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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, JAIPUR BENCHES,”SMC” JAIPUR
Before: Honble SHRI SANDEEP GOSAIN
ORDER PER: SANDEEP GOSAIN, JM This appeal filed by the assessee is directed against order of the ld. Addl. CIT(A)-1, Pune dated 15-02-2024 for the assessment year 2008-09 raising therein following the grounds. ‘’1. The ld. CIT(A) as well as ld. AO erred in law as well as on the facts of the case in passing the impugned order u/s 143(3) r.w.s 147 dt. 05.02.2016. The impugned assessment order thus, having been passed absolutely without jurisdiction is void-ab-initio being a nullity in absence of specific sanction of law. The ld. AO having acted contrary to the
The ld. CIT(A) erred in law as well as on the facts of the case by passing impugned order u/s 250 dt. 15.02.2024 which is bad in law and is a complete nullity in as much as the ld. CIT(A) without calling for submission from appellant on the delayed filing of appeal, decided the matter arbitrary, ad-hoc basis and such an action on the part of ld. CTT(A) is in complete violation of principles of natural justice afforded under law. Thus, the impugned assessment order passed in violation of principles of natural justice deserves to be quashed.
Rs. 1,76,250/-: The ld. CIT(A) has erred in law as well as in facts in confirming the additions made by the AO of Rs. 1,76,250/-on account of HRA allowance claimed by assessee. Thus, impugned disallowance which being completely contrary to the provisions of law and facts may kindly be deleted in full 4. Rs. 1,50,137/-: The ld. CIT(A) has erred in law as well as in facts in confirming the additions made by the AO of Rs. 1,50,137/ on account of deduction claimed u/s 80E Chapter VI-A of the Act. Thus, impugned disallowance which being completely contrary to the provisions of law and facts may kindly be deleted in full. 5. Rs. 1,30,560/-: The ld. CIT(A) has erred in law as well as in facts in confirming the charging interest made by the AO u/s 234A, 234B of the Act. The appellant totally denies it liability of charging of any such interest. The interest, so charged, being contrary to the provisions of law and facts, kindly be deleted in full.’’ 2.1 At the outset of the hearing, the Bench noticed that the ld. Addl. CIT(A) has dismissed the appeal of the assessee by observing hereunder on the ground of substantial delay of 2594 days in filing the appeal by the assessee. ‘’4. DECISION: 4.1 I have gone through the facts of the case. As per the provisions of section 249(3) of the Act, there should be 3 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR sufficient cause for the appellant for not presenting the appeal within the time allowed. The relevant provisions read as under: "The CIT(A) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.’’ Under section 249(3) of the Act, the appellate authority may, on good and sufficient reason for the delay being shown, admit an appeal after the expiry of the period of limitation. 4.2. On the issue of delay in filing the appeal, no reason was given by the Appellant. The appellant submitted that the petition for delay will be submitted at the time of hearing. The appellant was given opportunities to file the reason vide issuing various notices u/s 250 of IT Act having hearings dated 25/10/2023, 01/11/2023, 17/11/ 2023 and 14/02/2023 however no response was filed with respect to substantial delay of about 2594 days in filing of appeal Appellant neither submitted its own affidavit along with the petition for condonation of delay nor has submitted any documentary evidence to show that the delay was justified. Not stating the reason of delay in filing of appeal also shows that the appellant was casual in attitude. The appellant was duty bound to submit these documents along with form 35 so that appeal could be admitted. It also shows that the appellant was casual in attitude. 4.3 In the case of Satbarg Singh v. Income-tax Officer, Ward- 2 (3), Chandigarh [2015] 61 taxmann.com 46 (Chandigarh Trib.), it was held that in condoning the delay the appellate authority must be satisfied that there has been due diligence on the part of the appellant and it was not guilty of negligence. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of these provisions must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions.
4 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR 4.4 In the instant case, the reason given by the appellant appears to be a lame excuse. Thus, the cause as explained by the appellant doesn't appear to be reasonable and sufficient. The language used in section 249(3) is "sufficient cause" and not "reasonable cause. 'Sufficient cause is much more stringent that the term 'reasonable cause' and even if a cause is reasonable, it has to be ascertained whether it was a sufficient cause or not. The cause given by the appellant is very general and unverifiable. If this kind of reason is accepted, then any one can take this plea. It has already been discussed above that for qualifying u/s 249(3) for condonation of delay, the appellant must show that he was diligent all along with taking appropriate steps and if he appears to be guilty of lapses or negligence, then he must be prepared to have his remedy barred without expecting condonation.
4.5 Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Basawaraj and Ors vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer, held that the sufficient cause does not include the negligent manner in which the applicant had acted or and there was a want of bona fide, on his/her part. If a party does not act diligently or remains inactive, it cannot qualify as sufficient ground allowing the court to exercise discretion in favour of such a party. We are further of the view that condonation of delay is not an automatic right but requires the person requesting it to provide a valid explanation for each day of delay and demonstrate a reasonable cause. The discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. "Sufficient Cause’’ cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction of lack of bona fides is attributing to the party.
5 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR 4.6 On the basis of the circumstances of the case, it is held that the appellant was not having "sufficient cause" for delay in filing appeal. The appeal filed by the appellant is held to be invalid and non-maintainable being out of time. For statistical purposes, the appeal is treated as DISMISSED in-limine. 5. In the result, the appellant's appeal is DISMISSED.’’ 2.2 Being aggrieved by the order of the ld.Addl. CIT(A), the assessee carried this appeal before this Bench praying that order of the ld.Addl. CIT(A) is not justified in not condoning the delay of 2594 days made by the assessee in filing the appeal. 2.3 On the other hand, the ld. DR supported the order of the ld.Addl. CIT(A). 2.4 After having gone through the counsel of both the sides and after perusing the written submission filed by ld. AR of the assessee and also perusing the judgements advanced by the respective parties, the Bench noticed that there was inordinate delay of 2594 days in filing in filing the appeal by the assessee. In this regard, the assessee in Form No. 35 at Column No. 15 has only mentioned that ‘’ The date of receipt of order and notices alongwith condonation of delay shall be given at the time of hearing’’ However, during the pendency of the proceedings before the ld.Addl. CIT(A), the assessee has neither submitted his own affidavit alongwith petition for condonation of delay nor submitted any documentary
6 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR evidence to show that the delay was justified. However, before the Bench, the ld. AR of the assessee vehemently argued that no proper opportunity was granted to the assessee while rejecting the appeal of the assessee on account of delay in filing the same. In this regard, the ld. AR of the assessee submitted that he has already prepared a Prayer for Condonation but being not required by the ld.Addl. CIT(A), did not file the same. It was also submitted that at the same time the assessee was quite serious, conscious and interested in prosecuting the appeal and therefore, a detailed written submission and paper book running into 48 pages were uploaded . It was also submitted that the assessee certainly observed at least one opportunity on the delayed filing of the appeal. The ld. AR appearing on behalf of the assessee vehemently argued that the assessee has been made to suffer on a highly technical ground and that too without giving an opportunity to explain the delay whereas on the contrary the ld. DR vehemently repeated the submissions made by the assessee and submitted that there was inordinate delay and it was never explained by the assessee and the assessee was not serious in prosecuting the appeal before the ld.Addl. CIT(A)and thus the appeal of the assessee was rightly dismissed as he was not able to demonstrate his ‘’sufficient cause’’ before the ld.Addl. CIT(A) for condonation of delay. Further, after having gone through the facts of the present case and submissions of both the parties, the Bench finds that absolutely no reason
7 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR was placed on record by the assessee before the ld. Addl. CIT(A) with regard to filing the appeal belatedly. In this regard, the assessee was provided sufficient opportunities to file the reasons vide issuing notices u/s 250 of the Act having hearing dated 25-10-2023, 01-11-2023, 17-11-2023 and 14-02-2023. However, no response was filed with respect to the substantial delay of about 2594 days in filing of appeal. It is important to mention here that only argument raked up before the Bench by the ld. AR of the assesse to the effect that ld.Addl. CIT(A) did not provide opportunity of hearing whereas the assessee wanted to file the application for condonation of delay. In this regard, the Bench is of the considered view that at the time of filing of the appeal, the asssessee was conscious of the fact that there was delay of 2594 days in filing the appeal. Therefore, at that very moment, the assessee was required to file the application for seeking condonation of delay. More so, the assessee himself had admitted in Column No. 15 of Form 35 that ‘’ Condonation of delay shall be given at the time of hearing’’. Therefore, in these circumstances, the ld.Addl. CIT(A) was not to remind the assessee, when s the assessee himself was alive to the issue and very well knew that this appeal is not in time. Therefore, it was all the more necessary for the assessee to comply with his undertakings and to file the necessary application but by not doing so, the assessee has reflected his casual and cavalier approach towards the proceedings pending
8 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR before the statutory authorities. It can be seen from the fact narrated (supra) that the assesse has not bothered to respond to the notices issued by ld.Addl. CIT(A). Hence, it is clear that the assessee was not interested in pursuing/ prosecuting the appeal by explaining the delay in filing the appeal with documentary evidences. The Bench is of the considered opinion that the maxim ‘’Vigilantivbus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt is clearly applicable to the assessee (Law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights)’’ . Hence, the Bench is of the view that every assessee is bound to file the appeal within the stipulated period prescribed under the law. In belated appeal, the delay can only be condoned when sufficient reason is shown for delay. The assessee who seeks condonation of delay, therefore, must explain the delay of each day. It is true that Courts have time and again held that pedantic approach must not be adopted while condoning the delay in filing of appeal and explanation of each day’s delay should not be taken literally but the fact remains that there must be a reasonable explanation for the delay. In the present case, the reasons cited are not reasonable by any measure and bereft of an attempt to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause warranting condonation of the same. The delay is attributable to the gross/ sheer negligence on the part of the assessee and not attributable to any sufficient cause which prevented him from filing the appeal within limitation date. It cannot
9 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR be disputed that the onus to show that ‘’sufficient cause’’ exists for condonation of delay lies upon the assessee. It is obligation upon the assessee to show sufficient cause due to which assessee was prevented from filing the appeal in time. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Maji Sinnemma vs Reddy Sridevi 2021 SSC online SC 1260 dated 16-12-12021 has held as under:- "Even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by the statute. The expression sufficient cause cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence in action or lack of bonafide is attributed to the party. If the court starts condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions, then that would amount to violation of statutory principle and showing utter disregard ard to logistics 3.6. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Dabra vs Pyare Ram & Ors arising out of SLP (C) No. 15793/2019 dated 31/01/2023 dismissed applications for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, declining to condone a delay of 254 days, because the reasons assigned for the condonation were not sufficient reasons for condonation of the delay. 3.7. I am further fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors, dated 08/07/2010, where it has held in para 6 that "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds". The order supra also refers to various judgements where it has been held that "here is no question of construing the expression 'sufficient cause' liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions 10 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice by applying the principle of reasonable time' This, however, does not mean that the Court should readily accept whatever the appellant alleges to explain away his default. The decision supra also holds that Section 5 of the Limitation Act are to apply para materia. Section 3 of the Limitation Act requires that suits or proceedings instituted after the prescribed period of limitation shall be dismissed. However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court/Appellate Authority to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows sufficient cause' for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression 'sufficient cause commonly appears in the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thus categorically demonstrating that they are to be decided on similar grounds.’’’ After evaluating the facts of the present case, the Bench is conscious of the facts that the Courts should not adopt an injustice oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However, the Court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. ‘’Sufficient cause’’ is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. After having gone through different citations of different forums as well as courts, the Bench has noticed that the Court have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and 11 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR convincingly explained, the Court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. The Bench is of the view that Courts are not a ‘’walk- in- place’’ where appellant can approach whenever they want. The law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim ‘’Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium (It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. To understand the scope of the term ‘’sufficient cause’’ in matters of delay, the Bench place reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Ors vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the sufficient cause does not include the negligent manner in which the applicant had acted or/ and there was a want of bona fide, on his/her part. If a party does not act diligently or remains inactive, it cannot qualify as sufficient ground allowing the court to exercise discretion in favour of such a party. The Bench is further of the view that condonation of delay is not an automatic right but requires the person requesting it to provide a valid explanation for each day of delay and demonstrate a reasonable cause. The discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. ‘’Sufficient Cause’’ cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, 12 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR inaction or lack of bona fides is attributing to the party. On this proposition, we place reliance on the in the case of Ram Lal & Ors vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the decision to grant condonation of delay is discretionary even if sufficient cause is proven. Moreover, the Court considers all relevant facts including diligence and good faith but the scope of this enquiry while exercising the discretionary power is limited to only such relevant facts. Lastly, the Bench while referring to the case of Anshul Agarwal vs New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578 held that the reason provided for the delay must be something beyond the individual’s control that prevented them from approaching the Court. After analyzing and evaluating the facts of the present case, it is nowhere coming forth from the instant application moved by the assessee seeking condonation of delay as to whether the applicant herein made any efforts or attempt to contact his counsel engaged in the tax proceedings after passing of impugned order u/s 263 of the Act. Thus the plea of the assessee cannot be taken to be as gospel truth unless the applicant would have shown that he made any serious efforts after passing of impugned order for deciding the same before any appellate authority or moreover, no such information has been furnished by the assessee before me. Therefore, the Bench is of the considered view that that decision to condone the delay has to be 13 ITA NO. 305/JP/2024 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR exercised judiciously and if Court starts condoning delay where ‘’no sufficient cause’’ is made out then that would amount to violation of statutory principles. Thus, the Bench rely upon the decision of Hon’ble High Court in the case of Mewa Ram (deceased by L.Rs) & Ors vs State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 45,State of Nagaland vs Lipok AO & Ors, AIR 2005 SC 2191 and D. Gopinathan Pillai vs State of Karal;a & Anr.AIR 2007 SC 2624. Further the decision relied upon by the assessee of ITAT Delhi Bench in the case of Sheena Exports vs CIT (Central) [ITA No, 6001/Del/2013 dated 15 Oct. 2014. Recently the Hoh’ble Supreme Court in its latest decision in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by Lrs. And vs Special Deputy Collector (La) on 8th April 2024 has held as under:-
‘’6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by limitation.
The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicaeut sit finislitium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-a- vis the litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are mortals.
The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a right not exercised or 14 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR the remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist. This is one way of putting to an end to a litigation by barring the remedy rather than the right with the passage of time.
Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.
Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced hereinbelow: “3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”
Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.
In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to 15 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.1, it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of (2007) 11 SCC 285 the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors.2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be 16 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- (1987) 2 SCC 107 = AIR 1987 SC 1353 oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing he delay is A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.
In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.4, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by A.I.R. 1935 PC 17 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR 85 2014 (4) SCALE 50 12| 22 approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand &Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani& Ors.7, that the merits of the (2011) 4 SCC 363 AIR 2009 SC 1927 13 | 22 case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal (2013) 14 SCC 81 14| 2 2 approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an 18 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”
This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning 15 | 22 such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; 19 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice- oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and 17 | 2 2 condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.’’ Therefore, the Bench is of the considered view that that the decision to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously and if the Courts start condoning the delay where no sufficient cause is made out then that would amount to violation of statutory principles. Thus the Bench rely upon the decision of Hon’ble High Court in the case of Mewa Ram (deceased by L.Rs) & Ors vs State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 45,State of Nagaland vs Lipok AO & Ors, AIR 2005 SC 2191 and D. Gopinathan Pillai vs State of Karal;a & Anr.AIR 2007 SC 2624. Considering the totality of the facts as discussed hereinabove by the Bench, 20 ITA NO. 305/JP/2024 TANUJ JAIN VS ITO, WARD 7(2), JAIPUR there is no occasion for the Bench to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the Hon’ble High Court for the reasons record. Firstly, the assessee was negligent in pursuing the appeal and then not filing the application for seeking condonation of delay and thus there is apparently no due diligence on the part of the assessee in pursuing the appeal. Thus the Bench does not find any infirmity in the order of the ld Addl.CIT(A) and the appeal of the assessee is dismissed. 3.0 In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed with no order as to cost. Order pronounced in the open court on 05/06/2024. Sd/- ¼lanhi xkslkbZ½ (Sandeep Gosain) U;kf;d lnL;@Judicial Member Tk;iqj@Jaipur fnukad@Dated:- 05/06/2024 *Mishra आदेश की प्रतिलिपि अग्रेf’ात@ब्वचल वf जीम वतकमत वितूंतकमक जवरू 1. The Appellant- Shri Tanuj Jain, Jaipur 2. izR;FkhZ@ The Respondent- The ITO, Ward -7(2) Jaipur 3. vk;dj vk;qDr@ The ld CIT 4. vk;dj vk;qDr¼vihy½@The ld CIT(A) 5. विभागीय प्रतिनिधि] आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण] जयपुर@क्त्ए प्ज्Aज्ए Jंपचनत 6. xkMZ QkbZy@ Guard File (ITA No. 305/JP/2024) vkns'kkuqlkj@ By order, सहायक पंजीकार@Aेेजज. त्महपेजतंत