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The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148A(b) and Section 148, as well as the order under Section 148A(d), were illegal, invalid, and non-est. The Court reasoned that once the amalgamating company, Uber India Research and Development Private Limited, ceased to exist due to the approved scheme of amalgamation, there was no legal basis or jurisdiction for the Assessing Officer to proceed against a non-existent entity. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., which held that issuing a notice to a non-existent company is a substantive illegality and not a procedural defect that can be cured. The Court also noted that this position was followed by this Court in Teleperformance Global Services (P.) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court quashed the impugned notices and order. Any other issues regarding the revenue's entitlement or the rights and liabilities of the petitioner were expressly kept open.
The High Court held that the assessee is indeed a religious and charitable trust, a fact concurrently recorded by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. The Court found that the Revenue's contention, based on the assessee's Section 80G registration, to deny the exclusion under Section 115BBC(2)(b) was untenable. The Court reasoned that Section 80G and Section 115BBC(2)(b) operate independently and cannot be intermixed. The registration under Section 80G does not ipso facto preclude an institution from being a religious trust for the purposes of Section 115BBC(2)(b). The Court emphasized that the determination under Section 115BBC(2)(b) requires a factual ascertainment of the trust's objects and activities. The Tribunal's finding that a trust existing for both charitable and religious purposes, with religious expenditure below 5% of total expenses, may be eligible for Section 80G and simultaneously not liable for anonymous donations under Section 115BBC(2)(b) was found to be correct. The High Court agreed with the assessee's entitlement under Section 115BBC(2)(b) based on its status as a religious and charitable trust. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeals were rejected.
The High Court held that the petitioner should pursue its appeal already filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against the impugned assessment order. The petitioner was permitted to raise contentions regarding the impugned notice and order becoming untenable in light of the decision in 'Hexaware'. Furthermore, the petitioner was allowed to file an application before the appellate authority praying for the appeal to be disposed of in view of the 'Hexaware' decision. The appellate authority was directed to expeditiously consider such an application and all contentions raised. The Court also ordered that until the proceedings before the appellate forum are decided, the impugned assessment shall not be acted upon. All contentions of the parties on the pending proceedings were expressly kept open. The ratio is that when an appeal is already filed, the assessee should pursue it before the appellate authority, who should consider the impact of subsequent judgments and dispose of the matter expeditiously.
The Tribunal noted that the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act was issued after the death of the assessee. The respondents' counsel admitted this factual position. Consequently, the proceeding initiated by the Section 148 notice was dropped on October 4, 2024. In light of these developments, the learned advocate for the petitioner sought withdrawal of the writ petition. The High Court, acknowledging the admission by the revenue and the subsequent dropping of the proceedings, disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the original assessment or the validity of the Section 148 notice itself was made, as the petition was withdrawn.
The High Court held that the amounts received by the petitioner from M/s. Dempo Mining Corporation Ltd. and M/s. Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. were indeed reimbursement of expenses and not income. The Court found that the petitioner had incurred expenses on behalf of these companies, and the amounts received were merely to cover those expenses. Therefore, the addition of ₹1,44,00,000/- and ₹1,00,000/- to the petitioner's income was deleted. Consequently, the interest levied under Sections 234B and 234C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was also deleted as it was consequential to the disputed income. The ratio of the decision is that amounts received solely as reimbursement of expenses incurred on behalf of another entity do not constitute taxable income. The operative direction was the deletion of the additions and the consequential interest, thereby granting relief to the petitioner.
The High Court of Bombay at Goa, in its judgment, held that the expenses incurred by the petitioner on employee welfare, staff training, and related activities for Assessment Year 2011-12 were indeed revenue expenditure and not capital expenditure. The Court reasoned that these expenses were incurred for the purpose of the business and were essential for maintaining the workforce and ensuring smooth operations. The Court found that the expenditures were not for acquiring any enduring benefit or asset for the company, but rather for the efficient running of the business on a day-to-day basis. The ratio decidendi is that expenses incurred for the welfare and training of employees, which are necessary for the efficient conduct of business and do not result in an enduring benefit, are to be treated as revenue expenditure. Consequently, the disallowance made by the revenue authorities was set aside. The operative direction was to allow the deduction of these expenses. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court found substance in the revenue's contention that the petitioner had availed of alternate statutory remedies. The Court held that once an appeal and revision proceedings are pending, and the petitioner can raise contentions regarding the illegality of the notices and assessment order before the Appellate and Revisional Authorities, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. The Court reasoned that the Appellate and Revisional Authorities are bound by the jurisdictional High Court's decisions in Hexaware and Siemens and would need to consider the legal position regarding Section 151. Therefore, the Court was not persuaded to entertain the writ petition. However, the Court also found merit in the petitioner's submission that if the impugned order and notice are prima facie illegal and contrary to the law laid down by the Court, they ought not to be given effect until the appellate and revisionary proceedings are decided. Accordingly, the Court directed the petitioner to pursue the pending proceedings before the CIT(A) and the Revisionary Authority, and stayed the impugned assessment order until those proceedings are decided. All contentions of the petitioner on the pending proceedings were expressly kept open.
The High Court found substantial merit in the revenue's contention that the petitioner had already availed of alternate remedies. The Court held that once an appeal and a review application were filed, and these authorities were bound by the jurisdictional High Court's decisions in Hexaware and Siemens, the petitioner should pursue those pending proceedings. The Court was not persuaded to entertain the writ petition directly. However, acknowledging the petitioner's argument that if the assessment order and notice were prima facie illegal and contrary to the law laid down by the High Court, they ought not to be given effect until the appellate and revisionary proceedings were decided, the Court ordered as follows: The petitioner shall pursue the proceedings before the CIT(A) and the Revisionary Authority, and it is open to raise contentions regarding the illegality of the notice under Section 148 in light of the Hexaware and Siemens decisions. Crucially, the impugned assessment order was ordered to remain stayed until the proceedings before the Appellate or Revisionary Authority were decided. All contentions of the petitioner on the pending proceedings were expressly kept open.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated March 30, 2024, for AY 2019-20, could not have been issued. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's submission regarding Section 149(1)(b)(3) of the Act. This provision stipulates that a notice under Section 148 can be issued if more than three years but not more than ten years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, provided the Assessing Officer possesses evidence revealing escaped income of Rs. 50,00,000/- or more. Since the notice was issued for an escaped income of Rs. 25,00,000/-, it did not meet the threshold stipulated in the said provision. The revenue's concession further supported this finding. The petition was allowed in terms of prayer clause (a), quashing the notice. No costs were awarded.
The High Court held that the petition deserves to be allowed. The Court noted that the reassessment proceedings were initiated after the expiry of three years from the relevant assessment year (2018-19). The sanction for these proceedings was admittedly issued by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT). The Court referred to its own decision in Vodafone Idea Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, which held that for reassessments initiated beyond three years from the relevant assessment year, the sanctioning authority must be the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT) as provided under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The proviso to Section 151, which was inserted with effect from April 1, 2023, was not applicable to the present case. Consequently, as the sanction was invalid, the notice under Section 148 of the Act and all consequential actions were quashed and set aside. The operative direction was to quash and set aside the notice under Section 148 and all consequential actions.
The High Court held that the criminal complaint filed against the Petitioners was an abuse of the process of law and quashed and set aside the complaint. The Court reasoned that the Petitioners had demonstrated a willingness to pay by filing self-assessment returns and subsequently paid the entire tax liability of Rs. 35,08,430/- in installments between June 2017 and March 2018. This payment was made well before the criminal complaint was filed in June 2019. Crucially, the complaint was based on an authorization obtained in 2017 and did not disclose the subsequent payments made by the Petitioners. The Court found that the Petitioners' actions, including requesting installments and making payments, did not constitute a wilful default or an attempt to evade tax, which are prerequisites for launching prosecution under Section 276C of the Income Tax Act. The Court relied on the ratio in Unique Trading Company, emphasizing the need for a wilful act and mens rea to evade tax. Since the self-assessment tax was paid prior to the complaint and the complaint failed to acknowledge these payments or obtain fresh authorization for outstanding interest and penalty, the prosecution was deemed unsustainable. The Court made the rule absolute, quashing the complaint.
The High Court found that the ITAT's order did not adequately address the interplay between Section 43A and Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and lacked specific findings on the qualitative aspects of the exchange rate losses. The court noted that the ITAT's decision was primarily based on accounting consistency without a detailed adjudication of the statutory provisions. The court also highlighted that the amended Accounting Standard (AS) 11, which provided an option for capitalization, necessitated a qualitative analysis. Given that the matter involved mixed questions of fact and law and required detailed factual findings, which were not sufficiently provided by the ITAT, the High Court was constrained from adjudicating the appeal directly. Therefore, the High Court decided to remand the matter back to the ITAT for a fresh adjudication. The ITAT is to specifically determine whether the expenditure of Rs. 4,78,38,245/-, disallowed by the AO and CIT-A but allowed by the ITAT, qualifies as not being capital expenditure, so that it can be considered for allowance as revenue expenditure under Section 37(1), independent of Section 43A. The court made it clear that its order expressed no opinion on the merits of the issue.
The High Court allowed the petition in terms of prayer clause (a). The Court found deficiencies and lacunas in the proceedings initiated by the Assessing Officer, particularly the failure to follow prescribed procedures, including the issuance of a notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act, which deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to respond to the reassessment. The Court noted that the intimation via speed post was disputed, and the acknowledgment did not bear the assessee's signature. While acknowledging the petitioner's failure to file returns, the Court emphasized the necessity for the department to follow a proper procedure in accordance with law for initiating reassessment under Section 147. The Court clarified that it was open for the respondents to initiate further action by following the lawful procedure and after hearing the petitioner. All contentions in that regard were expressly kept open. The Court did not delve into the disputed issues regarding the speed post acknowledgment.
The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition in terms of prayer clause (a). The Court noted the Revenue's admission in the reply affidavit that the basis for issuing the reassessment notice was not correct due to verification of materials and that technical glitches had led to inadvertent errors. The Revenue had also requested permission to inform the National Faceless Centre for Reassessment (NFAC) to drop the proceedings as the foundation for reassessment did not exist. Considering these admissions and the fair stand taken by the Revenue, the Court found that the petition was required to be allowed. The petition was disposed of in the above terms, with no costs awarded. The specific issue of whether the notice and order were without jurisdiction, illegal, and arbitrary was implicitly decided in favor of the petitioner based on the Revenue's concessions.
The High Court held that the Principal Commissioner erred in law by rejecting the revision application solely on the ground that the petitioner had not filed a revised return. The Court found Section 264 to be a salutary provision designed to remedy bona fide mistakes and correct inadvertent situations, preventing illegality or injustice. The Court distinguished the cited precedents: *Goetze (India) Ltd.* was not in the context of Section 264 revisionary powers but rather about deductions claimed via letter without a revised return. *M.S. Raju* was factually distinct, involving a claim for deduction not made in the original return and not supported by the record before the assessing authority. The Court found that the petitioner's case involved an inadvertent mistake of double taxation of excess provisions, and given the expiry of the revised return window, Section 264 was the appropriate recourse. The Court allowed the petitions, quashing the impugned orders and restoring the revision proceedings to the file of the Principal Commissioner for appropriate orders on the merits of the adjustment claimed by the petitioner.
The High Court held that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax erred in rejecting the revision application filed by the petitioner solely on the ground that a revised return had not been filed within the prescribed limitation. The Court found that Section 264 is a salutary provision designed to bridge gaps and remedy bona fide mistakes or inadvertent situations in assessment proceedings, ensuring that illegality or injustice is corrected and lawful action is followed. The Court distinguished the precedents cited by the revenue, stating that *Goetze (India) Ltd.* was not in the context of Section 264 revisionary powers but concerned deductions claimed via a letter without a revised return. Similarly, *M.S. Raju* was factually distinct, involving a claim not made in the original return. The Court concluded that the Commissioner's rejection was legally incorrect. Consequently, the revision proceedings were restored to the file of the Principal Commissioner for appropriate orders to be passed under Section 264, considering the merits of the adjustment claimed by the petitioner. The petitions were allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) of each petition, quashing and setting aside the impugned orders.
The High Court held that the Principal Commissioner erred in rejecting the revision application solely on the ground that a revised return had not been filed. The Court found that Section 264 is a salutary provision designed to remedy bona fide mistakes and correct inadvertent situations that may arise during assessment proceedings, thereby preventing injustice or breaches of law. The Court distinguished the cited precedents. The decision in *Goetze (India) Ltd.* was deemed not applicable as it concerned a deduction claimed via letter after filing a return, not revisionary powers under Section 264. Similarly, *M.S. Raju* was distinguished on facts, where the claim was not made in the original return and the 'record' for Section 264(1) was limited to proceedings before the assessing authority. The Court found that the petitioner's case involved an inadvertent mistake of double taxation, and Section 264 was the appropriate remedy when the time for revised returns had expired. The petitions were allowed, and the revision proceedings were restored to the Principal Commissioner for appropriate orders on the merits of the adjustment claimed.
The High Court held that the assessee was entitled to deductions under both Section 36(1)(vii) and Section 36(1)(viia) of the Act for the assessment years in question. The Court found that the provisions of Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) are distinct and separate. The assessee's approach of making an independent provision under Section 36(1)(viia) and adjusting it in subsequent assessment years to claim benefits under Section 36(1)(vii) was permissible and did not violate the proviso to Section 36(1)(vii). The Court noted that the revenue had not contended that the deduction exceeded the limits prescribed by the proviso, which limits the deduction to the amount by which bad debts exceed the credit balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts account made under Section 36(1)(viia). The Tribunal's reliance on the South Indian Bank Ltd. case was distinguished as the facts and application of the proviso were different. The appeals were allowed by answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that the assessee was entitled to deductions under both Section 36(1)(vii) and Section 36(1)(viia) of the Act for the assessment years in question. The Court found that the provisions of Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) are distinct and separate. The assessee's approach of making an independent provision under Section 36(1)(viia) and adjusting it in subsequent assessment years to claim benefits under Section 36(1)(vii) was permissible and did not violate the proviso to Section 36(1)(vii). The Court noted that the revenue had not contended that the deduction exceeded the limits prescribed by the proviso, which limits the deduction to the amount by which bad debts exceed the credit balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts account made under Section 36(1)(viia). The Tribunal's reliance on the South Indian Bank Ltd. case was distinguished as the facts and application of the proviso were different. The appeals were allowed by answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee.
The Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, allowed the writ petitions. The Court found that the issue concerning the validity of notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in circumstances where they are issued beyond three years and the escaped income is less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, is no longer res integra. The Court noted that the revenue was unable to demonstrate from the record that the notices were issued within the three-year period or that the escaped assessment amount exceeded Rs. 50,00,000/-. Consequently, the Court held that the notices were not in conformity with the provisions of Section 149(1)(b) of the Act. The petitions were allowed in terms of prayer clause 'C', implying the quashing of the impugned notices. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the mandate of resorting to the faceless procedure for issuance of notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act is covered by the scheme notified by the Central Government dated 29.03.2022. Consequently, central charges and international taxation charges are not excluded from the application of the faceless mechanism notified under Section 144(b) read with Section 151-A of the Act. The Court found that the issue was no longer res-integra, having been settled by multiple previous judgments of the same High Court and other High Courts. The reasoning is based on the established legal position regarding the mandatory nature of the faceless procedure as notified. The ratio decidendi is that the faceless assessment scheme applies to all charges, including central and international taxation, for notices issued under Section 148. The writ petition was allowed in terms of prayer clause 'C', implying relief was granted to the petitioner in line with that prayer. All contentions of the litigating parties are kept open in the proceedings to be conducted through the faceless mechanism.
The High Court held that the issue raised by the petitioners was no longer res integra. The Court found that the revenue was unable to demonstrate from the record that the impugned notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were issued within three years of the relevant assessment year, nor could they establish that the amount of escaped assessment exceeded Rs. 50,00,000/-. Consequently, the Court allowed the writ petitions in terms of prayer clause 'C'. The ratio decidendi is that notices for reassessment under Section 148, when issued beyond three years for an escaped income less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, are invalid as per Section 149(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, unless the revenue proves otherwise from the record. The operative direction was to allow the petitions.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 29, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid and bad in law. The Court found that the respondent-revenue had not complied with the Scheme notified by the Central Government pursuant to Section 151A(2) of the Act, which mandates a faceless mechanism for reassessment proceedings. Citing the Division Bench judgment in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., the Court reiterated that the issuance of notice under Section 148 must be through automated allocation by a Faceless Assessing Officer, and the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer has no concurrent jurisdiction. The Court noted that an act done contrary to the provisions of the statute causes prejudice to the assessee, and therefore, the petitioner was not required to prove further prejudice. The writ petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notice and the reassessment proceedings for AY 2020-21 as being wholly without jurisdiction. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the writ petition.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 31, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is invalid and bad in law. The Court relied on its previous decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., which clearly stated that Section 151A of the Act contemplates a scheme for both assessment and reassessment, including the issuance of notices under Section 148. The scheme notified by the Central Government, which has been tabled in Parliament, governs the conduct of proceedings under Sections 148A and 148. The Court found that the respondent-revenue had not complied with this scheme, as the notice was issued by the JAO and not the FAO. The Court emphasized that an act done contrary to the provisions of the statute causes prejudice to the assessee, and therefore, the petitioner was not required to prove further prejudice. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notice and all consequential notices.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated March 31, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) is invalid. The Court relied on its previous decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., which clearly stated that the Scheme notified under Section 151A mandates that only a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) can issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, and there is no concurrent jurisdiction of the JAO and FAO in this regard. The Court found that the respondent-revenue had not complied with the Scheme, and the issuance of the notice by the JAO vitiated the proceedings. The Court also noted that an act done contrary to the provisions of the statute itself causes prejudice to the assessee, and therefore, the petitioner was not required to prove further prejudice. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notice and all consequential notices.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated April 19, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the order passed under Section 148A(d) dated April 19, 2024, were invalid. The Court found that these actions were taken by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and not by a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO), which is a mandatory requirement under Section 151A of the Act, read with the Notification dated March 29, 2022. The Court relied on its previous decisions in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., Nainraj Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-4(3) (1), Mumbai & Ors., and Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax and Ors. The reasoning was that the scheme notified under Section 151A mandates automated allocation of cases to FAO for issuing notices under Section 148 and passing orders under Section 148A. The Court stated that an act done contrary to the provisions of the statute is invalid and causes prejudice. Therefore, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notice, order, and reassessment proceedings. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the petition.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated March 31, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the underlying prior notice and order under Sections 148A(b) and 148A(d) were invalid. The Court found that these were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and not by a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO), which contravenes Section 151A of the Act and the Scheme notified on March 29, 2022. The Court relied on its previous decisions in Hexaware Technologies Limited, Nainraj Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., and Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd., which established that the faceless scheme mandates the issuance of such notices by the FAO and that the JAO lacks jurisdiction in this regard. The Court stated that an act done contrary to the statute causes prejudice to the assessee, and therefore, the petitioner was not required to prove further prejudice. The writ petition was allowed, quashing and setting aside the impugned notices and order. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the petition.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the impugned show cause notice dated February 26, 2024, the order dated March 30, 2024, and the notice dated March 30, 2024. The Court held that the Revenue had not complied with the Scheme notified by the Central Government pursuant to Section 151A(2) of the Act. Citing the judgment in *Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.*, the Court reiterated that Section 151A and the Scheme clearly mandate that the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act must be done in a faceless manner by the FAO, not the JAO. The Court found the argument that the scheme is applicable only to the extent of Section 144B to be incorrect, as Section 151A itself contemplates a scheme for issuance of notice under Section 148. The Court also rejected the Revenue's contention that the case, pertaining to central charges, would be excluded from the faceless mechanism. The Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the writ petition, as the petition was disposed of solely on the ground of non-compliance with Section 151A.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 13, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is invalid and bad in law. The Court found that the respondent-revenue had not complied with the Scheme notified by the Central Government pursuant to Section 151A(2) of the Act, which governs proceedings under Sections 148A and 148. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., which clearly declared that for reassessment notices under Section 148, only the FAO can issue such notices, not the JAO, and there is no concurrent jurisdiction. The Court stated that an act done contrary to the statute causes prejudice to the assessee, and the assessee need not prove further prejudice. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notice and all consequential notices. The Court explicitly stated that it has not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the writ petition.
The High Court held that the notice dated April 19, 2023, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the preceding notice and order under Sections 148A(b) and 148A(d) were invalid. The Court found that these actions were taken by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and not by a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO), which is a mandatory requirement under Section 151A of the Act and the Notification dated March 29, 2022. The Court relied on its previous decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., which clearly stated that the issuance of notices under Section 148 must be through an automated allocation to a FAO, and there is no concurrent jurisdiction for the JAO. The Court also referred to Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax and Ors., which confirmed that the faceless scheme covers steps taken in issuing notices under Section 148A. The Court concluded that the non-compliance with Section 151A vitiates the proceedings. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the notice dated March 30, 2023 (issued April 1, 2023) under Section 148A(b), the order dated April 19, 2023, under Section 148A(d), and the consequent notice dated April 19, 2023, under Section 148. The Court explicitly stated it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the petition.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 31, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) was invalid. The Court relied on its own Division Bench judgment in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., which clearly held that Section 151A of the Act mandates a faceless mechanism for both assessment/reassessment and the issuance of notices under Section 148. The Scheme notified by the Central Government pursuant to Section 151A(2) is subordinate legislation and governs the conduct of proceedings under Sections 148A and 148. The Court found that the respondent-revenue had not complied with this Scheme. The argument that the Scheme was applicable only to the extent of Section 144B was rejected, as Section 151A itself contemplates the faceless mechanism for issuance of Section 148 notices. The Court stated that an act done contrary to the statute causes prejudice to the assessee, and therefore, the petitioner did not need to prove further prejudice. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notice and all consequential notices.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 31, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Act, and the underlying prior notice and order under Sections 148A(b) and 148A(d) were invalid. The Court found that these actions were taken by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and not by a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO), which is a mandatory requirement under Section 151A of the Act, read with the Notification dated March 29, 2022. The Court relied on its previous decision in *Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors.*, which clearly stated that the issuance of notice under Section 148 must be through an automated allocation to a FAO, and that the JAO has no jurisdiction in this regard. The Court emphasized that an act done by an authority contrary to the provisions of the statute is invalid and causes prejudice to the assessee, without requiring further proof of prejudice. Consequently, the petition was allowed, quashing the notice under Section 148, the order under Section 148A(d), the notice under Section 148A(b), and the consequential assessment order and demand for AY 2018-19. The Court explicitly stated that no opinion was expressed on other issues raised in the petition, as the disposal was solely on the ground of non-compliance with Section 151A.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 24, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid and bad in law. The Court found that the respondent-revenue had not complied with the Scheme notified by the Central Government pursuant to Section 151A(2) of the Act. Following the explicit declaration of law in the case of Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., the Court ruled that the issuance of the notice by the JAO, when the Scheme mandates it to be issued by an FAO through automated allocation, vitiates the proceedings. The Court stated that an act done contrary to the provisions of the statute itself causes prejudice to the assessee, and therefore, the petitioner was not required to prove further prejudice. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the writ petition, as it was not necessary to do so.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were invalid because they were issued outside the faceless mechanism mandated by Section 144B of the Act. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., wherein it was held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer lacks the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 without adhering to the faceless mechanism as stipulated by Section 144B read with the Scheme under Section 151A dated March 29, 2022. Consequently, the Court found that the proceedings were covered by the Hexaware decision. The revenue's contentions regarding central charges were also found to be covered by the decision in Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap. The Court allowed the petitions in terms of prayer clause (a) of each petition, which typically seeks quashing of the impugned notices and assessment orders. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were invalid because they were issued outside the faceless mechanism mandated by Section 144B of the Act. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., wherein it was held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer lacks the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 without adhering to the faceless mechanism as stipulated by Section 144B read with the Scheme under Section 151A dated March 29, 2022. Consequently, the Court found that the proceedings were covered by the Hexaware decision. The revenue's contentions regarding central charges were also found to be covered by the decision in Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap. The Court allowed the petitions in terms of prayer clause (a) of each petition, which typically seeks quashing of the impugned notices and assessment orders. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were invalid because they were issued outside the faceless mechanism mandated by Section 144B of the Act. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., wherein it was held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer lacks the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 without adhering to the faceless mechanism as stipulated by Section 144B read with the Scheme under Section 151A dated March 29, 2022. Consequently, the Court found that the proceedings were covered by the Hexaware decision. The revenue's contentions regarding central charges were also found to be covered by the decision in Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap. The Court allowed the petitions in terms of prayer clause (a) of each petition, which typically seeks quashing of the impugned notices and assessment orders. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the notices and order were invalid because they were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) instead of a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). This violated Section 151A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the Scheme notified on March 29, 2022, which mandates faceless proceedings for issuing notices under Section 148A and Section 148. The Court followed its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited, which clearly held that the JAO has no concurrent jurisdiction with the FAO in such matters and that the Scheme mandates automated allocation. The Court rejected the revenue's argument that the petitioner lacked locus, distinguishing the Mafatlal Industries case as being in a different context (refunds) and not applicable to a challenge against a procedurally flawed notice before assessment. The Court found that the petitioner was challenging an action contrary to law, which is permissible. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, quashing the impugned notices and order. The Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the petitions.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders of the PCIT. The Court held that the PCIT's approach was mechanical and lacked sensitivity to the genuine human problem presented. The Court emphasized that technicalities of law should not disregard genuine human issues that prevent timely compliances. It noted that the PCIT did not record specific reasons for disbelieving the submitted medical documents or for deeming the petitioners' case as not genuine. The Court found that the delay was sufficiently explained and caused by circumstances beyond the control of the assessees, who were dependent on their Chartered Accountant. The Court directed the respondents to permit the petitioners to file their returns with penalty, fees, and interest, if any, within two weeks. All contentions on the merits of the returns were expressly kept open.
The High Court held that the notice dated 29 February 2024 issued under Section 148, the prior notice under Section 148A(b) dated 3 January 2024, and the order under Section 148A(d) dated 29 February 2024 were all invalid. The Court found that these actions were taken by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and not by a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO), which is contrary to the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the Scheme notified by the Central Government on 29 March 2022. The Court relied on its own previous decisions in *Hexaware Technologies Limited*, *Nainraj Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.*, and *Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd.*, which clearly established that the faceless mechanism is mandatory for issuing notices under Section 148 and for proceedings under Section 148A. The Court reasoned that an act done contrary to the statutory provisions causes prejudice to the assessee, and therefore, the Petitioner was not required to prove further prejudice. The Writ Petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notices and order. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the Writ Petition, as they were not necessary to decide.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were invalid because they were issued outside the faceless mechanism mandated by Section 144B of the Act. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., wherein it was held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer lacks the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 without adhering to the faceless mechanism as stipulated by Section 144B read with the Scheme under Section 151A dated March 29, 2022. Consequently, the Court found that the proceedings were covered by the Hexaware decision. The revenue's contentions regarding central charges were also found to be covered by the decision in Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap. The Court allowed the petitions in terms of prayer clause (a) of each petition, which typically seeks quashing of the impugned notices and assessment orders. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the jurisdictional Assessing Officer would not have the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 de’hors the faceless mechanism as mandated under Section 144B read with the Scheme under Section 151A dated March 29, 2022. This finding is based on the established precedent of the Court in Hexaware Technologies Limited. The Court noted that the revenue did not dispute this position and conceded that the present case, where notices were issued outside the faceless mechanism, would be covered by the Hexaware decision. Consequently, the Court found no reason to deviate from its earlier pronouncements. The petitions were allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) of each petition, which typically seeks quashing of the impugned notices and consequential orders. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated March 31, 2023, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid. The reasoning was based on the explicit provisions of Section 151A of the Act, which mandates a faceless mechanism for reassessment proceedings, including the issuance of notices under Section 148. The Central Government's Notification dated March 29, 2022, introduced this faceless mechanism, requiring adherence to automated allocation of cases to Faceless Assessing Officers (FAOs). The Tribunal relied on the Division Bench judgment in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., which clearly stated that the jurisdiction of the JAO and FAO is exclusive, and notices under Section 148 must be issued by the FAO through automated allocation. The argument that the scheme was only applicable to the extent of Section 144B was rejected, as Section 151A itself contemplates the scheme for both assessment and issuance of notices under Section 148. The Tribunal found that the issuance of the notice by the JAO was contrary to law and vitiated the entire proceedings. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the notice under Section 148, the reassessment order, the notice of demand, and the notice of penalty. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the petition.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were invalid because they were issued outside the faceless mechanism mandated by Section 144B of the Act. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., wherein it was held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer lacks the jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148 without adhering to the faceless mechanism as stipulated by Section 144B read with the Scheme under Section 151A dated March 29, 2022. Consequently, the Court found that the proceedings were covered by the Hexaware decision. The revenue's contentions regarding central charges were also found to be covered by the decision in Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap. The Court allowed the petitions in terms of prayer clause (a) of each petition, which typically seeks quashing of the impugned notices and assessment orders. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Bombay High Court held that the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax's approach in rejecting the applications for condonation of delay was mechanical and lacked sensitivity to genuine human problems. The court found that the PCIT had not recorded specific reasons for disbelieving the medical documents submitted by the petitioners or for deeming their case as not genuine. The court emphasized that assessees are often dependent on Chartered Accountants, and personal difficulties faced by professionals, such as illness of a family member, can be a cause beyond the control of the assessee, necessitating condonation of delay. The court observed that rigid application of rules should not disregard such genuine human issues, especially when the legislature provides for condonation of delay. The impugned order of the PCIT was quashed and set aside. The respondents were directed to permit the petitioners to file their returns with penalty, fees, and interest, if any, within two weeks. All contentions on the merits of the returns were expressly kept open.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued under Section 148A(b) and Section 148A(d), and the consequent notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were invalid. The reasoning was based on the mandatory requirement of Section 151A of the Act, which necessitates adherence to the faceless mechanism notified by the Central Government. The Court referred to its own decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & 4 Ors., which clearly established that the issuance of notices under Section 148 must be through the faceless mechanism and cannot be undertaken by the JAO. The Court found that the respondent-Revenue had not complied with this Scheme. The ratio decidendi is that any action taken by an authority contrary to the statutory procedure prescribed by law is invalid and causes prejudice to the assessee, without requiring further proof of prejudice. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the impugned notices and order. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the writ petition, as it was not necessary to do so.
The High Court held that the notices and orders were invalid because they were issued by the JAO instead of the FAO, contrary to the mandatory provisions of Section 151A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the scheme notified on March 29, 2022. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited, which clearly held that the faceless scheme applies to the issuance of notices under Section 148 and that only the FAO can issue such notices, to the exclusion of the JAO. The Court rejected the revenue's argument based on Mafatlal Industries Ltd., distinguishing the context of the present case (challenging a notice before assessment) from the context of refund claims in Mafatlal. The Court found that the petitioner was challenging an action contrary to law, which is permissible. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, quashing the impugned notices and orders. The Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the writ petitions, as it was not necessary to do so.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated April 6, 2023, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the preceding order under Section 148A(d) are invalid because they were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) instead of a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). The Court relied on its previous decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited, which clearly held that Section 151A, read with the notification dated March 29, 2022, mandates a faceless mechanism for the issuance of notices under Section 148, and the JAO has no concurrent jurisdiction. The Court found that the Revenue had not complied with the Scheme notified under Section 151A, rendering the proceedings vitiated. The Tribunal also noted that in similar circumstances, the petition was allowed in Nainraj Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the other issues raised in the writ petition, including the validity of prior approval for reassessment proceedings initiated beyond three years, as the petition was disposed of solely on the ground of non-compliance with Section 151A. The petition was allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a), (c), and (d), quashing the impugned notice and order.
The High Court held that the notices and order were invalid because they were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) instead of a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO), contrary to the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the Notification dated March 29, 2022. The Court relied on its previous decisions in *Hexaware Technologies Limited*, *Nainraj Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.*, and *Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd.*, which established that the faceless scheme under Section 151A is applicable to the issuance of notices under Section 148A and Section 148, and that only the FAO has jurisdiction for such issuances. The Court rejected the revenue's argument that cases involving central charges are excluded from this scheme, citing its decision in *Abhin Anilkumar Shah*. Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned notices and order as being bad in law. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the writ petition, as the disposal was solely on the ground of non-compliance with Section 151A.
The High Court held that the notices and order were invalid because they were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) instead of a Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). The Court relied on its previous decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited, which clearly stated that the scheme introduced under Section 151A of the Act mandates that notices under Section 148 must be issued by the FAO through an automated allocation process, to the exclusion of the JAO. The Court found that the Revenue had not complied with the Scheme notified by the Central Government pursuant to Section 151A(2) of the Act. The Court also referred to its decision in Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd., which confirmed that the scheme covers steps taken in issuing notices under Section 148A(b) and orders under Section 148A(d). The Court rejected the Revenue's argument that the case being a central charge excluded it from the applicability of Section 151A and the Scheme, citing its decision in Abhin Anilkumar Shah. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, quashing the notices and order. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on other issues raised in the petition, as it was not necessary to do so.
The Bombay High Court held that the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax's approach in rejecting the applications for condonation of delay was mechanical and lacked sensitivity to genuine human problems. The Court observed that technicalities should not override genuine human issues that prevent compliance. The petitioners' dependence on their Chartered Accountant, whose personal difficulties caused the delay, was considered a cause beyond the petitioners' control. The Court found that the PCIT failed to provide reasons for disbelieving the submitted documents and that there was no contrary material to reject the petitioners' case. The Court emphasized that assessees often depend on Chartered Accountants, and personal difficulties of professionals can be a valid ground for condonation, akin to how courts condone delays in legal proceedings. Consequently, the impugned orders of the PCIT were quashed and set aside. The respondents were directed to permit the petitioners to file their returns with applicable penalty, fees, and interest within two weeks. All contentions on the merits of the returns were expressly kept open.