PROFORM INTERIORS PRIVATE LIMITED,GURGAON vs. DCIT CC-20, DELHI

We further observed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajiv Bansal (supra) has made the following observations in para 46 to 49 which are as under: 45. The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) provides thus: “149. (1) No notice under section 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year, - (a) If three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b); (b) If three years, but not more than ten years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the Assessing Officer has in possession of books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the form of asset, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more for that year: Provided that no notice under section 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1st day of April 2021, if such notice could not have been issued at that time on account of being immediately beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section, as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021:” (emphasis supplied) 46. The ingredients of the proviso could be broken down for analysis as follows: (i) no notice under Section 148 of the new regime can be issued at any time for an assessment year beginning on or before 1 April 2021; (ii) if it is barred at the time when the notice is sought to be issued because of the “time limits specified under the provisions of” 149(1)(b) of the old regime. Thus, a notice could be issued under Section 148 of the new regime for assessment year 2021-2022 and before only if the time limit for issuance of such notice continued to exist under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime.

In CTO v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwalla,107 the Bengal Sales Tax Rules 1941 empowered the Commissioner to revise any assessment within four years from the date of assessment. Subsequently, the State Government issued a notification following the law to extend the time limit from four years to six years from the date of assessment. The extension of the time limit was challenged by the respondents on the ground that the assessments which had attained finality because of the expiry of the period of four years could not be reassessed. This Court observed that it was the clear intention of the notification to permit the Commissioner to revise any assessment made or order passed, provided the assessment had not been made before six years. It was held that if the legislative intention is clear and the language is unambiguous, full effect must be given to the legislative intention by reading the notification as applying not only to the incomplete assessments but also to assessments that had reached finality because of lapse of the earlier prescribed period. The principle that emanates from Biswanath Jhunjhunwalla (supra) is that the courts should give full effect to the legislative intention of granting reassessment powers to assessing officers unless the legislature, by express provision, states otherwise.

Notices have to be judged according to the law existing on the date the notice is issued. Section 149 of the old regime primarily provided two time limits: (i) four years for all situations and (ii) beyond four years and within six years if the income chargeable to tax which escaped assessment amounted to Rupees one lakh or more. After 1 April 2021, the time limits prescribed under the new regime came into force. The ordinary time limit of four years was reduced to three years. Therefore, in all situations, reassessment notices could be issued under the new regime if not more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. For example, for assessment year 2018-2019, the four year period would have expired on 31 March 2023 under the old regime. However, if the notice is issued after 1 April 2021, the three year time limit prescribed under the new regime will be applicable. The three year time limit will expire on 31 March 2022.

The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) requires the determination of whether the time limit prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime continues to exist for the assessment year 2021-2022 and before. Resultantly, a notice under Section 148 of the new regime cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime applies prospectively. For example, for the assessment year 2012-2013, the ten year period would have expired on 31 March 2023, while the six year period expired on 31 March 2019. Without the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime, the Revenue could have had the power to reopen assessments for the year 2012-2013 if the escaped assessment amounted to Rupees fifty lakhs or more. The proviso limits the retrospective operation of Section 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assesses.

The ingredients of the proviso could be broken down for analysis as follows: (i) no notice under section 148 of the new regime can be issued ot any time for an assessment year beginning on or before 1 April 2021 (W) if it "time limits specified under the provisions of 149(1)(b) of the old regime. Thus a notice could be issued under section 148 of the new regime for assessment year 2021- 2022 and before only if the time limit for issuance of such notice continued to exist under section 149(1)(b) of the old regime.

In the present case, the petitioner's assessment is sought to be reopened on the basis of the information available pursuant to a search conducted on 11 102023 in respect of Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. Apparently, certain formation pertaining to the petitioner was found during the course of the said proceedings and on 16.08.2024, the same was forwarded to the Assessing Officer (hereafter AD) exercising jurisdiction in the case of the assessee. On receipt of the said information, the AO issued a notice dated 17.08.2024 under Section 148A(b) of the Act setting out the information, which according to the AD suggested that the petitioner's income for the relevant AY 2015-16, has escaped assessment …… 8. Concededly, in case any incriminating material was found in respect of o non- search party during the search proceedings, procedure under Section 148A of the Act is not required to be followed. It is on this basis that the notice under Section 148 was issued.

As noted above, the short question to be considered by this Court is whether the impugned notice has been issued beyond the period of limitation as stipulated under Section 149(1)(b) of the Act. The said issue is squarely covered by the earlier decisions of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others [2024] 164 taxmonn.com 746 (Delhi) as well as in The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax- Central- 1 v. Offus Medicare Pvt. Limited [2024] 161 taxmann.com 160/465 ITR 101 (Delhi) 11. In Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Limited (supra), the Court also explained the manner in which the period of six or ten years is required to be reckoned in respect of reopening of the assessment for a period prior to six years and/or before the expiry of ten years from the relevant assessment years as contemplated under Section 1530 of the Act. The court held that the period of ten years is required to be reckoned from the end of the assessment year relevant to the year in which the notice under Section 148 of the Act is issued: ….. Analysis of time-period to issue reassessment notice Date of impugned notice under Section 148-31.08.2024 This chart is prepared in light of the first proviso of Section 149 of the Act as amended by Finance Act 2021 Relevant Assessment year for Without prejudice initiating proceedings under Section computation of 10 148 of the Act

The Ld. AR further filed detailed written submissions which read as under: “1. The assessee challenges the assessment orders passed by the Assessing Officer (“AO”) for the captioned assessment years as illegal, void ab initio, and bad in law, on the ground that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Range-5, Delhi under Section 148B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) for passing the said assessment orders was accorded in mechanical manner and without any independent application of mind. 2. Section 148B of the Act mandates that no order of assessment, reassessment, or recomputation shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner, in respect of an assessment year falling under clauses (i) to (vi) of Explanation 2 to Section 148, except with the prior approval of the specified higher authority. The relevant statutory provisions reads as under: “Prior approval for assessment, reassessment or recomputation in certain cases. 148B. No order of assessment or reassessment or recomputation under this Act shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner, in respect of an assessment year to which clauses (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) or clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to section 148 apply except with the prior approval of the Additional Commissioner or Additional Director or Joint Commissioner of Joint Director.”

It is respectfully submitted that the requirement of prior approval under Section 1488 is not an empty formality, but a substantive statutory safeguard, intended to ensure that assessment orders particularly in search and reassessment cases carrying serious civil consequences are framed only after due, conscious, and independent application of mind by the approving authority. Facts Demonstrating Mechanical Approval 4. In the present case, the approval under Section 148B of the Act was granted in a routine, perfunctory, and mechanical manner, as is evident from the following undisputed chronology:

It is also submitted that even on a plain grammatical and dictionary interpretation, the expressions "an assessment year" and "each assessment year" convey the same legal consequence in the present context. The word "an", being an indefinite article, denotes one out of many and is used distributively, signifying a singular and separate unit taken individually. As per standard dictionary usage, "an" refers to one, any one, or one by one, depending upon the context. Similarly, the word "each" is defined to mean every one of two or more persons or things, regarded and considered separately. Thus, both expressions emphasize individuality and separateness, rather than collectivity or aggregation.

Therefore, the use of the phrase "an assessment year" in Section 148B cannot be construed to permit a composite or omnibus approval for multiple years. On the contrary, it mandates that every assessment year must be independently examined and approved, just as is statutorily required under Section 153D. Any interpretation otherwise would render the safeguard illusory and defeat the very object of legislative control over reassessment proceedings.

The careful and conjoint reading of section 153A(1) and section 153D leave no room for doubt that approval with respect to "each assessment year" is to be obtained by the Assessing Officer on the draft assessment order before passing the assessment orders under section 153A. …..”

That being the case, I adopt the judicial consistency to quash all these assessments framed on 24.05.2023 and 09.06.2023 in all these assessee’s appeals pertaining to assessment years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22, respectively. Failure to. Examine Seized Material and Appraisal Report 13. It is further the case of the Appellant that while granting, approval under Section 1488 of the Act, the Additional Commissioner failed to examine the seized material and the appraisal report. It is respectfully submitted that the grant of approval under Section 148B is not a mere procedural formality, rather, the approving authority is statutorily obliged to examine all relevant records, including the seized material, appraisal report, and the draft assessment order, and to apply independent and conscious consideration to each material aspect before according approval. The failure to do so renders the approval mechanical and vitiates the assessment proceedings.

Reliance in this regard is placed on the following case laws, SEH Realtors Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT, Central Circle-8, New Delhi - [ITAT Delhi 8. We find as per the scheme of the Act, for framing search assessments, the Ld. AO can pass the search assessment order u/s 153A or u/s 153C of the Act only after obtaining prior approval of the draft assessment order and the conclusions reached thereon from the ld. JCIT, in terms of section 153D of the Act. This is a mandatory requirement of law. The said approval granting proceedings by the Id. JCIT is a quasi-judicial proceeding requiring application of mind by the Id. JCIT judiciously. In order to ensure smooth implementation of the aforesaid provisions, in consonance with the true spirit of the scheme of the Act, it is the bounden duty of the Ld. AO to seek to place the draft assessment order together with copies of the seized documents before the Id. JCIT well in time much before the due date of completion of search assessment. The Id. ICIT is supposed to examine the seized documents, questionnaires raised by the Ld. AO on the assessee seeking explanation of contents in the seized documents, replies filed by the assessee in response to the questionnaires issued by the Ld. AO and the conclusions drawn by the Ld. AO vis-à-vis the said seized documents after considering the reply of the assessee. All these functions, as stated earlier, are to be performed by the Id. ICIT in a judicious way after due application of mind. In our considered opinion, if the arguments of the Ld. CIT DR are to be appreciated that the Id. (CIT need not apply his mind while granting approval of the draft assessment orders u/s 153D of the Act as it is not provided in section 153D of the Act, then it would make the entire approval proceedings contemplated u/s 153D of the Act ofiose. The law provides only the Ld. AO to frame the assessment, but, certain checks and balances are provided in the Act by conferring powers on the Id. JCIT to grant judicious approval u/s 153D of the Act to the draft assessment orders placed by the Ld. AO.

On the other hand, the Ld. CIT-DR submits that section 148 has been amended w.e.f. 01.04.2021 and is totally different from the erstwhile provisions of search assessment as contained in section 153A of the Act and therefore, it cannot be said that the approval in section 153D is pari materia with that provided in amended section 148B of the Act. Ld. CIT DR further submits that the AO has referred all the material and evidences relating to the assessment year under appeal and the Additional CIT has time and again discussed the progress of the assessments pending with the Assessing Officer and direct him time to time after going through the seized records and replies filed by the assessee. Ld. CIT DR submits that the Adl. CIT has closely monitored the assessment progress, and the Assessing Officer after due consultation with the Additional CIT passed the order and, therefore, it cannot be said that the approval granted is mechanical approval. She Prayed accordingly.

It is further observed that the assessee under RTI Act, 2005 has requested the AO to supply the material which was sent by the Assessing Officer to the Addl. CIT alongwith the letter seeking approval u/s 148B of the Act. The AO in reply, vide order u/s 7(1) of RTI Act, 2005 dated 16.09.2025 in column 2 stated, that “proposal letter was submitted along with assessment folders of the case. The assessment folders consist of the notices issued to the assessee and submissions received from the assessee in respect of the said notices. All these information is supposed to be already available with the assessee.

As observed above, the Addl. CIT while granting approval for various assessment years has not gone through the seized materials referred by the Assessing Officer for making the additions as established from the report submits under RTI Act by Assessing Officer reproduced hereinabove. Before going further, the amended provision of section 148 and 148B are reproduced as under:

Before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147, and subject to the provisions of section 148A, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice, along with a copy of the order passed, if required, under clause (d) of section 148A, requiring him to furnish within such period, as may be specified in such notice, a return of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under section 139: Provided that no notice under this section shall be issued unless there is information with the Assessing Officer which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year and the Assessing Officer has obtained prior approval of the specified authority to issue such notice. Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section and section 148A, the information with the Assessing Officer which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment means,— (i) any information flagged in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board from time to time; (ii) any final objection raised by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India to the effect that the assessment in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year has not been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, where,— (i) a search is initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under section 132A, on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, in the case of the assessee; or (ii) a survey is conducted under section 133A, other than under sub-section (2A) or sub-section (5) of that section, on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, in the case of the assessee; or (iii) the Assessing Officer is satisfied, with the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, that any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing, seized or requisitioned under section 132 or section 132A in case of any other person on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, belongs to the assessee; or (iv) the Assessing Officer is satisfied, with the prior approval of Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, that any books of account or documents, seized or requisitioned under section 132 or section 132A in case of any other person on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, pertains or pertain to, or any information contained therein, relate to, the assessee, the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to have information which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the case of the assessee for the three assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search is initiated or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned or survey is conducted in the case of the assessee or money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents are seized or requisitioned in case of any other person. Explanation 3.—For the purposes of this section, specified authority means the specified authority referred to in section 151.] “Prior approval for assessment, reassessment or recomputation in certain cases. 148B. No order of assessment or reassessment or recomputation under this Act shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner, in respect of an assessment year to which clauses (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) or clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to section 148 apply except with the prior approval of the Additional Commissioner or Additional Director or Joint Commissioner of Joint Director.”

As is evident, as per Explanation -2 of section 148, in case where a search or survey action is carried out u/s 132 of the Act, it is deemed that the AO has information that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the case of assessee for three assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is initiated or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned or survey is conducted in the case of the assessee. Accordingly, proceedings for various assessment years were initiated to reassess the income of the assessee by issue of notice u/s 148 after obtaining approval from the competent authorities. As per section 148B, a rider is imposed that before passing any order where the reassessment proceedings are initiated under clause (i) to (iv) of Explanation 2 of section 148, prior approval of Additional Commissioner of Income Tax should be obtained.

Under the old provisions related to the assessment in the case of search as provided in section 153A, where approval of draft assessment order was statutorily required u/s 153D of the Act. The erstwhile section 153D regarding approval of draft assessment order before completing the assessment reads as under: Prior approval necessary for assessment in cases of search or requisition. 153D. No order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner in respect of each assessment year referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A or the assessment year referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153B, except with the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner: 28. From the perusal of the provisions as contained in Section 153D and 148B, we find that both sections 148B and 153D are pari-materia. The intent of both the provisions is to protect the interest of assessee so that the concluded assessments are not reopened and concludes on mere possession of “information” found in search. Thus due application of mind while giving approval be it in erstwhile section 153D of the Act or under new section 148B of the Act only concludes the assessment. It is the penultimate step of assessment which cannot be mere formality. The Co- ordinate Bench of Tribunal Chandigarh in the case of Homelife Buildcon (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT reported in [2025] 176 taxmann.com 614 (Chandigarh - Trib.) had an occasion to compare the provisions of both section and after comparison, the Co- ordinate Bench has observed as under: 29. Furthermore, there exists a mandatory statutory requirement that in all cases involving search-related assessments falling within the assessment year, immediately preceding the year of the search, the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner is required under section 148B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the present case, the Assessing Officer (AO) has proceeded without obtaining such approval, which is a clear violation of the procedural safeguards envisaged under the law and, as such, vitiates the assessment proceedings. In the present case, approval has been granted for assessment framed u/s 143(3) only. The relevant provision of section 148B reads as under: Prior approval for assessment, reassessment or recompilation in certain cases.

In case of Homelife Buildcon (P.) Ltd. (supra), the co-ordinate bench of Chandigarh Tribunal made a detailed comparison of both the sections i.e. newly inserted section 148B and erstwhile section 153D and drawn the conclusion that section 153D is pari- materia to section 148B of the Act after comparing the provisions as well as explanatory notice explaining the insertion of section 148B in the statute. Thus, by respectfully following the aforesaid judgement in the case of Homelife Buidcon (supra) we are of the view that sections 153D and 148B of the Act are pari materia.

Once it is established that both the sections 153D and 148B are pari materia to each other, the issue comes for consideration of the validity of approval granted by Addl. CIT whether it is mechanical or granted after independent application of mind. In the present case, as could be seen from the letters issued by the Assessing Officer to the Addl. CIT dated 28.03.2023, reached to the office of the Additional CIT on 30.03.2023 and the approval granted on draft assessment order on the very same date, it is observed that Addl. CIT has granted the approval on the same day when he received draft assessment orders and assessment records containing notices issued and submissions filed by the assessee. Here it is relevant to state that no copy of the seized material based on which additions proposed by the Assessing Officer in the draft assessment order were sent to the Addl. CIT along with records which is a fact on record. Further since that the additional CIT has granted approval for more than 10 assessment years on the same day it appears that before granting the approval, he has not even gone through each individual case file containing notices and replies filed by assessee. This clearly shows that Additional Commissioner has granted the approval u/s 148B of the Act without having independent application of mind and granted the approval in mechanical manner.

The coordinate bench of ITAT, Chandigarh in the case of M/s Malbros International Pvt. Ltd. Versus DCIT Central Circle-2 Ludhiana reported in 2026 (1) TMI 983 - ITAT Chd. has dealt the issue of validity of approval granted u/s 148B of the Act wherein the bench by following its earlier decision in the case of Homelife Buildcon (supra) has held the approval u/s 148B as invalid. The relevant observations of the bench are reproduced as under: “9. …………………. The coordinate bench, on identical facts, held that Ld. AO proceeded to frame the assessment u/s 143(3) despite relying heavily on material found during searches conducted on third-parties. The AO, instead of complying with the jurisdictional preconditions laid down under the reassessment provisions, proceeded without recording the mandatory satisfaction and without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority. The said conduct not only violates the express mandate of law but also renders the assessment jurisdictionally erroneous. A plain reading of the Finance Act, 2021 coupled with Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Bill clearly indicate that the legislative intent was to bring all searches conducted on or after 01-04-2021 within the ambit of the new reassessment regime u/s 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This new regime was introduced through significant amendments to Sec.147 and Sec.148, along with the insertion of Explanations-1 and 2 and the concept of "information suggesting escapement of income" was explicitly defined. From the reading of Explanation-2 to Section 147, it would be evident that in cases where a search is initiated on or after 01-04-2021, AO shall be deemed to have information, which suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for three assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year, in which, the search is initiated, provided that books of account, documents, assets, bullion, jewellery, or other valuable articles are seized or requisitioned in the course of the search. This deeming provision is not limited only to the person searched, but also extends to "other persons", provided that due procedure under the law specifically, the recording of satisfaction that such seized material belongs to the assessee and obtaining prior approval from the PCIT is followed otherwise the assessment would be bad-in-law. It was further observed by the bench that AO relied upon material seized during searches conducted on other persons and therefore, it was mandatory for Ld. AO to invoke the provisions of Sec.147 and not to bypass the statutory framework by proceeding u/s 143(3). Granting such unfettered powers to the AO to rely on third-party material without adhering to the safeguards u/s 147 would defeat the very purpose of the amendment and open the floodgates to arbitrary assessments. It was further observed by the bench that assessment u/s 143(3) was initiated solely for the purpose of verifying the return of income as filed by the assessee. In such circumstances, the importing and reliance upon material seized from third-party searches would go beyond the jurisdiction conferred u/s 143(3) particularly, where the applicable law i.e., Explanation-2 to section 148 (as amended by the Finance Act, 2021) mandates prior approval from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) before initiating reassessment proceedings on the basis of such material. The failure to comply with such requirement would render the assessment legally untenable. The Ld. AO did not issue a notice u/s 148 nor did he followed the due process of law under the new reassessment framework, including recording of satisfaction and obtaining prior sanction from the PCIT. Therefore, the assessment framed u/s 143(3), because of being based on third-party material without adhering to statutory safeguards, would be bad-in-law. The AO was only empowered to verify the return of income and restrict his scope of inquiry accordingly and he was not permitted to expand the assessment by importing and relying upon third-party seized material without following the mandatory procedure laid down under the law. It was mandatory statutory requirement that in all cases involving search-related assessments falling within three assessment year, immediately preceding the year of the search, the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner u/s 148B would be required. However, Ld. AO proceeded without obtaining such approval which is a clear violation of the procedural safeguards envisaged under the law which would vitiate entire assessment proceedings. In the present case, approval was taken to frame assessment u/s 143(3) only. As against this, the provisions of Sec.148B mandate prior approval of specified authority. These provisions provide that no order of assessment or reassessment or recomputation under this Act shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner, in respect of an assessment year to which clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) or clause (iv) of Explanation-2 to Sec.148 apply except with the prior approval of the Additional Commissioner or Additional Director or Joint Commissioner or Joint Director. The bench further observed that under the amended provisions, approval u/s 148B would be required in all cases where proceedings were initiated pursuant to a search, requisition, or survey, or where asset / material / documents found during such search pertain to or relate to another person. In such cases, the Assessing Officer must take the approval u/s 148B from the specified higher authority. This requirement was explicitly discussed in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 2022, which emphasizes the need to protect taxpayer rights by ensuring that no reassessment is carried out without proper sanction and due process. The Joint Commissioner was not even supplied with seized material as relied upon by Ld. AO. There exists a prescribed procedure under which such seized material (including material found from third-party premises) is to be forwarded to the approving authority at least 30 days in advance of granting approval. This procedural safeguard is crucial to prevent arbitrary and unregulated use of third-party material. There was no evidence to demonstrate that the prescribed procedure was followed, or that the Joint Commissioner was apprised of the seized material by forwarding copies of the documents found from the third party prior to framing the assessment. The complete failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 148B renders the reassessment not only procedurally defective but also without jurisdiction. The bench further observed that while framing the assessment u/s 143(3), the AO has, on the last page of the assessment order, referred to an approval obtained from the supervisory authority. However, this approval was obtained in reference to F.No. 299/36/2020/1DAR/INV3(3)/577 dated 15-07-2022, i.e., in accordance with the CBDT Circular dated 15-07-2022 and not under the mandatory provisions of section 148B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was to be noted that the said approval did not mention or consider any of the seized materials sourced from the third party despite the fact that AO heavily relied upon that material while making the additions. The approval merely states that the appraisal report was considered, without any reference to the original documents seized or to the statutory procedure outlined under section 148B. Pertinently, the manual of office procedure issued in February 2003 lays down a mandatory protocol that in all search cases especially where material pertains to persons other than the one searched, such material is to be forwarded in original to the approving authority and a draft order is required to be submitted for approval at least 30 days in advance. In the present case, the approval letter was issued by the DCIT only on 22-08-2023 which clearly contravenes this procedural requirement. This procedural lapse is further compounded by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Serajuddin and Co. case (163 Taxmann.com 118) wherein it was held that in search cases, strict adherence to the approval protocol as laid down in the departmental Manual of Office Procedure in February 2003 and law is essential to uphold the validity of the assessment. It was quite evident from the approval as granted by Ld. Addl. CIT that there was no mention or consideration of the seized material sourced from the third party though both the lower authorities heavily relied upon such seized material. The approval merely states that the appraisal report has been considered but without any reference to any documents seized from third parties. Finally, on the given facts, the bench quashed the assessment order. We find that similar facts exist in the present appeal before us. No change in facts could be demonstrated by revenue.

We further find that the above decision has subsequently been followed and a similar view has been taken by another co-ordinate bench in Jamna Dass Nilkamal Jain Saraf Private Ltd. (ITA No.403/Chd/2025 & ors.). Faced with similar facts / situation, the bench observed that the impugned AY being one of the three preceding years would fall under Explanation 2(iv) to Sec.148. The Explanation provide that if a search is initiated then the AO shall be deemed to have information suggesting escapement of income for the three AYs immediately preceding the AY relevant to the previous year in which the search is initiated. Therefore, the only permissible statutory course was to issue notice u/s 148 and obtain prior approval u/s 148B before passing assessment order. Since the AO completed the assessment u/s 143(3) without issuing the notice u/s 148 the assessment

Similar view is expressed by the coordinate bench of Lucknow Tribunal in the case Rakesh Kumar Pandey Vs.rsus A.C.I.T., Central Circle-2, Lucknow reported in 2025 (12) TMI 1645 - ITAT Lucknow. The Chandigarh bench of Tribunal in the case of Rosha Alloys P Limited Vs. DCIT Central Circle I, Ludhiana reported in 127 ITR (Trib.) 76 also expressed the same view and quashed the assessment order passed us/ 147 based on invalid approval u/s 148B of the Act. The SMC Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Manish Sharda (supra) has held that the approval granted u/s 148B of the Act as invalid as the same was granted in mechanical manner.

The Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of Asst. CIT v. Serajuddin and Co. [2023 SCC OnLine Ori 992] in Paragraph 22 observed as under:- "22. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the assessee there is not even a token mention of the draft orders having been perused by the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax. The letter simply grants an approval. In other words, even the bare minimum requirement of the approving authority having to indicate what the thought process involved was is missing in the aforementioned approval order. While elaborate reasons need not be given, there has to be some indication that the approving authority has examined the draft orders and finds that it meets the requirement of the law. As explained in the above cases, the mere repeating of the words of the statute, or mere "rubber stamping" of the letter seeking sanction by using similar words like "seen" or "approved" will not satisfy the requirement of the law. This is where the Technical Manual of Office Procedure becomes important. Although, it was in the context of section 158BG of the Act, it would equally apply to section 153D of the Act. There are three or four requirements that are mandated therein, (i) the Assessing Officer should submit the draft assessment order "well in time". Here it was submitted just two days prior to the deadline thereby putting the approving authority under great pressure and not giving him sufficient time to apply his mind ; (ii) the final approval must be in writing ; (iii) the fact that approval has been obtained, should be mentioned in the body of the assessment order." [Emphasis supplied]

It is relevant to mention that Special Leave Petition preferred by the Revenue against the aforesaid decision of Serajuddin and Co. (supra), stood dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 28.11.2023 in SLP (C) Diary no. 44989/2023.

A similar view was taken by the hon’ble Delhi High court in the case of Anuj Bansal (supra), whereby, it was reiterated that the exercise of powers under Section 153D cannot be done mechanically. Thus, the salient aspect which emerges from the abovementioned decisions is that grant of approval under Section 153D of the Act cannot be merely a ritualistic formality or rubber stamping by the authority, rather it must reflect an appropriate application of mind.

Recently the hon’ble Third member in the case of Dheeraj Chaudhary Vs. ACIT in to 6160/Del/2018 after considering all the judgements relied upon by the ld. CIT DR and further after detailed analyzing the provisions of section 153D, power and independence of assessing authority and the CBDT manual referred by the revenue has held that the common approval granted for various year and for various assessee without making any reference to the material seen is mechanical approval and cannot sustained in the eyes of law. A reference is also made the CBDT manual issued in respect to the procedure to be followed in this regard. The relevant observations of the hon’ble Third Member are as under: 22. I noted that the common thread discussed by Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of Serajuddin& Co. (supra), by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anuj Bansal (supra) and by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Sapna Gupta (supra) is that the requirement of previous approval of assessment by the Additional CIT/Joint CIT in terms of provisions of Section 153D of the Act being an inbuilt protection against any arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by the Assessing Officer, casts a very heavy duty on the said high ranking authority to see to it that the requirement of the previous approval, envisaged in the Section is not turned into an empty formality. Needless to say that before granting approval, the Additional CIT/Joint CIT, as the case may be, must have before him the material on the basis whereof an opinion in this behalf has been formed by the Assessing Officer and the approval must reflect the application of mind to the facts of the case. The CBDT itself recognized the importance of this provision and the above laid down principle and hence issued Manual of Office Procedure in February, 2023 in exercise of powers under Section 119 of the Act. Vide Para 9 of Chapter 3 of Volume-II (Technical), a clear procedure is devised i.e., how an approval is to be granted for draft assessment for passing of assessment order in search cases. According to the Manual, the Assessing Officer should submit the draft assessment order for such approval well in time along with docketed in the order sheet, a copy of the draft assessment order, covering letter filed in the relevant miscellaneous records folder. Even, it is noted that due opportunity of being heard should be given to the assessee by the supervisory officer giving approval to the proposed block assessment, at least one month before the time barring date. It is further noted that once such approval is granted, it must be in writing and filed in the relevant folder indicating above after making due entry in the order sheet. This is the mandate provided in the office manual of the Department. In view of above, I am of the view that the ‘approval’, as mandated u/s 153D of the Act, signifies a product of human thoughts based on the given set of facts and interpretation of the applicable law. It provides equality in treatment and thus prevents bias, prejudice and arbitrariness. It also prevents and avoids inconsistent and divergent views. The power of approval to the specified authority i.e., Superior authority has been envisaged with the objectives that no illegality or biasness, to either of the sides i.e., the assessee or the Revenue, remains.

In the present case before me, the above procedure is not at all followed as is evident from the proposal sent by the Assessing Officer as reproduced in Paragraph 10. It means that the approval granted is mechanical in manner and without application of mind by the approving authority i.e., by the Additional CIT.

Further with respect to argument of the Revenue that Addl. CIT and AO had worked together in consultation with each other on regular basis and after seeking directions from the Addl. CIT from time to time, AO passed the assessment order. We find that working of AO under close supervision and directions of Adl. CIT tantamount to interference in the independence of the AO and assessment proceeding. The Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of FinDoc Finvest Private Ltd Vs. DCIT reported in 172 Taxmann.com 773 (P&H HC) made certain observations which are very relevant on the issue of independence of the AO, the same are reproduced herein below:-

Although, the approval can be taken from the Joint Commissioner of the assessment order, the question arises that while examining the return and conducting assessment, can the Assessing Officer seek guidance or discuss the case with the Joint Commissioner and whether his consultation with the Joint Commissioner would amount to abdication of his powers. In Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the issue relating to the powers vested with DSP by Section 20-A of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and has observed as under:- "11. The case against the appellants originally was registered on 19th March, 1995 under the Arms Act. The DSP did not give any prior approval on his own to record any information about the commission of an offence under TADA. On the contrary, he made a report to the Additional Chief Secretary and asked for permission to proceed under TADA. Why? was it because he was reluctant to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by the provision of Section 20A (1)? This is a case of power conferred upon one authority being really exercised by another. If a statutory authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authority's instruction, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion altogether. In other words, the discretion vested in the DSP in this case by Section 20A (1) was not exercised by the DSP at all.

Reference may be made in this connection to Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1952 SCR 135, in which the action of Commissioner of Police in cancelling the permission granted to the respondent for construction of cinema in Greater Bombay at the behest of the State Government was not upheld, as the concerned rules had conferred this power on the Commissioner, because of which it was stated that the Commissioner was bound to bear his own independent and unfettered judgment and decide the matter for himself, instead of forwarding an order which another authority had purported to pass.

In view of the above, the assessment order cannot be result of an independent application of mind and exercise of discretionary power by the Assessing Officer in terms of Section 143(3) of the Act and but is an order passed under the influence and directions of the superior officers. It is to be noticed that the consultation with a superior officer would be akin to directions of the superior. There is no room available for discretion where consultation is sought from a superior officer while if a superior officer consults his subordinates, the discretion continues to stay with him. He may choose not to follow the advice of his subordinate but the opposite would be untrue. We are, thus, of firm view that the order has been passed whereby the Assessing Officer has abdicated his authority and, therefore, the order has become vitiated in law.

We find that the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Courtin the aforesaid case had held that where AO was influenced by consultation and discussion with his superior officer, the said order was to be set aside as it was passed under influence and direction from superior officers. Similar view is taken by the coordinate bench of Delhi Tribunal in the case of Shiv Kumar Nayyar Vs. ACIT, wherein the observations with regard to independence of the AO for framing of search assessment and the ld. Addl. CIT, Central Range thereon is discussed, which is reproduced below: - "7. Per contra, the ld. DR vehemently argued that the role of Addl. CIT, Central Range is totally different from the role of an Addl. CIT in the normal range. She argued that in a Central Range, the ld. Addl. CIT is involved in the search assessment proceedings right from the time of receipt of appraisal report from the Investigation Wing and is involved with the ld. AO from time to time while issuing various questionnaires to the assessee. The ld. Addl. CIT in Central Range also examine the seized documents in detail immediately after receipt of the appraisal report and provides able assistance to the ld. AO about the interpretation of the said seized documents while issuing questionnaires to assessee, examining the replies filed by the assessee and drawing conclusions thereon. Hence, it is very easy for the ld. Addl. CIT to grant approval of the draft assessment order on the same day since he is involved with the assessment proceedings right from the inception. Accordingly, she argued that the objection raised by the ld. AR has no force.

We find, as per the scheme of the Act, for framing search assessments, the ld. AO can pass the search assessment order u/s 153A or u/s 153C of the Act only after obtaining prior approval of the draft assessment order and the conclusions reached thereon from the ld. Addl. CIT in terms of section 153D of the Act. This is a mandatory requirement of law. The said approval granting proceedings by the ld. Addl. CIT is a quasi judicial proceeding requiring application of mind by the ld. Addl. CIT judiciously. In order to ensure smooth implementation of the aforesaid provisions, in consonance with the true spirit of the scheme of the Act, it is the bounden duty of the ld. AO to seek to place the draft assessment order together with copies of the seized documents before the ld. Addl. CIT well in time much before the due date of completion of search assessment. The ld. Addl. CIT is supposed to examine the seized documents, questionnaires raised by the ld. AO on the assessee seeking explanation of contents in the seized documents, replies filed by the assessee in response to the questionnaires issued by the ld. AO and the conclusions drawn by the ld. AO visà-vis the said seized documents after considering the reply of the assessee. All these functions, as stated earlier, are to be performed by the ld. Addl. CIT in a judicious way after due application of mind. Even though as vehemently argued by the ld. CIT-DR, the Addl. CIT is involved with the search assessment proceedings right from the time of receipt of appraisal report from the Investigation Wing, still, the ld. Addl. CIT, while granting the approval u/s 153D has to independently apply his mind dehors the conclusions drawn either by the Investigation Wing in the appraisal report or by the ld. AO in the draft assessment order. The copy of the appraisal report submitted by the Investigation Wing to the ld. AO and ld. Addl. CIT are merely guidance to the ld. AO and are purely internal correspondences on which the assessee does not have any access. The scheme of the Act mandates due application of mind by the ld. AO to examine the seized documents independently dehors the appraisal report of the Investigation Wing and seek explanation/clarifications from the assessee on the contents of the seized documents. When the scheme of the Act provides for a leeway to both the ld.

Besides confirming the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Nayyar (supra) further held that approval u/s 153D of the Act has to be granted for each Assessment year independently. The relevant observations of the judgement of Hon’ble High Court are as under:- "11. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision evinces an uncontrived position of law that the approval under Section 153D of the Act has to be granted for "each assessment year" referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 153A of the Act. It is beneficial to refer to the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the case of PCIT v. Sapna Gupta [2022 SCC OnLine All 1294] which captures with precision the scope of the concerned provision and more significantly, the import of the phrase- "each assessment year" used in the language of Section 153D of the Act. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are reproduced as under:- "13. It was held therein that if an approval has been granted by the Approving Authority in a mechanical manner without application of mind then the very purpose of obtaining approval under Section 153D of the Act and mandate of the enactment by the legislature will be defeated. For granting approval under Section 153D of the Act, the Approving Authority shall have to apply independent mind to the material on record for "each assessment year" in respect of "each assessee" separately. The words 'each assessment year' used in Section 153D and 153A have been considered to hold that effective and proper meaning has to be given so that underlying legislative intent as per scheme of assessment of Section 153A to 153D is fulfilled. It was held that the "approval" as contemplated under 153D of the Act, requires the approving authority, i.e. Joint Commissioner to verify the issues raised by the Assessing Officer in the draft assessment order and apply his mind to ascertain as to whether the required procedure has been followed by the Assessing Officer or not in framing the assessment. The approval, thus, cannot be a mere formality and, in any case, cannot be a mechanical exercise of power. *** 19. The careful and conjoint reading of Section 153A(1) and Section 153D leave no room for doubt that approval with respect to "each assessment year" is to be obtained by the Assessing Officer on the draft assessment order before passing the assessment order under Section 153A." [Emphasis supplied] 12. It is observed that the Court in the case of Sapna Gupta (supra) refused to interdict the order of the ITAT, which had held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act therein was granted without any independent application of mind. The Court took a view that the approving authority had wielded the power to accord approval mechanically, inasmuch as, it was humanly impossible for the said authority to have perused and appraised the records of 85 cases in a single day. It was explicitly held that the authority granting approval has to apply its mind for "each assessment year" for "each assessee" separately.

Reliance can also be placed upon the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Asst. CIT v. Serajuddin and Co. [2023 SCC OnLine Ori 992] to understand the exposition of law on the issue at hand. Paragraph no.22 of the said decision reads as under:- "22. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the assessee there is not even a token mention of the draft orders having been perused by the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax. The letter simply grants an approval. In other words, even the bare minimum requirement of the approving authority having to indicate what the thought process involved was is missing in the aforementioned approval order. While elaborate reasons need not be given, there has to be some indication that the approving authority has examined the draft orders and finds that it meets the requirement of the law. As explained in the above cases, the mere repeating of the words of the statute, or mere "rubber stamping" of the letter seeking sanction by using similar words like "seen" or "approved" will not satisfy the requirement of the law. This is where the Technical Manual of Office Procedure becomes important. Although, it was in the context of section 158BG of the Act, it would equally apply to section 153D of the Act. There are three or four requirements that are mandated therein, (i) the Assessing Officer should submit the draft assessment order "well in time". Here it was submitted just two days prior to the deadline thereby putting the approving authority under great pressure and not giving him sufficient time to apply his mind ; (ii) the final approval must be in writing ; (iii) the fact that approval has been obtained, should be mentioned in the body of the assessment order." [Emphasis supplied] 14. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the assessee apprised this Court that the Special Leave Petition preferred by the Revenue against the decision in the case of Serajuddin (supra), came to be dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 28.11.2023 in SLP (C) Diary no. 44989/2023.

A similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Anuj Bansal (supra), whereby, it was reiterated that the exercise of powers under Section 153D cannot be done mechanically. Thus, the salient aspect which emerges from the abovementioned decisions is that grant of approval under Section 153D of the Act cannot be merely a ritualistic formality or rubber stamping by the authority, rather it must reflect an appropriate application of mind.

In the present case, the ITAT, while specifically noting that the approval was granted on the same day when the draft assessment orders were sent, has observed as under:- "10. We have gone through the approval granted by the ld. Addl. CIT on 30.12.2018 u/s 153D of the Act which is enclosed at page 36 of the paper book of the assessee. The said letter clearly states that a letter dated 30.12.2018 was filed by the ld. AO before the ld. Addl. CIT seeking approval of draft assessment order u/s 153D of the Act. The ld. Addl. CIT has accorded approval for the said draft assessment orders on the very same day i.e., on 30.12.2018 for seven assessment years in the case of the assessee and for seven assessment years in the case of Smt. Neetu Nayyar. It is also pertinent in this regard to refer to pages 68 and 69 of the paper book which contains information obtained by Smt. Neetu Nayyar from Central Public Information Officer who is none other than the ld. Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Range-S, New Delhi, under Right to Information Act, wherein, it reveals that the ld. Addl. CIT had granted approval for 43 cases on 30.12.2018 itself. This fact is not in dispute before us. Of these 43 cases, as evident from page 36 of the paper book which contains the approval u/s 153D, 14 cases pertained to the assessee herein and Smt. Neetu Nayyar. The remaining cases may belong to some other assessees, which information is not available before us. In any event, whether it is humanly possible for an approving authority like ld. Addl. CIT to grant judicious approval u/s 153D of the Act for 43 cases on a single day is the subject matter of dispute before us. Further, section 153D provides that approval has to be granted for each of the assessment year whereas, in the instant case, the ld. Addl. CIT has granted a single approval for all assessment years put together."

Notably, the order of approval dated 30.12.2020 which was produced before us by the learned counsel for the assessee clearly signifies that a single approval has been granted for AYs 2011-12 to 2017-18 in the case of the assessee. The said order also fails to make any mention of the fact that the draft assessment orders were perused at all, much less perusal of the same with an independent application of mind. Also, we cannot lose sight of the fact that in the instant case, the concerned authority has granted approval for 43 cases in a single day which is evident from the findings of the ITAT, succinctly encapsulated in the order extracted above."

It is observed that the hon’ble jurisdictional high Court in the case of Sapna Gupta (supra) refused to interdict the order of the ITAT, which had held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act therein was granted without any independent application of mind. The Court took a view that the approving authority had wielded the power to accord approval mechanically, inasmuch as, it was humanly impossible for the said authority to have perused and appraised the records of 07 cases in a single day. It was explicitly held that the authority granting approval has to apply its mind for "each assessment year" for "each assessee" separately.

In view of the above facts and by respectfully following the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, Hon’ble Delhi High Court and other Hon’ble high court as referred herein above, and further in the case of Co-ordinate Benches of Tribunal, we are of the considered opinion that the approval u/s 153D and 148B of the Act are pari materia and in the present case, the approval is granted by Adl. CIT without independent application of mind and without even referring to the seized material based on which additions were proposed in the draft assessment order and thus is invalid approval and consequent final assessment orders passed based on such invalid approval are hereby quashed. Accordingly, we allowed the respective grounds of appeal in all the assessment years and quashed the assessment orders passed based on invalid approval u/s 148B of the Act.

In the result, all the appeals for Assessment Years 2013-14 to 2022-23 in to 2713/Del/2025, ITA 4008/Del/2025 and to 2717/Del/2025 are allowed.

Since, we have allowed the legal ground taken by the assessee in its appeal for Assessment Year 2018-19 in by (Assessee), by (Department) become infructuous and dismissed.