PRL.COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs. M/S KERADI MILK PRODUCERS' WOMEN

PRL. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AAYAKAR BHAVAN, C.R. BUILDING, N.G. ROAD, ATTAVARA, MANGALURU – 575 001.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRALIZED PROCESSING CENTRE, BENGALURU – 560 500.

INCOME-TAX OFFICER, WARD-2, AAYAKAR BHAVAN, ADI-UDUPI MALPE ROAD, UDUPI – 576 103.

The legality and correctness of the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No.28872/2019, dated 19/09/2019 is called in question in this intra-Court appeal.

Briefly stated the facts are that, the respondent herein had filed the writ petition seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari by quashing order dated 17/06/2019, bearing No.124/119(2)(b)/Pr.CIT/MNG/2019- 20, passed by respondent No.1 in the writ petition/appellant No.1 herein namely, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Mangaluru. By the said order, appellant No.1 herein refused to condone the delay and rejected the application filed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the sake of brevity). Consequently, the delay

Learned single Judge, who heard the writ petition along with other similar matters, has referred to the decision of the Delhi High Court, passed in Fibrefill Engineers vs. CIT [(2017) 177 TTJ 556 (Del.), wherein it has been held that on the aspect of delay, genuine hardship would have to be considered before condoning the delay and discretion has to be exercised in genuine cases of hardship and accordingly, exercising his discretion, learned single Judge held that application seeking condonation of delay in filing the returns has to be reconsidered.

Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the learned single Judge was not right in exercising discretion in favour of the respondent herein. That for the assessment year 2018-19, there was a delay in filing the returns. Therefore, the respondent could not also claim the deduction under Section 80P of the Act. Appellant No.1 herein has rightly rejected the application filed under

Learned counsel for the respondent supported the order impugned in this appeal.

Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and on perusal of the impugned order of the learned single Judge as well as the order of appellant No.1/respondent No.1 in the writ petition passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act, we find that the learned single Judge was right in setting aside the said order and remanding the matter. However, while remanding the matter, the same ought to have been remanded to

Since a time frame of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the impugned order was granted by the learned single Judge to complete the reconsideration of the application filed by the respondent herein seeking condonation of delay in filing the returns, we now extend the said time by three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment.