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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI „K‟ BENCH, MUMBAI
By way of this appeal, the Assessing Officer has challenged correctness of the order dated 29thFebruary, 2016 passed by the learned CIT(A)-56, Mumbai for the assessment year 2010-11.
Grievances raised by the Assessing Officer are as follows:
Assessment year: 2010-11 Page 2 of 6 "1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition or Rs. 71,78,913/-u/s. 145A, on account of cenvat credit in closing stock.
2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A)has erred in considering the LIBOR rate to benchmark the transaction of trade credits of AE, as the credits was related to currency PESO of Philippines.
3. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) not considering the analysis carried out by the TPO vide Para No. .4 of the order u/s 92CA(3) dated 31.12.2013 and considered the LIBOR has erred in rate to benchmark the transaction of trade credits of AE.
4. The appellant prays that the order of the ld CIT(A) on the above grounds be set aside and confirm the order of the AO.
When this appeal was called out for hearing, learned counsel for the assessee submitted that the present appeal of the Revenue needs to be dismissed on account of low tax effect in view of the recent CBDT Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019 whereby the monetary limits for filing the appeal by the Revenue before the Tribunal was enhanced from Rs.20 lakhs to Rs.50 lakhs. This instruction is applicable to the pending cases also. Therefore, the present appeal of the Revenue is liable to be dismissed as non-maintainable as held by this Tribunal in the case of ITO Vs. Dinesh Madhavlal Patel in for AY 1998-99 vide a consolidated order dated 14.08.2019.
The learned Departmental Representative fairly admitted that the tax effect involved in this appeal is less than the limit prescribed by the aforesaid CBDT Circular.
We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered facts of the case in the light of applicable legal position. As learned counsel rightly contends, this appeal of the Revenue is no longer maintainable in view of the recent CBDT Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019. The mandatory limit for cases in which Revenue can challenge the relief granted by the CIT(A) now stands enhanced to Rs.50 lakhs. This concession granted by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) is retrospective in effect inasmuch as it applies to all pending appeals as well. In view of the above position, the appeal of the Revenue is no longer maintainable and must be dismissed as such.
It is, however, made clear that on re-verification at the end of the Assessing Officer it comes out that the tax effect of more than Rs.50 lakhs is being involved in the appeal or the Assessment year: 2010-11 Page 3 of 6 appeal falls within the exemption clause of the Circular, then the Revenue will be at liberty to file Miscellaneous Application to recall the Tribunal order. The application should be filed within time limit prescribed in the Act.
However, before we part with the matter, we must deal with one procedural issue as well. While hearing of this appeal was concluded on 13th February 2020, these orders are being pronounced today on 13thday of July, 2020, much after the expiry of 90 days from the date of conclusion of hearing. We are also alive to the fact that rule 34(5) of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules 1963, which deals with pronouncement of orders, provides as follows:
(5) The pronouncement may be in any of the following manners :—
(a) The Bench may pronounce the order immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing. (b) In case where the order is not pronounced immediately on the conclusion of the hearing, the Bench shall give a date for pronouncement. (c) In a case where no date of pronouncement is given by the Bench, every endeavour shall be made by the Bench to pronounce the order within 60 days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Bench shall fix a future day for pronouncement of the order, and such date shall not ordinarily (emphasis supplied by us now) be a day beyond a further period of 30 days and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given on the notice board.
Quite clearly, “ordinarily” the order on an appeal should be pronounced by the bench within no more than 90 days from the date of concluding the hearing. It is, however, important to note that the expression “ordinarily” has been used in the said rule itself. This rule was inserted as a result of directions of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Shivsagar Veg Restaurant Vs ACIT [(2009) 317 ITR 433 (Bom)] wherein Their Lordships had, inter alia, directed that “We, therefore, direct the President of the Appellate Tribunal to frame and lay down the guidelines in the similar lines as are laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai (supra) and to issue appropriate administrative directions to all the benches of the Tribunal in that behalf.We hope and Assessment year: 2010-11 Page 4 of 6 trust that suitable guidelines shall be framed and issued by the President of the Appellate Tribunal within shortest reasonable time and followed strictly by all the Benches of the Tribunal. In the meanwhile (emphasis, by underlining, supplied by us now), all the revisional and appellate authorities under the Income-tax Act are directed to decide matters heard by them within a period of three months from the date case is closed for judgment”. In the ruled so framed, as a result of these directions, the expression “ordinarily” has been inserted in the requirement to pronounce the order within a period of 90 days. The question then arises whether the passing of this order, beyond ninety days, was necessitated by any “extraordinary” circumstances.
Let us in this light revert to the prevailing situation in the country. On 24th March, 2020, Hon’ble Prime Minister of India took the bold step of imposing a nationwide lockdown, for 21 days, to prevent the spread of Covid 19 epidemic, and this lockdown was extended from time to time. As a matter of fact, even before this formal nationwide lockdown, the functioning of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai was severely restricted on account of lockdown by the Maharashtra Government, and on account of strict enforcement of health advisories with a view of checking spread of Covid 19. The epidemic situation in Mumbai being grave, there was not much of a relaxation in subsequent lockdowns also. In any case, there was unprecedented disruption of judicial wok all over the country. As a matter of fact, it has been such an unprecedented situation, causing disruption in the functioning of judicial machinery, that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in an unprecedented order in the history of India and vide order dated 6.5.2020 read with order dated 23.3.2020, extended the limitation to exclude not only this lockdown period but also a few more days prior to, and after, the lockdown by observing that “In case the limitation has expired after 15.03.2020 then the period from 15.03.2020 till the date on which the lockdown is lifted in the jurisdictional area where the dispute lies or where the cause of action arises shall be extended for a period of 15 days after the lifting of lockdown”. Hon’ble Bombay High Court, in an order dated 15th April 2020, has, besides extending the validity of all interim orders, has also observed that, “It is also clarified that while calculating time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly”, and also observed that “arrangement continued by an order dated 26th March 2020 till 30th April 2020 shall continue further till 15th June
Assessment year: 2010-11 Page 5 of 6 2020”. It has been an unprecedented situation not only in India but all over the world. Government of India has, vide notification dated 19th February 2020, taken the stand that, the coronavirus “should be considered a case of natural calamity and FMC (i.e. force majeure clause) maybe invoked, wherever considered appropriate, following the due procedure…”. The term ‘force majeure’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, as „an event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled‟ When such is the position, and it is officially so notified by the Government of India and the Covid-19 epidemic has been notified as a disaster under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, and also in the light of the discussions above, the period during which lockdown was in force can be anything but an “ordinary” period.
In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon’ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon’ble Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed “while calculating the time for disposal of matters made time- bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly”. The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without the words “ordinarily”, in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Assessment year: 2010-11 Page 6 of 6 Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized, but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts of this case.
In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue stands dismissed. Order pronounced under rule 34(4) of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1962, by placing the details on the notice board.