BAIJNATH MELARAM,MUMBAI vs. ASST CIT 14(3), MUMBAI

3. On the other hand, the ld. DR Shri T.A. Khan relied upon the assessment order by contending that reassessment was validly done.

(Baijnath Melaram) r.w.s. 147 was passed on 30/10/2012 making addition of Rs. 8,23,115/-.

4.1 The assessee felt aggrieved and filed the appeal before the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) challenging the reopening of assessment on the basis of change of opinion as the same facts were considered during the original assessment proceedings. The stand of the ld. Assessing Officer was affirmed and the assessee is in further appeal before this Tribunal.

4.2. If the observation made in the assessment order, leading to addition made to the total income, conclusion drawn in the impugned order, material available on record, assertions made by the ld. respective counsel, if kept in juxtaposition and analyzed, we find from the original assessment order dated 09/11/2009 that in response to the notices the assessee was attended from time to time, furnished its details, books of accounts were produced and the same were examined by the Assessing Officer (page 1 of the original assessment order). This factual finding has been duly recorded in the original assessment order. So far

(Baijnath Melaram) as the issue of transportation expenses is concerned, the same has been duly examined in para 6 of the original assessment order. So far as the observation made in the impugned order that necessary details were not filed by the assessee is also factually incorrect because it is evident from letter addressed to the ACIT (page No. 19 of the paper book) wherein it was claimed that there was contract with the transporter, therefore, the provision of section 194C of the Act was not attracted and the assessee duly enclosed confirmation received from the transport companies and they also confirmed that they were also not contract with them. The Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Bhagwati Steels (supra) held as under:-

Where payment of freight charges by assessee was based on individual GRs, which represented individual and separate contracts and there was no single contract for carriage or transportation of goods referred to between assessee and impugned parties which would make assessee liable for deduction of tax at source under section 194C, such freight charges paid by assessee could not be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) [A.Y. 2006-07] The SLP filed against the aforesaid decision was dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The CBDT vide Circular No. 715, dated 08/08/1995 also clarified and in (Baijnath Melaram) reply to question No.9, with respect to payments to transporters and whether each GR can be said to be a separate contract, even though payments to several GRs are made under one bill, it was clarified that normally, each GR can be said to be a separate contract if the goods are transported at one time. But, if the goods are transported continuously in pursuance of a contract for a specified period or quantity, each GR will not be a separate contract and all GRs relating to that period or quantity will be aggregated for the purposes of TDS. From page No. 19 of the paper book filed by the assessee, we note that it was clarified to the Assessing Officer that there was no contract with the transporters. M/s. Bhumi Transports vide letter 30/10/2011 addressed to the ACIT it was clairified that the assessee was engaged / hired from time to time for transporting their goods and no contract was entered into with the assessee. The transport charges were claimed to be collected truck to truck basis. Likewise, J.K. Road Lines and Rajahmundry Transport also wrote identical letters (page No. 21 & 22 of the paper book respectively). The details of transport expenses, summary wise, bill wise, is (Baijnath Melaram) available at page 4 to 7 of the assessment order, wherein we find that each payment is below Rs. 10,000/-. All these documents were duly produced before the ld. Assessing Officer as well as before the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Now question arises whether re-assessment was made on the basis of any new material which was not filed by the assessee. The obvious reply is that no new material was found by the assessee and the material facts were fully and duly disclosed by the assessee during original assessment proceedings. It is not the case of the Revenue that new material was digged out by the Revenue at the later stage. Thus, reopening of assessment merely on the basis of change of opinion is not permissible. It is our bounded duty to analyze section 147 of the Act, which is reproduced hereunder:-

"147. Income escaping assessment.—If the Assessing Officer, has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or re-compute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year) : Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant

(Baijnath Melaram) assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub- section (1) of section 142 or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. Explanation 1.—Production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the fore going proviso. Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely :— (a) where no return of income has been furnished by the assessee although his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to Income-tax ; (b) where a return of income has been furnished by the assessee but no assessment has been made and it is noticed by the Assessing Officer that the assessee has understated the income or has claimed excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in the return ; (c) where an assessment has been made, but— (i) income chargeable to tax has been under assessed ; or (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate ; or (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act ; or (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allow ance under this Act has been computed. Explanation 3.—For the purpose of assessment or reassessment under this section, the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue, which has escaped assessment, and such issue comes to his notice subsequently in (Baijnath Melaram) the course of the proceedings under this section, notwithstanding that the reasons for such issue have not been included in the reasons recorded under sub- section (2) of section 148." 4.3. If the aforesaid provision of the Act is analyzed, we are of the view that for reopening an assessment made under section 143(3) of the Act, the following conditions are required to be satisfied:-

(i) the Assessing Officer must form a tentative or prima facie opinion on the basis of material that there is underassessment or escapement of income ; (ii) he must record the prima facie opinion into writing ; (iii) the opinion formed is subjective but the reasons recorded or the information available on record must show that the opinion is not a mere suspicion. (iv) reasons recorded and/or the documents available on record must show a nexus or that in fact they are germane and relevant to the subjective opinion formed by the Assessing Officer regarding escapement of income. (v) In cases where the first proviso applies, there is an additional requirement that there should be failure or omission on the part of the assessee in disclosing full and true material facts. The Explanation to the section stipulates that mere production of books of account or other documents from which the Assessing Officer could have, with due diligence, inferred material facts, does not amount to "full and true disclosure of material facts" (the proviso is not applicable where reasons to believe for issue of notice are recorded and notice is issued within four years from the end of assessment year). 4.4. The term and facets of the term "change of opinion". The expression "change of opinion" postulates formation of opinion and then a change thereof. In the (Baijnath Melaram) context of section 147 of the Act it implies that the Assessing Officer should have formed an opinion at the first instance, i.e., in the proceedings under section 143(3) and now by initiation of the reassessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer proposes or wants to take a different view.

4.5. The word "opinion" is derived from the latin word "opinari" which means "to believe", "to think". The word "opinion" as per the Black's Law Dictionary means a statement by a judge or a court of a decision reached by him incorporating cause tried or argued before them, expounding the law as applied to the case and, detailing the reasons upon which the judgment is based. Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (third edition) explains the term "opinion" to mean "something more than mere retaining of gossip or hearsay ; it means judgment or belief, that is, a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question . . . An opinion is a conviction based on testimony . . . they are as a result of reading, experience and reflection".

4.6. In the context of assessment proceedings, it means formation of belief by an Assessing Officer resulting (Baijnath Melaram) from what he thinks on a particular question. It is a result of understanding, experience and reflection to use the words in Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar. The question of change of opinion arise when an Assessing Officer forms an opinion and decides not to make an addition or holds that the assessee is correct and accepts his position or stand. In Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT [2003] 263 ITR 437 (P&H), a Division Bench of the Hon‟ble Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that an assessee has no control over the way an assessment order is drafted. It was observed that generally, the issues which are accepted by the Assessing Officer do not find mention in the assessment order and only such points are taken note of on which the assessee's explanations are rejected and additions/ disallowances are made. Applying the principles laid down by the Full Bench of this court as well as the observations of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, we find that if the entire material had been placed by the assessed before the Assessing Officer at the time when the original assessment was made and the Assessing Officer applied his mind to that material and accepted the view canvassed by the (Baijnath Melaram) assessee, then merely because he did express this in the assessment order, that by itself would not give him a ground to conclude that income has escaped assessment and, therefore, the assessment needed to be reopened. On the other hand, if the Assessing Officer did not apply his mind and committed a lapse, there is no reason why the assessee should be made to suffer the consequences of that lapse.

4.7. The Hon‟ble Delhi High Court in the case of Photo and Finvest Ltd. [2006] 281 ITR 394 (Delhi) held as under:

In the light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to above, which are binding upon us and the observations made by the High Court of Gujarat with which we find ourselves in respectful agreement, the action initiated by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment cannot be said to be either incompetent or otherwise improper to call for interference by a writ court. The Assessing Officer has in the reasoned order passed by him indicated the basis on which income exigible to tax had in his opinion escaped assessment. The argument that the proposed reopening of assessment was based only upon a change of opinion has not impressed us. The assessment order did not admittedly address itself to the question which the Assessing Officer proposes to examine in the course of reassessment proceedings. The submission of Mr. Vohra that even when the order of assessment did not record any explicit opinion on the aspects now sought to be examined, it must be presumed that those aspects were present to the mind of the Assessing Officer and had been held in favour of the assessee is too far-fetched a proposition to merit acceptance. There may indeed be a presumption that the assessment proceedings have been regularly conducted, but there can be no presumption that even when the order of assessment is silent, all possible angles (Baijnath Melaram) and aspects of a controversy had been examined and determined by the Assessing Officer. It is trite that a matter in issue can be validly determined only upon application of mind by the authority determining the same. Application of mind is, in turn, best demonstrated by disclosure of mind, which is best done by giving reasons for the view which the authority is taking. In cases where the order passed by a statutory authority is silent as to the reasons for the conclusion it has drawn, it can well be said that the authority has not applied its mind to the issue before it nor formed any opinion. The principle that a mere change of opinion cannot be a basis for reopening completed assessments would be applicable only to situations where the Assessing Officer has applied his mind and taken a conscious decision on a particular matter in issue. It will have no application where the order of assessment does not address itself to the aspect which is the basis for reopening of the assessment, as is the position in the present case. It is in that view inconsequential whether or not the material necessary for taking a decision was available to the Assessing Officer either generally or in the form of a reply to the questionnaire served upon the assessee. What is important is whether the Assessing Officer had based on the material available to him taken a view. If he had not done so, the proposed reopening cannot be assailed on the ground that the same is based only on a change of opinion.

4.8. From the foregoing discussion, the clear position emerges as under:

(1) Reassessment proceedings can be validly initiated in case return of income is processed under section 143(1) and no scrutiny assessment is undertaken. In such cases there is no change of opinion. (2) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case the assessment order itself records that the issue was raised and is decided in favour of the assessee. Reassessment proceedings in the said cases will be hit by the principle of "change of opinion". (3) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case an issue or query is raised and answered by the assessee in original assessment proceedings but thereafter the Assessing Officer does not make any addition in the assessment order. In such situations it should be accepted that the issue was examined but the Assessing Officer did not find any ground or reason to make addition or reject the stand of the assessee. He forms an opinion. The reassessment will be invalid because the Assessing Officer had formed an opinion in the original assessment, though he had not recorded his reasons.

(Baijnath Melaram) 4.9. Thus, where an Assessing Officer incorrectly or erroneously applies law or comes to a wrong conclusion and income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, resort to section 263 of the Act is available and should be resorted to. But initiation of reassessment proceedings will be invalid on the ground of change of opinion. Here a distinction has to be drawn between erroneous application/interpretation /understanding of law and cases where fresh or new factual information comes to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the passing of the assessment order. If new facts, material or information comes to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer, which was not on record and available at the time of the assessment order, the principle of "change of opinion" will not apply. The reason is that "opinion" is formed on facts. "Opinion" formed or based on wrong and incorrect facts or which are belied and untrue do not get protection and cover under the principle of "change of opinion". Factual information or material which was incorrect or was not available with the Assessing Officer at the time of original assessment would justify initiation of (Baijnath Melaram) reassessment proceedings. The requirement in such cases is that the information or material available should relate to material facts. The expression "material facts" means those facts which if taken into account would have an adverse effect on the assessee by a higher assessment of income than the one actually made. Correct material facts can be ascertained from the assessment records also and it is not necessary that the same may come from a third person or source, i.e., from source other than the assessment records. However, in such cases, the onus will be on the Revenue to show that the assessee had stated incorrect and wrong material facts resulting in the Assessing Officer proceeding on the basis of facts, which are incorrect and wrong. The reasons recorded and the documents on record are of paramount importance and will have to be examined to determine whether the stand of the Revenue is correct. A decision of the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court dated September 26, 2011 in Dalmia P. Ltd. v. CIT [2012] 348 ITR 469 (Delhi) and another decision from Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court dated November 8, 2011, in Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Asst. CIT [2012] 348 ITR 439 (Bom) are two such (Baijnath Melaram) cases, which throws light on the issue. In the first case, the Assessing Officer in the original assessment had made addition of Rs. 19,86,551 under section 40(1) on account of unconfirmed sundry creditors. The reassessment proceedings were initiated after noticing that unconfirmed sundry creditors, of which details, etc., were not furnished, were to the extent of Rs. 52,84,058 and not Rs. 19,86,551. In Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. (supra), after verification the claim under section 54EC was allowed but subsequently on examination it transpired that the second property was purchased prior to the date of sale. The aforesaid decisions/ facts cases must be distinguished from cases where the material facts on record are correct but the Assessing Officer did not draw proper legal inference or did not appreciate the implications or did not apply the correct law. The second category will be a case of "change of opinion" and cannot be reopened for the reason that the assessee, as required, has placed on record primary factual material but on the basis of legal understanding, the Assessing Officer has taken a particular legal view. However, as stated above, an erroneous decision, which is (Baijnath Melaram) also prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, can be made subject-matter of adjudication under section 263 of the Act.

4.10. A division of the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court in the case of New Light Trading Co. v. CIT [2002] 256 ITR 391 (Delhi), referred to the decision of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in CIT v. P. V. S. Beedies P. Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 13 (SC) made the following observations. (page 392) :

In the case of CIT v. P. V. S. Beedies P. Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 13 (SC), the apex court held that the audit party can point out a fact, which has been overlooked by the Income-tax Officer in the assessment. Though there cannot be any interpretation of law by the audit party, it is entitled to point out a factual error or omission in the assessment and reopening of a case on the basis of factual error or omission pointed out by the audit party is permissible under law. As the Tribunal has rightly noticed, this was not a case of the Assessing Officer merely acting at the behest of the audit party or on its report. It has independently examined the materials collected by the audit party in its report and has come to an independent conclusion that there was escapement of income. The answer to the question is, therefore, in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

“As recorded above, the reasons recorded or the documents available must show nexus that in fact they are germane and relevant to the subjective opinion formed by the Assessing Officer regarding escapement of income. At the same time, it is not the requirement that the Assessing Officer should have finally ascertained escapement of income by recording conclusive findings. The final ascertainment takes place when the final or reassessment order is passed. It is enough if the Assessing Officer can show tentatively or prima facie on the basis of the reasons recorded and with reference to the documents available on record that income has escaped assessment.”

(Baijnath Melaram) This takes us to the observations of the Delhi High Court in Kelvinator of India Ltd. [2002] 256 ITR 1 (Delhi) [FB] which read as under (page 18):

"The Board in exercise of its jurisdiction under the aforementioned provisions had issued the circular on October 31, 1989. The said circular admittedly is binding on the Revenue. The authority, therefore, could not have taken a view, which would run counter to the mandate of the said circular.” From a perusal of clause 7.2 of the said circular it would appear that in no uncertain terms it was stated as to under what circumstances the amendments had been carried out, i.e., only with a view to allay the fears that the omission of the expression 'reason to believe' from section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessment on mere change of opinion. It is, therefore, evident that even according to the CBDT a mere change of opinion cannot form the basis for reopening a completed assessment.

4.11. Another aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. A statute conferring an arbitrary power may be held to be ultra virus article 14 of the Constitution of India. If two interpretations are possible, the interpretation which upholds constitutionality, it is trite, should be favoured. In (Baijnath Melaram) the event it is held that by reason of section 147 if the Income-tax Officer exercises its jurisdiction for initiating a proceeding for re-assessment only upon mere change of opinion, the same may be held to be unconstitutional. We, therefore, are of the opinion that section 147 of the Act does not postulate conferment of power upon the Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment proceeding upon his mere change of opinion.

4.12. The Hon‟ble Apex Court thereafter referred to the subsequent decision in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) wherein it was observed that some of the observations made in Kalyanji Mavji (supra) were far too wide and the statute did not permit reappraisal of material considered by the Assessing Officer during the original assessment. The observations in Kalyanji Maviji (supra) that reopening would cover a case "where income has escaped assessment due to the oversight, inadvertence or mistake" was too broadly expressed and did not lay down the correct law. It was clarified and observed at page 1004 in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) as under :

(Baijnath Melaram) "Now, in the case before us, the Income-tax Officer had, when he made the original assessment, considered the provisions of sections 9 and 10. Any different view taken by him afterwards on the application of those provisions would amount to a change of opinion on material already considered by him. The Revenue contends that it is open to him to do so, and on that basis to reopen the assessment under section 147(b). Reliance is placed on Kalyanji Mavji and Co. v. CIT [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC), where a Bench of two learned judges of this court observed that a case where income had escaped assessment due to the 'oversight, inadvertence or mistake' of the Income-tax Officer must fall within section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It appears to us, with respect, that the proposition is stated too widely and travels farther than the statute warrants in so far as it can be said to lay down that if, on reappraising the material considered by him during the original assessment, the Income-tax Officer discovers that he has committed an error in consequence of which income has escaped assessment it is open to him to reopen the assessment. In our opinion, an error discovered on a reconsideration of the same material (and no more) does not give him that power. That was the view taken by this court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. CIT [1959] 35 ITR 1 (SC), CIT v. A. Raman and Co. [1968] 67 ITR 11 (SC) and Bankipur Club Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 831 (SC), and we do not believe that the law has since taken a different course. Any observations in Kalyanji Mavji and Co. v. CIT [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC) suggesting the contrary do not, we say with respect, lay down the correct law." 4.13. In A. L. A. Firm (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court explained that there was no difference between the observations of the Supreme Court in Kalyanji Maviji [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC) and Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC), as far as proposition (4) is concerned. It was held that (page 297 of 189 ITR) :

"We have pointed out earlier that Kalyanji Maviji's case [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC) outlines four situations in which action under section 34(1)(b) can be validly initiated. The Indian Eastern Newspaper Society's case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) has only indicated that propo sition (2) outlined in this case and extracted earlier may have been somewhat widely stated ; it has not cast any doubt on the other three propositions set out (Baijnath Melaram) in Kalyanji Mavji's case. The facts of the present case squarely fall within the scope of propositions 2 and 4 enunciated in Kalyanji Maviji's case [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC). Proposition (2) may be briefly summarized as permitting action even on a 'mere change of opinion'. This is what has been doubted in the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) and we shall discuss its application to this case a little later. But, even leaving this out of consideration, there can be no doubt that the present case is squarely covered by proposition (4) set out in Kalyanji Maviji's case [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC). This proposition clearly envisages a formation of opinion by the Income-tax Officer on the basis of material already on record provided the formation of such opinion is consequent on 'information' in the shape of some light thrown on aspects of facts or law which the Income-tax Officer had not earlier been conscious of. To give a couple of illustrations ; suppose an Income-tax Officer, in the original assessment, which is a voluminous one involving several contentions, accepts a plea of the assessee in regard to one of the items that the profits realised on the sale of a house is a capital realisation not chargeable to tax. Subsequently, he finds, in the forest of papers filed in connection with the assessment, several instances of earlier sales of house property by the assessee. That would be a case where the Income-tax Officer derives information from the record on an investigation or enquiry into facts not originally undertaken. Again, suppose the Income-tax Officer accepts the plea of an assessee that a particular receipt is not income liable to tax. But, on further research into law he finds that there was a direct decision holding that category of receipt to be an income receipt. He would be entitled to reopen the assessment under section 147(b) by virtue of proposition (4) of Kalyanji Mavji. The fact that the details of sales of house properties were already in the file or that the decision subsequently come across by him was already there would not affect the position because the information that such facts or decision existed comes to him only much later. What then, is the difference between the situations envisaged in propositions (2) and (4) of Kalyanji Maviji's case [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC). The difference, if one keeps in mind the trend of the judicial decisions, is this. Proposition (4) refers to a case where the Income- tax Officer initiates reassessment proceedings in the light of 'information' obtained by him by an investigation into material already on record or by research into the law applicable thereto which has brought out an angle or aspect that had been missed earlier, for e.g., as in the two Madras decisions referred to earlier. Proposition (2) no doubt covers this situation also but it is so widely expressed as to include also cases in which the Income-tax Officer, having (Baijnath Melaram) considered all the facts and law, arrives at a particular conclusion, but reinitiates proceedings because, on a reappraisal of the same material which had been considered earlier and in the light of the same legal aspects to which his attention had been drawn earlier, he comes to a conclusion that an item of income which he had earlier consciously left out from the earlier assessment should have been brought to tax. In other words, as pointed out in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society's case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC), it also ropes in cases of a 'bare or mere change of opinion' where the Income-tax Officer (very often a successor officer) attempts to reopen the assessment because the opinion formed earlier by himself (or, more often, by a predecessor Income- tax Officer) was, in his opinion, incorrect. Judicial decisions had consistently held that this could not be done and the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society's case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) has warned that this line of cases cannot be taken to have been overruled by Kalyanji Mavji [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC). The second paragraph from the judgment in the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society's case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) earlier extracted has also reference only to this situation and insists upon the necessity of some information which make the Income-tax Officer realise that he has committed an error in the earlier assessment. This paragraph does not in any way affect the principle enumerated in the two Madras cases cited with approval in Anandji Haridas 21 STC 326. Even making allowances for this limitation placed on the observations in Kalyanji Mavji, the position as summarised by the High Court in the following words represents, in our view, the correct position in law (at page 629 of 102 ITR) : The result of these decisions is that the statute does not require that the information must be extraneous to the record. It is enough if the material, on the basis of which the reassessment proceedings are sought to be initiated, came to the notice of the Income-tax Officer subsequent to the original assessment. If the Income-tax Officer had considered and formed an opinion on the said material in the original assessment itself, then he would be powerless to start the proceedings for the reassessment. Where, however, the Income-tax Officer had not considered the material and subsequently came by the material from the record itself, then such a case would fall within the scope of section 147(b) of the Act'." (emphasis supplied) The aforesaid observations are a complete answer to the issue that if a particular subject-matter, item, (Baijnath Melaram) deduction or claim is not examined by the Assessing Officer, it will nevertheless be a case of “change of opinion” and the reassessment proceedings will be barred.

4.14. So far as, the decision from Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Dr. Amin‟s Pathology Laboratory (supra) is concerned, there also, the assessment was framed u/s 143(3) and subsequently, the Ld. Assessing Officer found that he overlooked an entry with respect to unpaid purchases, in respect of which, he wrongly granted deduction. Notice u/s 148 was issued. However, the Hon'ble High Court found that there was no change of opinion. The Ld. counsel for the assessee, cited a later decision dated 09/06/2011 from Hon'ble Bombay High Court itself in the case of Titanor Components (supra), wherein, notice u/s 147 was quashed. The Hon'ble Apex Court in CIT vs Foramer France, vide order dated 16/01/2003, where, there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts, it was held that the notice issued beyond prescribed period cannot be sustained merely on the basis of change of opinion. Even otherwise, (Baijnath Melaram) when two views are possible, the view, which favours the assessee has to be preferred.

4.15. We are conscious of the fact that the aforesaid observations have been made in the context of section 147(b) with reference to the term "information" and conceptually there is difference in scope and ambit of reopening provisions incorporated with effect from April 1, 1989. However, it was observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Kelvinator of India Ltd. [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC) that the amended provisions are wider. What is important and relevant is that the principle of "change of opinion" was equally applicable under the un-amended provisions. The Supreme Court was, therefore, conscious of the said principle, when the observations mentioned above in A. L. A. Firm [1991] 189 ITR 285 were made.

4.16. Another aspect of the matter is that under the new provisions of section 147, an assessment can be reopened if the Assessing Officer has "a reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; but if he wants to do so after a period of four years from the end of the assessment year, he can do so only if the (Baijnath Melaram) assessee has fallen short of his duty to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. It does not follow that he cannot reopen the assessment even within the period of four years as aforesaid if he has reason to believe that the assessee has failed to make the requisite disclosure. All that the section says is that in a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened after the period of four years, the only reason available to the Assessing Officer is the non-disclosure on the part of the assessee. The Act places a general duty on every assessee to furnish full and true particulars along with the return of income or in the course of the assessment proceedings so that the Assessing Officer is enabled to compute the correct amount of income on which the assessee shall pay tax. The position has been further clarified by the proviso itself in a case where assessment under sub-section (3) of section 144 of the Act or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such year by the reason of failure on the (Baijnath Melaram) part of the assessee to make a return u/s 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148 or to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. It is also noted that the scope of newly substituted (w.e.f. 01/04/1989) section 147 has been elaborated in department circular number 549 dated 31st October, 1989, meaning thereby, on or after 01/04/1989, initiation of reassessment proceedings has to be governed by the provisions of section 147 to 151 as substituted (amended) w.e.f. 01/04/1989. Still, power u/s 147 of the Act, though very wide but no plenary. We are aware that Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court in Praful Chunilal Patel: Vasant Chunilal Patel vs ACIT (1999) 236 ITR 82, 840 (Guj.) even went to the extent that action under main section 147 is possible in spite of complete disclosure of material facts. The primary condition of reasonable belief having nexus with the material on record is still operative. However, we are of the view, that mere fresh application of mind to the same set of facts or mere change of opinion does not confer jurisdiction to the Assessing Officer even under the post (Baijnath Melaram) 1989 section 147 of the Act. Our view finds support from the decision from Hon‟ble High Courts in following cases:- i. Jindal Photo Films Ltd. vs DCIT (1998) 234 ITR 170 (Del.), ii. Garden Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs DCIT (1999) 151 CTR (Guj.) 533, iii. Govind Chhapabhai Patel vs DCIT 240 ITR 628, 630 (Guj.), iv. Foramer vs CIT (2001) 247 ITR 436 (All.), affirmed in CIT vs Foramer Finance (2003) 264 ITR 566, 567 (SC), v. Ipica Laboratories vs DCIT (2001) 251 ITR 416 (Bom.), vi. Ritu Investment Pvt. Ltd.(2012) 345 ITR 214 (Del.), vii. Ketan B. Mehta vs ACIT (2012) 346 ITR 254 (Guj.), viii. Ms. Praveen P. Bharucha vs DCIT (2012) 348 ITR 325 (Bom.), ix. CIT vs Usha International Ltd. 348 ITR 485 (Del.), x. Agricultural Produce Market Committee vs ITO (2013) 355 ITR 348 (Guj.), xi. B.B.C. World News Ltd. vs Asst. DIT (2014) 362 ITR 577 (Del.). xii. Identical ratio was laid down in CIT vs Malayala Manorma Company Ltd. (2002) 253 ITR 378 (Ker.)

(Baijnath Melaram) We think this thread runs through the various provisions of the Act. But Explanation 1 to the section confines the duty to the disclosure of all primary and material facts necessary for the assessment, fully and truly. As to what are material or primary facts would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no universal formula may be attempted. The legal or factual inferences from those primary or material facts are for the Assessing Officer to draw in order to complete the assessment and it is not for the assessee to advise him, for obvious reasons. The Explanation, however, cautions the assessee that he cannot remain smug with the belief that since he has produced the books of account before the Assessing Officer from which material or evidence could have been with due diligence gathered by him, he has discharged his duty. It is for him to point out the relevant entries which are material, without leaving that exercise to the Assessing Officer. The caveat, however, is that such production of books of account may, in the light of the facts and circumstances, amount to full and true disclosure; this is clear from the use of the expression "not necessarily" in (Baijnath Melaram) the Explanation. Thus, the question of full and true disclosure of primary or material facts is a pure question of fact, to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No general principle can be laid down. It was observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in various cases that there should be some "tangible material" coming into the possession of the Assessing Officer in such cases to enable him to resort to section 147 of the Act. Despite being a case of full and true disclosure, tangible material coming to the possession of the Assessing Officer after he made the original assessment under section 143(3), would influence the opinion, formed or presumed to have been formed earlier, by the assessing authority; he can with justification change it, but that would not be a case of a "mere change of opinion" unguided by new facts or change in the legal position. It will be a case of the assessing authority having "reason to believe", notwithstanding that full and true particulars were furnished by the assessee which were examined, or presumed to be examined, by him. There was a divergence of opinion amongst various High Courts as to what constitute “Information” for the purposes of section (Baijnath Melaram) 34(1)(b) of the 1922 Act (which corresponds to section 147(b) of the 1961 Act) the Hon‟ble Apex Court in CWT vs Imperial Tobacco Company Ltd. (1966) 61 ITR 461 has noted such divergence of opinion on the point. Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court in CIT vs Sir Mohammad Yusuf Ismail (1944) 12 ITR 8 (Bom.) held that mere change of opinion on the same facts are on question of law or mere discovery of mistake of law is not sufficient information and that in order to sustained action u/s 34 by further holding that reassessment is not permissible. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Simon Carves Ltd. (1976) 105 ITR 212 held that errorless legally correct order cannot be reopened, therefore, it is settled law that without any new information and on the basis of mere change of opinion, reopening of assessment is not permissible as was held in CIT vs TTK Prestige ltd. (2010) 322 ITR 390 (Karn.) SLP dismissed in 2010 322 ITR (St.) 14 (SC). Reference also made to Asian Paints ltd. vs DCIT (2009) 308 ITR 195 (Bom.), Andhra Bank Ltd. vs CIT (1997) 225 ITR 447 (SC). The observations of the Supreme Court are a protection against the abuse of power; they also protect the Revenue which can, in the light (Baijnath Melaram) of subsequent coming into light of facts or law, reopen the assessment. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, since, there was no new tangible material available with the Assessing Officer while resorting to section 147/148 of the Act, more specifically, while framing original assessment u/s 143(3) of the Act, there was full disclosure of material facts by the assessee and on the basis of those facts, assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act, therefore, in our humble opinion, the reassessment/reopening u/s 147 of the Act is unjustified as there was no fresh tangible material with the Assessing Officer, while reopening the assessment, therefore, the reopening beyond a period of four years is not permissible, more specifically, when the material facts were disclosed by the assessee and assessment was framed u/s 143(3) of the Act. Thus, the reopening of assessment is bad in law. This ground of the assessee is allowed.

194C. (1) Any person responsible for paying any sum to any resident (hereafter in this section referred to as the contractor for carrying out any work1 (including supply of labour for carrying out any work) in pursuance of a contract between the contractor and a specified person shall, at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the contractor or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct an amount equal to— (i) one per cent where the payment is being made or credit is being given to an individual or a Hindu undivided family; (ii) two per cent where the payment is being made or credit is being given to a person other than an individual or a Hindu undivided family, of such sum as income-tax on income comprised therein. (2) Where any sum referred to in sub-section (1) is credited to any account, whether called "Suspense account" or by any other name, in the books of account of the person liable to pay such income, such crediting shall be deemed to be credit of such income to the account of the payee and the provisions of this section shall apply accordingly. (3) Where any sum is paid or credited for carrying out any work mentioned in sub-clause (e) of clause (iv) of the Explanation, tax shall be deducted at source— (i) on the invoice value excluding the value of material, if such value is mentioned separately in the invoice; or (ii) on the whole of the invoice value, if the value of material is not mentioned separately in the invoice. (4) No individual or Hindu undivided family shall be liable to deduct income-tax on the sum credited or paid to the account of the contractor where such sum is credited or paid exclusively for personal purposes of such individual or any member of Hindu undivided family.

(Baijnath Melaram) (5) No deduction shall be made from the amount of any sum credited or paid or likely to be credited or paid to the account of, or to, the contractor, if such sum does not exceed 2 [thirty] thousand rupees : Provided that where the aggregate of the amounts of such sums credited or paid or likely to be credited or paid during the financial year exceeds 3 [seventy-five] thousand rupees, the person responsible for paying such sums referred to in sub-section (1) shall be liable to deduct income-tax under this section. (6) No deduction shall be made from any sum credited or paid or likely to be credited or paid during the previous year to the account of a contractor during the course of business of plying, hiring or leasing goods carriages, 3a[where such contractor owns ten or less goods carriages at any time during the previous year and furnishes a declaration to that effect along with] his Permanent Account Number, to the person paying or crediting such sum. (7) The person responsible for paying or crediting any sum to the person referred to in sub-section (6) shall furnish, to the prescribed income-tax authority or the person authorised by it, such particulars, in such form and within such time as may be prescribed. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (i) "specified person" shall mean,— (a) the Central Government or any State Government; or (b) any local authority; or (c) any corporation established by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act; or (d) any company; or (e) any co-operative society; or (f) any authority, constituted in India by or under any law, engaged either for the purpose of dealing with and satisfying the need for housing accommodation or for the purpose of planning, development or improvement of cities, towns and villages, or for both; or (g) any society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or under any law corresponding to that Act in force in any part of India; or (h) any trust; or (i) any university established or incorporated by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act and an institution (Baijnath Melaram) declared to be a university under section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (3 of 1956); or (j) any Government of a foreign State or a foreign enterprise or any association or body established outside India; or (k) any firm; or (l) any person, being an individual or a Hindu undivided family or an association of persons or a body of individuals, if such person,— (A) does not fall under any of the preceding sub- clauses; and (B) is liable to audit of accounts under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 44AB during the financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which such sum is credited or paid to the account of the contractor; (ii) "goods carriage" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Explanation to sub-section (7) of section 44AE; (iii) "contract" shall include sub-contract; (iv) "work" shall include— (a) advertising; (b) broadcasting and telecasting including production of programmes for such broadcasting or telecasting; (c) carriage of goods or passengers by any mode of transport other than by railways; (d) catering; (e) manufacturing or supplying a product according to the requirement or specification of a customer by using material purchased from such customer, but does not include manufacturing or supplying a product according to the requirement or specification of a customer by using material purchased from a person, other than such customer.] 98. Substituted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 1-10-2009. Prior to its substitution, section 194C, as amended by the Finance Act, 1972, w.e.f. 1-4-1972, Finance Act, 1973, w.e.f. 1-4-1973, Finance Act, 1982, w.e.f. 1-6-1982, Direct Tax Laws (Amdt.) Act, 1987, w.e.f. 1-4-1988, Finance Act, 1988, w.e.f. 1-6-1988, Finance Act, 1992, w.e.f. 1-6-1992, Finance Act, 1994, w.e.f. 1-6-1994, Finance Act, 1995, w.e.f. 1-7-1995, Finance Act, 2002, w.e.f. 1-6- 2002, Finance Act, 2003, w.e.f. 1-6-2003, Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. 1-10-2004, Finance Act, 2005, w.e.f. 1-6-2005, Finance Act, (Baijnath Melaram) 2007, w.e.f. 1-6-2007 and Finance Act, 2008, w.e.f. 1-6-2008, read as under : '194C. Payments to contractors and sub-contractors.—(1) Any person responsible for paying any sum to any resident (hereinafter in this section referred to as the contractor) for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work) in pursuance of a contract between the contractor and— (a) the Central Government or any State Government; or (b) any local authority; or (c) any corporation established by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act; or (d) any company; or (e) any co-operative society; or (f) any authority, constituted in India by or under any law, engaged either for the purpose of dealing with and satisfying the need for housing accommodation or for the purpose of planning, development or improvement of cities, towns and villages, or for both; or (g) any society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or under any law corresponding to that Act in force in any part of India; or (h) any trust; or (i) any university established or incorporated by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act and an institution declared to be a university under section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (3 of 1956) ; or (j) any firm; or (k) any individual or a Hindu undivided family or an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, other than those falling under any of the preceding clauses, whose total sales, gross receipts or turnover from the business or profession carried on by him exceed the monetary limits specified under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 44AB during the financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which such sum is credited or paid to the account of the contractor, shall, at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the contractor or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct an amount equal to— (i) one per cent in case of advertising, (ii) in any other case two per cent, (Baijnath Melaram) of such sum as income-tax on income comprised therein: Provided that no individual or a Hindu undivided family shall be liable to deduct income-tax on the sum credited or paid to the account of the contractor where such sum is credited or paid exclusively for personal purposes of such individual or any member of Hindu undivided family. (2) Any person (being a contractor and not being an individual or a Hindu undivided family) responsible for paying any sum to any resident (hereafter in this section referred to as the sub-contractor) in pursuance of a contract with the sub-contractor for carrying out, or for the supply of labour for carrying out, the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the contractor or for supplying whether wholly or partly any labour which the contractor has undertaken to supply shall, at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the sub-contractor or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct an amount equal to one per cent of such sum as income-tax on income comprised therein: Provided that an individual or a Hindu undivided family, whose total sales, gross receipts or turnover from the business or profession carried on by him exceed the monetary limits specified under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 44AB during the financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which such sum is credited or paid to the account of the sub-contractor, shall be liable to deduct income-tax under this sub-section. Explanation I.—For the purposes of sub-section (2), the expression "contractor" shall also include a contractor who is carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work) in pursuance of a contract between the contractor and the Government of a foreign State or a foreign enterprise or any association or body established outside India. Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, where any sum referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is credited to any account, whether called "Suspense account" or by any other name, in the books of account of the person liable to pay such income, such crediting shall be deemed to be credit of such income to the account of the payee and the provisions of this section shall apply accordingly. Explanation III.—For the purposes of this section, the expression "work" shall also include— (a) advertising; (Baijnath Melaram) (b) broadcasting and telecasting including production of programmes for such broadcasting or telecasting; (c) carriage of goods and passengers by any mode of transport other than by railways; (d) catering. (3) No deduction shall be made under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) from— (i) the amount of any sum credited or paid or likely to be credited or paid to the account of, or to, the contractor or sub-contractor, if such sum does not exceed twenty thousand rupees: Provided that where the aggregate of the amounts of such sums credited or paid or likely to be credited or paid during the financial year exceeds fifty thousand rupees, the person responsible for paying such sums referred to in sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub-section (2) shall be liable to deduct income-tax under this section: Provided further that no deduction shall be made under sub-section (2), from the amount of any sum credited or paid or likely to be credited or paid during the previous year to the account of the sub- contractor during the course of business of plying, hiring or leasing goods carriages, on production of a declaration to the person concerned paying or crediting such sum, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and within such time as may be prescribed, if such sub-contractor is an individual who has not owned more than two goods carriages at any time during the previous year: Provided also that the person responsible for paying any sum as aforesaid to the sub-contractor referred to in the second proviso shall furnish to the prescribed income-tax authority or the person authorised by it such particulars as may be prescribed in such form and within such time as may be prescribed; or (ii) any sum credited or paid before the 1st day of June, 1972; or (iii) any sum credited or paid before the 1st day of June, 1973, in pursuance of a contract between the contractor and a co-operative society or in pursuance of a contract between such contractor and the sub-contractor in relation to any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work) undertaken by the contractor for the co-operative society. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (i), "goods carriage" shall have the same meaning as in the Explanation to sub-section (7) of section 44AE. (4) [***] (Baijnath Melaram) (5) [***].' 99. See also Circular No. 433, dated 25-9-1985, Circular No. 487, dated 8-6-1987, Circular No. 502, dated 27-1-1988, Circular No. 558, dated 28-3-1990, Circular No. 681, dated 8-3-1994, Circular No. 713, dated 2-8-1995, Circular No. 714, dated 3-8-1995, Circular No. 715, dated 8-8-1995, Circular No. 723, dated 19-9- 1995, Circular No. 13/2006, dated 13-12-2006 and Circular No. 9/2012, dated 17-10-2012. For details, see Taxmann's Master Guide to Income-tax Act. See rules 28, 28AA, 28AB, 30, 31, 31A, 31AB and 37BA and Form Nos. 13, 16A, 24G, 26AS, 26B, 26Q and 27A. 99a. For relevant case laws, see Taxmann's Master Guide to Income-tax Act.

2. Substituted for "twenty" by the Finance Act, 2010, w.e.f. 1-7- 2010.

If the aforesaid provision is analysed, it speaks about any person responsible for paying any sum to any resident for carrying out any work in pursuance to a contract between the contractor and the specified persons. However, there was no contract between the assessee and the transporters and it was merely on truck to truck basis. Therefore, section 194C of the Act has no application to the facts of the present appeal. Any income generated out of the transportation was expected to be included / taxed in (Baijnath Melaram) the hands of the recipient of such income. As mentioned earlier, each GR can be said to be a separate contract for transportation of goods. Thus, on this issue also the appeal of the assessee deserves to be allowed.