176 orders · Page 4 of 4
The High Court followed its previous decision and the Supreme Court's ruling to answer the first two substantial questions of law against the revenue. However, it answered the third substantial question in favour of the revenue based on a Supreme Court judgment.
The Tribunal found that the AO had conducted a thorough investigation, examining various documents and evidence provided by the assessee. Therefore, the Principal Commissioner was not justified in invoking Section 263 as the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue.
The High Court noted that the appeal filed by the revenue was heard along with another appeal and disposed of by a judgment dated July 2, 2015. The learned counsel for the respondent/assessee submitted that the assessee had preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the said judgment and subsequently availed the benefit under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. In light of these developments, the Court held that no further order is required to be passed in the present appeal. The operative direction is that the appeal is disposed of without any further order, acknowledging the settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, finding no error in its appreciation of facts and legal provisions. The court noted that similar issues had been decided in favour of the assessee in earlier years, and the revenue had not presented any distinguishing features for the current assessment year.
The Tribunal erred in reversing the CIT(A)'s order by ignoring factual evidence, including a revised tax audit report and the fact that the mistake was brought to the Assessing Officer's notice during assessment. The Tribunal's findings were considered perverse.
The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay. The court found the revenue's explanation for the delay to be unsubstantiated and emphasized that the government, as a litigant, must also adhere to the law of limitation.
The Tribunal correctly held that the PCIT could not exercise jurisdiction under Section 263. The interest on service tax was considered a contingent liability, and Section 50C was not applicable to common parking spaces in office premises.
The tribunal found no contributory negligence on the part of the claimant and modified the compensation awarded for loss of future income by applying a structured formula based on functional disability, increasing the overall award.
The tribunal held that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued for lodging an FIR when an efficacious remedy exists under criminal law. The Supreme Court has consistently held that aggrieved persons should approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for such grievances.
The High Court found that the Assessing Officer failed to consider the assessee's objections and wrongly dismissed reliance on pre-amendment case law. The court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.
The High Court held that the ITAT rightly quashed the Section 263 order because the Assessing Officer had conducted due inquiry and the conditions for invoking Section 263 (erroneous and prejudicial to revenue) were not met. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263 was erroneous as it was not based on correct facts and the assessee had not made any claim under Section 54B. The High Court found no substantial question of law.
The High Court found no proper explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed.
The High Court held that the PCIT erred in exercising jurisdiction under Section 263 as no finding was recorded that income assessable to tax had escaped assessment. The court found no substantial questions of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the entire matter revolved on facts appreciated by both lower authorities. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the appeal.
The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in quashing the reopening of assessment because the reasons recorded did not indicate any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. The Assessing Officer had merely re-appraised existing material.
The High Court found no substantial questions of law arising from the ITAT's order. Consequently, the revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The High Court found that the ITAT's decision was based on factual findings that the department could not dispute. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the ITAT's order was passed without proper consideration of the submissions and evidence, making it perverse. Therefore, the ITAT's order was set aside.
The High Court held that the ITAT's order was passed without proper consideration of the submissions and evidence, making it perverse. Therefore, the ITAT's order was set aside.
The High Court dismissed the revenue's appeal, noting that the issues involved had been decided against the revenue in earlier similar cases. The court found that the ITAT's order did not warrant interference and the substantial questions of law raised did not arise for consideration.
The High Court found that both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had independently assessed the facts and arrived at their decisions. The court noted that the creditworthiness of lenders was examined, documents were submitted, and the Assessing Officer's findings were based on limited questions, allegedly obtained under threat.
The Tribunal rightly permitted the assessee to raise the issue of jurisdiction as it goes to the root of the matter. The assessment order was correctly held to be bad in law due to the lack of jurisdiction of the assessing officer.
The High Court found that the ITAT rightly considered the jurisdictional issue raised by the assessee, as there can be no estoppel against law. The court held that the assessment order was indeed bad in law due to the defective notice.
The Tribunal held that interest on personal loans used for business purposes is deductible and that the CT Scan machine is eligible for higher depreciation. However, the High Court modified the depreciation to 15% and directed a revision of the assessment order regarding the calculation of tax, penalty, and interest in relation to TDS.