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The High Court held that since the assessee company is under liquidation and a liquidator has been appointed, the appeal cannot be proceeded with in its present form. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. However, liberty was granted to the assessee company to work out its remedy in accordance with law at a later point in time. No order as to costs was made. The specific grounds of appeal or the merits of the case were not decided.
The High Court recorded the endorsement made by the learned counsel for the appellant seeking permission to withdraw the tax case appeals. Consequently, the Court granted the permission and dismissed the tax case appeals as withdrawn. No costs were awarded. The judgment does not provide any reasoning on the merits of the original appeals before the Tribunal, as the appeals were disposed of solely on the basis of the withdrawal request. No specific issues were decided on merit.
The High Court set aside the impugned order of the ITAT and remitted the case back to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order. The Court held that while the assessee was not entitled to exemption as a Trust under Sections 11, 12, and 12A due to lack of registration under Section 12AA for the relevant assessment year, it should not be denied other legitimate deductions available under the Act. The Court reasoned that the purpose of assessment is to recover just tax, not to impose unjust tax liability. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Goetze India Ltd. vs. CIT, stating it pertains to the power of the Assessing Authority and does not impinge on the power of the ITAT under Section 254. The Court found that the Assessing Officer should have considered other applicable deductions before finalizing the assessment. The substantial questions of law were partly answered in favour of the assessee. The operative direction was to remit the case to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act (later amended to delete this specific section reference).
The High Court recorded the submission made by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant Revenue that both appeals were under low tax effect. Based on this submission, the Court ordered that both appeals stand dismissed. The Court explicitly stated that the questions of law raised in these appeals are kept open to be decided at the appropriate point of time. No order as to costs was made. The principle derived is that appeals can be dismissed on the ground of low tax effect, even if the questions of law are substantial, with the liberty to revisit them later.
The High Court held that no substantial questions of law arose for consideration in the appeal. The dispute concerned cash deposits made by the assessee during demonetization, which were treated as unexplained income. The Court found no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the ITAT. The ITAT had partly allowed the appeal by attributing Rs. 4,00,000/- of the cash deposits to savings from agricultural income declared in the preceding two financial years (approximately Rs. 6,00,000/- declared in total), after considering expenses. The remaining additions of Rs. 27,60,956/- were confirmed as the assessee could not provide sufficient evidence for the source of these deposits. The operative direction from the ITAT was to allow relief to the extent of Rs. 4,00,000/- towards cash deposits.
The High Court, acknowledging the submission made by the Revenue's counsel regarding the low tax effect, decided to dismiss the Tax Case Appeals. The Court explicitly stated that the substantial questions of law raised in these appeals would be kept open for adjudication at an appropriate stage. This means the Tribunal's order remains undisturbed on merits, and the appeals before the High Court were disposed of on a procedural ground (low tax effect) rather than a substantive legal determination. No costs were awarded. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeals.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's objects and activities were in the nature of general public utility (GPU) but were also in the nature of trade, commerce, or business, thus potentially hit by the proviso to Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal found that the assessee's gross income from conducting conferences exceeded 20% of its gross receipts for the assessment year 2013-14. However, it noted that the assessee's counsel had calculated this limit based on net income after expenses, which was not in accordance with the law. The Tribunal therefore set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer to verify the facts with reference to the assessee's financial statements and examine the assessee's entitlement for exemption in light of the gross receipts from trade, commerce, or business activities. The High Court found no substantial question of law and upheld the ITAT's order.
The High Court held that to the extent of Rs. 56,96,988/-, the Tribunal's decision to treat certain expenses as revenue expenditure was acceptable, as these expenses were culled out by the Tribunal based on their nature. However, for the remaining expenditure of Rs. 1,81,92,126/-, the High Court found no error in the Tribunal's order. The reasoning was that since the assessee itself had booked this expenditure as capital expenditure, it could not subsequently claim it as revenue expenditure. Therefore, the Tribunal's approval of the invocation of Section 35D for this portion of the expenditure was upheld. The questions of law were answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
The High Court noted that the appellant company had been ordered to be under liquidation by the National Company Law Tribunal. In view of this development, the court held that the appeal could not be proceeded further. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The court granted liberty to the assessee to work out its remedy in the future in accordance with law. No costs were awarded. The specific findings of the ITAT or the merits of the original dispute were not addressed as the appeal was dismissed on a procedural ground.
The High Court decided to dispose of the appeal by remitting all issues back to the Assessing Officer for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. This decision was made following the precedent set by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) -vs- Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority [2022] 143 taxmann.com 278 (SC). The High Court explicitly stated that all issues were left open to be canvassed before the assessing officer. Therefore, no finding was given on the merits of the case by the High Court, and no specific relief was granted or denied at this stage. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer. No issue was expressly left undecided, as all were remitted.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the respondent-assessee and against the Revenue. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's finding that the CIT's revision order under Section 263 was based on a difference of opinion, and that the Assessing Officer had not passed the order without application of mind. The Tribunal correctly considered the fact that the recipients of the payment had declared the amounts as income and paid taxes. The Court also upheld the Tribunal's view that the amended second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative, having retrospective effect. Furthermore, the Court noted that the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) are applicable only to amounts payable as of the last day of the financial year, not to amounts already paid without TDS. The Court found no merit in the Revenue's challenge to the Tribunal's order and dismissed the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court, by order dated 27.08.2024, dismissed the Tax Case Appeal filed by the Revenue. This dismissal was based on the submission made by the Revenue's counsel regarding the low tax effect of the case. The Court recorded this submission and proceeded to dismiss the appeal. Subsequently, by order dated 05.09.2024, the Court clarified its earlier order. It directed the Registry to re-issue the order to include a specific statement that the questions of law raised in the appeal were kept open for adjudication at an appropriate stage. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed without deciding the merits of the questions of law, preserving the right to raise them later.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law, concerning the allowability of electricity charges paid to Wescare, was covered by a decision rendered in the assessee's own case by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Tube Investments of India (P) Ltd. (2023) 150 Taxmann.com Page 186 (SC). Consequently, this question was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Regarding the second and third substantial questions of law, which were considered issues arising from the first question, the Court found that in view of the decision on the first question, the matter needed to be remitted back to the assessing officer for fresh consideration. The appeal was disposed of with this direction, answering the first question in favour of the assessee. No specific finding was recorded on the merits of the second and third issues by the High Court, as they were remitted.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by Yelchur Venkata Kotiah Charities. The dismissal was based on the Court's prior order dated 27.08.2024 in TCA Nos. 265 of 2015, which in turn followed the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) -vs- Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority [2022] 143 taxmann.com 278 (SC). The Court held that since the issue raised in the present appeals had been remitted back to the Assessing Officer for passing orders on merits and in accordance with law, the appeals should be disposed of by following the aforesaid decision. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, leaving all issues open to be canvassed before the Assessing Officer. No costs were awarded.
The High Court, in this case, followed its own Division Bench judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s.Ennore Cargo Container Terminal Pvt. Ltd. The Court held that even if there are common shareholders between the assessee-company and the entity providing the advance (Indev Logistics Pvt. Ltd.), and the advance may have been for the benefit of those shareholders, it could only be assessed in the hands of the registered shareholders, not in the hands of the assessee-company. The Court distinguished the present case from the Supreme Court's decision in Gopal and Sons, which dealt with loans and advances received by a HUF and their classification as deemed dividend. The substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court, following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) vs. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority [2022] 143 taxmann.com 278 (SC), dismissed the Tax Case Appeal. The Supreme Court had also held that the issue had to be decided afresh and the assessment had to be reopened. Therefore, the High Court's decision was to uphold the ITAT's order of remand, leaving open all issues to be canvassed before the assessing officer. No costs were awarded. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal, effectively upholding the remand by the ITAT.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the appeal. The Tribunal is the ultimate fact-finding authority, and its findings cannot be disturbed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is confined to substantial questions of law. The Tribunal had found that the assessee had not furnished the required information for completing the assessment under Section 143(3) and had not disclosed fully and truly all material facts, thus justifying the reopening of assessment under Section 147. The Tribunal specifically noted that no details were filed regarding the loss on restatement of foreign exchange during the original assessment proceedings and that the provided details were not sufficient for completing the assessment. The Tribunal also held that a change of opinion did not arise as the assessee had not filed relevant details. Regarding the disallowance of foreign exchange losses, the Tribunal noted the Assessing Officer's observation that the assessee failed to establish how the provision was calculated on a scientific basis. The High Court concluded that the appeal was not maintainable and dismissed it.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law had arisen for consideration. The Court found that the arguments advanced by the Revenue were purely questions of fact and not questions of law. The Revenue's contention that the ITAT came to a wrong conclusion based on erroneous appreciation of facts was considered a matter of fact. The Court stated that if the Revenue believed there was an error in the ITAT's appreciation of facts, they should move a suitable application for rectification of the order. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court granted liberty to the appellant (Revenue) to move a suitable application for rectification of the impugned order of the ITAT. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law, specifically questions 1 and 2, were already decided in favour of the assessee by this Court's decision in CIT vs. SRA Systems, which was followed in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai vs. Mizpah Publishing Services (P.) Ltd. Regarding the third question of law concerning the introduction of Rule 8D, the Court noted that it was introduced for the assessment year 2008-09 onwards. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Essar Teleholdings Ltd., the Court stated that Rule 8D has prospective effect. Therefore, as the issue pertains to the assessment year 2007-08, Rule 8D would not apply to the assessee. The Court also referred to a decision in M/s. Simpson and Co. Ltd. Vs. DCIT, which was deferred by the Supreme Court in Essar Teleholdings Ltd. Consequently, the third question of law was also answered in favour of the assessee. The appeal was disposed of by answering all questions of law in favour of the assessee, with no order as to costs.
The High Court recorded the submission made by the Revenue's counsel regarding the liquidation of the respondent company and the appointment of an official liquidator. Based on this submission, the Court disposed of the Tax Case Appeal. The disposal was made with liberty granted to the official liquidator to agitate the issue at a later point in time, should the Revenue decide to proceed further. No order as to costs was made. The specific merits of the appeal or the Tribunal's order were not adjudicated upon.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised in the appeals are answered in favour of the assessee. The Court noted that the issue of whether income from letting out property for a software technology park is business income or house property income has been categorically settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chennai Properties & Investments Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax. The Supreme Court held that in such cases, letting of properties is in fact the business of the assessee, and the income should be rightly disclosed under the head 'Income from Business' and cannot be treated as income from house property. The Court also referred to Circular No. 16 of 2017 of the CBDT and decisions of the Karnataka High Court in Velankani Information Systems Pvt. Ltd. and CIT vs. Information Technology Park Ltd., which were accepted by the Board, reinforcing the view that income from letting out premises in an industrial park/SEZ is business income. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Income Tax Department and dismissed them. The appeals were dismissed, and the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.
The High Court recorded the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant company is under liquidation and therefore, the appellant wishes to pursue their remedy before the official liquidator, as nothing further survives in the present appeal. Based on this submission, the Court found that the appeal had become infructuous. Consequently, the Tax Appeal was dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs. No specific issue was decided on merits, and the dismissal was based on the procedural development of the appellant company being under liquidation.
The High Court dismissed the Tax Case Appeal. Regarding the second ground before the ITAT, the assessee claimed a loan of Rs. 25 Lakhs from Sukumar but failed to provide any proof. The ITAT found this ground not feasible to entertain. Similarly, for the third ground, the assessee claimed an expenditure of Rs. 17,37,000/- for levelling the ground, but there was no evidence regarding the source of payment or that the payment was made directly by the assessee. Consequently, the Assessing Officer added this amount as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C. The ITAT also found this ground factually not feasible. The High Court found no substantial question of law in the ITAT's order and therefore dismissed the appeal. The court noted that it is open to the appellant to file a rectification application before the ITAT if any factual error is found in the impugned order.
The High Court allowed the appeals in favour of the assessee. It held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of Section 80-IA(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that remitting the case back to the AO to re-examine the eligibility for the Section 80-IA deduction, after the CIT's Section 263 orders were upheld by the ITAT, would serve no useful purpose and would be an empty formality. The Court referred to the principles laid down in National Thermal Power Company Ltd. v. CIT and Formica India Division v. CCE, emphasizing that statutory benefits should not be denied on technical grounds when an assessee is otherwise eligible. Consequently, the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee, and the appeals were allowed. The operative direction was to allow the appeals, setting aside the ITAT's order and the CIT's Section 263 orders.
The High Court held that the Tribunal did not commit an error in condoning the delay of four days in filing the application for rectification under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to applications filed under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as it is not expressly or implicitly barred. Furthermore, the Tribunal had restored the appeal to its files in light of the Supreme Court's decision in M/s.Checkmate Services Private Limited Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax-1. Consequently, the Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned Miscellaneous Order passed by the Tribunal and concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration, as the original appeal (I.T.A.No.688/Chny/2022) was to be decided on merits by the Tribunal. The appeal before the High Court was dismissed.
The High Court recorded the submission made by the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant Revenue that the tax effect in the instant case was below the monetary limit imposed. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Tax Case Appeal for low tax effect. The Court explicitly stated that the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal were kept open for adjudication at an appropriate stage. No costs were awarded. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal on the ground of low tax effect, without deciding the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court held that the balance additional depreciation can be carried forward and claimed in the subsequent assessment year. The Court found the revenue's submissions untenable. It distinguished the case of M.M.Forgings Limited Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, stating it did not deal with the issue of carrying forward balance additional depreciation. The Court also noted that Circular No. 281 dated 29.11.1979 predated the insertion of Section 32(1)(iia) and that Circular No. 8 of 2002 did not assist the revenue's case. The Court reiterated that circulars are not binding on the Court. The reasoning of the Assessing Officer regarding the calculation of depreciation was deemed misconceived, as it could not impede the claim for balance additional depreciation in the following year. The appeal was allowed in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that the substantial question of law raised in the present appeal has already been answered by a Division Bench of the same court in the case of The Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Sanghvi and Doshi Enterprises, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Sanghvi and Doshi Enterprises. Consequently, the substantial question of law is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The appeal filed by the Revenue is therefore dismissed. The court also noted that for similar issues concerning the same assessee, appeals were previously dismissed by a co-ordinate bench for low tax effect. No costs were awarded.
The High Court allowed the appeal, answering the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellant (assessee). The Court followed its previous decisions in M/s.Comstar Automative Techonologies Private Limited vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai Vs. SRA Systems Limited. In these precedents, it was held that deductions under Section 10A or 10B are to be made while computing the gross total income under Chapter IV of the Act, not at the stage of total income computation under Chapter VI. The Court reiterated that the Revenue's method of setting off unabsorbed depreciation first, thereby reducing the profit to nil and preventing the claim of Section 10B deduction, is contrary to the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Yokogawa India Ltd. Consequently, the ITAT's decision was found not to stand legal scrutiny. The appeal was dismissed against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appellate Tribunal is the ultimate fact-finding authority and its findings on facts are binding. The Court found that the present appeal by the Income Tax Department sought a re-appreciation of evidence, which is not permissible under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The ITAT's decision, which is not detailed in the provided excerpt but is the basis for the High Court's dismissal, had apparently found that the Assessing Officer's additions towards the difference in stock/purchases lacked a proper basis and were made on surmises and suspicion. The ITAT noted that the AO himself admitted in a letter to the CIT(A) that details regarding the stock difference worked out by the Investigation Wing were not available and sought clarification. The Tribunal also observed that the Department's representative could not explain how the difference was worked out. Consequently, the ITAT directed the deletion of additions made towards the difference in stock in trade under Section 69C. The High Court found no substantial question of law and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court held that the present appeal need not be gone into independently. The Court observed that the substantive issues raised in this appeal have merged with the main order passed by the ITAT, against which a separate appeal (TCA No.155 of 2024) has already been admitted by the High Court. Therefore, the issues in the present appeal will be decided as part of the adjudication of the main appeal. The Court's reasoning is based on the principle of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and ensuring that all related matters are decided together. The operative direction is that the present tax case appeal stands dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised in the present appeal had already been decided in favour of the assessee against the Revenue in T.C.A.No.551 of 2013 (M/s. Brakes India Ltd. vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax). The Court noted that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the Revenue against the decision in the Brakes India Ltd. case was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, a co-ordinate bench of the High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai vs. Aztec Auto (P) Ltd. had reiterated this position, stating that the decision in Brakes India Ltd., having been approved by the Supreme Court, was binding. Therefore, following the precedent set by the Brakes India Ltd. case, the High Court allowed the appeal and answered the substantial questions of law in favour of the assessee. No costs were awarded. The operative direction was to allow the appeal.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the present Tax Appeals is covered by a previous decision of a Division Bench of the same Court, dated 07.02.2020, in T.C.A.Nos.26 to 28 of 2013, which also involved the same assessee. Consequently, the High Court recorded this finding and dismissed the present appeals in accordance with the precedent. The reasoning is that the substantial questions of law are identical to those already decided. The ratio decidendi is that if an issue is covered by a prior judgment of a coordinate bench, the subsequent appeals raising the same issue should be dismissed. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the appeal in favour of the appellant. The Court noted that the issue was covered in favour of the appellant by its own previous decisions, specifically citing M/s. Comstar Automative Techonologies Private Limited and Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai Vs. SRA Systems Limited. These decisions held that deductions under Section 10A/10B are to be computed before setting off unabsorbed depreciation and brought forward losses. The Court acknowledged the Revenue's submission regarding pending appeals before the Supreme Court but ultimately found that the issue was settled in favour of the appellant based on the High Court's own precedents. The Court also noted that a similar fact situation was decided in favour of the appellant by the ITAT in its own case for assessment year 2007-08. Therefore, the Tax Case Appeal was disposed of in favour of the appellant. No specific finding was recorded on the pending Supreme Court appeals, but the High Court's decision was based on its own settled law.
The High Court answered the substantial questions of law in favour of the Revenue. It held that in cases of amalgamation, unlike winding up, the corporate entity continues within the transferee company, and the business adventure lives on. The Court noted that the transferee company (GWL Properties Ltd.) had filed an appeal before the CIT (Appeals) for AY 2000-01, and the transferor company (M/s. Shaw Wallace Properties Ltd.) had filed an appeal for AY 2002-03, indicating awareness of the ongoing liability despite the amalgamation. The Court found that the ITAT had not considered these aspects, particularly the continuity of liability with the transferee company and the fact that the transferor company itself pursued appeals post-amalgamation. Consequently, the assessment orders were not to be treated as a nullity. However, the Court also observed that there had been no effective hearing to the transferee company, leading to the rejection of the long-term capital gain claim. Therefore, the orders of the ITAT, CIT (Appeals), and Assessing Authority were set aside, and the case was remitted back to the Assessing Authority for fresh assessment after giving proper notice to the transferee company and providing a full opportunity of being heard.
The High Court held that it was unable to entertain the appeal filed by the Revenue against the dismissal of the Miscellaneous Application. The Court reasoned that if the Revenue believed there was an error apparent on the face of the record in the main order, it was open to the Revenue to challenge the main order itself by filing a regular appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. Raising a point against the dismissal of a Miscellaneous Application under Section 254(2) was considered not justified in this context. The Court dismissed the appeal with liberty to the Revenue to file an appeal against the main order. No costs were awarded. The issue of whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record in the main order was not decided on merits.
The High Court of Judicature at Madras, in view of the submission made by the learned Junior Standing Counsel for the appellant/Revenue and the endorsement filed, dismissed the Tax Case Appeal as not pressed. The court noted that the Revenue's counsel had stated that she was not pressing the appeal and had provided an endorsement explaining the reason. The endorsement indicated that the assessee had filed C.O.No.36/CHNY/2017, which was dismissed as withdrawn, and that the cross-objections filed by the assessee in ITA.No.697/CHNY/2017 (AY 2012-2013) contained the same facts, leading to the withdrawal of C.O.No.36/CHNY/2017. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without any costs, and the connected civil miscellaneous petition was closed. No specific findings were made on the merits of the case, as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer cannot assess or reassess income in completed assessments in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during a search under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132-A. This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-3 v. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. The Court noted that the Revenue was unable to place any incriminating material found during the search, despite being directed to do so on multiple occasions. The Revenue's submission that the material was still being traced, even for assessment years as old as 2009-2010 and 2011-2012, and after the Revenue had accepted before the Tribunal that no incriminating materials were found, further weakened their case. Consequently, the substantial questions of law were answered against the Revenue, affirming the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Court found that human intervention and technical expertise are integral and indispensable for the smooth, efficient, and uninterrupted operation of roaming services. The National GSM Roaming Agreement explicitly acknowledges the need for human intervention in various critical aspects, including customer care, network fault handling, SIM card issues, and billing inquiries. The Court noted that situations like manual network selection by subscribers or activation of international roaming require human intervention. Therefore, the Court concluded that roaming services involve human intervention and technical expertise at various levels, making the charges paid constitute 'fees for technical services' under Section 194J. The ITAT's order was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, as the Tribunal had misconstrued the judgment of the Apex Court in Bharati Cellular Ltd. case by restricting its analysis to the initial connection stage and not considering the entirety of the roaming period.
The High Court, considering that the quantum appeals filed by the assessee were allowed by this court vide judgment dated 11.08.2017, held that the question of levy of penalty in respect of the same assessment does not arise. Therefore, there was no requirement to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer to revisit the issue of penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act. The court set aside the order of the Tribunal to that extent. The Tax Case Appeal filed by the Revenue was accordingly disposed of. The substantial questions of law raised were left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No costs were awarded.
The High Court of Judicature at Madras, based on the submission and endorsement made by the learned counsel for the appellant, dismissed the tax case appeal as withdrawn. No costs were awarded. The connected miscellaneous petition was also closed. The judgment does not record any decision on the merits of the case, as the appeal was disposed of on the ground of withdrawal.
The High Court, based on the memo filed by the appellant's counsel and the submission made during the hearing, granted permission to withdraw the Tax Case Appeal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. No costs were awarded. The connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition (C.M.P.No.3525 of 2020) was closed. No specific issue regarding the merits of the assessment year 2013-14 or the Tribunal's order was decided.
The High Court observed that the order under challenge merely extended the stay of demand for a further period of 180 days from the date of receipt of the order or till the disposal of the quantum appeal, whichever was earlier. The Court noted that this order extending the stay had already expired long ago. Consequently, the High Court was of the opinion that no further adjudication was required in the present appeal. The appeal was disposed of, keeping the substantial questions of law raised open to be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings. The Court explicitly stated that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. No costs were awarded.
The High Court, upon considering the submission and endorsement made by the learned counsel for the appellant seeking permission to withdraw the Tax Case Appeal, allowed the withdrawal. The Court noted that the appeal was listed for withdrawal based on a memo filed by the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No costs were awarded. The specific grounds or merits of the appeal were not adjudicated upon as the appeal was withdrawn by the appellant.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law were answered against the appellant/assessee and in favour of the respondent. The Court found no reason to interfere with the order passed by the PCIT, which was confirmed by the Tribunal. The Court noted that the assessee had not properly explained the source of income for the remaining cash deposit of Rs. 44,60,000 before the PCIT, the Tribunal, or the High Court. The contention that the AO had thoroughly verified the records was deemed futile, indicating an inadequate explanation of the source for the cash deposit. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal was confirmed, and the Tax Case Appeal was dismissed. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.