ANYBODY CAN HELP FOUNDATION,KEMPS CORNER vs. ITO EXEM 1(1) MUMBAI, CUMBALLA HILL

The learned Authorized Representative, placed on record the fact sheet and submitted that the activities of the assessee trust had commenced on 01.02.2016, much prior to the introduction of the provisional approval regime and prior to the grant of provisional approval dated 31.08.2021. Therefore, the condition of filing the application within six months from commencement of activities could not be applied to the assessee. It was submitted that the expression “within six months of commencement of activities” under clause (iii) of the proviso to section 80G(5) applies only to newly formed trusts which commence activities after obtaining provisional approval.

Without prejudice, the learned AR submitted that even with respect to the period relating to expiry of provisional approval, the delay was bona fide and occurred during the initial phase of implementation of the new registration regime. It was contended that the assessee is otherwise complying with all statutory requirements and that the CIT(E) has not doubted the genuineness of activities.

The learned Departmental Representative strongly relied upon the order of the CIT(E) and submitted that irrespective of the extensions granted by the CBDT, the assessee failed to apply within the prescribed time. It was contended that approval under section 80G is a conditional statutory benefit and strict compliance with timelines is mandatory. The learned DR thus supported the rejection of the application on the ground of limitation.

The controversy raised before us is no longer res integra. The coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in National Association for the Blind v. CIT(E) [2025] 178 taxmann.com 120 (Mumbai – Trib.), after considering and following a series of earlier decisions including Shri Kailashmath Trust v. CIT (Exemption)[IT Appeal No.1177/Pun/2023, dated 5.01.2024],, has examined the scheme of section 80G(5) in the light of the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2020, the Memorandum explaining the provisions, and the Budget Speech of the Hon’ble Finance Minister.

The consistent ratio emerging from these decisions is that the concept of provisional approval was primarily introduced to facilitate newly constituted trusts or institutions which had not yet commenced their charitable activities. The requirement contained in clause (iii) of the proviso to section 80G(5) prescribing filing of an application within six months from commencement of activities is intended to operate only in such cases. For trusts and institutions which were already in existence Anybody Can Help Foundation and carrying on charitable activities prior to the grant of provisional approval, the relevant and operative time limit is the requirement to apply at least six months prior to the expiry of the provisional approval.

The coordinate Benches have further held that a literal interpretation of the phrase “within six months of commencement of activities” so as to apply it to long-standing trusts would lead to an absurd and unintended consequence, namely that such trusts would be permanently barred from seeking approval under section 80G, which could never have been the legislative intent. Such an interpretation would render the statutory scheme unworkable and defeat the object of the amendments introduced to simplify and streamline the registration process.

Applying the above settled principles, it has been consistently held that where the assessee trust had commenced its activities much prior to the grant of provisional approval and prior to the introduction of the provisional registration regime with effect from 01.04.2021, the second limb of clause (iii) of the proviso to section 80G(5) has no application. In such cases, rejection of the application solely on the ground that it was not filed within six months from commencement of activities is legally unsustainable.

Respectfully following the binding coordinate Bench decisions and the judicial principles laid down therein, we hold Anybody Can Help Foundation that the rejection of the assessee’s application by the CIT(E) on this ground cannot be upheld.

As regards the alternative limb relating to filing the application six months prior to expiry of provisional approval, it is evident from the record that the CIT(E) has rejected the application only on the ground of delay, without examining the eligibility of the assessee or the genuineness of its activities.

In the present case, the CIT(E) has not recorded any adverse finding regarding the charitable nature of activities or non- compliance with the conditions of section 80G(5). The rejection is founded solely on limitation. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the delay deserves to be condoned, and the application ought to be examined on merits.

In view of the above discussion and respectfully following the judicial precedents cited hereinabove, we hold that: i. The rejection of the assessee’s application in Form No. 10AB solely on the ground of delay is not sustainable in law. ii. The delay in filing Form No. 10AB is condoned. iii. The impugned order passed by the CIT(E) dated 28.09.2025 is set aside.

The matter is restored to the file of the CIT(E) with a direction to grant approval under section 80G, if the assessee is otherwise found to be eligible in accordance with law, after examining the genuineness of activities and compliance with

In the result, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.