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The High Court held that the issue in the present writ petition was identical to that decided by a Coordinate Bench in Jasjit Singh vs. Union of India and others (CWP No. 21509 of 2023, decided on 29.07.2024). The Coordinate Bench had held that circulars or instructions issued by the Board under Section 119 of the Act could not override statutory provisions or make them obsolete, and that legislative enactments must be followed strictly. The Court found that the authorities could not usurp legal provisions for their own convenience, causing hardship and confusion. Consequently, notices issued under Section 148 of the Act, dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2024, and 30.03.2023, along with subsequent proceedings for faceless assessment under Section 144B, were found to be contrary to the provisions of the Act and were set aside for want of jurisdiction. The Revenue was granted liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act if so advised. All writ petitions and interim orders were disposed of in terms of this order.
The High Court held that circulars or instructions issued by the Board could not override statutory provisions or render them otiose. Legislative enactments with financial implications must be followed strictly. The Court found that authorities cannot usurp legal provisions for their convenience, causing hardship to assessees, and that instructions and circulars can only supplement statutory provisions. Consequently, notices issued by the JAO under Section 148 of the Act, 1961, and proceedings initiated thereafter without conducting faceless assessment as envisaged under Section 144B, were found to be contrary to the Act and set aside for want of jurisdiction. The Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the notice and order dated 08.04.2024. Other questions raised by the petitioner were not pressed and were dismissed as not pressed. The revenue was granted liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, if advised.
The High Court held that notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and subsequent proceedings, including those initiated without conducting faceless assessment as envisaged under Section 144B of the Act, 1961, were contrary to the provisions of the Act, 1961. The Court relied on its previous decision in Jasjit Singh vs. Union of India and others, which established that circulars or instructions from the Board cannot override statutory provisions, and authorities cannot act beyond their legal powers to the detriment of assessees. Consequently, the notices dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2024, and 30.03.2023, along with the order dated 30.03.2023, were set aside for want of jurisdiction. The revenue was granted liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, if so advised. The writ petition was allowed, and all pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. It relied on its own previous judgment in CWP-21509-2023 (Jasjit Singh Vs. Union of India and Others) and a Coordinate Bench's judgment in CWP-15745-2024. The Court held that notices issued under Section 148 and subsequent proceedings initiated without conducting a faceless assessment as per Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were contrary to the Act and set aside. Specifically, notices dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2024, and 30.03.2023, along with an order dated 30.03.2023, were set aside for want of jurisdiction. The revenue was granted liberty to follow the prescribed procedure if advised. The challenge to the vires of Explanation 2(iv) to Section 148 was expressly left open for future adjudication. The operative direction was to set aside the notice dated 31.03.2024 and consequential proceedings.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 15.03.2023, 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2023, 30.03.2023, and the consequential order dated 30.03.2023, are set aside for want of jurisdiction. This decision is based on the reasoning that such proceedings were found to be contrary to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court explicitly agreed with the view taken by a Coordinate Bench in Jasjit Singh vs. Union of India (CWP No.21509 of 2023, decided on 29.07.2024), which held that circulars or instructions by the Board cannot override statutory provisions or make them obsolete. The Court found no occasion to take a different view. The revenue is at liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, and proceed accordingly if so advised. The writ petitions are allowed, and the interim order stands merged with the present order.
The High Court held that the facts of the present case were similar to the case of Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Gwalior) M.P. Limited. In that case, the Commissioner had cancelled the registration under Section 12A of the Act by an order dated 13.04.1991, and by a subsequent order dated 29.04.2002, the Commissioner was not empowered to cancel such registration. Therefore, the questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee based on that judgment. The Court concluded that the registration of the respondent could not have been cancelled retrospectively. Consequently, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed. The operative direction was that the appeal stands dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 2(15) of the Act, which require scrutiny of activities, became applicable from 01.04.2009 and were not applicable to the assessment year 2008-2009. Therefore, the benefit of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act was extended.
The High Court, after considering the submissions and examining the applicability of its prior judgments, found that the issue raised by the revenue stood finally adjudicated. The Court referred to its decisions in Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Young Scholars Educational Society (supra) and Pinegrove International Charitable Trust vs. Union of India (supra), which held that the power to cancel registration under Section 12AA(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was prospective and could not be applied retrospectively. The Court noted that the ITAT had held the order of cancellation passed by the Commissioner on 02.03.2010 to be without jurisdiction and without authority in law, as the amendment empowering the Commissioner to cancel registration was made in Section 12AA(3) by the Finance Act of 2010, and the power was not available on the date of cancellation. The facts of the present case were found to be similar to Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Gwalior) Limited’s case (supra). Therefore, the High Court concluded that the registration of the respondent could not have been cancelled retrospectively. Questions of law nos. 1, 3, and 4 were answered in favour of the assessee.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions, quashing and setting aside the orders dated 22.03.2016 and 31.03.2016 passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS Circle. The Court held that the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) could not be made to suffer on account of orders passed by the Court. It was noted that the LAO had stopped deducting TDS after October 2012 based on legal advice and various High Court judgments, including those that restrained such deductions. The Court found that the LAO was acting under a genuine belief, following the advice of the District Revenue Officer and the legal opinion of the Additional District Attorney, which was based on court directions. While acknowledging that some of these directions might not have been in conformity with other High Court orders, the Court emphasized that the LAO was not privy to those other orders and was bound by the directions provided to him. Therefore, the action of the LAO in releasing the interest amount without deducting TDS could not be considered wrongful or illegal, and the penalty imposed under Sections 201 and 201(1A) of the Act was unjustified. If any amount had been deposited, it was to be refunded to the petitioner along with interest at 6% per annum.
The High Court held that the amended question of law regarding the exclusion of 90% interest received from customers for eligible profits under Section 80HHC was concluded by the Gujarat High Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Atul Ltd., which was followed by this Court. The Court agreed with the Gujarat High Court's view that such interest earned on delayed payment of sale consideration is derived from business and should not be excluded for Section 80HHC computation. Regarding the exclusion of export turnover and total turnover of a 100% EOU for Section 80HHC deduction, the Court respectfully agreed with the Delhi High Court's judgment in CIT vs. M/s Dabur India Ltd. (and similar judgments from Madras and Bombay High Courts), holding that the deduction under Section 80HHC is computed based on specific components (export turnover, total turnover, profits of business) and the export turnover from an EOU unit is not to be excluded. The Court found that Section 10B provisions are similar to Section 10A in this context. Consequently, both questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee. The ITAT and CIT(A) orders were quashed to the extent of the disallowance, and the assessee was held entitled to the deduction under Section 80HHC. For the other appeals, the admitted questions of law were already adjudicated in favour of the assessee in M/s Mahavir Spinning Mills Ltd. vs. CIT, and those appeals were also allowed.
The Tribunal directed the AO to allow depreciation as per law, upholding the estimation of income by applying a net profit rate of 7%. The Tribunal also set aside the CIT(A)'s order regarding a Rs. 50,000 disallowance and directed the AO not to make any further disallowance.
The High Court, following its earlier decision in Jasjit Singh Vs. Union of India and Others, held that circulars or instructions issued by the Board cannot override statutory provisions or render them otiose. Legislative enactments with financial implications must be followed strictly. The Court found that authorities cannot usurp legal provisions for their convenience, causing hardship to assessees, by exercising powers under Sections 119 and 120 of the Act, 1961, as well as Section 144B(7 & 8). Instructions and circulars can only supplement statutory provisions and facilitate their implementation. Consequently, notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer under Section 148 of the Act, 1961, and proceedings initiated thereafter without conducting faceless assessment under Section 144B, were found to be contrary to the Act. The Court set aside the notices dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2024, and 30.03.2023, and the order dated 30.03.2023, for want of jurisdiction. In the present petition, notices dated 14.03.2024, 24.05.2024, and 29.06.2024 were set aside. The revenue was granted liberty to follow the prescribed procedure. Other questions raised by the petitioner were not pressed and were dismissed.
The High Court held that interest received from customers on delayed payment of sale consideration is derived from business and should not be excluded for calculating deduction under Section 80HHC. Similarly, the export turnover of a 100% EOU unit should not be excluded from the total turnover for Section 80HHC computation.
The High Court held that the question of law regarding Section 10B exemption was not pressed by the assessee and was therefore not decided. Regarding the amended questions of law, the Court allowed the appeals in favour of the assessee. For Issue 2, the Court agreed with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Atul Ltd., Nirma Industries Ltd., and Nirma Ltd., holding that 90% interest received from customers on delayed payment of sale consideration is derived from business and should not be excluded for the purpose of computing deduction under Section 80HHC. The Court found no substantial question of law arising on this issue and dismissed the revenue's appeal. For Issue 3, the Court respectfully agreed with the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. M/s Dabur India Ltd. (which dealt with Section 10A but was held to be similar in principle to Section 10B), the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Ambatture Clothing Ltd., and the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. M/s Hindustan Lever Ltd. The Court held that the export turnover from a 100% EOU unit is not to be excluded while computing deduction under Section 80HHC, as the deduction is computed based on specific components (export turnover, total turnover, and profits of business) without reference to total income. Consequently, the orders of the ITAT and CIT(A) were quashed and set aside to the extent of exclusion, and the assessee was held entitled to the deduction.
The High Court held that the question of law regarding Section 10B exemption was not pressed by the assessee and was therefore not decided. Regarding the amended questions of law, the Court allowed the appeals in favour of the assessee. For Issue 2, the Court agreed with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Atul Ltd., Nirma Industries Ltd., and Nirma Ltd., holding that 90% interest received from customers on delayed payment of sale consideration is derived from business and should not be excluded for the purpose of computing deduction under Section 80HHC. The Court found no substantial question of law arising on this issue and dismissed the revenue's appeal. For Issue 3, the Court respectfully agreed with the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. M/s Dabur India Ltd. (which dealt with Section 10A but was held to be similar in principle to Section 10B), the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Ambatture Clothing Ltd., and the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. M/s Hindustan Lever Ltd. The Court held that the export turnover from a 100% EOU unit is not to be excluded while computing deduction under Section 80HHC, as the deduction is computed based on specific components (export turnover, total turnover, and profits of business) without reference to total income. Consequently, the orders of the ITAT and CIT(A) were quashed and set aside to the extent of exclusion, and the assessee was held entitled to the deduction.
The High Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The court noted that the file had been completely burnt in a fire incident in the Registry. Despite repeated notices from the Registry to the parties to take steps for reconstruction of the file, no such steps were taken. In the absence of the necessary records and the parties' failure to facilitate the reconstruction, the court found it impossible to proceed with the hearing of the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. All pending applications were also dismissed accordingly.
The High Court held that the appeal has become infructuous. The reasoning provided is that the tax demand in dispute is Rs.1,42,290/-, which is less than Rupees One Crore. This fact, in conjunction with Circular No. 5 of 2024 dated 15.03.2024, renders the appeal infructuous. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below a certain threshold, as defined by relevant circulars, are to be considered infructuous and dismissed. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as having been rendered infructuous. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the PCIT. The Court found that the factual findings arrived at by the ITAT were based on substantial evidence and did not require any further examination. The Court noted that the trust was formed in 1942 for the benefit of the family, as well as for religious and charitable purposes, and had been continuously engaged in such activities. The ITAT's reliance on Section 12A registration and the cited judgments, including Radhasoami Satsang vs. Commissioner of Income-tax and Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Smt. Kasturbai Walchand Trust, was considered appropriate. The Court also took into account the renunciation certificate issued by the beneficiaries. Consequently, the Court found no perversity in the order of the ITAT and held that no substantial question of law arose for its consideration. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.
The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were purely factual. It noted that the ITAT had examined the facts and arrived at a finding. The ITAT, in its order, had addressed the issue of working capital adjustment, finding that the TPO himself had given such an adjustment for A.Ys. 2010-11 & 2011-12. The ITAT relied on its coordinate bench's decision in Sony Mobile Communication International SB (supra) and Navisite India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO, which held that working capital adjustment cannot be denied to the assessee, especially in service industries, to neutralize differences in carrying high or low inventory, trade payables, and trade receivables. The ITAT also noted that the Revenue had not pointed to any distinguishing feature in the facts of the current year compared to earlier years and had not placed any material to demonstrate that the decisions relied upon by the CIT(A) had been stayed or set aside by higher judicial forums. Consequently, the ITAT found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order and dismissed the Revenue's ground. The High Court agreed with the concurrent findings of the appellate authorities and found no substantial question of law. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The High Court also noted that for subsequent assessment years (2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014), the TPO himself had rejected the comparables, and there was no justification to allow inclusion of such comparables for the first time for the year 2009-2010. The Revenue failed to establish compelling reasons for such departure.
The High Court held that circulars or instructions issued by the Board cannot override statutory provisions or render them otiose. Legislative enactments with financial implications must be strictly followed. Authorities cannot usurp legal provisions for their convenience, causing hardship and confusion. Instructions and circulars can only supplement statutory provisions. Consequently, notices issued by the JAO under Section 148 of the Act, 1961, and proceedings initiated thereafter without conducting faceless assessment as envisaged under Section 144B of the Act, 1961, were found to be contrary to the Act. The Court set aside the notices dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2024, and 30.03.2023, and the order dated 30.03.2023, for want of jurisdiction. The revenue was granted liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, if advised. In the present specific case, notices dated 24.03.2024 and 25.04.2024 were set aside. Other questions raised were not pressed by the petitioner and were dismissed as not pressed. The ratio is that faceless assessment procedures mandated by statute cannot be bypassed by administrative instructions or by issuing notices without adhering to the prescribed assessment mechanism.
The Tribunal held that the present appeal filed by the appellant/Revenue stands dismissed. This decision is based on the procedural history where the Revenue's earlier appeal against the ITAT's order (which had set aside the CIT's order under Section 263) was dismissed by this Court, and the ITAT's order was upheld. Therefore, the present appeal, which appears to be a subsequent challenge or a continuation of the same dispute, is dismissed on the grounds of the prior unfavorable adjudication for the Revenue. No specific issue regarding the merits of the assessment itself was decided in this judgment; the dismissal is based on the finality of the previous court decision.
The High Court held that depreciation is allowable on machinery kept ready for use, even if not actually put to use, as it undergoes normal wear and tear. The addition on account of revenue expenditure was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the CIT was not justified in revising the AO's order under Section 263 of the Act. Regarding the arbitration award, it was an admitted position that the award was for assessment years 1989-90 and 1990-91, and additions made then were deleted by the CIT(Appeals). The assessee did not receive any award money during the assessment year 1993-94. Therefore, including award money in the assessment for 1993-94 was incorrect. Concerning cash withdrawals, the Tribunal found no material to support the CIT's assertion of black market foreign exchange purchases and subsequent deposits. The Tribunal also found that the AO had made proper inquiries before assessment regarding the suspense account. The High Court noted that the CIT's order was based on surmises and presumptions, and as per the Supreme Court in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. and M/s Paville Projects Private Limited, if two views are possible and the AO adopts one plausible view, the order cannot be revised under Section 263 merely because the CIT has a different view. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the issue relating to the TPO taking suo-motu cognizance of alleged excess AMP expenditure as an international transaction was purely academic. This was because the assessee had not been burdened with any costs relating to the AMP expenditure. The ITAT had granted full relief to the assessee, and the assessee's AR had conceded that the TPO's suo-motu cognizance was wrongful. The ITAT's order noted that additions made on a substantive basis were deleted by the DRP, and the revenue was not in appeal against this deletion. The ITAT had allowed the ground concerning sales-related expenses and had also allowed the ground regarding remaining AMP expenses on a protective basis, finding the issue covered in favour of the assessee by earlier ITAT orders. Since the remaining issue was academic and the assessee had not suffered any financial detriment, the Court did not propose to examine it, leaving it open for an appropriate case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the issue was already decided in a previous case with similar substantial questions of law. The Court found that the ITAT had given a finding of fact that the unit was entitled to the benefit under Section 10B, and circulars clarified the position.
The Tribunal, agreeing with the view taken by a Coordinate Bench, held that instructions or circulars issued by the Board could not override statutory provisions or render them otiose. Legislative enactments having financial implications must be followed strictly and mandatorily. The authorities cannot usurp legal provisions to their own satisfaction and convenience, causing hardship to assessees and confusion in taxpayers' minds. Instructions and circulars can only supplement statutory provisions for their implementation. Consequently, notices issued by the JAO under Section 148 of the Act, 1961, and proceedings initiated thereafter without conducting faceless assessments as envisaged under Section 144B of the Act, 1961, were found to be contrary to the provisions of the Act. The notices dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2023, 24.03.2023, and 30.03.2023, along with the order dated 30.03.2023, were set aside for want of jurisdiction. The revenue was at liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, and proceed accordingly. The writ petitions were allowed, and interim orders stood merged with the present order.
The High Court found that the ITAT's decision to uphold the Assessing Officer's order, which applied a higher GP rate of 21.95% instead of the assessee's declared 19.44%, was in conformity with law. The court did not find any reason to differ from the ITAT's order.
The High Court, considering the meager amount of the addition (Rs. 3,98,246/-) and referring to Circular No. 5/2024 issued by the GOI, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Direct Taxes, which stipulates that appeals with a tax effect below Rs. 1,00,00,000/- are to be adjudicated before the ITAT, found that the present appeal would be rendered as not pressed. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as not pressed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds related to tax effect and circulars.
The Tribunal, agreeing with the view taken by a coordinate bench, held that instructions or circulars issued by the Board could not override statutory provisions or render them obsolete. Legislative enactments with financial implications must be followed strictly. The authorities cannot usurp legal provisions to their own satisfaction or convenience, causing hardship to assessees and confusion. Instructions and circulars can only supplement statutory provisions for their implementation. Consequently, the notices issued by the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) under Section 148 of the Act, 1961, and the proceedings initiated thereafter without conducting faceless assessments as envisaged under Section 144B of the Act, 1961, were found to be contrary to the provisions of the Act. The notices dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2023, 24.03.2023, and 30.03.2023, and the order dated 30.03.2023, were set aside for want of jurisdiction. The revenue was granted liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, and proceed accordingly. All writ petitions were allowed, and the interim order passed by the Court stood merged with the present order. Other questions raised were not pressed and were dismissed.
The High Court held that the ITAT's view that stock should be valued at the lower of cost or market price was correct. Regarding the first issue, the Court found that the A.O. had assessed the stock on the basis of the price at which the goods had been sold by the assessee, which was higher than the declared value. The Court reasoned that the market price of goods can change annually, and therefore, the value of stock would accordingly change, necessitating valuation based on market price where it is higher. Section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was considered, which allows the A.O. to make an assessment if not satisfied with the accounts or if the method of accounting is not regularly followed. On the second issue, the Court held that the decision in CIT vs. British Paints India Ltd. (Supra) laid down principles for stock valuation considering the facts and circumstances of that specific case and would not be a binding precedent in all cases, especially when the market price of goods has not changed. The Court agreed with the view taken by the A.O. and affirmed by the ITAT, answering both questions in favour of the respondent-revenue.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the impugned order of the CIT. The Court found that neither the Assessing Officer's report nor the CIT's order contained a categorical discussion or specific finding that the donations/funds received by the petitioner society were utilized for any profit, personal gains, or other non-charitable purposes. The primary allegations were related to the non-production of proofs of expenses and improper maintenance of accounts. The Court held that the use of donations/funds by a renowned society already working for charitable purposes should not be discarded from seeking exemption merely on technicalities like production of receipts or entries, especially when there was no allegation of using funds for personal gains. The Court also noted that the petitioner had continuously enjoyed registration under Section 12AA and was within the definition of a charitable society. The construction of a Public Library was also considered a charitable function. The Court acknowledged the alternative remedy of appeal before the ITAT but, given the writ petition was filed in 2006, deemed it inappropriate to relegate the petitioner after 18 years. Therefore, the CIT's order was set aside, and the respondents were directed to reconsider the application and grant renewal of registration under Section 80G(5)(vi).
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, in its oral order, dismissed the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Panchkula. The Court stated that detailed reasons for this decision would be provided in a separate order of even date, passed in the case titled 'Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Panchkula vs. M/s Venus Remedies Limited'. All pending miscellaneous applications related to these appeals have also been disposed of.
The High Court held that the revenue expenditure incurred on patents and IPR should be allowed as a deduction while computing book profit under Section 115JB. The ITAT's order was set aside as the mistake was apparent from the books of accounts.
The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law requiring examination. The Court noted that the ITAT considered the original assessment records and examined the effect relating to the denial of deduction under Section 80IA(4) of the Act, amounting to Rs. 6,22,80,152/-. The ITAT followed its own order for AY 2012-13, where the same issue was examined and the order of the CIT(Appeals) was confirmed. The ITAT also considered the aspect that there were more than five distinct units and a single tenant from the same owner of the property, and that deduction had been allowed from AY 2006-07 to 2009-10. Given the concurrent factual findings of the CIT(Appeals) and the ITAT, the High Court found no substantial question of law to be examined. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court, considering the provisions of the circulars dated 11.07.2018 and 15.03.2024 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, decided not to delve into the merits of the issue. The Court acknowledged that the assessment amount in dispute is on the lower side. Consequently, all pending applications in this case were ordered to stand disposed of accordingly, and the appeal itself was to be disposed of in line with the circulars. The specific findings on the substantive tax dispute were not reached due to the procedural circumstances and the circulars relied upon.
The High Court held that the capital gains from the sale of shares in May 1995, declared in the return filed in October 1996, could not be added to the block period assessment. The earlier ITAT order remanding the matter to the AO was misinterpreted by the subsequent ITAT order.
The High Court held that while it does not find fault with the DRP's jurisdiction to correct errors in proceedings, it cannot overlook the fact that the final order was passed without taking into consideration the objections raised by the petitioner. The Court found itself unable to sustain the order dated September 29, 2023 (Annexure P-5). Consequently, the Court set aside the said order and directed the DRP to consider the objections which had already been raised by the petitioner and pass a final order expeditiously, within a period of three months from the date of the order. If demanded, personal hearing may be provided to the petitioner. The writ petition was allowed to the aforesaid extent.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the order of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court found that the aims and objects of the petitioner-trust, as detailed in its memorandum of association, encompassed multiple objectives beyond solely advancing education. These included social upliftment, setting up hospitals and dispensaries, organizing medical camps, providing economic assistance to the needy, distributing free food and clothing, helping orphanages and poor houses, and promoting public morality and humanity. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in New Noble Educational Society, which emphasized that for exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi), an institution must exist 'solely for educational purposes'. The Court concluded that since the trust was not found to exist solely for educational purposes, it was rightly denied exemption. The exemption was claimed by the trust itself, not by an individual educational institution run by it.
The High Court held that at the stage of a notice under Section 148, it should not interfere in the proceedings when the statutory authority has yet to conclude its task. The Court cited several precedents, including 'Lachhman Das Nayar and others vs. Hans Raj Puri, Income-Tax Officer, Amritsar and others' (1953 AIR (P&H) 55), 'Rasulji Buxji Kathawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi and another' (Civil Writ No.44 of 1955), 'Sumit Passi vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax' (2016) 386 ITR, Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) 5787/2022 titled as Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer Ward 10(3) Delhi, and Supreme Court in 'Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors. Vs. Chhabil Das Agarwal' (2014) 1 SCC 603 and 'Raymond Woollen Mills Limited vs. Income Tax Officer, Centre XI, Range Bombay and others' (Civil Appeals No.1972 of 1992 with No.1973 of 1992). The consistent view is that where proceedings are not concluded, the writ court should not intervene at such a premature stage. The Court found no reason to interfere under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, as it was not a case of the authority clutching jurisdiction not vested in it. The challenge was based on factual premises regarding the exercise of vested jurisdiction, for which statutory remedies are available. The writ petition was dismissed, with the observation that nothing in the judgment would be construed as an opinion on the merits of the case.
The High Court held that circulars or instructions by the Board could only be issued for supplementing statutory provisions and for their implementation, not to override them or make them obsolete. Legislative enactments with financial implications must be followed strictly. Authorities cannot usurp legal provisions for their own satisfaction and convenience, as this causes hardship and confusion for taxpayers. The Court agreed with the view of a Coordinate Bench that such actions were impermissible. Consequently, the notices dated 24.02.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2023, 24.03.2023, and 30.03.2023, along with the order dated 15.04.2024 passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 15.04.2024 under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were set aside for want of jurisdiction. The revenue was granted liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961. The writ petitions were allowed, and the interim order stood merged with the final order.
The High Court found that the ITAT had not examined the applicability of Section 80IC(4) regarding the conditions for the benefit. The court remanded the matter back to the ITAT to reconsider the issues.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Case (ITC) could not be decided on its merits due to the unavailability of necessary documents resulting from the record being partially burnt in a fire. The Court noted that attempts to reconstitute the file by sending notices to the concerned parties were unsuccessful, as no response was received. Furthermore, notices sent to the petitioner were returned unserved with a report indicating an incorrect address. In light of these circumstances, the Court concluded that it was impossible to proceed with the adjudication of the case on its merits. Accordingly, the ITC was dismissed for non-prosecution, and all pending applications were also disposed of.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court found that the ITAT, as well as the CIT (Appeals), had reached factual findings in favour of the assessee. The Court noted that the ITAT had observed that the assessee had furnished documentary evidence to support its case, including evidence regarding the rates of power and fuel which led to the fall in the GP rate. The Court specifically mentioned that the documentary evidence included ledger accounts of power and fuel, break-up of power and fuel, and comparative charts of rates for AY 2011-12 and 2012-13. The Court also noted that this evidence was furnished before the CIT (Appeals) and was not controverted by the AO. Regarding the non-compete fee, the ITAT had noticed documentary evidence supporting the assessee's claim. The Court concluded that the findings of fact recorded by both the CIT (Appeals) and the ITAT did not require interpretation by the High Court as they did not create any substantial question of law, and there was no perversity in the orders passed by the lower authorities. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Case could not be decided on merits due to the lack of documents resulting from the destruction of the file in a fire. Since no response was received from either party for the reconstitution of the file, the court found it impossible to proceed with the adjudication of the case. Accordingly, the Income Tax Case was dismissed for non-prosecution. All pending applications related to the case were also disposed of.
The High Court held that it was of the firm view that parallel proceedings could not be allowed to continue. The Court also acknowledged that any order passed by the High Court would definitely influence the decision in the miscellaneous application/review filed by the Revenue before the ITAT. Consequently, the Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the appeals at this stage as premature. The department was granted liberty to pursue its remedies before the ITAT and was informed that they would be free to approach the High Court again if they remained aggrieved by any order passed by the ITAT. The applications for condonation of delay and exemption were allowed, and the appeals were disposed of accordingly.
The High Court addressed the substantial questions of law. Regarding the first question, concerning the ex-parte assessment and opportunity to be heard, the Court found that the AO had issued multiple notices under Section 143(2) and 142(1) of the IT Act. The record indicated that the assessee admitted service of notice and, despite this, chose not to appear. The revenue's submission that the assessee was represented by a lawyer who sought adjournments was also considered. The Court concluded that the AO's action did not warrant interference and answered this question in favour of the revenue. Consequently, for the second question, regarding the alleged violation of Section 145, the Court noted that the AO had invoked Section 144 (best judgment assessment) due to the assessee's failure to pursue the proceedings after appearing through counsel. The Court held that the AO had no other option but to proceed under Section 144. Therefore, the action taken by the AO was deemed not to warrant interference, and question (ii) was answered in favour of the revenue. As both questions (i) and (ii) were answered in favour of the revenue, the third question regarding the sustainability of the impugned orders was also answered in favour of the revenue. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the appeal filed by Freeman Measures Ltd. The dismissal was based on the submission by the learned counsel for the appellant that they had no instructions from the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Court also noted that all pending miscellaneous applications in the matter stood disposed of. The judgment does not provide any reasoning on the merits of the case, as the dismissal was procedural. No specific principle or ratio decidendi for future citation on substantive tax law issues can be derived from this decision.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. This decision was based on the submission by the learned counsel for the appellant that they had no instructions from the appellant. The Court reasoned that without instructions, the appeal could not be proceeded with on its merits. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of on this procedural ground. The ratio decidendi is that an appeal cannot be prosecuted if the counsel lacks instructions from the party. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal and the disposal of all pending miscellaneous applications.
The High Court, after considering the submissions of both parties and the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) vs. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (Supra), found no error in the judgment passed by the ITAT. The Court noted that the Supreme Court's larger Bench had summed up its conclusions regarding the interpretation of the changed definition of 'charitable purpose' in Section 2(15) of the Act, effective from 01.04.2009. The Supreme Court's conclusions, as reproduced in the judgment, elaborated on the general test under Section 2(15), the harmonious interpretation of Section 11(4A) with Section 2(15), and the treatment of receipts by statutory authorities and government bodies. The High Court found that the ITAT had considered all these aspects and the objects for which the Haryana Rural Development Act, 1986, was enacted, and the activities of the respondent-Board. The Court concluded that the Commissioner was not justified in denying the registration. Therefore, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.
The High Court held that an opportunity of hearing must be provided to the assessee when a revision petition is decided under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that procedural fairness dictates that an assessee should be heard before a revisional authority passes an order affecting their case. Consequently, the impugned order dated 29.03.2024 was set aside. The Court directed the respondent-Principal Commissioner of Income Tax to decide the revision petition afresh after granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The operative direction is to grant a fresh hearing and decide the matter anew. No other issues were decided.