grounds raised by the assessee before the CIT(A) for condoning the delay to be sufficient. Consequently, the ITAT condoned the delay, set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) dated 27.07.2026, and restored the matters to the file of the CIT(A) for passing a fresh order on merits after considering the precedents and ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 272A(1)(d) was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that while the assessee failed to comply with the notices by the stipulated dates, the Assessing Officer (AO) had afforded an opportunity by issuing a second notice, indicating a willingness to receive the information. Crucially, the assessee did furnish the required information on October 21, 2024, which was taken into account by the AO while framing the assessment. The Tribunal reasoned that since the assessee ultimately complied and the information was used in the assessment, initiating penalty proceedings for a technical breach, especially after an opportunity was given, was not appropriate. The Tribunal respectfully followed judicial precedents, including the decision in Bundelkhand University (supra), which held that for mere technical or venial breaches, penalty should not be levied when full compliance is made before the assessment is finalized. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned penalty. The issue was decided in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 05.04.2023, for Assessment Year 2019-20, was issued beyond the permissible time limit. It was undisputed that the time limit of three years from the end of the assessment year expired on 31.03.2023. The Tribunal noted that Section 149(1)(b) read with Section 149(1)(a) pertains to escaped income less than Rs. 50,00,000/-. Since the notice was issued on 05.04.2023, it was time-barred and bad in law. Consequently, all subsequent proceedings were vitiated. The assessment order dated 26.11.2024 was set aside and quashed. The Tribunal stated that the other legal issues raised were academic and left them undecided. The appeal was allowed.
The ITAT held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal as time-barred and subsequently deciding it on merits. The Tribunal condoned the delay of 1428 days in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A), considering the assessee's status as a retired senior citizen with limited knowledge and the bonafide cause for the delay. The ITAT emphasized that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and that the object of procedural rules is to advance justice. The Tribunal also noted that deciding an appeal on merits after rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay is contrary to established legal principles. The ITAT cited the Supreme Court's observation in Union of India & Anr. v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) and the Allahabad High Court's order in Dinanath Singh & Anr. V. State of U.P. & Ors., stating that an appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to entertain a time-barred appeal without condoning the delay. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the CIT(A)'s file for a fresh decision on merits after considering the authoritative precedents. The ITAT directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative and the CIT(A) to ensure observance of principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the Diwali expenses of Rs. 24,340/- were incurred for celebrating Diwali at the business premises with staff and customers, creating goodwill, and were therefore considered for business purposes. The addition of Rs. 24,340/- was deleted. Regarding general and office expenses, the Tribunal noted that the assessee did not contest the AO's finding that Rs. 76,118/- were personal in nature, so the disallowance to that extent was confirmed. However, in the absence of specific findings by the AO or NFAC that the balance expenses were personal or not for business purposes, the disallowance of the remaining amount was not sustained and was deleted. Therefore, the disallowance of Rs. 76,118/- was sustained, and the balance disallowance of Rs. 5,08,410/- was deleted. The Tribunal found that the disallowance of sales promotion expenses was not discussed separately in the operative part of the judgment, but the overall appeal was partly allowed. The operative direction was to delete the disallowance of Rs. 5,08,410/- and sustain the disallowance of Rs. 76,118/-.
The Tribunal held that the denial of exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad) solely on the ground of non-filing of a return under Section 139(4C) was incorrect for AY 2020-21. The Tribunal noted that the requirement of filing a return under Section 139(4C) as a condition precedent for exemption was introduced by the Finance Act, 2022, effective from April 1, 2023 (i.e., AY 2023-24 onwards) through the 20th proviso to Section 10(23C). This amendment was not applicable to the AY 2020-21. The Tribunal further observed that the statute itself recognizes belated returns filed in response to a notice under Section 142(1), as evidenced by Section 234A, and such returns should not be treated as non-est or invalid. The assessee had filed a return in response to a notice under Section 148, and claimed exemption therein. The Tribunal found that the assessee satisfied the substantive conditions prescribed under Section 10(23C)(iiiad) for the year under consideration. Therefore, the denial of exemption by the revenue authorities on the premise of non-filing of a return under Section 139(4C) was not justified. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition made.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence regarding sundry creditors, finding sufficient cause for not filing it earlier due to a change in counsel. The Tribunal noted that the balance sheet for FY 2006-07, relevant to AY 2007-08, showing construction and development costs for the asset sold, had not been dealt with by the CIT(A). Furthermore, the fact that an addition of Rs. 25,84,000/- on account of cash deposit was also made in the assessment order of the assessee's husband, Shri Deepak Chandak, had not been considered by the CIT(A). Given these points requiring fresh examination and factual verification, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh assessment. The admitted additional evidence was directed to be considered by the AO during the fresh assessment proceedings. All grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) should have provided at least one more opportunity to the assessee to present the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal before dismissing it. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of adhering to the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the ITAT restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction for the assessee to file a fresh condonation application. The CIT(A) is directed to decide this application in accordance with the law and thereafter decide the appeal on merits. The Tribunal also stressed that the first appellate authority must ensure substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had issued several notices for hearing (dated 03.06.2026, 17.06.2026, and 27.07.2026), but no one appeared on behalf of the assessee, and no written submissions were filed, leading to an ex-parte order. The Tribunal found that while the assessee's non-appearance was not appreciated, the CIT(A)'s order lacked any finding on the assessee's contention that it acted as an intermediary and thus Section 194Q was not applicable. To ensure substantial justice and provide another opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to be diligent in attending future hearings. All grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the penalty under Section 271AAC(1) was levied due to the non-issuance of Form 4, which would entitle the assessee to a waiver of penalty under the DTVSV Scheme, 2024. The assessee had opted for the scheme and requested Form 4 from the Principal CIT, Agra-1, vide a letter dated 03.04.2026, which was pending. The Tribunal found the assessee's request to set aside the matter to the CIT(A) reasonable, directing the CIT(A) to keep the appeal pending until the issue of Form 4 under the DTVSV Scheme is finally decided by the Principal CIT, Agra-1. All grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the penalty itself but remanded the matter for procedural completion.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 663 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons provided by the assessee, relating to his wife's health and counsel's non-compliance, to be sufficient. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal noted the assessee's submission that the cash deposits of Rs. 1,59,54,170/- pertained to cash sales in his liquor business. Considering the interest of justice and the assessee's request for an opportunity to explain the facts before the AO, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the AO for fresh assessment in accordance with law. The ratio decidendi is that in cases of significant delay caused by circumstances beyond the assessee's control and where a substantive issue requires examination, it is just and appropriate to restore the matter to the AO for a fresh assessment, provided the assessee demonstrates a prima facie case and a willingness to cooperate.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad) was rejected primarily because it could not initially prove that the cash deposits were indeed students' fees. The Tribunal observed that the annual gross receipts were below Rs. 1 crore. In the interest of justice, and considering the assessee's request to produce evidence, the Tribunal decided to afford the assessee an opportunity to prove the nature of the cash deposits. The matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer, who was directed to consider the fresh evidence to establish that the deposits were students' fees received during the year. The Assessing Officer was also directed to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee's non-cooperative conduct in not filing details before the CIT(A) despite multiple opportunities could not be appreciated, the order of the CIT(A) was not a speaking order. The CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal on merits after reproducing the assessment order's reasoning, which added Rs. 45,00,000/- based on a seized document (LPS-01) indicating cash payment received by the assessee's husband on behalf of the assessee for property sale. The Tribunal, in the interest of justice and to provide one more opportunity, restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to be diligent and cooperative. The CIT(A) was instructed to ensure observance of principles of natural justice. All grounds were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) rejected the assessee's application by not condoning a delay of 46 days in filing the application, without adjudicating the application on its merits. The Tribunal took note of CBDT Circular No. 1/2026 dated 23.03.2026, which clarifies that the CIT(E) has the power to condone delays under the proviso to Section 12A(1)(ac) and that eligible trusts should not be denied registration solely on account of delay. The Tribunal considered the assessee's explanation for the delay to be reasonable. Consequently, the Tribunal deemed it just and proper to condone the delay and remit the matter back to the file of the CIT(E) to decide the application afresh on its merits after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeals solely on the ground of delay without condoning it. The Tribunal emphasized the well-established legal principle that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and that procedural law is subservient to justice. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the Tribunal stated that the object of procedural rules is to advance justice, and parties should not ordinarily be denied an opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal considered the grounds raised by the assessee for condonation as sufficient cause. Consequently, the delay in filing the first appeals before the CIT(A) was condoned. The impugned orders of the CIT(A) were set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for passing fresh orders on merits, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice.
The tribunal considered the withdrawal applications filed by the assessee. The department representative raised no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeals solely on the ground of delay without condoning it. The Tribunal emphasized the well-established legal principle that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and that procedural law is subservient to justice. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the Tribunal stated that the object of procedural rules is to advance justice, and parties should not ordinarily be denied an opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal considered the grounds raised by the assessee for condonation as sufficient cause. Consequently, the delay in filing the first appeals before the CIT(A) was condoned. The impugned orders of the CIT(A) were set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for passing fresh orders on merits, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeals solely on the ground of delay without condoning it. The Tribunal emphasized the well-established legal principle that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and that procedural law is subservient to justice. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the Tribunal stated that the object of procedural rules is to advance justice, and parties should not ordinarily be denied an opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal considered the grounds raised by the assessee for condonation as sufficient cause. Consequently, the delay in filing the first appeals before the CIT(A) was condoned. The impugned orders of the CIT(A) were set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for passing fresh orders on merits, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice.