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The High Court dismissed the appeal. It was not disputed by the revenue's counsel that the matter was no longer res integra and had been concluded by a prior decision of the same Court in ITA-5-2016 decided on 25.4.2016. In that earlier case, an identical question as raised in the present appeal was held not to be a substantial question of law. Therefore, for the reasons recorded in the aforementioned appeal, the present appeal was also dismissed. No specific finding was given on the merits of the stay period exceeding 365 days, as the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the issue was already decided by the High Court.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. It was clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue claimed by the revenue was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No decision was made on the substantive merits of the appeal.
The High Court ordered accordingly, disposing of the writ petition as infructuous. The court noted the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondent that search proceedings under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, had taken place in the premises of the assessee on February 13, 2019. Consequently, in terms of the second proviso to Section 153A(1) of the Act, the proceedings under Section 142(2A) had abated. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not dispute this position and submitted that the petition had become infructuous. Therefore, the court found no reason to proceed with the writ petition on merits and disposed of it as infructuous.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order. Regarding the claim of ₹10,31,906 for repair and renovation of the property sold, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the assessee had only produced a quotation dated 26.6.1999, which was not evidence of actual expenditure. The CIT(A) noted that the original bills were allegedly stolen, and an FIR was filed, but the architect's report was merely a quotation for work done at a different time. The Tribunal further observed that the assessee failed to provide bills of material and labour or any other proof of incurring the expenditure, despite opportunities. Regarding the ₹4,95,000 paid for renovation of the newly purchased house, the contractor stated that only petty renovation like whitewashing was done, costing approximately ₹90,000-95,000. The CIT(A) allowed a partial relief of ₹1,00,000. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding no substantive or corroborative material produced by the assessee. The Court found no illegality or perversity in the findings of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. The second issue concerning the distinction between criminal and civil jurisprudence was not addressed as the appeal was dismissed on merits.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The decision was based on the low tax effect of ₹2,77,400/-. The Court followed the precedent set by the Apex Court in 'Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Dhanalekshmi Bank Ltd., [2015] 373 ITR 526 (SC)', where an appeal was dismissed without delving into the merits due to a low tax effect, leaving the question of law open. The Court clarified that this dismissal does not constitute an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. The legal issue, as claimed by the Revenue, is expressly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. No specific operative directions like remand or deletion were issued, as the appeal was dismissed on a procedural ground.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. The Court noted that the revenue's counsel did not dispute that the matter in issue was no longer res integra and stood concluded by the decision of this Court in ITA-5-2016, decided on April 25, 2016. In that prior decision, an identical question as raised in the present appeal was held not to be a substantial question of law. Therefore, for the reasons recorded in the earlier appeal, the present appeal was also dismissed. No specific finding was given on the contravention of Section 254(2A) or the void ab-initio nature of the order, as the appeal was disposed of based on the precedent.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The decision was based on the tax effect of ₹1,49,597/-. The Court relied on the Apex Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Dhanalekshmi Bank Ltd., [2015] 373 ITR 526 (SC), where an appeal was dismissed without going into the merits due to low tax effect, leaving the question of law open. The High Court clarified that the dismissal of the appeal would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. The legal issue, as claimed by the Revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No specific finding was given on the merits of the case.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The Tribunal had correctly noted that ₹18,00,000/- was deposited in an escrow account, with both transferor and transferee having common rights. Due to a dispute and ongoing litigation, there was no certainty about the quantum or timing of the release of funds from the escrow account. Therefore, the assessee did not have a vested right to receive the amount until the end of the litigation, at which point the rights and liabilities were ascertained. The ITAT rightly concluded that capital gains accrued in AY 2010-11 when the assessee's share was passed on. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the investment in REC bonds was made in the year of receipt and taxability of capital gains, entitling the assessee to the benefit under Section 54EC. The High Court found no error in the ITAT's findings and dismissed the revenue's appeal, stating the Apex Court's judgment in Sanjeev Lal was based on its own facts and did not advance the revenue's case.
The High Court held that the matter in issue was no longer res integra and stood concluded by a previous decision of the same Court in ITA-5-2016 decided on April 25, 2016. In that prior decision, an identical question raised in the present appeal was held not to be a substantial question of law. Consequently, following the precedent set in ITA-5-2016, the present appeal was also dismissed. The Court did not independently analyze the application of Section 254(2A) to the facts of this case but relied on its prior ruling. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was dismissed based on the established legal position.
The High Court noted that the revenue had communicated that the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Act for the assessment year 2010-11 had been dropped vide an order dated February 28, 2019. In light of this development, the petitioner's counsel submitted that the writ petition had become infructuous. The Court acknowledged this submission and ordered accordingly. The primary finding was that the challenge to the assessment proceedings was rendered moot by the revenue's subsequent action of dropping the proceedings. No specific issue regarding the merits of the original assessment proceedings was decided, as the case was disposed of on a procedural ground. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition as infructuous.
The High Court considered the application filed by the appellant (Commissioner of Income-Tax-I, Amritsar) seeking permission to withdraw the main appeal. The Court allowed the application. Consequently, the main appeal (ITA No.84 of 2011) was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the appeal. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court held that in view of the moratorium declared by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 14(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the writ petition had become infructuous. The court noted that the parties were in agreement on this point. Consequently, the petition was disposed of as such. The court did not delve into the merits of the dispute regarding the precedence of recovery between the Income Tax Department and the State Bank of India, as the moratorium effectively stayed all such recovery proceedings. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition as infructuous.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in it. The Court held that the appeal under Section 260A of the Act lies only on a substantial question of law. The High Court found that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Assessing Officer, the CIT(A), and the Tribunal were not perverse. The Court noted that the assessee's plea of a mistake by the accountant remained unsubstantiated and was not supported by the explanation furnished. The Court observed that the revised statement of account was not genuine, as only the cash payment entries were altered and split into smaller amounts to circumvent Section 40A(3). The delay in submitting the revised account and the affidavit from the accountant were considered circumstantial evidence of an attempt to escape liability. The Court concluded that appreciation of evidence to arrive at a different conclusion does not fall within the ambit of a substantial question of law. Therefore, the findings of fact could not be held to be perverse. No substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the Draft Assessment Order was an appealable order under the Income-tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the Court declined to go into the merits of the controversy presented in the writ petition. The principle applied is that writ jurisdiction is generally not to be exercised when an equally efficacious alternative remedy is available. The Court disposed of the writ petition by relegating the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy of appeal. The petitioner was granted three weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order to file an appeal. It was clarified that if filed within this period, the appeal would not be dismissed on the grounds of limitation and would be decided in accordance with law. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the Court chose not to decide the merits of the assessment.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the liberty sought by the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was being left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. No specific finding on the merits of the original dispute was made.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty granted to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be construed as an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue claimed by the revenue was explicitly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn with liberty.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The Court did not decide the merits of the case.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the liberty prayed for by the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the High Court explicitly stated that the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was being left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal if something survives therein. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue shall not be taken as an affirmation of the order of the Tribunal on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No specific finding was given on the merits of the case, as the appeal was withdrawn by the revenue.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal. The Court noted that the concurrent findings of fact by the Assessing Officer, CIT(A), and the Tribunal were not shown to be illegal or perverse. The Tribunal had found the assessee's explanation for the cash deposit implausible, considering the 8-9 month gap between withdrawal and re-deposit, the subsequent taking of loans and further withdrawals, and the staggered manner of re-deposit. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had not provided any further explanation before it. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal that the assessee had been unable to justify the cash deposits. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law was made out.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty granted to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue shall not be construed as an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. The specific findings on the merits of the case or the ITAT's order were not addressed due to the withdrawal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn with the specified liberty.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. It granted the revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be construed as an affirmation of the ITAT's order on its merits. Furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. No specific finding was given on the merits of the case, as the appeal was withdrawn before any such adjudication.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on its merits. Furthermore, the legal issue that the revenue claimed to exist was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal with liberty to revive.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty granted to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue claimed by the revenue was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn with liberty.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue claimed by the revenue was explicitly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn, with the specified liberty and clarification.
The High Court held that it lacked territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The court observed that while the initial assessment process commenced in New Delhi, the final assessment order was passed by the Assessing Officer at Ghaziabad. Citing the precedent in Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad vs. M/s Motorola India Ltd. and Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Gurgaon vs. M/s Parabolic Drugs Limited, the court emphasized that the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court extends only to the area over which it exercises jurisdiction, and the location of the Assessing Officer determines the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed on the preliminary objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The court returned the complete paper books to the appellant-revenue for filing before the competent court of jurisdiction. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court allowed the revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The court noted the communication from the Income Tax Officer (Hq.)(Judl.) stating the tax effect was ₹12,64,621/-, which is below the CBDT's monetary limit of ₹50,00,000/- for High Court appeals. Consequently, the learned counsel for the revenue stated they had instructions to withdraw the appeal. The court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty granted to the revenue to file an application for revival if circumstances warranted. It was clarified that the withdrawal does not signify affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits, and the legal issue claimed by the revenue is left open for adjudication in an appropriate case. No specific finding was given on the merits of the original dispute.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal if something survives therein. It was clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be taken as an affirmation of the order of the Tribunal on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue as claimed by the revenue was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The court did not decide the merits of the case.
The High Court allowed the Civil Miscellaneous Application, permitting the revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted that the tax effect was ₹27,38,474, which is below the ₹50.00 lakhs limit specified in CBDT Circular No. 03/2018, directing withdrawal of such appeals. The Court explicitly clarified that the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn shall not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the Court stated that the legal issue claimed by the revenue was being left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The main appeal (ITA-9-2016) was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
The High Court noted that the respondent-assessee had submitted that a moratorium was declared by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 14(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which prohibited the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor. The assessee relied on the Delhi High Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd., which held that the Code would apply notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court had also dismissed the Special Leave Petition against this decision, observing that the Code would override anything inconsistent in other enactments. The revenue's counsel could not seriously oppose this prayer. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the appeals with liberty to the revenue to revive them subject to further orders from the NCLT. The specific questions of law framed by the revenue regarding the interpretation of Section 153A and the scope of search assessments were not decided on merits due to the moratorium.
The High Court held that the findings of the Tribunal on all issues were findings of fact. The Court found no illegality or perversity in the Tribunal's orders that would warrant interference. Specifically, regarding the sale of shares, the Tribunal had treated the profit as capital gains based on the principle of consistency, noting that this treatment had never been disputed by the revenue in prior years. For dividend income, the Tribunal correctly noted that amendments to Section 10(34) and Section 115-O of the Act, effective from 1st April 2004, shifted the tax liability from the recipient to the dividend-paying company. Therefore, dividend income was not taxable in the hands of the assessee. The reliance on Brook Bond & Co. Limited was deemed inapplicable due to the change in law. The Tribunal's decision to restore the issue of disallowance of expenses under Section 14A to the AO for determining expenses incurred for earning exempt dividend income was upheld. The Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was being left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No specific finding was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal, as prayed for. It was clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The court did not decide the merits of the case.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty granted to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The principle that can be cited is that appeals can be withdrawn based on specific circulars and tax effects, with the court retaining the discretion to grant liberty for revival under certain circumstances, while explicitly stating that such withdrawal is not an endorsement of the lower authority's decision.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted the revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. It was clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The court did not decide the substantive merits of the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. It granted the revenue liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal, as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No specific finding was given on the merits of the ITAT's order.
The High Court held that the Revenue's counsel was unable to point out any error or illegality in the Tribunal's findings. The Tribunal had held that the assessee's claim for 100% deduction under Section 80IC was based on a bonafide belief and did not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars or concealment of income. The Tribunal had relied on the Himachal Pradesh High Court's decision in M/s Stovekraft India Vs. CIT, which supported the allowability of deduction under Section 80IC on account of substantial expansion. Therefore, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order deleting the penalty. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The High Court held that the payment of non-compete fee is an allowable revenue expenditure, citing its own previous decision in ITA No. 193 of 2013. Expenses incurred for starting new business lines (healthcare division, Maxxon) and for business expansion were held to be revenue expenditure, referencing its decision in ITA No. 426 of 2010. Regarding the conversion of stock into investment and subsequent losses, the Court noted that the merger of Max Corporation Limited with the assessee led to the conversion of shares from stock-in-trade to investment. The ITAT had upheld the CIT(A)'s view that this conversion was valid and losses were not speculative. The Court found no perversity in the ITAT's findings and answered questions (d) to (f) against the revenue. For question (g) concerning non-compete fee and capital gains, the Court relied on the Guffic Chem. P. Ltd. case and its own previous rulings, holding that prior to April 1, 2003, such payments were capital receipts and not taxable as capital gains. The additional questions in ITA Nos. 189 and 191 of 2013 were also decided against the revenue, referencing prior judgments of the Court. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The primary reason for dismissal was the monetary limit stipulated in the CBIC instructions dated July 11, 2018, which fixed the threshold for filing appeals in High Courts at ₹50,00,000. Since the tax effect in the present appeal was ₹12,00,000, which was below the prescribed limit, the appeal was dismissed in accordance with these instructions. The Court also referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income tax Vs. Dhanalekshmi Bank Ltd., where appeals with low tax effects were dismissed without adjudicating on the merits. The High Court clarified that the dismissal of the appeal would not be construed as an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits, and the legal issue raised by the Revenue was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeal was disposed of on a procedural/administrative ground.
The High Court held that the payments made to the sub-contractor fell under Section 194C of the Act and not Section 194J. The Court reasoned that the assessee was engaged in a works contract for constructing a thermal power plant, which involved men, machinery, and material, resulting in a physical output and a tangible structure. The scope of work given to the sub-contractor, including grounding, straightening, cutting, transporting, erection, alignment, welding, testing, inspection, illumination, and communication, constituted construction activities undertaken with men and machines, which were beyond the scope of technical services as defined in Section 194J. The Court noted that the sub-contractor had offered the payments received to tax, eliminating any justification for creating an additional demand due to short deduction. Consequently, there was no short deduction under Section 201(1) and no liability for interest under Section 201(1A). The Court found no error in the findings of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, and therefore, no substantial question of law arose. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Commissioner of Customs, Ludhiana. The dismissal was based on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in 'Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Dhanalekshmi Bank Ltd., [2015] 373 ITR 526 (SC)', where appeals with a low tax effect were dismissed without delving into the merits of the case. The Court clarified that this dismissal should not be construed as an affirmation of the CESTAT's order on merits. The legal issue raised by the Revenue was explicitly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case. Therefore, no specific finding was made on the entitlement to interest or the quantum thereof.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's findings were not illegal or perverse. The Tribunal had correctly noted that the grounds for cancellation of registration were based on three additions made to the assessee's income for Assessment Years 2005-06 and 2006-07. The first addition, concerning unaccounted cash found at the trustees' residence, was dismissed in the revenue's quantum appeal. The second addition, an unaccounted payment of ₹8 lakhs to M/s R.K. Engineering Works, was deleted, and no appeal was filed against this deletion. The third ground, an unexplained cash transfer entry, was also decided in favour of the assessee. Since all issues on which registration was cancelled no longer survived, the Tribunal rightly allowed the assessee's appeal. The court also noted that the assessee had been granted fresh registration from AY 2008-09, with the CIT finding the trust and its activities genuine and charitable. Consequently, the consequential benefits of exemption under Section 80G and Section 11 were rightly extended. The substantial questions of law were answered against the revenue.
The High Court held that no illegality or perversity could be pointed out in the findings of the ITAT. The Tribunal had allowed exemption under Section 11 and 12 of the Act because the assessee had been granted registration under Section 12AA and had fulfilled the conditions for Sections 11 and 12. The ITAT had noted that in regular assessment, the assessee's income was determined at nil. Regarding the deletion of additions and penalty, the Tribunal had observed that once quantum additions were deleted, there was no amount on which the assessee could be said to have evaded tax, and therefore, no penalty could be levied. The High Court found no reason to interfere with the ITAT's orders. The substantial questions of law were answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court ordered accordingly, meaning the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning provided is that the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that necessary relief had been granted to the petitioner and requested the writ petition be dismissed as withdrawn. The Court accepted this submission and disposed of the petition. The specific nature of the relief granted to the petitioner, which led to the withdrawal, is not detailed in the judgment. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the petition was withdrawn.
The High Court allowed the withdrawal of the writ petition. The Court held that it shall be open to the petitioner(s) to take recourse to the remedies as may be available to him, in accordance with law. This implies that the petitioner is free to pursue the appellate remedy against the Assessment Order passed by the respondent. The Court did not decide on the merits of the original challenge to the notice under Section 148 or the objections order. The ratio decidendi is that a party can withdraw a writ petition and pursue alternative statutory remedies, provided such remedies are available and pursued within the prescribed time limits.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law are decided against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The Court relied on the Apex Court's decision in M/s Classic Binding Industries's case. The Court reasoned that once an assessee starts claiming deduction under Section 80IC and the initial assessment year has commenced, there cannot be another "Initial Assessment Year" for the purpose of Section 80IC within the 10-year period, even if substantial expansion is undertaken. This would amount to "doing violence to the provisions of sub-section (3) read with sub-section (6) of Section 80-IC." A pragmatic and reasonable interpretation dictates that there cannot be another "Initial Assessment Year" for claiming 100% deduction for the next five years based on substantial expansion. The Court distinguished the case from Mahabir Industries, where assessees had availed initial deduction under Section 80-IA, which had different conditions. In the present cases, the assessees availed deduction under Section 80-IC alone, and the initial assessment year commenced under this provision. Consequently, the ITAT orders were set aside, and the appeals were allowed.
The High Court found no merit in the revenue's appeal. It noted that the assessee's Section 12AA registration was continuing and that its previous Section 80G registration had not been withdrawn, although it had expired. The Tribunal had observed that the assessee's assessment for AY 2012-13 allowed benefits under Section 11, and its return for AY 2016-17 declared 'Nil' income claiming exemption under Section 11. There was no violation by the assessee warranting withdrawal of its 12AA registration. The Court agreed with the Tribunal that once established as a charitable institution for 80G registration, it cannot be denied again. The Tribunal's reliance on the Circular dated 27.10.2010, which deemed registrations expiring on or after 1.10.2009 as extended in perpetuity, was considered valid. The High Court held that no illegality or perversity could be pointed out by the revenue and no substantial question of law arose. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that since the issues raised in the present writ petition were substantively similar to those being debated before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and considering the orders passed by the Supreme Court protecting the petitioner's rights and restraining coercive action, the present petition need not be kept alive. The Court disposed of the petition, leaving the parties to their remedies before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The High Court also clarified that the petitioner's remedy against assessment orders, in accordance with the law, would remain available. No specific issue was left undecided; the petition was disposed of on procedural grounds related to parallel proceedings.