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The High Court held that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is clearly time-barred. This conclusion is based on the admitted fact that the notice was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to AY 2015-16. The court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693). The Supreme Court's order dated 4th May 2026 explicitly stated that if a matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required by the High Court, other than declaring the notice as time-barred. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned notice, along with any action taken or emanating from it, was quashed and set aside. The rule was made absolute.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the ITAT's decision to deny the deduction under Section 80-O. The Court found that while the assessee made a valiant effort to distinguish its case, the ratio in the Supreme Court decisions cited by the revenue (B.L.Passi, Ramnath & Co, and Khursheed Anwar) established that the Assessing Officer (AO) has the jurisdiction to verify whether the information shared is attributable to the information or service contemplated by Section 80-O. The AO is required to make such an inquiry, and the assessee must provide supporting material. The Court noted that the present case displayed an attempt to create an illusion of compliance by relying on CCIT approval while refusing to produce evidence. Merely brandishing newspaper cuttings was not proof of sharing commercial expertise as mandated by Section 80-O. The Court answered the second question of law in the negative. The appeal failed and was dismissed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
The High Court held that the notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were invalid and bad-in-law. This decision was based on the court's prior ruling in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, where it was determined that such notices, not issued by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) as per Section 151A and the scheme, are indeed invalid. Consequently, the court quashed and set aside the notices issued in all the present petitions. Furthermore, any reassessment orders, consequential demand notices, or penalty notices that may have been passed pursuant to these invalid notices were also quashed and set aside. The court explicitly stated that all rights and contentions of the parties not covered by the Hexaware judgment were kept open to be raised in any future proceedings. The petitions were disposed of accordingly.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned assessment order dated 22nd March 2024, passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 254, Section 144C(13), and Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2011-2012. The Court also quashed the consequential notice of demand under Section 156 and the show-cause notice under Section 274 read with Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, both dated 22nd March 2024. The Court's decision was based on the finding that the assessment order was passed without following the mandatory procedure laid down in Section 144C(1) of the Act. The Court explicitly stated that it was not going into the merits of the matter. The petition was allowed in terms of prayer clause (a), which sought to quash the impugned orders and accept the income returned by the Petitioner. No issue was left undecided.
The Bombay High Court held that the present writ petition is covered by its previous judgments in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. and Vodafone Idea Limited. Consequently, all notices and orders impugned in the petition were quashed and set aside. This included any consequential notices, assessment orders, and other consequential orders. The court did not provide specific reasoning beyond stating that the petition was covered by the precedents. The ratio decidendi is that if a matter is squarely covered by a binding precedent of the same court, the impugned actions will be set aside. The operative direction was to quash and set aside all impugned notices and orders, and the petition was disposed of.
The High Court held that the Rule is made absolute. The Court answered the issues as follows: Issue No. 1 (Applicability of TOLA and retrospective effect of Section 148 notice) was answered 'No'. Issue No. 2 (Limitation under Section 149) was answered 'Yes'. Issue No. 3 (Notice without DIN) was answered 'Yes'. Issue No. 4 (Notice not in accordance with Section 151A) was answered 'Yes'. Issue No. 5 (Escapement of income in the form of an asset) was answered 'No'. Issue No. 6 (Reopening on change of opinion) was answered 'Yes' on the basis of change of opinion and 'No' on permissibility. Issue No. 7 (Belief of escapement of income despite consistent allowance of Section 80JJAA deduction) was answered 'No'. Issue No. 8 (Validity of approval) was answered 'Yes'. The Court found that the jurisdictional conditions prescribed under Sections 147, 148, 148A, 149, 151, and 151A of the Act were not fulfilled by the respondent no.1. The Court specifically noted that the notice dated August 27, 2022, was barred by limitation as per the first proviso to Section 149, was issued without a DIN, and was not in accordance with Section 151A. The Court also held that the reopening was based on a change of opinion and that the AO could not have formed a belief of escapement of income regarding the Section 80JJAA deduction, which had been consistently allowed in earlier years. The Court was unable to agree with the petitioner that there was non-application of mind by the approving authority for Issue No. 8. The petition was allowed, quashing the impugned initial notice dated May 25, 2022, the order dated August 26, 2022, and the notice dated August 27, 2022.
The High Court allowed the petition, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated February 29, 2024, passed by the CBDT. The Court directed the respondents to allow the petitioner to file revised returns of income and computations of income based on the recasted/revised books of account and financial statements for AY 2015-16 to 2020-21, and to assess the petitioner's income based on these revised returns. The Court also directed that the Assessing Officer shall frame assessments in accordance with law considering the revised returns within a specified timeframe. Any assessment orders passed under Section 143(3) or 144(C) for the relevant years, and consequential notices or orders, were deemed not to survive. The Court clarified that accepting returns on recasted accounts would not absolve anyone from actions based on earlier accounts and investigations, and the company would not raise the issue of limitation for three years from the date of assessment order if recasted accounts needed relooking. The time for calculating the period under Section 149 of the Act would commence from the date of assessment orders. The Court made no observations on the revenue's submission regarding appeals pending before NCLAT, stating it was open for the revenue to take steps as advised. The investigation by SFIO would proceed. The Court noted that the recasted accounts were accepted by NCLT and filed with the RoC, making the Income Tax Department's objections frivolous. The Court found no merit in the CBDT's stand and noted the change in the Board's stance.
The High Court held that the reopening of the assessment was based purely on a change of opinion by the Assessing Officer, which does not constitute justification or reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The Court found that for the designing fees of Rs. 99,83,000/-, the AO's reasons explicitly stated that the 'said contention was accepted and expenses was allowed by the department' in the original assessment, and then later suggested it should have been disallowed. Similarly, for the concession fee of Rs. 4,98,00,000/-, the reasons indicated that the deduction was accepted and allowed, but then suggested it should have been capitalized and disallowed. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Petitioner had received a notice under Section 142(1) during the original assessment proceedings seeking details on both these items, and had provided the necessary information. Citing its own decision in Aroni Commercials Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, the Court held that once a query is raised and replied to during assessment, it is considered subject to the AO's consideration, and the assessment order need not explicitly record satisfaction on every query. Consequently, the notice under Section 148, the reassessment order, and the consequential demand and penalty proceedings were quashed and set aside. The Court made the Rule absolute in terms of the prayer clause.
The High Court quashed and set aside the Assessment Order dated February 5, 2024, the order passed under Section 148A(d), the notice issued under Section 148, the Notice of Demand under Section 156, and the Penalty Notices under Section 274 read with Sections 270A and 271AAC. The Court reasoned that in no circumstances could the entire receipt have been treated as the income of the assessee. The Petitioner was directed to file a reply to the notice under Section 148A(b) within seven working days of the portal opening. The A.O. was directed to pass an order under Section 148A(d) by July 31, 2024, after providing a personal hearing. The Court clarified that no observations were made on the merits of the matter. The Petitioner was also directed to pay Rs. 50,000/- as a donation to the P.M. Cares Fund within two weeks, with proof of payment to be filed with the reply. The time from issuing the notice under Section 148A(b) until the current date was excluded for limitation purposes.
The High Court accepted the undertaking given by the Revenue that the refund amount of Rs. 31,42,325/-, which includes interest of Rs. 18,25,424/- under Section 244A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, would be paid to the petitioner on or before May 9, 2024. The Court noted that the process to ensure the credit of the refund had already been initiated by the concerned officer. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the court again if the amount was not credited by the stipulated date. No specific finding was made on the merits of the Section 154 order itself, as the matter was resolved based on the undertaking and the procedural disposal.
The Tribunal held that the sanction for the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 were invalid. The assessment year was 2017-2018, and the impugned notices and order were issued on 20th July 2022. Since this was beyond a period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the sanctioning authority ought to have been the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT) as stipulated under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The proviso to Section 151, which came into effect from 1st April 2023, was not applicable to the present case. The Court followed its own decision in Siemens Financial Services Private Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. The Court also observed that even if the Assessee had not responded to the notice, it would not validate an otherwise invalid notice. Consequently, the impugned order and notice were quashed and set aside. All rights and contentions were kept open.
The High Court held that the assessment order dated February 28, 2024, passed by the AO was liable to be set aside. The Court reasoned that since the petitioner had filed a reference raising objections with the DRP within the 30-day period, and Section 144C(4) of the Act mandates the AO to pass a final order considering the DRP's views, the AO should not have proceeded without such consideration. The Court found support for this view in the case of Sulzer Pumps India Pvt. Ltd. v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 15(3)(2) & Ors. While acknowledging that the AO could not be faulted for passing the order based on the information available, the Court directed that the AO would have the benefit of considering the DRP's views while passing a fresh assessment order. The Court made the rule absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), quashing the impugned assessment order, demand notice, and penalty notice. The AO was directed to take further steps after the DRP passes its order.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening assessment and the orders rejecting the Assessee's objections were liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court found that the reasons for reopening were primarily based on borrowed material from the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report and the Supreme Court's observations, without independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The Court endorsed the view that the third report of the Justice M.B. Shah Commission contained mere expressions of opinion lacking finality and authoritativeness, and thus could not form the basis for a prima facie belief for reopening. Regarding the disclosure of material facts, the Court observed that the Supreme Court's decision declaring mining leases beyond 2007 as illegal was rendered on April 21, 2014. Prior to this, the Assessee could not have been aware of this illegality and therefore could not be faulted for failing to disclose it in returns filed for AY 2011-12. The Court concluded that the Assessing Officer failed to satisfy the twin conditions for reopening assessment and allowed the petitions, quashing the notices and orders.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening assessment and the orders rejecting the Assessee's objections were liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court found that the reasons for reopening were primarily based on borrowed material from the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report and the Supreme Court's observations, without independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The Court endorsed the view that the third report of the Justice M.B. Shah Commission contained mere expressions of opinion lacking finality and authoritativeness, and thus could not form the basis for a prima facie belief for reopening. Regarding the disclosure of material facts, the Court observed that the Supreme Court's decision declaring mining leases beyond 2007 as illegal was rendered on April 21, 2014. Prior to this, the Assessee could not have been aware of this illegality and therefore could not be faulted for failing to disclose it in returns filed for AY 2011-12. The Court concluded that the Assessing Officer failed to satisfy the twin conditions for reopening assessment and allowed the petitions, quashing the notices and orders.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 31, 2015, issued under Section 148 of the Act was invalid and quashed it. The Court reasoned that the escapement of income due to the claim of deduction under Section 80-IB(10) of Rs. 4,47,30,649/- was indeed a subject matter of the appeal before the CIT(A), as evidenced by the grounds of appeal raised by the petitioner. The CIT(A)'s order dated March 30, 2015, had set aside the assessment order, and the subsequent reopening notice was based on the very issue that was under appeal. The Court relied on the third proviso to Section 147 of the Act, which clearly bars reassessment of income that is the subject matter of an appeal. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. (Supra), stating that reassessment proceedings can be initiated only if they are not hit by the third proviso to Section 147. Therefore, reassessment on this income was not permissible. The Rule issued was made absolute, quashing the Section 148 notice in toto.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening the assessment and the orders rejecting the objections were unsustainable and liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court found that the Assessing Officer had failed to record independent reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment. The reasons relied upon were primarily "borrowed material" from the DRI and the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report, which the Court characterized as lacking authoritativeness and being mere expressions of opinion. The Court emphasized that the Shah Commission's report, by itself, could not form the basis for a prima facie belief for reopening without independent material. Regarding the disclosure of illegal activities, the Court noted that the Supreme Court's definitive ruling on the illegality of mining leases beyond November 22, 2007, was pronounced on April 21, 2014, and the returns were filed earlier. The Court held that the assessee could not be expected to disclose the illegality of activities before such a declaration was made, especially when even the Assessing Officer was unaware of it until the Supreme Court's decision. The Court reiterated its view from a previous judgment that the Shah Commission's third report lacked finality and authoritativeness. Consequently, the Court allowed the petitions, quashing the reopening notices and the orders rejecting objections. The Court also held that additional affidavits filed by the revenue could not supplement the reasons recorded at the time of issuing the notice under Section 147/148.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening the assessment and the orders rejecting the objections were unsustainable and liable to be quashed. The Court found that the Assessing Officer had failed to record independent reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment. The primary reasons for reopening, such as the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report and the Supreme Court's observations regarding illegal mining beyond November 22, 2007, were not sufficient on their own. The Court endorsed the view that the third report of the Justice M.B. Shah Commission was merely an expression of opinion lacking authoritativeness and could not form the basis for a prima facie belief for reopening. Regarding the alleged failure to disclose material facts, the Court noted that the Supreme Court's decision declaring mining leases beyond 2007 as illegal was pronounced on April 21, 2014, much after the assessment year in question and the filing of returns. The Court held that the assessee could not be expected to disclose the illegality of activities that were not declared illegal at the time and for which they had paid all applicable duties and royalties. Therefore, the notices failed to satisfy the twin conditions for reopening under Section 147/148, and the petitions were allowed.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening the assessment and the orders rejecting the objections were unsustainable and liable to be quashed. The Court found that the Assessing Officer had failed to record independent reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment. The primary reasons for reopening, such as the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report and the Supreme Court's observations regarding illegal mining beyond November 22, 2007, were not sufficient on their own. The Court endorsed the view that the third report of the Justice M.B. Shah Commission was merely an expression of opinion lacking authoritativeness and could not form the basis for a prima facie belief for reopening. Regarding the alleged failure to disclose material facts, the Court noted that the Supreme Court's decision declaring mining leases beyond 2007 as illegal was pronounced on April 21, 2014, much after the assessment year in question and the filing of returns. The Court held that the assessee could not be expected to disclose the illegality of activities that were not declared illegal at the time and for which they had paid all applicable duties and royalties. Therefore, the notices failed to satisfy the twin conditions for reopening under Section 147/148, and the petitions were allowed.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening the assessment and the orders rejecting the petitioners' objections were unsustainable and liable to be quashed. The Court found that the reasons for reopening, primarily based on the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report, were merely expressions of opinion without authoritativeness and lacked independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The Court also noted that the Supreme Court's decision declaring mining leases beyond 2007 as illegal was rendered on April 21, 2014. Therefore, the assessee could not be expected to have disclosed these activities as illegal in their returns filed for Assessment Year 2011-12, especially when the Assessing Officer himself was unaware of this illegality until the Supreme Court's pronouncement. The Court emphasized that the revenue could not supplement material beyond the reasons recorded at the time of issuing the notice under Section 147/148. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, quashing the reopening notices and the orders rejecting objections.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening assessment and the orders rejecting the Assessee's objections were liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court found that the reasons for reopening were primarily based on borrowed material from the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report and the Supreme Court's observations, without independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The Court endorsed the view that the third report of the Justice M.B. Shah Commission contained mere expressions of opinion lacking finality and authoritativeness, and thus could not form the basis for a prima facie belief for reopening. Regarding the disclosure of material facts, the Court observed that the Supreme Court's decision declaring mining leases beyond 2007 as illegal was rendered on April 21, 2014. Prior to this, the Assessee could not have been aware of this illegality and therefore could not be faulted for failing to disclose it in returns filed for AY 2011-12. The Court concluded that the Assessing Officer failed to satisfy the twin conditions for reopening assessment and allowed the petitions, quashing the notices and orders.
The High Court held that the notices issued for reopening assessment and the orders rejecting the Assessee's objections were liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court found that the reasons for reopening were primarily based on borrowed material from the Justice M.B. Shah Commission's Report and the Supreme Court's observations, without independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The Court endorsed the view that the third report of the Justice M.B. Shah Commission contained mere expressions of opinion lacking finality and authoritativeness, and thus could not form the basis for a prima facie belief for reopening. Regarding the disclosure of material facts, the Court observed that the Supreme Court's decision declaring mining leases beyond 2007 as illegal was rendered on April 21, 2014. Prior to this, the Assessee could not have been aware of this illegality and therefore could not be faulted for failing to disclose it in returns filed for AY 2011-12. The Court concluded that the Assessing Officer failed to satisfy the twin conditions for reopening assessment and allowed the petitions, quashing the notices and orders.
The Tribunal held that the sanction for the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid. The court noted that the impugned order and notice, both dated April 13, 2022, pertained to Assessment Year 2018-19 and were issued beyond a period of three years. Consequently, the sanctioning authority should have been the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT) as provided under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The proviso to Section 151, which was inserted with effect from April 1, 2023, was not applicable. Relying on its own prior decision in Siemens Financial Services Private Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., the court found the sanction to be invalid. Accordingly, the impugned order and notice dated April 13, 2022, were quashed and set aside, along with any consequential assessment orders, demand orders, and penalty notices. The petition was disposed of with all rights and contentions kept open.
The High Court made the Rule absolute, quashing and setting aside the impugned Notice dated March 26, 2015, and the Impugned Order dated January 15, 2016. The Court noted that the Apex Court, in the case of CIT Central-III vs. HCL Technologies Ltd., had confirmed the decision in Gem Plus Jewellery India Ltd. (Supra). This subsequent development validated the assessee's position that the pending appeal in the Apex Court did not negate the binding precedent of the Bombay High Court, especially when the Apex Court itself had later confirmed the same principle. Therefore, the AO's refusal to follow the High Court's decision based on a pending appeal was found to be unsustainable. The operative direction was to quash the reopening notice and the order disposing of objections.
The Bombay High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 143(2) and Section 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were bad in law. The Court reasoned that the Resolution Plan, approved by the NCLT and binding on all parties including the revenue, clearly stipulated the extinguishment of all claims and liabilities pertaining to the period prior to its Effective Date of November 10, 2022. The Court relied on the NCLT's order and the Supreme Court's judgment in "Ghanshyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v/s Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited," which mandates that all claims not part of the Resolution Plan stand extinguished upon its approval. The Court noted that the revenue had not submitted any claims during the CIRP. Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned notices and all consequential actions. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that it was not a fit case to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that the petitioner had not followed the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v/s. Income Tax Officer, which mandates filing a return of income, seeking reasons for the notice, and then filing objections. The petitioner had directly approached the High Court without complying with these steps. While acknowledging the petitioner's argument regarding the unsigned notice and citing Prakash Krishnavtar Bhardwaj, the Court distinguished that case by noting that the petitioner in Prakash Krishnavtar Bhardwaj had already responded to the initial notice and filed objections, unlike the present case where no return was filed. The Court directed the petitioner to file objections to the impugned notice along with the return of income within four weeks, allowing them to raise all defenses, including the unsigned notice. The Assessing Officer was directed to dispose of these objections by passing a reasoned order after providing a personal hearing to the petitioner.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court held that the AO, in the impugned order under Section 148A(d), had accepted the assessee's contention that the information reported by the Insight portal was accounted for and the income arising from those transactions was duly offered for taxation. Despite this acceptance, the AO proceeded to conclude that income to the extent of Rs. 25,25,57,767/- had escaped assessment, citing issues with sub-contracting work for M/s Prathmesh Constructions. The Court relied on the interpretation of Section 147, particularly the phrase 'and also', which implies a cumulative and conjunctive sense. If the AO accepts that the income initially believed to have escaped assessment has not, in fact, escaped, it is not open for him to independently assess some other income without issuing a fresh notice under Section 148. The Court found that the AO's action was contrary to this principle. The Court also criticized the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) for mechanically approving the draft order without proper application of mind, as the PCIT's approval was granted despite the AO's own admission that the initial grounds for escapement were accounted for. The Court quashed the impugned order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148. The Court expressed no opinion on whether a fresh notice under Section 148A(b) could be issued if permitted by law.
The High Court, agreeing with both the petitioner and the respondents that the issue was covered by the cited judgments, allowed the petition. The court did not delve into the specific details of the case but relied on the precedents. The operative direction was to issue a writ of Certiorari or a similar writ, quashing the impugned notices under Section 153C dated January 31, 2022, for AYs 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16, 2018-19, and 2019-20. The court found these notices to be wholly without jurisdiction, illegal, and arbitrary, as per the prayer clause (b) of the petition. The petition was disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the issue in the petition was covered by its recent judgment in Godrej Industries Ltd. V/s. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 14(1)(2), Mumbai and Ors. (2024 SCC Online Bom. 681). Consequently, the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act were quashed and set aside. All consequential assessment orders, demand notices, and penalty notices were also quashed and set aside. The Court explicitly stated that the petition was disposed of only on the issue of limitation, implying that other contentions raised by the petitioner could be raised independently if the need arose in other matters. The ratio decidendi is that if a subsequent judgment of the same court covers the issue, the impugned proceedings should be decided in accordance with that precedent, particularly concerning procedural aspects like limitation.
The High Court held that the development agreement dated September 29, 1992, and the commitment letter dated the same day should be read as one agreement. The amount of Rs. 1,00,92,750/- paid by the developer should be considered as payment under the development agreement for the development rights of the property, which the assessee always possessed. The Court found that the ITAT was incorrect in confirming the AO's view that this amount should be treated as income from other sources. The Court reasoned that the developer's payment of a substantial amount to a person who allegedly had no right over the property indicated the genuineness of the commitment letter and the intention of the parties. The Court noted that the revenue had not summoned the developer to depose about the intentions. Therefore, the amount should be treated as consideration for development rights and assessed as LTCG in the year it was received. The Court answered question no. 1 in the negative. In light of this, questions no. 2 and 3 were not pressed by the appellant. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the scope of interference with orders of the Income Tax Settlement Commission (ITSC) is very narrow, akin to statutory arbitration. The court emphasized that the ITSC comprises members appointed for their integrity, outstanding ability, and special knowledge in direct taxes and business accounts. The Central Government, by appointing these members, places confidence in their ability to settle disputes. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the revenue to challenge reasoned orders of the ITSC without alleging bias, fraud, or malice with specific details. The court found that the revenue had not demonstrated how the ITSC's order was contrary to the Act, resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or was passed without jurisdiction. The revenue was essentially sitting in appeal over the ITSC's findings, which is not permissible. The court noted that Chapter XIX-A of the Act was inserted to facilitate tax collection without protracted litigation, and undermining the ITSC's reasoned orders could erode the confidence of bona fide assessees. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that the issue in the petition was covered by the judgment in Godrej Industries Ltd. V/s. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. Consequently, the impugned orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act were quashed and set aside. Any consequential notices or orders also stood quashed and set aside. The Court noted that the petition was disposed of solely on the issue of limitation. It also clarified that the petitioner may independently raise other contentions if the need arises in the future. The ratio decidendi is that if a matter is squarely covered by a binding precedent of the same court, the authorities must follow it, leading to the quashing of notices/orders that are inconsistent with the precedent.
The High Court held that the delay in filing Form 10B should have been condoned. The Court found that the petitioner, a charitable trust with over thirty years of existence, had a consistent history of filing its returns and Form 10B on time for other assessment years (AY 2015-16 and AY 2017-18 to AY 2021-22). This consistent compliance suggested that the failure for AY 2016-17 was likely due to human error. The Court noted the absence of any allegation of malafide against the petitioner. Citing the Gujarat High Court in Sarvodaya Charitable Trust and the Delhi High Court in G.V. Infosutions (P) Ltd., the Court emphasized that the approach to condonation applications for public charitable trusts should be equitious, balancing, and judicious. It reasoned that such trusts, which otherwise satisfy the conditions for exemption, should not be denied benefits merely on the ground of limitation, especially when the legislature has granted wide discretionary powers for condonation. The Court also referred to a similar case, Shree Jain Swetamber Murtipujak Tapagachha Sangh v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions), where an auditor's oversight was accepted as a reasonable cause. The Court concluded that the delay was not intentional or deliberate and that the petitioner should not be prejudiced by the error of its professional. Consequently, the impugned order rejecting the condonation application was quashed, the delay was condoned, and the respondent was directed to process the petitioner's return as if Form 10B was filed within time.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice dated 29th March 2019 issued under Section 148 of the Act and the consequent order on objections dated 22nd March 2022. The Court held that the entire basis for reopening the assessment had collapsed because the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had ruled against the Revenue in its appeals for Assessment Years 2011-2012, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., the Court emphasized that subordinate authorities must follow orders of higher appellate authorities unless their operation is suspended. Since the ITAT's order was not stayed, it was binding on the Revenue. The Court found that the issues raised for reopening were already considered during the original assessment, constituting a change of opinion, which is not a valid ground for reopening. The Court also noted that the Revenue had not crossed the first hurdle of the proviso to Section 147, as there was no failure to disclose material facts recorded. The Court left open the Revenue's right to issue a fresh notice under Section 148 if they succeed in their appeal against the ITAT's orders.
The Bombay High Court held that the ex-parte assessment order dated December 17, 2019, and the subsequent penalty orders under Section 271F and Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could not be sustained. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently claimed non-service of any assessment order and that the concerned Assessing Officer in Kerala had informed the Court that there was no evidence of any notice having been served on the assessee. Based on this lack of evidence of service, the Court found that the principles of natural justice were violated. Consequently, the assessment order, penalty orders, and consequential demand notices were quashed and set aside. The Court did not leave any issue undecided.
The High Court disposed of the petition without going into the merits of the case. The Court passed a consent order based on the submissions made by both parties. The Petitioner was directed to apply to the High Pitched Committee (HPC) headed by the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Pune, for high-pitched assessment on or before April 20, 2024. The HPC was directed to dispose of the application on or before June 15, 2024, after giving the Petitioner a personal hearing at least seven working days in advance. Any written submissions by the Petitioner were to be filed within three working days of the personal hearing. The order passed by the HPC was to be a reasoned order. A stay on the demand made on the Assessee was granted until June 15, 2024, or earlier disposal by the HPC. The Petitioner could apply to the HPC for an extension of the stay. The Revenue also stated that the concerned banks would be informed to vacate the attachment of the Petitioner's bank accounts within 48 hours of the order being uploaded.
The High Court dismissed both writ petitions as withdrawn. The court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue the appeals filed before the ITAT. The court explicitly stated that all rights and contentions of the parties were kept open. This means the dismissal of the writ petitions was on a procedural basis, allowing the petitioner to proceed with their substantive appeals before the ITAT. The court did not decide on the merits of the original dispute or the ITAT's orders in the Miscellaneous Applications. The ratio decidendi is that a party can withdraw a petition with liberty to pursue alternative remedies, provided it does not prejudice the other side and all rights are preserved.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned order of the CBDT dated 1st September 2023. The Court found that the order was passed in a manner similar to previous cases (R.K. Madhani Prakash Engineers and TATA Autocomp) where orders were issued with the approval of a Member (IT&R) but signed by an Additional Commissioner, indicating a procedural flaw and disregard for judicial pronouncements. The Court noted that the legislature confers power to condone delay to enable substantive justice, and routine rejection defeats this purpose. Regarding the pending Section 154 application before the Assessing Officer (Respondent No. 1), the Court expressed disappointment with the lack of response and the baseless statement in the affidavit. The Court directed Respondent No. 1 to dispose of the Section 154 application on merits by 31st May 2024, after providing a personal hearing to the petitioner. Copies of the order were to be sent to the PCCIT for disciplinary action against Respondent No. 1 and to the Chairman of CBDT for compliance with court directions.
The High Court dismissed both writ petitions as withdrawn. The court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue the appeals filed before the ITAT. The court explicitly stated that all rights and contentions of the parties were kept open. This means the dismissal of the writ petitions was on a procedural basis, allowing the petitioner to proceed with their substantive appeals before the ITAT. The court did not decide on the merits of the original dispute or the ITAT's orders in the Miscellaneous Applications. The ratio decidendi is that a party can withdraw a petition with liberty to pursue alternative remedies, provided it does not prejudice the other side and all rights are preserved.
The High Court held that the impugned Assessment Order dated 29th February 2024 was liable to be quashed and set aside. The court found it undisputed that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to upload the documents and details requested by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) during the personal hearing before the portal was closed. Therefore, the court quashed and set aside the assessment order and remanded the matter for denovo hearing. The AO was directed to make the portal available to the petitioner for uploading the requested documents and details within two weeks of the order being uploaded. The petitioner was to upload these documents within one week thereafter. The AO was to pass a fresh Assessment Order on or before 30th June 2024, dealing with all submissions, and a personal hearing was to be given at least five working days after issuing notice. The court explicitly clarified that no observations were made on the merits of the matter.
The High Court dismissed the petition. Regarding the capitalization issue, the Court held that the ITSC was entitled to exercise its discretion and rightly did so. The Court reasoned that when the department relies on seized records for estimating undisclosed income, there is no reason to disbelieve the expenditure stated therein. The Court found no justification for doubting the entries pertaining to expenditure while accepting income recorded in the seized documents. The Court cited Commissioner of Income Tax vs. P. D. Abraham Alias Appachan And Another. Concerning the Section 80IB(10) adjustment, the Court found no error in the ITSC's decision-making process. The Court emphasized that the ITSC is a forum for self-surrender and seeking relief, and its powers are wide, including granting immunity. The scope of interference against a Settlement Commission order is very narrow, akin to statutory arbitration. The Court noted that unsettling reasoned orders of the ITSC could erode the confidence of bona fide assessees. The Court concluded that the ITSC's order was not contrary to the provisions of the Act, nor was there a miscarriage of justice or an order passed without jurisdiction. The Court found no bias, fraud, or malice alleged against the ITSC members. The Court held that the Revenue had not satisfied the criteria for interference, and the ITSC's order was not perverse.
The High Court held that the issues in all the writ petitions were covered by two previous reasoned orders of the Court in Rajendra Lilachand Sanghavi v. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-2, Pune and Ors. and Panacea Unique Star Developers v. Union of India. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petitions with specific directions. The revenue was directed to act in furtherance of the declarations made by the petitioners under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 (IDS) read with the IDS Rules and issue Form 4 under the IDS within four weeks from the date of the order. This was to be done after giving credit for all amounts paid, including advance tax and self-assessment tax. Furthermore, the Court quashed and set aside the assessment orders, demand notices, and penalty notices that were passed in consequence of the IDS declarations. The ratio decidendi is that where the High Court has already ruled on the specific issue concerning the implementation of the IDS and the consequential actions of the revenue, subsequent petitions raising the same issue are to be decided in line with the established precedent.
The Bombay High Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders passed under Section 148A(d) and the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, along with any consequential notices or orders. The court's decision was based on the agreement between the parties that the issue was covered by the recent judgment in Godrej Industries Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 14(1)(2), Mumbai and Ors. The judgment explicitly states that the petition was disposed of only on the issue of limitation. The court also noted that the petitioner may raise other contentions independently if the need arises in other matters, indicating that the merits of other potential issues were not decided in this writ petition.
The Bombay High Court held that the issue in all the petitions was covered by its previous reasoned orders in Rajendra Lilachand Sanghavi and Panacea Unique Star Developers. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents (Revenue) to act in furtherance of the declarations made by the petitioners under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 (IDS). Specifically, the Revenue was ordered to issue Form 4 under the IDS within four weeks from the date of the order. This action was to be taken after giving credit for all amounts paid by the petitioners, including advance tax and self-assessment tax. As a consequential relief, the assessment orders, along with the demand notices and penalty notices issued, were quashed and set aside. The petitions were disposed of with these directions.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) must record his dissatisfaction with the correctness of the assessee's claim regarding expenditure in relation to exempt income, and provide cogent reasons for such dissatisfaction, before invoking Rule 8D. The Court agreed with the findings of the CIT(A) and the ITAT that while the AO stated the assessee's explanation was not acceptable, he failed to provide reasons for this unacceptability. The judgment cited Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) v. JSW Energy Limited and Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. to emphasize that the AO cannot apply Rule 8D automatically or by putting the cart before the horse. The AO must first be dissatisfied with the assessee's claim based on the accounts, and only then can Rule 8D be invoked to compute the disallowance. The Court found that the AO's satisfaction was not recorded in the manner required by Section 14A(2) and Rule 8D. The appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that the issue in the present petitions is covered by its prior reasoned orders in Rajendra Lilachand Sanghavi and Panacea Unique Star Developers. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petitions with specific directions. The Revenue was directed to act in furtherance of the declarations made by the petitioners under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016, read with the IDS Rules, and to issue Form 4 under the IDS within four weeks from the date of the order. This was to be done after giving credit for all amounts paid, including advance tax and self-assessment tax. Furthermore, the Court quashed and set aside the assessment orders, demand notices, and penalty notices that were passed in conjunction with these declarations. The ratio decidendi is that the principles laid down in the earlier judgments concerning the IDS declarations are to be applied to subsequent similar cases.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act. The Court also set aside any consequential notices or orders. This decision was based on the agreement between the petitioner and the revenue that the issue was covered by the recent judgment of the High Court in Godrej Industries Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court explicitly stated that the petition was disposed of only on the issue of limitation, as implied by the reference to the Godrej Industries judgment. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise other contentions independently if the need arose in other matters. The ratio decidendi is that if a matter is covered by a binding precedent of the same court, the authorities should follow it, and the court will quash proceedings that do not adhere to it.
The High Court held that the notice dated September 16, 2021, issued by the ACIT, Pune, is quashed and set aside. The Court further held that the notification dated September 28, 2021, in so far as it seeks to make only those assessees eligible to file an application before the Settlement Commission who were eligible as on January 31, 2021, is invalid. The reasoning was that Section 245C(5) of the Act, though inserted with retrospective effect from February 1, 2021, could only be given effect to after the President's assent was received on March 28, 2021. The petitioner had filed their application on March 18, 2021, before Section 245C(5) was enacted. Therefore, the application was validly filed. The Court reasoned that the purport of Section 245C(5) was not to invalidate applications already filed after February 1, 2021, but to prevent future applications. The eligibility criteria imposed by the Press Release and notification were found to be beyond the scope of the Act and imposed new rigours not present in the statute. The Court directed that the petitioner's application before the IBSC be considered and disposed of in accordance with law. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, disposed of the Writ Petition. The Court noted the Petitioner's belated approach, filing the petition approximately two years after the impugned order and after a final order under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, had been passed. The Court found support in the Delhi High Court's decision in Indian National Congress Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central-19 and Anr., which held that there was no justification to interdict assessment proceedings at a belated stage. The Court did not comment on the Petitioner's request to raise all grounds in the appeal, stating that Income Tax Authorities are duty-bound to deal with all contentions raised in the appeal. Therefore, the petition was not decided on merits but was disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court held that the notices and order initiating reassessment proceedings for AY 2016-17 could not be sustained. The Court found that the genesis of the information for reopening was an order under Section 263 for AY 2017-18, which had been set aside by the ITAT. Therefore, the basis for the AO's belief that income had escaped assessment was rendered non-existent. Furthermore, the Court agreed with the Petitioner's submission that all material information was disclosed during the original assessment, and the reopening was based on a change of opinion, which is impermissible. Citing the principles laid down in Siemens Financial Services Private Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., the Court emphasized that reopening assessments based on a change of opinion would grant arbitrary powers to the AO and amount to a review, which they do not possess. The Court also noted that issues decided or queries raised and answered during the original assessment should not be revisited in reassessment proceedings. The Court made the Rule absolute, quashing and setting aside the impugned notices and order.