IMAM AHMED RAZA EDUCATIONAL AND WELFARE TRUST,HAVERI vs. CIT (EXEMPTION) BANGALORE, BENGALURU

PER KESHAV DUBEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER:

& 411/Bang/2025 Imam Ahmed Raza Educational and Welfare Trust, Haveri Page 4 of 9 3. We have perused the details filed by the assessee by way of above affidavit to justify the delay and we are satisfied that there is sufficient cause without any malafide intention on the part of the assessee in filing the appeal belatedly before us. It is to be noted that u/s 253(5) of the Act, the Tribunal may admit the appeal filed beyond the period of limitation where it has established that there exists a sufficient cause on the part of the assessee for not presenting the appeals within the prescribed time. The explanation therefore, becomes relevant to determine whether the same reflect sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee in not filing this appeal within the prescribed time.

3.1 While considering a similar issue the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down six principles. For the purpose of convenience, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder:

(1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner.

(4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.

& 411/Bang/2025 Imam Ahmed Raza Educational and Welfare Trust, Haveri Page 5 of 9 (6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

3.2 When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of nondeliberate delay. Therefore, we have to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue. As observed by Apex Court, if the application of the assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalize injustice on technical ground when the Tribunal is capable of removing injustice and to do justice. Therefore, this Tribunal is bound to remove the injustice by condoning the delay on technicalities. If the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalizing an illegal order which would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the State by retaining the tax relatable thereto. Under the scheme of Constitution, the Government cannot retain even a single pie of the individual citizen as tax, when it is not authorized by an authority of law. Therefore, if we refuse to condone the delay, that would amount to legalize an illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the lower authority.

3.3 Further, in the case of People Education & Economic Development Society Vs/ ITO reported in 100 ITD 87 (TM) (Chen), wherein held that “when substantial justice and technical consultation are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay”.

3.4 The next question may arise whether delay was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when the reason stated by the assessee was a reasonable cause for not & 411/Bang/2025 Imam Ahmed Raza Educational and Welfare Trust, Haveri Page 6 of 9 filing the appeal. We have to see the cause for the delay. When there was a reasonable cause, the period of delay may not be relevant factor. In fact, the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596) considered the condonation of delay and held that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, the Madras High Court condoned nearly 21 years of delay in filing the appeal. When compared to 21 years, 149 days cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive. Furthermore, the Chennai Tribunal by majority opinion in the case of People Education and Economic Development Society (PEEDS) v. ITO (100 ITD 87) (Chennai) (TM) condoned more than six hundred days delay. Therefore, in our opinion, by preferring the substantial justice, the delay of 149 days for the AY 2024-25 for both the appeals have to be condoned and accordingly we condone the delay and admit the appeals for adjudication.

“Assessee has withdrawn the application in Form 10AB filed for approval u/s 80G(5)(iii) of the Act. In view of the above, the Form 10AB dated 1.2.2024 for approval u/s 80G(5)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is hereby rejected.”

10.1 The ld. DR on the other hand submitted that this appeal filed by the assessee is not maintainable as the assessee trust itself withdrew the application filed in form 10AB for registration u/s 12(1)(ac)(iii) of the Act.

11.1 Keeping in view of the above, since the assessee trust had itself withdrawn the application for grant of registration u/s 12(1)(ac)(iii) of the Act before the ld. CIT (Exemptions), therefore we are of the opinion that no cause of action arises to the assessee trust to prefer the present appeal before us. Accordingly, we held that the present appeal is not maintainable and hence dismissed.