SOLIDWORKS CORPORATION,MUMBAI vs. ADDL DIT (IT) 2, MUMBAI

Appearances by: Ajit Kumar Jain, and Pranith Golecha for the appellant Jasbir Chauhan for the respondent Date of concluding the hearing : January 5, 2016 Date of pronouncing the order : March 31st , 2016 O R D E R Per Pramod Kumar, AM:

1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Assessing Officer and the DRP erred in holding that the payment received by the company from resellers in India, for acquisition of computer software, are royalty in nature and hence chargeable to tax in India @ 15% as per Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and USA Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 2 of 20 2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the AO and the DRP erred in levying interest under section 234B of the Act, inspite of the fact that the appellant is a non-resident assessee.

4. We find that, in a very elaborate and well reasoned order for the immediately preceding assessment year- which also deals with the issues being raised now by the learned Departmental Representative, our distinguished colleagues have observed as follows:

3. The issue raised by the Revenue in this appeal is identical to the issue raised by it in AY 03-04 and 05-06 before the Tribunal in and ITA No.5097/mum/08 respectively. This Tribunal on identical facts has already taken a view that that the sums received by the Assessee in both the aforesaid A.Y.s for supply of software is not in the nature of royalty within the meaning of Article 12(3) of the DTAA between India and USA and was in the nature of business income and since the Assessee did not have a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India the receipts are not taxable in India. The operative part of the order of the Tribunal in ITA No.3095/Mum/07 for AY 03-04 reads as follows: 3. The assessee is a company incorporated in the USA and a tax resident of USA. The assessee filed tax resident certificate before the Assessing Officer and is therefore entitled to the benefit of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and USA (DTAA). The assessee develops and markets 3D mechanical design solution in various countries. The shrink- wrap application software developed and sold by assessee is called 'Solidworks 2003' which is used for 3D modeling. The software creates 3D models either from scratch or from existing 2D data. The designed data Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 3 of 20 prepared by Solidworks 2003 software provides data which is 100% editable. The software is provided in a packed form to the customers in India alongwith and pursuant to an end user license agreement (EULA). The agreement is not physically signed but built in as part of the installation process. The license agreement pops up on computer screen and must be accepted by the user before the user can operate the software. The software provided to the user is a single user license whereby the software can be loaded in one computer or can be used many times (called multiple user license) which can be loaded on several computers. Solidwork owns and will retain all copyright, trade mark, trade secret and other proprietary rights. The end user is not permitted to make any modification or make works derivative of the software and user is not entitle to reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble or otherwise discover the source code of the software. 4.For the purposes of marketing the shrink wrap software, the assessee had entered into agreement with various distributors/resellers in India. Copy of a software distribution agreement was filed before the Assessing Officer. All distribution agreements are identical. As per the software distribution agreement, the distributor gets right to market distribute and support the product. However, distributor does not get any exclusive distributor rights. He also does not get any right to disassemble, decompile or reverse engineer the software. Copyright over software remain with the assessee. On these facts, it was claimed by the assessee before the Assessing Officer that the software being sold by the assessee was a shrink wrap software being sold to customers for their personal use without transfer of any copyright, trade mark, or patent etc. In view of this payment received for supply of software was not royalty and was only business income. The assessee did not have a permanent establishment (PE) in India and therefore business income is not taxable as per Article-7 of the DTAA. 5.The Assessing Officer did not agree with the plea of the assessee. He held that the payment received by the assessee was in the nature of royalty and he accordingly brought the same to tax. On appeal by the assessee, learned CIT(A) held that the payment in question was not in the nature of royalty and was payment for purchase of copyrighted article. Addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted by the learned CIT(A) giving rise to Ground No. 1&2 of the revenue before the Tribunal. 6.We have heard the rival submissions. The sample copy of the software distribution agreement filed before the lower authority shows that under section 6, thereof, the distributor has to obtain orders for the product and was free to fix price of the product. The assessee had a right to accept or reject the request of the distributor for supply. The distributor was not authorized directly or indirectly to entered into any written or oral contract on behalf of the assessee. More importantly, distributor cannot tamper with or remove from the original packaging and all product shall be distributed by the distributor in unopened packaging in which such products were received from the assessee. The Distributor does not have any right to make further copies of the products. Under section 3 of the Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 4 of 20 agreement, which grants license for use of the product by the ultimate consumer clearly provides that distributor cannot disassemble, decompile or in any way attempt to reverse engineer any of the product or to modify or make works derived from the products. It also provides that license to use cannot be construed as a right to make copies of the product. When the ultimate consumer uses the product he has to subscribe the end user license agreement (EULA). This only provides facility to ultimate consumer to install software on his computer and use it personally without allowing any right to the consumer of disassemble, reverse engineer, decompile the software. Customer is also not entitled to sell, license, sub-license, transfer, assign, lease or rent the software. It is thus clear neither the distributor nor end user has any right over the copyright of the software. 7.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 271 ITR 401 has held as follows :- "A software programme may consist of various commands which enable the computer to perform a designated task. The copyright in that programme may remain with the originator of the programme. But the moment copies are made and marketed, it becomes goods, which are susceptible to sale tax. Even intellectual property, once it is put on to a media, whether it be in the form of books or canvas (In case of painting) or computer discs or cassettes, and marketed would become 'good'. We see no different between a sale of a software programme on a CD/floppy disc from a sale of music on a cassette/CD or a sale of a film on a video cassette/CD. In all such cases, the intellectual property has been incorporated on a media for purposes of transfer. Sale is not just of the media which by itself has very little value. The software and the media cannot be split up. What the buyer purchases and pays for is not the disc or the CD. As in the case of paintings or books or music or films the buyer is purchasing the intellectual property and not the media i.e. the paper or cassette or disc or CD. Thus, a transaction of sale of computer software is clearly a sale of goods within the meaning of the term as defined in the said Act." 8.Thus computer software when it is put on to a media and sold has become goods like any other audio cassette or painting on canvas or a book. It is ceases to be transfer of intellectual property right. In fact, Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Lucent Technologies Hindustan Ltd. Vs. ITO, 92 ITD 366 (Bang) has also taken the view that in such a situation there is no acquisition of any right in software. Definition of 'royalty' is given in section (9)(1) Explanation (2) of the Act and the definition of Royalty in Article 12(3) of the Indo-US DTAA shows that definition of royalty under DTAA is more restrictive than what is provided in section (9)(1) of the Act. Under the definition as contained in DTAA, there should be a transfer of copyright. Sale of software by the assessee to the distributor or end user does not involve any transfer of copyright either in part or in whole; therefore consideration paid by the distributor cannot be said to be a payment for right of use copyright or transfer of use of copyright. It has been uniformly held in several decisions of the ITAT Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 5 of 20 that sale of shrink-wrap software does not involve receipt of consideration, which can be said to be royalty. Decisions in this regard are as follows :- • Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. Vs. ITO, 93 TTJ 658 • Motorola Incorporation, 270 ITR (AT) 62 • Sonata Information Technologies Ltd., to 1580/Bang/2004 dated 31.1.2006.

Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 8 of 20 5. The learned counsel for the Assessee relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Director of Income Tax Vs. Ericsson A.B., New Delhi dated 23.12.2007. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court was dealing with a question as to whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the consideration for supply of software was not a payment by way of royalty, and hence was not assessable both u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Act and the relevant clause of DTAA with Sweden. The facts of the aforesaid case were that the assessee company was incorporated in Sweden and was one of the leading suppliers of telecommunication equipment comprising of both, hardware and software. The assessee company had entered into agreements with ten cellular operators in India for supply of hardware and software. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the income of the assessee was taxable in India, both, under the Income-tax Act, 1961 as well as under the treaty between India and Sweden. He held that it was business income and Assessee had a PE in India. The CIT(A) held that the receipts in respect of license to use software which is part of the hardware alone could be taxed in India as royalty. The Assessee argued before Tribunal that the payment made by the assessee for the use of software in the equipment does not amount to royalty. The Tribunal in the aforesaid context examined the issue as to whether the payment is for a copyright or for a copyrighted article. If it is for copyright, it should be classified as royalty both under the Income-tax Act and under the DTAA and it would be taxable in the hands of the assessee on that basis. If the payment is really for a copyrighted article, then it only represents the purchase price of the article and, therefore, cannot be considered as royalty either under the Act or under the DTAA. The Tribunal after referring to definition of Royalty under the Act and the definition copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957 held that what was sold by the non resident was a copyrighted article and payment to the non resident was not for copyright. On further appeal by the Revenue, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court examined the issue which we have set out earlier. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that income did not accrue to the non- resident by virtue of a business connection in India and therefore the question of the Non resident having a permanent establishment in India did not arise for consideration at all. On the issue whether the payment to the non resident was of the nature of royalty which could be brought to tax in India, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held as follows: "WHETHER THE INCOME FROM THE SUPPLY CONTRACT CAN BE TREATED AS 'ROYALTY' UNDER SECTION 9(1)(vi) OF THE ACT: 50. Section 9 (1) (i) of the Act which deals with the taxability of „royalty income" reads as under :- "Section 9 .INCOME DEEMED TO ACCRUE OR ARISE IN INDIA. (1) The following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India :- (i) All income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in India, or through or from any property in India, or through or from any asset or source of income in India, or through the transfer of a capita! asset situate in India"

Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 9 of 20 51.The submission of Mr. Prasaran, learned ASG was that software part of the equipment supply would attract royalty as copy right of the said software programme still vests with the assessee. Therefore, payments made for the licence to use the software programme give rise to "royalty" for the purposes of both the Income-Tax Act as well as DTAA entered into between Sweden and India. Referring to Explanation-II (v) to Section ( (1)(vi) of the Act as well as Article 13, para-3 of DTAA, it was argued that for the purposes of Income-Tax law, royalty is essentially a payment received as consideration for the use or right to use a particular integral property right, whether partially or entirely. 52.We find that the Tribunal has held that there was no payment towards any royalty and this conclusion is based on the following reasoning:- (i)Payment made by the cellular operator cannot be characterized as royalty either under the Income Tax Act or under the DTAA. (ii)The operator has not been given any of the seven rights under S.14 (a) (i) to (vii) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and, therefore what is transferred is not a copyright but actually a copyrighted article (iii)The cellular operator cannot commercially exploit the software and therefore a copyright is not transferred. (iv)Further, the parties to the agreement have not agreed upon a separate price for the software and therefore it is not open for the income tax authorities to split the same and consider part of the payment for software to be royalty (v)The bill of entry for importing of goods shows that the price has been separately mentioned for software and that this was only for the purposes of customs. There is no evidence to show that the assessee was a party to the fixation of value for the customs duty purposes (vi)The software provided under the contract is goods and therefore no royalty can be said to be paid for it. 53.Mr. Prasaran, countered the aforesaid reasoning arguing that Clause 20 of the Supply Contract uses the term „licence" and the same term is used in the context of software throughout the three Agreements, indicating that it is not an outright sale of goods, or a full transfer of rights from the assessee to the Indian company. He also submitted that the software is a computer programme, which is treated differently from a book, not only in the Copyright Act, 1957 but also the Income Tax Act itself. His submission was that Section 52(1) (aa) of the Copyright Act only deems that certain acts will not to amount to infringement in the light of various concerns, where otherwise such acts would amount to infringement under Section 51 of the Copyright Act. The provision cannot by itself be used to hold that no right exists in the first place, since the scope of the right has to be understood only from the provisions of Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957. He also argued that the ITAT has misinterpreted the provisions of the DTAA, specifically Article 13, para 3 of the DTAA (Article 12, para 3 of the Model Convention) which defines royalties to mean "payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 10 of 20 or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work". The ITAT, it was submitted, has not appreciated that the royalty is for the use or right to use any copyright. According to him, since title of the software continued to vest with the assessee as provided in clause 20.2 of the Supply Agreement and the assessee was free to grant nonexclusive licenses to other parties, it follow that there was no full time transfer of copyright but it was only a case of right to use the software, and thus payment for use of software is to be treated as royalty. He further argued that reference to OECD Commentary was not apposite as it could not be used to interpret the scope of the relevant provisions of DTAA. 54.It is difficult to accept the aforesaid submissions in the facts of the present case. We have already held above that the assessee did not have any business connection in India. We have also held that the supply of equipment in question was in the nature of supply of goods. Therefore, this issue is to be examined keeping in view these findings. Moreover, another finding of fact is recorded by the Tribunal that the Cellular Operator did not acquire any of the copyrights referred to in Section 14 (b) of the Copyright Act, 1957. 55.Once we proceed on the basis of aforesaid factual findings, it is difficult to hold that payment made to the assessee was in the nature of royalty either under the Income-Tax Act or under the DTAA. We have to keep in mind what was sold by the assessee to the Indian customers was a GSM which consisted both of the hardware as well as the software, therefore, the Tribunal is right in holding that it was not permissible for the Revenue to assess the same under two different articles. The software that was loaded on the hardware did not have any independent existence. The software supply is an integral part of the GSM mobile telephone system and is used by the cellular operator for providing the cellular services to its customers. There could not be any independent use of such software. The software is embodied in the system and the revenue accepts that it could not be used independently. This software merely facilitates the functioning of the equipment and is an integral part thereof. On these facts, it would be useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in TATA Consultancy Services Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 271 ITR 401, wherein the Apex Court held that software which is incorporated on a media would be goods and, therefore, liable to sales tax. Following discussion in this behalf is required to be noted:- "In our view, the term "goods" as used in Article 366(12) of the Constitution of India and as defined under the said Act are very wide and include all types of movable properties, whether those properties be tangible or intangible. We are in complete agreement with the observations made by this Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. (supra). A software programme may consist of various commands which enable the computer to perform a designated task. The copyright in that programme may remain with the originator of the programme. But the moment copies are made and marketed, it becomes goods, which are susceptible to sales tax. Even intellectual property, once it is put on to a media, whether it be in the form of books or canvas (In case of painting) or computer discs or cassettes, and marketed would become "goods". We see no difference between a sale of a software programme on a CD/floppy disc from a sale of music on a cassette/CD or a sale of a film on a video cassette/CD. In all such cases, the intellectual property has been incorporated on a media for purposes of transfer.

Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 11 of 20 Sale is not just of the media which by itself has very little value. The software and the media cannot be split up. What the buyer purchases and pays for is not the disc or the CD. As in the case of paintings or books or music or films the buyer is purchasing the intellectual property and not the media i.e. the paper or cassette or disc or CD. Thus a transaction sale of computer software is clearly a sale of "goods" within the meaning of the term as defined in the said Act. The term "all materials, articles and commodities" includes both tangible and intangible/incorporeal property which is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and which can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. The software programmes have all these attributes." xxxxxxxxxx "In Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corpn, 925 F. 2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1991), relied on by Mr. Sorabjee, the court was concerned with interpretation of uniform civil code which "applied to transactions in goods". The goods therein were defined as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of the identification for sale". It was held : "Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to computer owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of musicians and in itself is not a "good," but when transferred to a laser- readable disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity. Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good. That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible, moveable and available in the marketplace. The fact that some programs may be tailored for specific purposes need not alter their status as "goods" because the Code definition includes "specially manufactured goods." 56.A fortiorari when the assessee supplies the software which is incorporated on a CD, it has supplied tangible property and the payment made by the cellular operator for acquiring such property cannot be regarded as a payment by way of royalty. 57.It is also to be borne in mind that the supply contract cannot be separated into two viz. hardware and software. We would like to refer the judgment of Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Sundwiger EMFG Co., 266 ITR 110 wherein it was held: "A plain and cumulative reading of the terms and conditions of the contract entered into between the principal to principal i.e., foreign company and Midhani i.e., preamble of the contract, Part-I and II of the contract and also the separate agreement, as referred to above, would clearly show that it was one and the same transaction. One cannot be read in isolation of the other. The services rendered by the experts and the payments made towards the same was part and parcel of the sale consideration and the same cannot be severed and treated as a business Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 12 of 20 income of the non-resident company for the services rendered by them in erection of the machinery in Midhani unit at Hyderabad. Therefore, the contention of the Revenue that as the amounts reimbursed by Midhani under a separate contract for the technical services rendered by a non- resident company, it must be deemed that there was a "business connection", and it attracts the provisions of Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act cannot be accepted and the judgments relied upon by the Revenue are the cases where there was a separate agreement for the purpose of technical services to be rendered by a foreign company, which is not connected for the fulfilment of the main contract entered into principal to principal. This is not one such case and thus the contention of the Revenue cannot be accepted in the circumstances and nature of the terms of the contract of this case." 58.No doubt, in an annexure to the Supply Contract the lump sum price is bifurcated in two components, viz., the consideration for the supply of the equipment and for the supply of the software. However, it was argued by the learned counsel for the assessee that this separate specification of the hardware/software supply was necessary because of the differential customs duty payable. 59.Be as it may, in order to qualify as royalty payment, within the meaning of Section 9(1) (vi) and particularly clause (v) of Explanation-II thereto, it is necessary to establish that there is transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of any license) in respect of copy right of a literary, artistic or scientific work. Section 2 (o) of the Copyright Act makes it clear that a computer programme is to be regarded as a literary work". Thus, in order to treat the consideration paid by the cellular operator as royalty, it is to be established that the cellular operator, by making such payment, obtains all or any of the copyright rights of such literary work. In the presence case, this has not been established. It is not even the case of the Revenue that any right contemplated under Section 14 of the Copyright Act,1957 stood vested in this cellular operator as a consequence of Article 20 of the Supply Contract. Distinction has to be made between the acquisition of a "copyright right" and a "copyrighted article". 60.Mr. Dastur is right in this submission which is based on the commentary on the OECD Model Convention. Such a distinction has been accepted in a recent ruling of the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) in Dassault Systems KK 229 CTR 125. We also find force in the submission of Mr. Dastur that even assuming the payment made by the cellular operator is regarded as a payment by way of royalty as defined in Explanation 2 below Section 9 (1) (vi), nevertheless, it can never be regarded as royalty within the meaning of the said term in article 13, para 3 of the DTAA. This is so because the definition in the DTAA is narrower than the definition in the Act. Article 13(3) brings within the ambit of the definition of royalty a payment made for the use of or the right to use a copyright of a literary work. Therefore, what is contemplated is a payment that is dependent upon user of the copyright and not a lump sum payment as is the position in the present case.

Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 13 of 20 61.We thus hold that payment received by the assessee was towards the title and GSM system of which software was an inseparable parts incapable of independent use and it was a contract for supply of goods. Therefore, no part of the payment therefore can be classified as payment towards royalty." 6.Before us the learned D.R. as well as the learned counsel for the Assessee referred to several decisions of the Tribunal rendered on identical issue. These decisions are not being considered as the two decisions of the Hon'ble High court of Karnataka and Hon'ble High Court of Delhi were rendered after those decisions rendered by the Tribunal and these two decisions are the decisions of High Court available as of now on the issue. Both the decisions have taken note of the terms of the agreement subject to which software was to be used by the customer. 7.It was the submission of the learned counsel for the Assessee that where two views are available on an issue one favourable to the Assessee and the one against the Assessee, the view which is favourable to the Assessee and does not support levy of tax on the Assessee should be preferred. The learned D.R. on the other hand submitted that the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court was rendered in the context of sale of equipment in which software was embedded and not a case of shrink wrap software as such and therefore that decision should be applied to a case where sale of shrink wrap software is involved. Alternatively it was submitted by him that the concession that where two views are available on an issue one favourable to the Assessee and the one against the Assessee, the view which is favourable to the Assessee and does not support levy of tax on the Assessee should be preferred, should not be applied to non-resident assesses. 8.On the argument of the learned D.R. that where two views are available on an issue one favourable to the Assessee should be preferred, should not be applied to non-resident assesses, we are of the view the same cannot be accepted in view of Article 24 of the DTAA between India and USA which provides for Non- discrimination. Article 24(1) lays down that Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be subjected. This provision shall, notwithstanding the provisions of article 1, also apply to persons who are not residents of one or both of the Contracting States. Therefore where two views are available on an issue one favourable to the Assessee and the one against the Assessee, the view which is favourable to the Assessee and does not support levy of tax on the Assessee should be preferred, should be applied to non-resident assesse in this case. 9.On the other submission of the learned D.R. that the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court was in respect of use of software embedded in an equipment supplied and therefore the same should not be applied to the case of shrink wrap software, we are of the view that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court after referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services (supra) went on to observe at para-56 of its judgment that when software is incorporated in a CD it becomes a tangible property and the payment made for acquiring the same is not a payment by way of royalty. In para- Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 14 of 20 60 of its judgment, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has approved the ruling of the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) in the case of Dassault Systems KK 322 ITR 125 (AAR). The facts giving rise to the ruling of the AAR were that the applicant, a Japanese company, engaged in the business of providing "Products lifecycle management" software solutions, applications and services, marketed licensed software products mostly through a distribution channel comprising value added resellers (VAR) who were independent third party resellers. To authorize a VAR to act as a reseller the applicant entered into a general VAR agreement. The terms of the agreement explicitly provided for the appointment of reseller/distributor of product on a non-exclusive basis for making the product available to the end-user within the territory for his internal use. The product was sold to the VAR for a consideration based on the standard list price less discount ; and the VAR in turn would sell the product to the end-users at a price independently determined by the VAR. The end-user would enter into the end-user licence agreement with the applicant and the VAR for the product supplied. The reseller did not hold any inventory of the software in India. The VAR was free to negotiate the price with the customer but the VAR paid to the applicant the standard price in force less agreed discount. The reseller (VAR) would get the order from the end-user and place a back-to-back order on the applicant. On acceptance of the order by the applicant, the applicant would provide a licence key via e-mail so that the customer would directly download the product through the web link. On these facts, the applicant sought the advance ruling of the Authority on the question "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the payment received by Dassault Systems K. K. (hereinafter referred to as 'the applicant') from sale of software products to independent third party resellers will be taxable as business profits under article 7 of the India-Japan Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement ('India Japan DTAA' or 'Treaty') and will not constitute 'royalties and fee for technical services' as defined in article 12 of India-Japan DTAA ?" On the facts stated, the Authority ruled on the question whether the payment would amount to royalty as follows: (i)That the computer programme forming part of the software fell within the description of literary or scientific work. A copyright in or over the computer software produced by the applicant was in the nature of an intangible, incorporeal right belonging to the category of intellectual property rights. All intellectual property rights in the licensed programs exclusively belonged to the applicant or its licensor and they were retained by the applicant. (ii)That passing of a right to use and facilitating the use of a product for which the owner had a copyright was not the same thing as transferring or assigning rights in relation to the copyright. Where the purpose of the licence or the transaction was only to establish access to the copyrighted product for internal business purpose, it was not legally correct to say that the copyright itself had been transferred to any extent. Merely authorizing or enabling a customer to have the benefit of data or instructions contained therein without any further right to deal with them independently did not amount to transfer of rights in relation to copyright or conferment of the right of using the copyright. (iii)That the VAR had not been given an independent right to sell or offer for sale the software products of the applicant to the end-users. What the VAR did, in the Assessment years: 2007-08 Page 15 of 20 course of carrying out its marketing function, was to canvass for orders, collect the purchase order from the interested customer and forward that offer to the applicant; and it was the applicant that accepted or rejected that offer. In the absence of an independent right to conclude the sale or offer for sale, section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957, could not be invoked to bring the case within the fold of article 12(3) of the DTAA or section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

………..It will be wholly inappropriate for us to choose views of one of the High Courts based on our perceptions about reasonableness of the respective viewpoints, as such an exercise will de facto amount to sitting in judgment over the views of the High Courts something diametrically opposed to the very basic principles of hierarchical judicial system. We have to, with our highest respect of both the Hon’ble High Courts, adopt an objective criterion for deciding as to which of the Hon’ble High Court should be followed by us.