GANGUNAIDU SABBAVARAPU,VISAKHAPATNAM vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-2(5), VISAKHPATNAM

In CIT v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate, a three Judge bench of this Court discussed the scope of Section 31(3)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 which is almost identical to Section 251(1)(a). The court held as under: (ITR p. 229) "If an appeal lies, Section 31 of the Act describes the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such an appeal. Under Section 31(3)(a) in disposing of such an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; under clause (b) thereof he may set aside the assessment and direct the Income Tax Officer to make a fresh assessment. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. The scope of his power is co-terminus with that of the Income-tax Officer. He can do what the Income- tax Officer can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do." (emphasis supplied)

The above observations are squarely applicable to the interpretation of Section 251(1)(a) of the Act. The declaration of law is clear that the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is co-terminus with that of the Income Tax Officer, if that be so, there appears to be no reason as to why the appellate authority cannot modify the assessment order on an additional ground even if not raised before the Income Tax Officer. No exception could be taken to this view as the Act does not place any restriction or limitation on the exercise of appellate power. Even otherwise an Appellate Authority while hearing appeal against the order of a subordinate authority has all the powers which the original authority may have in deciding the question before it subject to the restrictions or limitations if any prescribed by the statutory provisions. In the absence of any statutory provision the Appellate Authority is vested with all the plenary powers which the subordinate authority may have in the matter. There appears to be no good reason and none was placed before us to justify curtailment of the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in entertaining an additional ground raised by the assessee in seeking modification of the order of assessment passed by the Income Tax Officer. [emphasis supplied] (B) It is clear, therefore, that an assessee is entitled to raise not merely additional legal submissions before the appellate authorities, but is also entitled to raise additional claims before them. The appellate authorities have the discretion whether or not to permit such additional claims to be raised. It cannot, however, be said that they have no juri iction to consider the same. They have the juri iction to entertain the new claim. That they may choose not to exercise their juri iction in a given case is another matter. The exercise of discretion is entirely different from the existence of juri iction.

At page 694, after referring to certain observations of the Supreme Court in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gurjargravures P. Ltd., (1978) 111 ITR 1, the Supreme Court observed at Page 694 as under :- "The above observations do not rule out a case for raising an additional ground before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner if the ground so raised could not have been raised at that particular stage when the return was filed or when the assessment order was made, or that the ground became available on account of change of circumstances or law. There may be several factors justifying raising of such new plea in appeal, and each case has to be considered on its own facts. If the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is satisfied he would be acting within his juri iction in considering the question so raised in all its aspects. Of course, while permitting the assessee to raise an additional ground, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should exercise his discretion in accordance with law and reason. He must be satisfied that the ground raised was bona fide and that the same could not have been raised earlier for good reasons. The satisfaction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rigid principles or any hard and fast rule can be laid down for this purpose." [emphasis supplied]

The underlined observations in the above passage do not curtail the ambit of the juri iction of the appellate authorities stipulated earlier. They do not restrict the new/additional grounds that may be taken by the assessee before the appellate authorities to those that were not available when the return was filed or even when the assessment order was made. The sentence read as a whole entitles an assessee to raise new grounds/make additional claims :- "if the ground so raised could not have been raised at that particular stage when the return was filed or when the assessment order was made..." "or" if "the ground became available on account of change of circumstances or law" The appellate authorities, therefore, have juri iction to deal not merely with additional grounds, which became available on account of change of circumstances or law, but with additional grounds which were available when the return was filed. The first part viz. "if the ground so raised could not have been raised at that particular stage when the return was filed or when the assessment order was made... "clearly relate to cases where the ground was available when the return was filed and the assessment order was made but "could not have been raised" at that stage. The words are "could not have been raised" and not "were not in existence". Grounds which were not in existence when the return was filed or when the assessment order was made fall within the second category viz. where "the ground became available on account of change of circumstances or law."

The facts in Jute Corporation of India Ltd., various judgments referred to therein as well as in subsequent cases, which we will refer to, establishes this beyond doubt. In many of the cases, the grounds were, in fact, available when the return was filed and/or the assessment order was made. In Jute Corporation of India Ltd., the ground was available when the return was filed. The assessee did not claim any deduction of its liability to pay purchase tax as "it entertained a belief that it was not liable to pay purchase tax under the Bengal Raw Jute Taxation Act, 1941". Thus, the ground existed when the return was filed. The assessment order was even made and received by the assessee. It is only after the appeal was filed that the assessee claimed a deduction in respect of the amount paid towards the purchase tax under the said Act. It is also significant to note that the assessee's entitlement to claim deduction had been held to be valid in view of an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Company Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1971) 82 ITR 363. This was, therefore, a case of error in perception/judgment. Despite the same, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in allowing the deduction. The words "could not have been raised" must, therefore, be construed liberally and not strictly.

It is indeed a question of exercise of discretion whether or not to allow an assessee to raise a claim which was not raised when the return was filed or the assessment order was made. As held by the Supreme Court there may be several factors justifying the raising of a new plea in appeal and each case must be considered on its own facts. However, such cases include those, where the ground though available when the return was filed or the assessment order was made, was not taken or raised for reasons which the appellate authorities may consider valid. In other words, the juri iction of the appellate authorities to consider a fresh or new ground or claim is not restricted to cases where such a ground did not exist when the return was filed and the assessment order was made. 16(A). A Full Bench of this Court in Ahmedabad Electricity Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1993) 199 ITR 351 considered a similar situation. In that case, the appellant/assessee did not claim a deduction in respect of the amounts it was required to transfer to contingencies reserve and dividend and tariff reserve either before the Income Tax Officer or before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal. Subsequently, this Court had, in Amalgamated Electricity Company Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1974) 97 ITR 334, held that such amounts represented allowable deductions on revenue account. The appellant, therefore, raised a new claim and additional grounds before the Tribunal in that connection. The Tribunal rejected the same. The second question which was raised in the reference before the Division Bench was as under :- "(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in not allowing the assessee leave to raise in its own appeals additional grounds and in the departmental appeals cross objections regarding the deductibility of the sums transferred to contingency reserve and tariff and dividend control reserve?" (B) The Division Bench which heard the reference, finding that there was a conflict of decisions, placed the papers before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench to resolve the controversy. The Full Bench answered the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The Full Bench held :- "Thus, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has very wide powers while considering an appeal which may be filed by the assessee. He may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or remand the case to the Assessing Officer. This is because, unlike an ordinary appeal, the basic purpose of a tax appeal is to ascertain the correct tax liability of an assessee in accordance with law. Hence an Appellate Assistant Commissioner also has the power to enhance the tax liability of the assessee although the Department does not have a right of appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Explanation to subsection (2), however, makes it clear that for the purpose of enhancement, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot travel beyond the proceedings which were originally before the Income-tax Officer or refer to new sources of income which were not before the Income-tax Officer at all. For this purpose, there are other separate remedies provided under the Income-tax Act." (C) It is unnecessary to refer to all the judgments that the Full Bench referred to while answering the reference. The Full Bench referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Jute Corporation of India Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax (supra) set out above. It is important to note that even in this case, therefore, the ground existed when the return was filed. The mere fact that a decision of a court is rendered subsequently does not indicate that the ground did not exist when the law was enacted. Judgments are only a declaration of the law. The assessee could have raised the ground in its return itself. It did not have to await a decision of a court in that regard. Indeed, even if a judgment is against an assessee, it is always open to the assessee to claim the deduction and carry the matter higher. The words "could not have been raised", therefore, cannot be read strictly. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Full Bench of this Court meant them to be read strictly. They include cases where the assessee did not raise the claim for a reason found to be reasonable or valid by the appellate authorities in the facts and circumstances of a case.

The next judgment to which our attention was invited by Mr. Mistri is the judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court in National Thermal Power Company Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1997) 7 SCC 489 = (1998) 229 ITR

In that case, the assessee had deposited its funds not immediately required by it on short term deposits with banks. The interest received on such deposits was offered by the assessee itself for tax and the assessment was completed on that basis. Even before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the inclusion of this amount was neither challenged by the assessee nor considered by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The inclusion of the amount was not objected to even in the grounds of appeal as originally filed before the Tribunal. Subsequently, the assessee by a letter, raised additional grounds to the effect that the said sum could not be included in the total income. The assessee contended that on a erroneous admission, no income can be included in the total income. It was further contended that the ITO and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had erred and failed in their duty in adjudicating the matter correctly and by mechanically including the amount in the total income. It is pertinent to note that the assessee contended that it was entitled to the deduction in view of two orders of the Special Benches of the Tribunal and the assessee further stated that it had raised these additional grounds on learning about the legal position subsequently. The Tribunal declined to entertain these additional grounds. The Supreme Court did not answer the question on merits, but framed the following question and held as under :- "

The Tribunal has framed as many as five questions while making a reference to us. Since the Tribunal has not examined the additional grounds raised by the assessee on merit, we do not propose to answer the questions relating to the merit of those contentions. We reframe the question which arises for our consideration in order to bring out the point which requires determination more clearly. It is as follows: "Where on the facts found by the authorities below a question of law arises (though not raised before the authorities) which bears on the tax liability of the assessee, whether the Tribunal has juri iction to examine the same." Under Section 254 of the Income Tax Act the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. The power of the Tribunal in dealing with the appeals is thus expressed in the widest possible terms. The purpose of the assessment proceedings before the taxing authorities is to assess correctly the tax liability of an assessee in accordance with law. If, for example, as a result of a judicial decision given while the appeal is pending before the Tribunal, it is found that a non-taxable item is taxed or a permissible deduction is denied, we do not see any reason why the assessee should be prevented from raising that question before the Tribunal for the first time, so long as the relevant facts are on record in respect of that item. We do not see any reason to restrict the power of the Tribunal under Section 254 only to decide the grounds which arise from the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Both the assessee as well as the Department have a right to file an appeal/cross- objections before the Tribunal. We fail to see why the Tribunal should be prevented from considering questions of law arising in assessment proceedings although not raised earlier."

In the case before us, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal have held the omission to claim the deduction of Rs.40,00,000/- to be inadvertent. Both the appellate authorities held, after considering all the facts, that the assessee had inadvertently claimed a deduction of Rs.20,00,000/- paid after the end of the year in question. We see no reason to interfere with this finding. We see less reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the appellate authorities in permitting the respondent to raise this claim. That the respondent is entitled to the deduction in law is admitted and, in any event, clearly established. In the circumstances, the respondent ought not be prejudiced.

The orders of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal clearly indicate that both the appellate authorities had exercised their juri iction to consider the additional claim as they were entitled to in view of the various judgments on the issue, including the judgment of the Supreme Court in National Thermal Power Corporation Limited. This is clear from the fact that these judgments have been expressly referred to in detail by the CIT(A) and by the Tribunal.

We wish to clarify that both the appellate authorities have themselves considered the additional claim and allowed it. They have not remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to consider the same. Both the orders expressly direct the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction of Rs.40,00,000/- under section 43B of the Act. The Assessing Officer is, therefore, now only to compute the respondent's tax liability which he must do in accordance with the orders allowing the respondent a deduction of Rs.40,00,000/- under section 43B of the Act.

The conclusion that the error in not claiming the deduction in the return of income was inadvertent cannot be faulted for more than one reason. It is a finding of fact which cannot be termed perverse. There is nothing on record that militates against the finding. The appellant has not suggested, much less established that the omission was deliberate, mala-fide or even otherwise. The inference that the omission was inadvertent is, therefore, irresistible.

It was then submitted by Mr. Gupta that the Supreme Court had taken a different view in Goetze (India) Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax. We are unable to agree. The decision was rendered by a Bench of two learned Judges and expressly refers to the judgment of the Bench of three learned Judges in National Thermal Power Company Limited vs. Commissioner of Income- tax (supra). The question before the Court was whether the appellant-assessee could make a claim for deduction, other than by filing a revised return. After the return was filed, the appellant sought to claim a deduction by way of a letter before the Assessing Officer. The claim, therefore, was not before the appellate authorities. The deduction was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that there was no provision under the Act to make an amendment in the return of income by modifying an application at the assessment stage without revising the return. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal, however, allowed the department's appeal. In the Supreme Court, the assessee relied upon the judgment in National Thermal Power Company Limited contending that it was open to the assessee to raise the points of law even before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held :- "

The decision in question is that the power of the Tribunal under section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is to entertain for the first time a point of law provided the fact on the basis of which the issue of law can be raised before the Tribunal. The decision does not in any way relate to the power of the Assessing Officer to entertain a claim for deduction otherwise than by filing a revised return. In the circumstances of the case, we dismiss the civil appeal. However, we make it clear that the issue in this case is limited to the power of the assessing authority and does not impinge on the power of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 254 of the Income- tax Act, 1961. There shall be no order as to costs." [emphasis supplied]|

It is clear to us that the Supreme Court did not hold anything contrary to what was held in the previous judgments to the effect that even if a claim is not made before the assessing officer, it can be made before the appellate authorities. The juri iction of the appellate authorities to entertain such a claim has not been negated by the Supreme Court in this judgment. In fact, the Supreme Court made it clear that the issue in the case was limited to the power of the assessing authority and that the judgment does not impinge on the power of the Tribunal under section 254. 24. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dealt with a similar submission in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jai Parabolic Springs Limited, (2008) 306 ITR 42. The Division Bench, in paragraph 17 of the judgment held that the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal making it clear that the decision was limited to the power of the assessing authority to entertain a claim for deduction otherwise than by a revised return and did not impinge on the powers of the Tribunal. In paragraph 19, the Division Bench held that there was no prohibition on the powers of the Tribunal to entertain an additional ground which, according to the Tribunal, arises in the matter and for the just decision of the case. Considering the aforesaid settled position of law, we are of the firm conviction that the assessee remained well within his right to raise the claim that the compensation received by him on the compulsory acquisition of his land under the National Highways Act, 1956, was not exigible to tax for the two fold reasons, viz. (i) that the compensation received on the acquisition of land under the National Highways Act, 1956 is not exigible to tax u/s 96 of the REFTLARR Act; and (ii) that as the agricultural land transferred by the assessee during the subject year was not a capital asset within the meaning of u/s 2(14)(iii) of the Act, i.e., neither situated within the urban agglomeration; nor within the notified area limits, therefore, the profit/gain arising on the transfer of the same was not exigible to tax under the head capital gains.

Ostensibly, as per the record to which our attention has been drawn by the Ld. AR., we find that the agricultural land of the assessee, admeasuring 111 sq. meters situated at Gudavalli Mandal, Subbavaram, District: Visakhapatnam, was compulsorily acquired as per - Award No. 8 of 2022, dated 04.02.2022 under Section 3E(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (Pages 15 and 82–83 of the APB). As per Section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, no income tax shall be levied on any award or agreement made under the said Act, except under section 46 of the Act. The Ld. AR had drawn our attention to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Smt. the Hon'ble High Court was inter alia sought for adjudicating the following substantial questions of law: i. Whether Section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, is applicable to compensation payable for land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956? ii. Whether compensation payable for acquisition of land under the National Highways Act, 1956 is exempt from payment of income tax/TDS under the Income Tax Act, 1961?

The Hon'ble High Court, in its order, had answered both the questions in the favour of the petitioner and against the respondent/revenue by holding that Section 96 of the REFTLARR Act, 2013 is applicable to compensation payable for land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956, and consequently, the compensation payable for acquisition of land under the National Highways Act, 1956 is exempt from the payment of income tax or TDS under the Income Tax Act, 1961. For the sake of clarity, the observations of the Hon'ble High Court are culled out as under: “7.21 Viewed from this angle also, I am of the considered opinion that Section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act is applicable to compensation for land acquired under the N.H.Act and the said compensation is exempted from TDS/ payment of income tax under the I.T.Act and the impugned order deserves to be set aside on this score also.

22 A perusal of the impugned order will indicate that the respondent has come to the conclusion that in view of Section 105(1) of the RFCTLARR Act is not applicable to acquisition of land under the N.H.Act, which is excluded in the Fourth Schedule, since the land of the petitioner was acquired under the N.H.Act and not under the RFCTLARR Act.

23 As stated hereinbefore, I have already come to the conclusion that by virtue of the Three Ordinances, Removal of difficulties order, Notification, Correspondence etc., Section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act is applicable to compensation paid / payable for acquisition of land under the N.H.Act, as a result of which, the compensation would not be exigible to income tax and therefore, the obligation to comply with tax deduction at source would not arise and as such, the said findings recorded by the respondent deserves to be set aside.

24 Insofar as the findings recorded by the respondent in relation to the CBDT Circular No.36/2016 dated 25.10.2016 and applicability of Section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act is concerned, for the reason mentioned above, even the said finding recorded by the respondent in the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

25 A perusal of the impugned order will indicate that the respondent has misconstrued and misinterpreted the various statutory provisions, Ordinances, Orders, Notifications, Circulars etc., as well as the judgment of the Apex Court and this Court relied upon by the petitioner and has rejected the application by assigning wholly untenable reasons warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.

Points 1 and 2 are accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent-revenue by holding that Section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, is applicable to compensation payable for land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 and consequently, compensation payable for acquisition of land under the National Highways Act, 1956 is exempt from payment of income tax / TDS under the Income Tax Act, 1961."

At this stage, we may herein observe that the CBDT vide its Circular No. 36 of 2016, dated 25.10.2016, had clarified that the compensation received in respect of an award or agreement which had been exempt from levy of income tax u/s 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 shall also not be taxable under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, even if there is no specific provision for exempting such compensation therein. In fact, we find that in the aforesaid CBDT Circular no. 36 (supra), it has been clarified that, as no distinction has been made between the compensation received for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land and non-agricultural land in the matter of providing exemption under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, therefore, the exemption provided u/s 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 has wider scope than the tax exemption provided under the existing provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Rather the aforesaid issue had also been deliberated at length by the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in the case of PCIT, Asansol Vs. M/s. The Durgapur Projects Ltd., ITA No. 282 of 2022, dated 24.02.2023. It was observed by the Hon'ble High Court that as per Section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 no distinction has been made between compensation received for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land and non-agricultural land in the matter of providing exemption from income tax under the said Act.

Considering the aforesaid settled position of law, we principally concur with the Ld. AR that the compensation received on the compulsory acquisition of the land under the National Highways Act, 1956 would be exempt from levy of income tax. However, we cannot remain oblivion of the fact that the aforesaid contention has been raised by the assessee for the first time in the course of the proceedings before us. We thus, in terms of our aforesaid deliberations and in all fairness, set aside the matter to the file of the A.O. for the limited purpose of verifying the veracity of the factual matrix of the claim raised by the assessee. In case, the claim of the assessee that he had received the compensation on compulsory acquisition of his land under the National Highways Act, 1956 is found to be in order, then the A.O., based on our aforesaid deliberations is directed to hold the amounts so received by the assessee as exempt from levy of income tax u/s 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. 19. Before parting, we may herein observe that the assessee has also submitted that the subject agricultural lands which were compulsorily acquired do not fall within the meaning of a ‘capital asset' u/s 2(14)(iii) of the Act, i.e., neither situated within the juri iction of a municipality or cantonment board having a population of not less than ten thousand; nor within the notified area limits contemplated in Clause (b) of the said statutory provision, therefore, the compensation received was on the said count also not exigible to tax under the head “capital gains”. As the aforesaid issue had also been raised by the assessee for the first time before us, we direct the A.O. to verify the veracity of the factual position pertaining to the same. In case, the claim of the assessee that the subject agricultural lands are not a “capital asset" u/s 2(14)(iii) of the Act is found to be in order, then the compensation so received by him on the compulsory acquisition of the same shall for the said reason also not be liable to be brought to tax as his income under the head "capital gains".

We thus, in terms of our aforesaid deliberations, restore the matter to the file of the A.O. for fresh adjudication but for the limited purpose of carrying out necessary verifications in terms of our aforesaid observations. Needless to say, the A.O., shall in the course of the set- aside proceedings afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee who shall remain at liberty to substantiate his claim based on fresh documentary evidence, if any.

Resultantly, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the Open Court on 27th June, 2025. (एस. बालकृष्णन) (S. BALAKRISHNAN) लेखा सदस्य/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER (रवीश सूद) (RAVISH SOOD) न्यायिक सदस्य/JUDICIAL MEMBER Hyderabad, dated 27.06.2025. TYNM/sps आदेशकी प्रतिलिपि अग्रेषित/ Copy of the order forwarded to:- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. निर्धारिती/The Assessee राजस्व/ The Revenue The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Visakhapatnam विभागीयप्रतिनिधि, आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण, / DR, ITAT, Visakhapatnam. गार्डफ़ाईल / Guard file : Gangunaidu Sabbavarapu, Mallunaid Palem, Sabbavaram, Sabbavaram Mandal, Visakhapatnam 531035. : The Income Tax Officer, Ward – 2(5), Visakhapatnam. आदेशानुसार / BY ORDER", "summary": { "facts": "The assessee filed a revised return declaring Long Term Capital Gains (LTCG) from compulsory land acquisition. The CPC recomputed the capital gains. The assessee claimed exemption, stating the land was agricultural and acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956, hence exempt under RFCTLARR Act and not a capital asset. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal, citing juri ictional limitations.", "held": "The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It accepted the assessee's plea that compensation from compulsory acquisition of agricultural land under the National Highways Act, 1956, is exempt under Section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. The Tribunal also considered that the land might not be a 'capital asset' as per Section 2(14)(iii) of the Income Tax Act.", "result": "Allowed", "sections": [ "143(1)", "250", "96 of REFTLAR Act", "2(37) of Income-tax Act, 1961", "10(37) of Income-tax Act, 1961", "139(1)", "3E(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956", "105(1) of the RFCTLARR Act", "2(14)(iii)(a)", "2(14)(iii)(b)", "43B", "254", "31(3)(a)", "251(1)(a)", "Section 31", "Section 251(1)(a)", "Income-tax Act, 1961", "Section 2(14)(iii)" ], "issues": "Whether the compensation received for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land is exempt from income tax and if the land qualifies as a capital asset." } }